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Abstract (nl-NL)
Het NWO-programma ”de maatschappelijke component van het genomics De-
bat”, heeft gepleit voor een versterking van de samenwerking en deliberatieve
betrokkenheid tussen de verschillende belanghebbenden van genomics. Dit pro-
gramma is door een projectgroep aan de Universiteit voor Humanistiek vertaald naar
een ‘lingua democratica’, dat onder meer onderzocht heeft aan welke voorwaarden
zulke deliberatieve inspanningen moeten voldoen.
De bijdrage aan dit programma dat in dit proefschrift is samengevat, heeft een
tamelijk abstracte invulling gegeven aan deze opdracht. Het doel was een methode
te ontwikkelen dat gedeeld kan worden door de verschillende belanghebbenden met
verschillende achtergronden, belangen en interesses voor welk complex thema dan
ook, hoewel genomics wel in focus bleef gedurende het onderzoek. Omdat ‘com-
plexiteitsdenken’ momenteel een thema is dat zowel in de natuurwetenschappen en
de sociale, en menswetenschappen aan belang wint, was complexiteit een kernbe-
grip om een dergelijke inclusieve benadering mogelijk te maken. Om te voorkomen
dat complexiteit echter gefragmenteerd raakt door disciplinaire begrenzingen, is het
essentieel dat die aspecten van complexiteit die steeds terugkomen in verschillende
debatten naar voren zouden worden gehaald, en benadrukt zouden worden tegen-
over de complexiteit van specialisatie. In dit proefschrift is beargumenteerd dat het
concept van ‘patroon’ hiervoor geldt, en patronen vormen dan ook de ruggengraat
van het vocabulaire dat ontwikkeld is. Met name terugkoppelingspatronen hebben
uitgebreide aandacht gekregen, omdat terugkoppeling essentieel is voor veel themas
rondom complexiteit.
Er is echter weinig methodologische (en filosofische) onderbouwing rondom ‘pa-
tronen’, en waarom ze doen wat ze doen. Daarom is vrij veel aandacht gegeven aan
de methodologische onderbouwing, en hoe patronen zich verhouden tot concepten
als ‘informatie’, ‘orde’ en ook complexiteit zelf.
Deze verkenningen liggen aan de basis van de ontwikkeling van de meth-
ode, dat ook praktische handvaten geeft om deze te gebruiken. Dit heeft de vorm
aangenomen van een bibliotheek van patronen, dat disciplinaire grenzen kan ontsti-
jgen, beginnend bij technologische gebieden, via biologische, psychologische en
sociale, om uiteindelijk bij een thema dat kenmerkend is voor de menswetenschap-
pen. Deze reis over de scheidslijn tussen de ‘twee culturen’, zoals beschreven is
door C.P. Snow, is zowel een proeve voor een lingua democratica, als dat het beoogt
duidelijk te maken wat er gebeurt bij de overgang van dergelijke disciplinaire gren-
zen.
Als laatste is de aanpak op een hele praktische wijze toegepast, rond een thema
dat sterk beı¨nvloedt wordt door huidige ontwikkelingen in genomics, namelijk de
trans-humanistiche visies van de toekomst.
4Abstract (en-UK)
The NWO-programme ”the societal aspects of genomics”, has called for stronger
means of collaboration and deliberative involvement between the various stakehold-
ers of genomics research. Within the project group assembled at the University for
Humanistics, this call was translated to the ‘lingua democratica’, in which the pre-
requisites of such deliberative efforts were put to scrutiny.
The contribution of this thesis has taken a more or less abstract angle to this task,
and sought to develop a vocabulary that can be shared amongst various stakeholders
with different backgrounds, interests and stakes for any complex theme, although
genomics has more or less been in focus throughout the research. As ‘complexity
thinking’ is currently a theme in both the ‘hard’ sciences as the social sciences
and the humanities, and has always been an issue for professionals, this concept
was pivotal in achieving such an inclusive angle. However, in order to prevent that
complexity would become fragmented due to disciplinary boundaries, it is essential
that those aspects of complexity that seem to return in many discussions would be
made clear, and stand out with respect to the complexities of specialisation. The
thesis has argued that the concept of ‘patterns’ applies for these aspects, and they
form the backbone of the vocabulary that has been developed. Especially patterns
of feedback have been given much attention, as this concept is pivotal for many
complex themes.
However, although patterns are implicitly or explicitly used in many areas, there
is little methodological (and philosophical) underpinning of what they are and why
they are able to do what they do. As a result, quite some attention has been given
to these issues, and how they relate to concepts such as ‘information’,‘order’ and
complexity itself.
From these explorations, the actual vocabulary was developed, including the
methodological means to use this vocabulary. This has taken the shape of a re-
cursive development of a so-called pattern-library, which has crossed disciplinary
boundaries, from technological areas, through biology, psychology and the social
sciences, to a topic that is typical of the humanities. This journey across the divide
of C.P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’ is both a test for a lingua democratica, as well as
aimed to demonstrate how delicate, and balanced such a path must be in order to be
effective, especially if one aims to retain certain coherence along the way.
Finally, the methodology has been applied in a very practical way, to a current
development that hinges strongly on research in genomics, which is trans-humanist
movement.
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Part I
Preparing a Workshop of Complexity

Chapter 1
A lingua democratica. An Introduction
This book is about conflicts. Not conflicts in the regular sense of the word, those
that are associated with problems and strife, but conflicts that enable creation and
progress. My supervisor, prof. dr. H. Kunneman tends to call this ‘creative friction’
to describe similar conflicts in the humanities.1
The phrase captures an opposition; creation in its essence ‘enabling change’,
while friction is associated with constraints and limitations. Thus I begin this thesis
with two words that are almost a paradox, an ideal starting point for an argumenta-
tion that is full of creation and constraint, and which will fill the rest of this book.
1 Background
The research that led to this book, is the result of a joint research project ‘The So-
cietal Component of Genomics Research’ (SCGR),i that was initiated by the NWO,
the Dutch organisation for scientific research. The aim of the programme was to
ensure that proper scientific attention was given to the societal and ethical conse-
quences of genomics that, in the view of the initiators, tends to be strongly focused
on the technological aspects.
Genomics is a term that covers genetically modified corn, Dolly the cloned sheep
and Herman the transgenic bull. It includes medically changing human genes to
repair illnesses and psychiatric diseases, and even to extend human life expectancies
and prevent aging. These issues raise concerns of a deep, ethical and philosophical
nature, which should not be left entirely in the hands of technologists, policy makers
and corporations.2
The University for Humanistics in Utrecht (UH), the Netherlands, couldn’t agree
more with this viewpoint, and therefore applied for a number of projects within
this programme that were put under the umbrella of the proposal ‘Towards a lingua
democratica for the public debate on genomics’, under the supervision of prof. Peter
Derkx. The ‘lingua democratica’ aimed to look at interactions between the stake-
holders of genomics –governments, NGO’s, corporations, scientists, and so on—
that would stimulate mutual understanding and dialogue on the various viewpoints
that these stakeholders take.3
Harry Kunneman, who participated with a research project in the group, was an
influential driving force in the preparation of the projects. When he heard about
my graduation thesis which described a formal model of symbiosis, he invited me
to join the project, and thus a self-proclaimed geek, with a background in electro-
technics and computer science, ended up amongst sociologists, philosophers and
i or in Dutch: MCG
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other humanities researchers with a focus on humanistics.4
My participation, which took shape in the research proposal ‘the complexity of
genomics’ therefore was, and is, in many aspects a crazy experiment to bring a
dedicated software engineer into the world of humanities researchers. Harry wanted
to include contributions from representatives of the ‘hard’ sciences into a debate that
is predominantly characterised by the humanities talking about (the consequences
of) technology, while the practitioners of technology are close to being a non-entity
in these debates. Sure, there are a lot of scientists with a broader interest than just
their research. and there are technologists who become philosophers, and sometimes
(though rarely, I believe) it may even be the other way round. However, I feel that
the majority of technological practitioners do not really involve themselves with the
‘societal aspects’ of the technology they work with, simply because they have other
things on their mind. The ‘societal aspects of technology’ is an abstract concept
that may sometimes present itself in the newspapers, an article in a journal, or a
bestseller in non-fiction that was picked up from a bookstore on the way to a holiday
destination.
I thought that I would want to represent this archetypal group of professionals,
who are not so sure whether philosophy and ethics provide real answers to the com-
plex problems of contemporary life; who use theory pragmatically and do not see it
as a panacea for our understanding of our world. Most of all, I wanted to represent
people who think that theory without action is of limited use, an academic past-time
at best.
Thus, by inviting me in the team, Harry saw an opportunity for ‘creative friction’ in
action. With my Frisian roots that are commonly associated with personality traits
being somewhere in-between headstrong and downright stubborn, I think that I have
not failed him on this issue.
Having said that, problems are not solved by creating and describing archetypal
stakeholders, and so the question that remained was how these sceptical techno-
logical professionals could be reached by those who concern themselves with the
‘societal aspects of technology’. Realising that I would be in a privileged situation
for the coming five years to fully submerge myself in this issue, I decided to stick
to my professional self, and start to read the work of social theorists, philosophers,
ethicists and so on, and just ask myself the question ‘does it make sense?’ If it did,
the obvious following question would be ‘why?’, if it didn’t –you guessed it— ‘why
not?’ This, in a nutshell, is my ‘theoretical framework’. I think it doesn’t get more
pragmatic than that!5
The resulting lateral approach to science and philosophy in the broadest sense, re-
vealed that many heated debates on all kinds of topics actually often seem to boil
down to a few related issues. There are certain patterns in these controversies, some
of which –at a sufficiently abstract level— seemed surprisingly common to mod-
elling issues in software engineering, where they are usually considered ‘interesting
approaches’ rather than intellectual quarrels. If there was a ‘lingua democratica’
somewhere, it might be found just there!
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For instance, research on complex systems in software engineering has made it
more and more clear that actor-environment interactions are often surprisingly com-
plex. This complexity is tackled with enthusiasm and pleasure, for instance when
designing self-learning robots who have to do something in their environment, such
as survey the landscape of Mars, or play a game of soccer against other robots.
Now just consider the surprise one feels if one has such a background, and then has
to delve into the deeply serious, and sometimes gravely angry debates between some
biologists and social scientists, for instance on how genes affect human behaviour
and/or the other way round[124].
Instead of discussions on who is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, the happy-go-lucky engineer
just thinks ‘aha, feedback!’ and takes it from there.
This provided one possible angle to the ‘lingua democratica’. Instead of ‘taking
sides’, it was a matter of looking into these discussions and take a sort of ‘helicopter
view’ to see if maybe a more inclusive angle could be found. In fact, this is often
rather easy, as many debates are currently already losing their sharper edges. Im-
proved modelling tools –especially the computer— and relentless scientific progress
are already edging theories away from the era of simple explanations for complex
phenomena. In fact, it would seem that complexity itself is becoming the banner that
is uniting many islands of science, as the word seems to be popping up everywhere.
For that reason –and also because I have above average experience with complex
technical systems— I decided to make complexity the ‘cloth-hanger’ theme of this
particular contribution to the lingua democratica.
There is also a practical reason for this, as complexity seems to be a sufficiently
neutral theme to be acceptable in both the sciences and the humanities, and there-
fore might be a good starting point for a ‘lingua democratica’.
The other opening I had to investigate was my own professional background.
Technological education tends to be packed with formal and mathematical tools that
are presented ready to be used. As a consequence, the names of their inventors or
discoverers and the historical context in which they were developed are sometimes
given little attention. This also means that sometimes we technologists identify our-
selves with ideas that trickle through our curricula and become part of that what we
consider ‘obvious’, while at another level of our research –or our daily lives for that
matter— these implicit ideas are not used, or are even contradicted.
The use of logic and formalism is one of the more striking examples; despite their
importance for our professional selves, I have never met any techie whose person-
ality even remotely approximates that of Spock, the Vulcan from Star Trek. As a
result, I can only conclude that apparently some things — such as ‘facts’ — are
important only in a certain setting, and therefore it might be important to reconsider
these implicit ideas and mindsets if one enters a different field of enquiry.
Lastly, I wanted to do something practical with the notion of ‘lingua democrat-
ica’. As I made headway in my research, also in the purely technical work on com-
plexity that I am still doing, it became more and more clear to me that many distinc-
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tions, such as between science, philosophy, methodology and practicality, are often
tremendously limiting. We, as human observers, may desperately cling to such dis-
tinctions, but complexity just weaves its own web of relationships and does not tend
to be overly impressed with categorisations and thematisations. As a result, I could
just as well stubbornly refuse to accept a singular attitude towards complexity. This
way I would be able to do justice not only to various stakeholder positions, but also
to ‘balance out’ claim with counterclaim from a much larger repertoire of view-
points.
Having read a vast number of mainly theoretical works by now, I have come to the
conclusion that practicality is often intellectuality’s best friend; the one that dares to
say what the latter does not want to hear.
So I decided I would try to make a book about an extremely abstract subject,
namely ‘complexity’ in as accessible a way as I could possibly manage. I figured
that if I could myself get interested people from various stakeholder domains to
think ‘hey, that makes sense’ on a subject that is as vague and maybe even illusory
as ‘complexity’, then I would have achieved something of a ‘lingua democratica’
myself.
A ‘lateral’, cross-academic approach in research holds the extreme risk of being
attacked from all sides, and so there is some danger in my aims.ii However, I can
also accept this as being inevitable, and that this stance also can give me the ‘aca-
demic freedom’ that is often sought for and just as often challenged by interests,
expectations, publication pressure and culture[72].
1.1 Complexity!
A few words have now been introduced rather informally; ‘(creative) friction’, ‘lin-
gua democratica’, ‘patterns’ and ‘complexity’. Then there are ‘stakeholders’, ‘ge-
nomics’, ‘debate’, ‘engineers’ and ‘humanisticans’. These words, or rather concepts,
are going to be more or less connected into a web of relationships in the coming
chapters, in which ‘complexity’ is the spider that is feeling the silk for every new
concept that hits the sticky threads. ‘Complexus’ is Latin for ‘that what is woven
together’,6 so the metaphorical image of a spider seems rather appropriate. It does
mean, however, that I am already moving away from a standard scientific treatise,
that begins with an introduction, moves towards a theory, methodology or a frame-
work, and ends at certain conclusions. That is way too linear; complexity just does
not work that way.
As I hope to argue in more detail later, and following others who have drawn
similar conclusions, complexity is proclaiming the end of an agenda to come to an
all-encompassing body of knowledge, based on a minimal amount of theoretical un-
derpinnings. This agenda is being consulted less anyway.7 There may still be a few
ii Currently, the technical papers I write will always end up having one or two peer reviewers
considering it ‘too philosophical’ for their liking...
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pockets of resistance, but most of science has come to the conclusion that the fa-
mous witticism that ‘the more we know, the less we actually know’ may actually be
true. Fragmentation of knowledge is all around us; ‘specialists seem to know every-
thing about nothing, while generalists know nothing about everything’, as another
famous witticism goes. The specialist will tend to say ‘It’s complex! Give me more
time!’, while the generalist will say ‘Everything’s complex! It’s no use!’.8
However, complexity is more subtle than this. Complexity suggests –as Grandma
used to say— that ‘the truth is somewhere in the middle’; in a friction space where
stakeholders, engineers, humanities researchers, debates, genomes and many other
concepts, are rubbing against each other. In fact, the number of these interactions
seems to be on the rise, while the friction space seems to have stopped expanding
ever since humankind became globalised. The complex world we currently live in
also includes concepts such as ‘global warming’, ‘oil’, ‘credit crisis’, ‘radical Is-
lam’, ‘depletion of natural resources’, and ‘Western capitalist society’.
It would seem that everything is complex, and no matter how much time is spent
on research and theorising, we will only be scratching surfaces and not get to the
heart of things. Intellectual endeavours are local, provisional, and temporal; they are
islands of knowledge, fragmentary and often isolated!
But complexity is also more than just scratched surface; that would also be too
simple! A complex world is not necessarily a harsh world –raw maybe, in the sense
that it can be beautiful and dangerous, unforgiving and mild, closed and open; the
surface is sloped and steep with high tablelands and deep crevasses. And in these
crevasses of complexity, sometimes we may see a glimpse of a deeper structure, a
glimpse of some kind of order. These form the patterns I was talking about, and
my claim here is that they, although not exclusively, can make the connections be-
tween fragmented theories or amongst pockets of knowledge. Patterns are yet an-
other common term from the weaver’s vocabulary, and so they seem a natural ally
to complexus. According to Wikipedia:
A pattern, from the French ”patron”, is a type of theme of recurring events or objects [...]
If knowledge tends to fragmentation, then patterns may just be one of the possi-
ble means to weave the patchwork together. Thus these patterns help to shape the
maps along which a ‘lingua democratica’, amongst any stakeholders in any debate,
might just be possible. Therefore this thesis will concentrate on patterns rather than
theories.
These patterns do not reveal themselves easily, they require a different way of
looking than may have been customary in science, and I would argue, in philosophy
as well, as both were born of theory. Patterns, as I will argue later, are children of
the craftspeople, of practices. Hence the metaphor of the spider; the patron of the
weavers.
Patterns are hidden in the vocabulary of professionals who have to act with finite
means in finite time. Theories tend to be for the in-crowd, for elites, while pat-
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terns are meant to be communicated and shared. As theory has become ever more
dominant in the professional’s daily work, alternative vocabularies that shape their
practices have sometimes receded to the background, but in some areas they are
currently also resurfacing, especially when dealing with complex themes. Patterns
are more ‘streetwise’ than theories are; they are less refined, but therefore also more
accessible for a wider audience.
Theory traditionally relies heavily on observation and reasoning, while crafts-
manship rather relies on touch and formation. Observation tends to focus, to distin-
guish, to make crisp and to differentiate. Tactile senses, on the other hand, are less
precise, but also more subtle. Observation tends to distance, while the tactile draws
near, in the way a potter handles the lump of clay in front of her.
Patterns, as we will see, follow the crafts, of making things from undetermined
substance, from coarse to fine. Patterns are not a means of theorising, but a means
of modelling. And the lump of clay in front of us at the moment is aimed to become
a model of a ‘lingua democratica’.
1.2 A lingua democratica
If a ‘lingua democratica’ finds itself in some sort of conceptual friction space, then
the first question is what this yet undefined term is in friction with? The most ob-
vious candidate would be a lingua franca, a ‘common language’ that can be shared
amongst the stakeholders in the genomics debate. This differentiation is directly re-
lated to the NWO programme. Initially, the ideas of the programme committee were
aimed at finding a lingua franca between the various stakeholders in the genomics
debate; companies, governments, consumers, NGOs, research labs, etc. In order to
address the challenges and contingencies of current developments in genome re-
search, this common language would allow them to become partners rather than
factions. In the words of the opening statement of the proposal:
The furtherance of reflexivity, responsibility and broad participation with regard to the de-
velopment of genomics are important themes in the call for proposals for the program ‘The
Social Components of Genomics Research (SCGR)’. This democratic intention underlying
the program is specified in terms of the desirability of a lingua franca which could promote
interactions between the wide range of scientific disciplines involved in genomics research
and could help to bridge the gap between the specialist languages of the scientists involved
and the concerns of the wider public. This proposal aims to contribute to the realization of
these democratic intentions of the SCGR-program by elaborating the concept of a lingua
democratica for genomics. This concept is inspired by the notion of a lingua franca and
shares its focus on the role of language in the reflection on genomics, but introduces a more
complex perspective on the interaction of the parties involved [142].
At the University for Humanistics, the participants who were preparing a proposal
for this programme realised, for different reasons, that language itself is a highly
complex form of interaction, and an ambiguous one at that. There is little reason
to believe that language will unite stakeholders with different interests and inten-
tions if there is no incentive or motivation to do so. So the group decided to go one
level deeper, to the motivations, desires and intentions themselves, to the underlying
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metaphors that shape the different vocabularies, and the values and world-views that
the various stakeholders host:
The notion of a lingua franca presupposes a shared language between the parties involved
which would allow them to transcend the different world views and presuppositions em-
bodied in their respective local languages. However, these ‘local languages’ are not only
characterized by different presuppositions with regard to the many complex issues involved
in the debates on genomics, but also express divergent legitimate interests. Instead of trying
to transcend these divergent interests by means of a hypothetical lingua franca, this program
aims to elaborate the idea of a lingua democratica for genomics [142].
A ‘lingua democratica’ moves away from a ‘lingua franca’ through its abstinence
of any aim to construct a language that various stakeholders would have to abide to,
and rather directs attention to interactions as means to bridge some gaps between
the various stakeholders of current and future developments in the field of genomics:
In such a lingua democratica the differences between the central presuppositions and core
concepts of the parties involved are seen as a legitimate expression of the complexity of the
questions at stake. Given this complexity the communication and interaction between the
different stakeholders involved can be improved by respecting the differences but looking
at the same time for conceptual ‘interfaces’ and points of connection between the central
concerns and presuppositions of the different languages [142].
The interesting point that is made is, that under the often raging surface of the stormy
waters of rhetoric, propaganda, and (other) language games, there may be undercur-
rents that allow ‘points of connection’. For a linguistically oriented species as us
humans, we may not always be aware of the limitations and pitfalls of language as
a means of expressing and sharing beliefs, desires and intentions. It may even be
that, up to a certain extent, language may be blinding the fact that opposing par-
ties, while bobbing up and down the waves of their preferred positions, are in fact
drifting along on the same currents, sufficiently far apart to be aware of each others
differences, yet oblivious to the tug of a shared direction.
The focus on these undercurrents in the spheres of interactions allows emotions,
presuppositions, interests and other sentiments to take their place in the spotlight, as
recognition that they are part of our biological and social behaviour. As a result:
These languages themselves do not have a unitary character, but exhibit different variants,
some more closed and ‘self-centered’, others more open towards interaction and possible
connections with the concerns and presuppositions of other languages involved in the de-
bates on genomics [142].
This leads to the central theme of the proposal:
This program aims to elucidate the notion of a lingua democratica for genomic and con-
tribute to its development by identifying and elaborating ‘interaction-prone’ dialects of the
language of four central parties to the debates on genomics: scientists, NGOs, international
corporations and representatives of religious and humanist world views. More in particular
the program focuses on variants of these languages offering opportunities for public delib-
eration and democratic debate with regard to the many pressing questions connected with
the development of genomics [142].
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For the purposes here, this translates to a search for constructive patterns of inter-
action. If these can be identified, then they may offer possibilities of adjusting the
‘language games’ towards cooperation.9 On the other hand, if there are no possibil-
ities of cooperation, then a lingua franca will be of little use anyway.
Genomics is not unique, in the sense that a novel technology has far-reaching
implications for us humans, or the world we live in. I personally consider the emer-
gence of the Internet and the world-wide web as a good example of this in our recent
past. The Internet was not only a technological revolution, but has had an enormous
impact on how we organise our lives and our inter-social relationships.
But the NWO realised that the ethical and normative consequences of genomics
may be more severe than any technological revolution we have faced so far, and the
UH is also deeply aware of the implications of this new development. The Internet
may have brought up issues, such as virtual relationships, spam, distributed social
networks and ‘abuse by MSN’, but the genomics group at the UH is looking into
matters such as artificially extending our life expectancy [57], engineering human
intelligence [91], or examining the ethical consequences of ecological destruction
[135]. Such topics push ‘extreme makeovers’ to the extreme, and we are far from
knowing what the impact is on our lives or that of our descendants. Progress is a
raging bull thundering along its rigid path and leaving us little to grab and grasp on,
but meanwhile treading on and trampling on our ethical presuppositions and ideals
on its rampage.
But there is something strange about this raging bull, for it is a bull that is us,
as collective of human agents. We create it by all our individual endeavours, our
dreams and intentions and yet now it often appears as if it has got a life of its own
and is feeding on our differences and oppositions. But do not these differences and
oppositions originate inside ourselves?
At the time of writing in 2006, a United States president with a life-long back-
ground in the oil industry presented a ‘State of the Union’ in which he addressed
the addiction of the United States to oil [32] and the associated risks this has for our
planet, while only a few years earlier he refused to ratify the Kyoto protocol to limit
global warming of our planet. In all honesty, we do not need to analyse the intentions
of a United States president and his staff to know that the origin of such oppositions
are ultimately inside us all. We all know the difference between our ideals and our
actions, of the frictions between short term and long term goals. Consider the sheer
complexity when the frictions of well over six billion other people are taken into
account, with their own backgrounds, cultures, languages and so on.
If one aims to look for ‘points of connection’, then the various ”system theories”,
that have matured in the latter half of the previous century seem to be an especially
good starting point for a lingua democratica. Here is an opening for analytical re-
flection, based on methodology and insights that are being developed in the ‘hard’
(or natural) sciences, but is enforced through the interdisciplinary crossovers with
disciplines that traditionally are rooted in the social sciences and the humanities. It
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is here that some tools may be found which can describe phenomena that are more
or less in the latter’s vocabulary, in terms of one that is more ‘attuned’ for tech-
nologists, and the other way round. If we can at least create some form of ‘pidgin
language’ between technology and society, then at least the stakeholders may know
better about what they are disagreeing on.10
This is also an area where an engineer can ‘interface’ with contributors from hu-
manist philosophy and ethics, biology and sociology, and participate in the micro-
cosmos of a lingua democratica of the research programme ‘The Social Components
of Genomics Research’. For indeed our research group at the UH is a micro-cosmos
of this friction!
For the time being, we can say that the ‘lingua democratica’ aims for a delib-
erative and co-operative means of interaction between different stakeholders. With
this, two questions immediately pop up. Why should this be pursued, and how can it
be done? Ideally one should aim to go beyond those often rather tasteless options,
to ‘agree to disagree’ or ‘respect different points of view’, for these may be true, but
say little on how — and why— often opposing factions should take the effort to find
a middle ground. On a similar vein, a lingua democratica should be put to test with
stakeholders who, generally speaking, have little patience with each other. By now,
I have read too many well-meant calls for mutual respect and understanding, while
by-passing the most pressing problem of stakeholders who just cannot get along,
both intellectually as well as practically.
As an example, I have by now met quite a few humanities thinkers who are just
appalled by the idea that ‘those scientists’ do not seem to understand that knowledge
is multi-interpretable, subjective and relativistic.
This may all be true, but then why does mathematics work so well for the tremen-
dously large as well as the extremely minute in our known universe, and quite a lot
of things in-between? Why is solid scientific research steadily progressing into the
neuro-sciences and biology?
It is almost impossible to even start reading a thick book on any topic, if the in-
troduction already takes certain biased positions that raises these questions without
accounting for them. If an author claims from the start that genomics is hazardous,
then s/he will almost immediately loose those who see the possibilities and opportu-
nities that this new technology offers. And this group includes quite a lot of people
who are actually shaping gen tech!
It will be clear that such differences are quite interesting for a lingua democratica,
and the ‘helicopter view’ may already reveal that these differences occur because all
the parties involved are somewhat naive with respect to the contributions and cul-
tures of the other domains. Normally this isn’t really problematic —or it doesn’t
show—, unless these parties experience friction from each other. And so the ques-
tion becomes how and why this happens?
These issues will be detailed further at a later stage, but I can already reveal that
concerning the lingua democratica, I think, the ‘why’ question relates to the theme
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of complexity, and the ‘how’ question to the ‘patterns’ that were succinctly intro-
duced earlier.
On a last note here, I will disclose why I prefer ‘friction’ (from Latin fricare:
rub, chafe) over ‘tension’ (from Latin tendere: stretch, pull, tighten), which is an-
other mechanical metaphor that is often used to describe struggles between societal
groups. In physics, ‘tension’ is usually reserved for two poles that are ultimately
connected, like the ends of a stretched rubber band. Tension thus refers to an im-
possibility of the poles to move away from each other. Friction refers to entities that
move in each others’ sphere of influence and interact. This more closely resembles
the issues that will be focused on here.11
2 On Engineering
The NWO hosted a conference on November 29th 2006 to bring together all the
researchers of the programme ‘NWO-Societal Component of Genomics Research’
of which this research is a contribution [271]. The central thesis of this particular
conference was ‘alpha-beta’ interaction, a very continental European expression to
describe the friction between the humanities and the ‘hard’ (or natural) sciences. In
fact, some of the projects concentrate on this topic and so we were entertained by a
few contributions of participatory research in laboratories and the likes. I had been
reading about a number of similar research activities, which are worthwhile and in-
teresting,iii but I couldn’t help seeing a recurrent pattern, which took the shape of
social scientists observing the mannerisms of hard scientists.iv It struck me that the
reverse approach is hardly ever undertaken.12
What about the stories of those who are actually submerged in the complexity of
performing technology? And how would social scientists and humanities thinkers
respond if an outsider would be glaring at their research, interactions, theories and
disputes? I had become sufficiently ‘enlightened’ by now to know that ‘those sci-
entists’ were often considered ‘reductionist’, in some ways ‘naive’, and otherwise
apparently falling short of certain standards. By now I could sympathise with some
of these complaints which had been popping up at regular intervals in my profes-
sional career, but my problem was always that these criticisms also often fell short
somewhere and I just couldn’t get a grip on the fact that it did not inspire me to
do something with it. Actually, the more I thought about it, the more I came to the
conclusion that it is often impossible!
Take the critique of ‘reductionism’ for instance. Coarsely and barbariously stated,
the criticism usually considers scientific approaches to often take a complex system
apart, but by doing so they take away the complexity itself. It is like a surgeon re-
moving the skeleton, organs, veins and skin of a number of human subjects and then
saying; ”Well, a human being consists of skeleton, organs, veins and skin, and with-
iii often also very funny and revealing
iv or ‘betas’ taking up this observer position
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out exception they’re also always quite dead!”13
Being an engineer myself, reductionism is not really part of my vocabulary. This
does not mean that engineers are not acquainted with reductionism — they are—
, but it is a tool rather than an ideology, and thus a lot of these gravely serious
debates seem somewhat alien. Besides this, nowadays many engineering disciplines,
especially those who concentrate on computer modelling —as this is in high demand
everywhere—, are collaborating with many other scientific disciplines and despite
the inevitable organisational hierarchies, the attitudes that often seem go with them,
and good-natured teasing amongst colleagues of different vocation, these factions
seem a bit, well..., outdated!
It is very hard then, to respond to accusations of the reductionism of ‘those
scientists’ by humanities thinkers who seem to base these accusations on Rene´
Descartes and Francis Bacon, and seem to forget the inevitable diversity of cul-
tures, approaches and mindsets within science itself, from individuals to the various
sub-disciplines. The problem here is, of course, that these accusations are them-
selves often based on reductionist arguments, and the really interesting question is
therefore never asked: when does reductionism become a problem?14
Probably the most irritating discovery I made was that a lot of these criticisms
on ‘those scientists’ are actually not intended for the target audience. I would hear
them on conferences or read them in article journals that were targeted for human-
ities forums, and not the scientists themselves. This is, of course, partially due to
the disinterest of scientists, but even more so because the argumentations were built
up from a vocabulary that requires an extensive knowledge on historical figures and
societal developments. As I said, theory tends to be elitist, which is okay, but fails
miserably when one’s aim is to bring a message across to a different stakeholder
domain. In all honesty, I often think that this is not the intention at all, and all these
specialists were raising their concerns for the converted, with a convenient ‘evil
other’ to close the ranks!
What really is surprising is these humanities intellectuals, who dedicate their
lives to understanding the human being in all its facets, seem to have a blind spot
for how all this knowledge affects their own behaviour and shapes their own ideas
on a certain topic in the most practical sense possible. Sure there are extensive theo-
retical treatises on the ‘problem of self-referentiality’, but apparently the pattern of
‘preaching for the converted’ is often overlooked as a practical consequence of such
self-referential dynamics. But then, maybe, it takes an engineer to see mismatches
between theories and practices. Probably engineers may find more natural allies in
anthropologists and other disciplines in the social sciences who are accustomed to
critically reflecting theories against practical settings.
So here it was! What would be the effect if I would turn the tables and look at
all the theories, ideas and argumentations from the humanities from a very technical
stance? How does their criticism hold from this ‘outsider’s perspective’ and what
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would they really contribute to? I was not particularly a big fan of the intellectual
sources of the humanities such as philosophy, nor was I opposed to them; in many
ways I was just a blank slate and so I could put the strength of the amateur into play
here. And in a multi-stakeholder environment, the amateur’s perspective —fresh,
somewhat naive, and above all enthusiastic— may just be the most effective one!
I realised that this was, in fact, where I had positioned myself when I, as a soft-
ware engineer, took on this ‘project’ of the lingua democratica. What would be
outcome if the ‘society’ of ‘stakeholders of genomics’ were described with tools
and concepts from engineering and related areas? Most engineers will only apply
their implicit knowledge to solve the problems they face. Far less do they share their
models, approaches and methodologies outside engineering, let alone reflect on the
impact that their ‘best practices’ could have for other areas.
Engineering is, in essence, one of the arts that perform in complexity, and where
the tools and means have developed to deal with this. If I could be able to translate
the knowledge that is being obtained in this discipline about dealing with and acting
in a severely complex environment, I could open a window of opportunity for others
to gain insight about the ‘why’ of our positions.
As I was asked by the UH to introduce the perspectives of the ‘hard sciences’ to ‘the
societal component of the genomics research’, I decided then and there that I would
not aim to become a half-turf humanist philosopher whose dealings with Nietzsche,
Wittgenstein or Kant are all but through their writing. Instead I would embrace my
training and professional background and daringly position this knowledge in a ‘so-
cietal’ setting. This would allow me to position myself in a ‘creative friction space’
that might help me to understand where at least some of the problems between tech-
nology and society emerge, maybe pinpoint the moments and places when friction
grazes the skin.
Harry, my supervisor, was immediately enthusiastic about this idea, as he saw
such a contribution as an interesting attempt to bridge the gap between the hard
sciences and the humanities from the position of one of the ‘hard’ sciences. How-
ever, such attempts will never fully achieve their purpose if there were no similar
contributions from the other side, and so he considered possible thinkers from the
humanities that I could ‘connect’ with. This hardly proved a challenge, for there are
various dialects of system theories, in especially the social sciences, and also in the
humanities, where a number of theorists have adopted concepts such as ‘systems’,
‘networks’, ‘complexity’ and other terms that are oddly familiar to an engineer. The
big question then becomes whether they actually mean the same?
And so we decided that I would delve into my twenty-five years of experience as
an engineer to find things that could reasonably be linked to these theorists as well
as the concept of the lingua democratica.
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2.1 Agile Argumentation
Up to now, I have started with a raw sketch of the lingua democratica. There are
many issues that need to be clarified and put in a proper scientific context. There is
yet another friction, between ‘too much’ and ‘too little’ and I will not deny that at
this point the tendency strongly tends towards the latter.
There is a reason for this, and this is actually derived from a programming tech-
nique that has become quite popular in the last ten or so years. The relationship
between a research thesis on the lingua democratica and (object oriented) program-
ming is that both provide descriptions of complexity. Software programmes describe
complex software applications in formal and mathematical constructs, while this
thesis uses natural language to describe ‘stakeholders’ and their mutual interactions.
Yet both need to interface with users. In the case of software development, the users
are quite clear; they are the ones who use the programmes (and therefore to some
extent need to understand them). The readers of this thesis can be considered the
users in the case of my current endeavour for the UH.
Most academic enterprises implicitly assume communication with peers who are
more or less knowledgeable in similar or related areas. This inherently drives spe-
cialisation, as a lot of contextual information is supposed to be present, and the
scientific contributions to that area are meant to further the understanding of that
research area.
I cannot make this assumption in the case of a lingua democratica. Here we
are dealing with communications across various stakeholders with their own ideas,
cultures and framing, and it may not be expected of them that they are deeply ac-
quainted with the ideas and mindsets of others. There are dilettantes, amateurs, pro-
fessionals and experts, and many people are experts in one domain, and dilettantes
in others. All have their stakes in technology and therefore deserve to be taken seri-
ously. In this case, the strength of being an amateur may be utilised better, for often
the ‘curse of knowledge’ will obfuscate rather than clarify.15
This same problem has been identified in software development and one particu-
lar method to address this is called ‘agile development’ [104]. In order to appreciate
this way of development, one needs to understand how software development has
evolved in the past twenty years or so, and so I will try to give a brief historical
account of this first.
As software engineering is strongly related to, well, engineering, it was quite un-
derstandable that the methodology of software development was initially strongly
associated with other engineering practices. This included writing detailed speci-
fications of the things that needed to be developed.v In software, this approach re-
v preferably agreed upon and signed by the customer to prevent legal claims when the end product
was delivered
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sulted in extensive documentation prior to coding, that aimed to fully and completely
describe the products that had to be made.vi
However, this approach did not prove to be failsafe. For one, it was argued that
in its extreme, this approach resulted in ‘software code that was described in spec-
ification documents’. The specification documents basically coded the application
in natural language and so it did not contribute to anything new. To make this claim
even stronger, natural language is too ambiguous for coding purposes, and so basi-
cally this approach was considered a deterioration of programming. The same work
was done twice, and in one case done with inferior supportive tools for the program-
mer.
But software has another trait that makes it distinctly different from other en-
gineering activities. Software is extremely malleable. The life cycles of a software
product are much shorter than that of, say, a harbour or a seawall,vii so that the
product would already have to be changed before the specifications are completed.
To make matters worse, the end users of a software application usually only con-
tribute to the product development once they have a working product to play with.
Talking and thinking about a non-existent product is much too abstract an activity
for most people, so they prefer a model, a prototype or something similar in order
to shape their ideas of what they really expected of the end-product. The result of
these extensive specification documents usually was a product of which, at best, the
customer would say ‘yeah, that looks like it! Let us test it and then you can start
building the real thing.’16
The first new methods that sought to address these issues proposed an ‘evolu-
tionary’ approach to software development, which basically meant that software
development would progress in cycles of specification, development and testing,
after which the following cycle would start. One of the first of these evolutionary
approaches that became somewhat successful in the early nineties of the previous
century was, in the best of IT traditions, hyped under the banner of ‘Rapid Appli-
cation Development’ (RAD). RAD consisted of a development cycle that consisted
of making an initial simple product with limited functionality that was then offered
to the end user for evaluation. Based on the user’s feedback, the software applica-
tion would be further developed and enhanced until all the functionality was imple-
mented. One advantage of this approach was that users sometimes already started
using the unfinished product and therefore could benefit from the functionality at a
much earlier stage than they would have if they would have to wait for the eventual
product.
Suppose for instance that a team of software engineers had to make a word pro-
cessor that assists in making text documents. If the base functionality of writing text,
opening and saving files were implemented, the users could start working with this,
vi Generally in software engineering, the software (source code) is considered to be the most com-
plete and accurate description of the application
vii My father was a civil engineer, so (the construction sites of) harbours and seawalls often were
my playground as a child.
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while the engineers could continue with more fancy gadgets, such as word counters
and spelling checkers. Meanwhile, the experiences of the users could provide valu-
able feedback for improvements.
As IT marketers smelled business, RAD was hyped and promised to solve All
Known Problems in the Universe, until the limitations of such an approach became
evident, especially in the management of the process. After the baying stopped the
best practices slowly matured and became more or less commonplace.
At around the turn of the millennium, a new evolutionary approach to software
development called Xtreme Programming became more popular. This approach in-
troduced the quick development cycles that RAD had applied to (representatives of)
end users to almost every aspect of programming. 17
Xtreme was introduced shortly after object oriented programming (OOP) became
popular in the software development community. OOP is a means of structuring
programs so that they become more or less autonomous packages of functionality
(called ‘objects’) that interact with each other. As OOP is perfectly suited for it-
erative development, Xtreme programming set guidelines to quickly design a raw
base set of such objects as an initial application that could be presented to end users.
Another novelty of Xtreme programming was its focus on developing the objects in
conjunction with test objects so that it would be subject to small cycles of enhance-
ment and testing. These test objects served as ‘gestalts’ for the objects, and closed
the loop between system (the software application) and environment (the test sets).
The tremendous growth of the Internet added a new challenge as users and software
were no longer restricted to one computer, and so the specific demands of Internet
applications and other developments in software engineering resulted in the Xtreme
programming concept to be taken up in what now is called ‘agile programming’.18
It could be argued that almost every book follows a method similar to an ‘agile
argumentation’, as the first chapters usually draw an outline that is further detailed
in the rest of the book, but this would neglect one essential aspect of the agile ap-
proach that is especially relevant for describing complexity. For there are indeed
many ways of starting from a sketch to an eventual detailed and complete descrip-
tion, and many of them can be, and have been, severely criticised when applied to
complexity. Reductionism was already mentioned as being one possible approach
with certain strengths and weaknesses. Holism is another approach that is some-
times advocated, but this tends to lack both the rigour as well as the methodological
strictness that had made reductionism so effective.
The invention of the computer however, has opened up new ways of modelling
and so holistic or quasi-holistic approaches are slowly becoming more influential.
More importantly, in the so-called ‘system theories’, these approaches are taken up
in a more inclusive ‘systems approach’.19 This will be given more attention shortly.
In engineering, holism is not considered the antithesis of reductionism, but both are
used. As computers and computer networks have opened up tremendous means of
creating complex models, the knowledge on the possibilities and limitations of such
30
experimental environments are also reconsidered, for only now there is sufficient
experience to assess the strengths and weaknesses of either.20
An agile approach is equivalent to reductionism in the sense that it tries to re-
duce complexity of the object under investigation, but not by cutting up the system
in parts, rather by reducing complexity by investigating a very crude and simple
sub-structure that represents a certain aspect of its eventual form, and then adding
more complexity in an iterative fashion. The idea for the ‘agile argumentation’ is to
gradually build up a certain vocabulary, in a coherent fashion where new concepts
—if possible— are derived from matters that were discussed earlier. Currently the
vocabulary developed here includes concepts such as ‘lingua democratica’, ‘stake-
holders’ and ‘engineers’, and hopefully their relationships are somewhat evident.
At a later stage, it may become more clear why I think this approach is needed to
address complexity.21
This has a number of consequences for the manner in which the argumentation
is organised in this book. First, as was said earlier, new phenomena will be intro-
duced in a rather crude manner, which are only aimed to make a point, but not much
more than that. I will try to describe these phenomena, which are often very ab-
stract in nature, by using examples, preferably from everyday life, that are aimed to
make them more understandable for others. These examples should be considered
to be metaphorical rather than descriptive at this stage. However, as we proceed,
I will revisit many of these examples and aim to show that, in fact, they are of-
ten plausible explanations of those phenomena. At this point, they usually become
(manifestations of) ‘patterns’. Agile argumentation also opens up means to explore
the vast area of topics that are more or less related to the lingua democratica by
starting from the amateur’s position. The amateur has to rely on introductions of the
various stakeholder domains instead of delving into the extensive specialist litera-
ture of those disciplines. This is an inherent problem of interdisciplinary research,
trying to cover a vast area of often very mature and extensively documented fields,
which is supplemented with novel areas from equally extensive amount of books
of a more speculative character. This in itself is an exercise in developing a ‘lingua
democratica’!
3 System Theories
It may now have become clear that the point of departure for the modelling activities
are the ‘system theories’. The plural tense reveals that there currently are many,
partially overlapping dialects. For one, ‘systems’ are in the everyday vocabulary of
most engineering activities. Electronic devices, machines, infrastructural works are
usually considered to be systems. For now, it suffices to consider such systems as
‘the interaction of different elements’.22 This already connects to some of the issues
related to the ‘lingua democratica’ and for this reason alone the modelling activities
that will be performed here, will bias this choice of tool.
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However, there are more reasons.
For one, many of the system theories are converging towards the concept of com-
plexity. Artificial (or computational) intelligence, neuroscience, cybernetics, biol-
ogy, social systems, chaos theory, and many, many more, are finding that they are
actually looking at the same issues from different angles. Currently they often use
different vocabularies to describe systems with various forms of complex behaviour.
For this reason alone, a lateral approach to the lingua democratica must recognise
the concept of ‘systems’ in order to assess these contributions, at least when ‘com-
plexity’ is a theme in the modelling activities.23
For the purposes of the lingua democratica, there is however a more pressing
reason to choose the system theories as a toolbox concept, as they have always
attempted to achieve certain synthesis across scientific disciplines.viii By looking
at the contributions from various domains, systems theorists aim to distil common
concepts and ideas and formalise these. In biology and the social sciences, Ludwig
von Bertalanffy is often considered a pioneer [21], but a lot of the ideas could be
traced back to engineering, physics and the likes. In fact, the word ‘system’ (Greek:
‘to bring together’) has been around for centuries.24
In this respect, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1597-1652) is probably the clos-
est of being a ‘founding father’ to the systems approach we will delve into here. For
one, Leibniz sought to synthesize the ideas of the two major and strongly opposing-
philosophical mainstreams of his time, the scholastics and the ‘moderns’ such as
Francis Bacon and Rene´ Descartes by providing a framework
”[. . . ] which would maximise the compatibility of the various points of view” 25
His ‘System of Pre-Established Harmony’ intended to bring about a ‘harmony of
the philosophers’ by introducing a radical form of perspectivism, in which objec-
tive truth was the ‘summation of the different viewpoints of all individuals’. Even
though we will tone down this claim a bit further on, we can at least appreciate the
democratic aspect of Leibniz’s philosophy.
His fervour in synthesising opposing views immediately gives the second reason
why Leibniz deserves to be considered a founder of the systems theory that will be
developed here, as it made him an expert in ‘creative friction’. For instance, Leibniz
aimed to unite the views from phenomenalists –who claim that nothing exists apart
from perceivers and their perceptions— and realists, who believe that there is a real
world that exists whether we perceive it or not. Although we will not cover his ideas
here, it will become clear later on that this ‘bit of both’ stance is very fundamental
in this thesis as well.
The same applies for views on Cartesian and atomist perspectives of ‘matter’,
which is the last reason for honouring Leibniz here. This controversy concerned the
viii it is indeed ironical that there are different dialects, hence the current development towards
‘systems thinking’
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question of what exactly matter was. Cartesians believed that matter was essentially
a continuous, homogenous quantity of which the observed distinct manifestations
required explanation. Their problems were related to the question of how this quan-
tity organises itself in space and matter. Atomists on the other hand thought that
matter consisted of discrete bits separated by empty space. The latter faced the prob-
lem that at some point they would have to accept that there are ‘bits’ that cannot be
divided into smaller ‘bits’ and space, so at some point there has to be an indivisible
unit, an ‘atom’.26
In complex systems this problem is partially resolved through the notion of scale.
For instance, a social system needs social entities, so the scale of a ‘social system’
starts where there are social entities, such as human beings. These entities may be
divisible (for instance into skeleton, organs, veins and skin), but this division is usu-
ally of little use to describe a ‘social system’. From this perspective, a ‘social entity’
can be the atom of that system . The synthesis between viewpoints such as phenom-
enalists and realists is therefore inherently a pragmatic one in complex systems;
within a certain scale, the observer can always ‘choose’ her preferred atoms. Look-
ing a bit ahead, I can already reveal here that this thesis will bypass the problem
between materialists and phenomenalists by choosing ‘pattern’ and ‘information’
as the units of preference.
The technical system theories tend to take off from the very intuitive distinction
between ‘system’ and ‘environment’. The system is that what is being researched,
while the environment is loosely connected to ‘system’ through ‘input and output
signals’. The system is further composed of ‘entities’ or ‘elements’ and their mutual
‘relationships’. The latter often also take the form of input and output signals that
connect the entities together. With these a system can be analysed. In many scientific
areas, such as in electrotechnical engineering, these base paradigms work miracles.
Fig. 1 Base paradigm
in Systems Theory
Take a radio for instance. A radio can be considered a system consisting of
electronic components (entities) that are connected together on an electronic cir-
cuit board (relationships). The radio’s aerial (antenna) serves as the ‘input’ of the
radio that picks up electro-magnetic waves of certain frequencies from its ‘environ-
ment’. These ‘air-waves’ are processed internally and eventually put through to the
loudspeaker, which produces human audible sound (output). The more perceptive
observers amongst us may also see input signals in the knobs to adjust volume, fre-
quency bands and so on, while outputs may be seen in dials, positions or angles of
the knobs. So the ‘environment’ of a radio consists of air-waves, sound and someone
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who uses it. So far, the system-environment paradigm seems useful enough!
Sadly however, complexity kicks in. The above paradigms often prove to be too
restrictive for many areas. For many systems it is not quite clear where system ends
and environment begins. Besides this, system boundaries are often not easily de-
scribed in terms of input and output signals.
Other problems revolve around some implicit assumptions that the ‘systems ap-
proach’ usually takes for granted. The most obvious of these are the role of the
observer of the system. Many system dialects implicitly position the observer out-
side the system/environment, and do not grant the observer any agency. In other
words, the observer does not influence the system. This assumption is impossible to
maintain in for instance social systems, as social scientists can influence that what
they observe, namely society itself. Quantum physics was another area where ob-
servation can influence the observed.27
System theories have thus become more and more complex systems, and the var-
ious system theories have further evolved by incorporating such distinctions. The
differences in (observed) complexity is (probably) one of the reasons why they have
fallen apart into various dialects, as not every scientific enterprise runs into such
problems. Social systems may emphasize the complexity between observer and ob-
served (self-referentiality), but many technical systems still can work with relatively
straightforward systems approaches that consist of an extensive set of entities that
approximate ideal mathematical equations. Software engineering, on the other hand,
tends to use graphical representations of blocks of software as their preferred enti-
ties. Besides this, the humanities may argue that norms and values are usually not
incorporated in these ‘system theories’. How do they relate to ‘system’, ‘environ-
ment’ and ‘observer’? Are the system theories for the sciences only?
Most of these issues will be detailed later. In fact, most of this book revolves
around these issues. But I opt for a gradual approach here; things are going to be
complex enough even without diving into ever-finer details at this stage.
A number of problems associated with the classic paradigms of the systems the-
ories can best be exemplified by considering the ‘lingua democratica’ to be part of
a ‘system’ of ‘stakeholders’ that operates in a certain ‘environment’.
3.1 Lingua Democratica versus its Environment
The previous sections have already hinted at it; the lingua democratica (LD) is not
only set against a lingua franca, but also against something else. This ‘something’ is
a logical opposition, namely ‘that what is not a lingua democratica’. This container
can hold an extremely large amount of phenomena, for it can contain anything from
plants to post offices, or the moon to black holes. There is an awful lot of ‘not LD’
around, but luckily almost everything is also quite insignificant. The container of
‘not LD’ is filled with details. In effect, the majority of the ‘not LD’ that is useful
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for our discussion is closely related to the LD itself, is influenced by the LD and in
turn influences the LD. In system theories, this particular bit of meaningful ‘not LD’
is usually called its environment.
This statement would be almost trivial if we were not dealing with a complex
system. Many scientific disciplines have a notion of ‘environment’, which is gen-
erally considered as something ‘that influences a system but is not part of it’, but
even this apparently transparent dichotomy causes friction when the LD is consid-
ered a complex system. For one, a complex system usually does not care too much
about the boundaries that observers impose on them, with the result that such dis-
tinctions may end up discarding bits and pieces as being ‘environment’ while in fact
they ultimately belong to the LD. Conversely too much of the environment may be
incorporated in the system, which may result in a meaningless jumble.
The difference between ‘system’ and ‘environment’ is related to the agency of an
observer, as it already presupposes that there are two distinct characteristics of the
stimuli that the observer perceives. Part of the stimuli becomes ‘system’ informa-
tion and part becomes ‘environment’ information. This distinction allows a focus on
that set of input stimuli that is considered important (the ‘system’) while the rest is
made less significant, without discarding its role as influence on the system. ‘Envi-
ronment’ therefore, is a purposeful reduction of complexity in order to allow focus
on the system. A radio, as a system, works because its environment has been re-
duced to a space where electro-magnetic radio waves propagate. These waves have
amplitudes and frequencies which can be captured in mathematical equations, and
which enter the system through the radio’s antenna. This description does not take
into account which radio stations are broadcasting or which kind of content is trans-
mitted at a given time. Such information is irrelevant in understanding a radio; all
a radio designer needs to know is that the interesting radio stations frequent certain
radio bands (LW, MW, SW and FM), that these bands have different ways of juxta-
posing voice and music on the radio waves (AM and FM), and that the radio should
be sufficiently sensitive to detect the waves and transform them to human audible
sound.
As was said earlier, this purposeful reduction of ‘environment’ has been ex-
tremely successful and therefore it becomes difficult to re-evaluate such a framing
when its explanatory bounds are challenged. Yet this is exactly what complexity
does. Complexity challenges simplicity and simple explanations,ix and so there is a
point where the boundaries between system and environment become less distinct.
It is probably better to say that there is point where the observation of a difference
becomes opaque. There is a limit to the scale-invariance of observation as a cogni-
tive modelling tool, and this means that other approaches may become necessary.
A phrase like ‘the stakeholders of the genomics debate’ is sufficient to grasp
the problems of the system-environment distinction. If the system describes ‘the
ix Probably one of the most complex issues related to complexity is that simplicity often still works!
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stakeholders of the genomics debate’, then the environment of the system could be
‘everything that is not a stakeholder of the genomics debate, but what does influence
it’. This could be anything from forests to lab rats. This divide is often more than
adequate, but from the perspective of an individual stakeholder, the other stakehold-
ers are in fact part of her or his environment. In a complex connectionist model, the
environment, or the boundaries between system and environment, is ‘folded into the
system’.28 An observer may get away with a simple perspective on many occasions,
but there will be a point when it will fail. From an observer’s point of view, the
friction then becomes the choice whether to gamble for the simple dichotomy and
give attention to all the cases when this explanation will fail, or just to accept the
complexity of the issue at hand and see if it can be better understood by carefully
examining the structure of the system to see what parts of the environment can be
discarded.
It is here, I think, that ‘system theories’ plough into a boundary of scale. Like
many theories in science and philosophy, system theories aim to create models that
are as complete as possible for a given task. However, if complexity acknowledges
scale-boundaries of observation and (other) modelling tools, then models are re-
stricted by the toolkit that is used. Some tools are coarse and rough, while others
allow a fine and precise approach. Any craftsman knows that, but we seem to be
less inclined to accept the limitations of our sensory and cognitive apparatus. Even
now there are many who think –maybe if only deep in their hearts— that observa-
tion, reasoning, reflection and contemplation is sufficient to understand anything.
This stance will not be followed here, and so this particular enterprise therefore
rather departs from the inherently skewed, fragmentary and provisional nature of
knowledge.29
With this, the differentiation between ‘system’ and ‘environment’ is no longer
an innocent one. Even if there are objectively observable boundaries that demarcate
the system from its environment, there is always a portion that is negotiated. A
boundary may be ultimately associated with the system, but if the environment does
not respect it, or even challenges it, such boundaries are far from being a done deal.
My skin may be my own, but not when I go swimming amongst salt water crocodiles
in Australia.
A boundary demarcates the transition from the system’s ‘inner perspective’ to its
‘outer perspective’, but this also applies for its environment! Boundaries in com-
plex systems therefore have two faces, one of which demonstrates an observable
closure of the system with respect to its environment, and one that is the result of
negotiation, an agreement.x
These two aspects of a boundary are very well understood in software engineer-
ing. An interface is a description of a boundary that is both an observable reduction
of complexity (of the internal structure of the system) as well as an agreement of
how an entity can interact with that which is behind the boundary. This agreement
x or a temporary truce
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is not only made between system and environment, but also between observer and
system and observer and environment.
A system is more than a factual manifestation in an environment, it is also a
result of framing by an observer who determines what elements of information are
positioned within the closure of the system and what may be considered outside
this closure. The problem of framing thus, is also tied to the characteristics of the
observer, and as human observers rely heavily on their visual abilities, it is very
common (and usually very worthwhile) to close the system according to boundaries
that can be perceived visually. However, in a complex, dynamic system the units
are often formed by invisible processes between the system’s boundaries and its
environment. If such processes are stable, the framing problem can often be resolved
by focusing on the processes rather than the observed entities.30
It will become clear that this particular analysis of the LD will concentrate on
such processes between stakeholders, and so the resulting system model will reduce
the importance of entities and blow up the relationships between them. An initial
crude, connectionist model of a complex system, consisting of a system, an envi-
ronment, an observer and their mutual relationships would look something like in
figure 2.
Fig. 2 First
decomposition of a
Complex System
This figure is less trivial than may appear at first glance, for it gives both the envi-
ronment as well as the observer certain agency, and grants them distinct characteris-
tics that interact with a system. Besides this, it changes the focus to the relationships
(the bolts of lightning) between system, observer and environment rather than the
entities themselves.
Describing a system as one entity amongst an observer entity and an environment
entity is only a first step in a direction away from the paradigms of my professional
training. The folding boundaries between them open up new dynamics in these re-
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lationships that may span aggregates of system-observers or observer-systems, or
environment-systems or observer-environments.31 And are not the ‘stakeholders of
the genomics debate’, interacting observer-systems bounded by their environment,
or cultures? These three entities already unleash complexity in all its raw splendour,
and we are only scratching the surface...
With the trinity of figure 2, the lump of clay that is the model of the lingua demo-
cratica has acquired a certain shape, but it is also too crude. The rest of this thesis
will therefore be spent on adding detail upon detail to this crude model of the lingua
democratica by iterating through the model of system, environment and the observer
in an agile fashion.
Complexity implies, I think, that the observer has two characteristics which are
mutually related. One of these is that the observer operates on limited knowledge,
which means that observing creates incomplete models of that what is observed.
Secondly, as observation is presumed to be a form of action, observation is some-
what skewed, as these observations are guided by these incomplete models.
This means that the observer has lost his innocence. I am intrinsically part of the
‘lingua democratica of the genomics debate’, and only time can tell whether this
membership was significant, or merely a temporal five year ripple around the Uni-
versity for Humanistics. Regardless of its scope or influence, this thesis has its place
in the evolution of genomics, and neither it, nor its author, can be discarded from
a description of the lingua democratica. This is another step away from my profes-
sional training that tends to prefer ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’. However, as observation
will now put a focus on certain facts (and certain objectivity), and therefore discard
others, facts and objectivity lie in the eye of the beholder. Observation is a normative
activity, and so I can already reassure the humanities that systems approaches do not
necessarily exclude norms and values.
4 The Approach
As I stated earlier, my argumentation is seeded in ‘creative friction’. This is an
acknowledgement that the kind of interactions that are addressed with the lingua
democratica are situated between entities, and so instead of focusing purely on the
stakeholders, I will rather investigate the dynamics of the interactions between them.
Following the ‘agile’ methodology, I will focus on the simple model of interactions
between system, environment and observer-actor, and gradually increase the com-
plexity of this initial model, using amongst others, methods and methodologies that
I normally use when developing software, both as a means of opening those ‘best
practices’ to other areas where the focus lies on complexity in all its facets, as well
as providing a means to reflect on these practices from a mirror positioned outside
software development. But the point of departure is a raw model with three entities,
and we will iterate through these base paradigms in the next chapters.
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It may appear to be a long stretch from this confined interpretation to a ‘lingua
democratica of the genomics debate’ and some may fear that this methodology is
going to fail because of its lack of exactness.
I can only argue that this is ‘exactly’ what complexity is telling us. We can never
know complex things ‘exactly’, and so I will not engage in a fruitless enterprise to
be ‘exact’, or claim a certain false rigour in creating detailed models, which bear
little relationship with the messy, complex things they purport to describe. Instead,
I have taken this message of complex systems as a means of liberating myself from
the need to be overly precise, by ‘patterning’ certain themes. This is the approach
that will be developed throughout this book.
Complexity, I think, allows a playful attitude in the sense of Feyerabend [72].
However, no one should be prevented from playing the game to the best of her or
his abilities.32
My game metaphor of choice for researching complexity is not that of a competi-
tion where one wins and others lose. It is rather that of computer games, where you
may fail at a certain point, but you can always restart from a level that you reached
earlier. Complexity is a bit like that, I think. It allows you to start the research as an
amateur and work your way up to becoming a ‘master’, level by level, step by step.
This also relieves the researchers from taking their endeavours with grave serious-
ness, as complexity itself will look down on strong claims —my own included—
with mild irony.
Currently the agile game played here aims to develop a ‘vocabulary of complex-
ity’ –that is my particular quest of the ‘lingua democratica’—, and one of the rules
of this particular game is to try to build this vocabulary starting from a few ini-
tial concepts, such as ‘creative friction’, ‘complexity’ and the ‘lingua democratica’.
I will revisit these time and time again in the same recurrent fashion of an agile
methodology. This also means that I will sometimes (or often) not delve too deeply
into certain issues, as they will re-emerge once the tools are developed to tackle
them. For the game of complexity this does not imply that ‘anything goes’ —on the
contrary—, rather that sometimes the levels of freedom and constraint emerge as
the game develops.
4.1 The Game
As may have become clear by now, this particular enterprise is not going to fol-
low the safe paths of scientific enquiry, as I intend to iterate through the interaction
patterns between system, observer and environment. I have mentioned earlier that
observation is by all accounts an activity that is constrained and skewed, which
means that this enterprise itself is subject to this fact. Anyone who claims to be
saying something on complexity must realise that every statement about complex-
ity inherently also says something about the act of observing complexity. In other
words, any description of complexity will have repercussions for its own approach!
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For instance, take modern research on psychology and neuroscience. Currently
it is widely known that the brain ‘fools’ us into thinking all kinds of things, from
filling in details that are not there, to all kinds of confirmation bias. It is therefore
surprising that all this is not widely re-entered into the philosophy of science. Why
do scientists and philosophers claim to be ‘proving facts’ or ‘be making valid argu-
mentations’ if the mental tools that are used have not been tailored for such tasks?33
I will not problematise these constraints, and I think that everyday life amply
demonstrates that this is not needed. In fact, the brain’s tomfoolery is usually aimed
to support us in performing complex cognitive tasks. However, for this reason, any
intellectual endeavour must be continuously willing to give some kind of account
for the interpretations behind the observations. Preferably, this account should try to
show how perceptual skewing and amplification guide the observations.34
It does mean, I think, that complexity is blurring the once clear distinctions be-
tween philosophy and science. Science currently is no longer following the classical
‘pure’ paths itself when it describes genes becoming ‘selfish’, quantum mechanics
evolves into mathematical philosophies that cannot be empirically verified, such as
‘superstring theory’, or when computation claims to explain ‘how the mind works’.
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One can also accept that complexity may demand a somewhat more ‘loose’ ap-
proach every now and then. The challenge then becomes to prevent an argument
from straying, by choosing some points that cannot be circumvented, such as scien-
tific data that has proven something or is widely accepted amongst the experts of a
certain domain.
For these very reasons, I am also deeply suspicious of any philosophy that does
not carefully account for what it purports to say, what it can’t explain, and why the
argumentation that is followed is actually supporting the claims. It may be true that
complex phenomena cannot be explained by simple theory, this does not imply that
complex intellectual constructions necessarily mean anything. This I think has been
effectively demonstrated by the Sokal affair.36
Complexity, in the end, is telling us that we humans have to work with limited
knowledge which skews our observations and interpretations. I see no other way
around this than by continuously accounting for the observations and the biases that
guide them. This is not a matter of ‘philosophy’ (alone), but an attempt to make the
art of observation a bit less naive.
4.2 The Levels
This book is organised in four parts. Part one, consisting of the first three chap-
ters, is a preparation for the ‘workshop of complexity’ that will be used later. A
‘pattern-oriented approach to complexity’ (PAC) will be developed, which I think
may provide the lateral connections between various ‘stakeholder domains’. I will
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mainly concentrate on interactions between science, the humanities and (technolog-
ical) professionals.
PAC will develop an elementary pattern library, which should cover most of the
concepts that have been introduced so far.
This contribution to a lingua democratica will mainly focus on interactions be-
tween technology and society in the broadest possible sense. The reason for this is
that, by starting from a more abstract level, I may be able to show that many of
the problems that are currently emerging in debates between stakeholders of ge-
nomics are similar to those that have been waged with other technologies earlier.
These debates uncover certain patterns that can be more widely applied. However,
the agile approach will always try to stay in orbit around themes related to genomics
wherever possible.
I will also not delve into complexity by overemphasising some of complexity’s
‘buzz-words’, such as ‘emergence’, ‘self-referentiality’ or ‘autopoiesis’. The reason
for this is two-fold. First, it is still unclear how many of these concepts work, so
care should be exercised when using them. It is not going to be beneficial for the
still delicate field of ‘complexity’ to end up in a state of terminological or conceptual
confusion. However, this does not mean that these concepts are unimportant.37
Secondly, I think that opening up a number of relatively mature concepts that
have been developed in certain scientific areas or otherwise, is sufficient to make
significant headway into the theme of complexity. There are currently ample contri-
butions by the pioneers and the forefront thinkers on this theme that were developed
in last decades, so maybe a more reflexive attitude on what has, and has not, been
achieved so far may be more helpful. As a result, this particular venture ‘Into Com-
plexity’ may be somewhat conservative for some.
In the second part, I will develop a number of patterns that are needed to un-
derstand the problem that is brought into focus by the ‘lingua democratica’. These
patterns will be developed by taking the ‘helicopter view’ approach on some debates
between biology and the humanities.
The third part will address the lingua democratica itself, using the patterns of
the pattern library that has been developed. First, I will return to PAC by reflecting
on the methodology with the patterns developed henceforth, and fill in some of the
gaps that have been left open, but are needed to account for the framing of the latter
part of the agile argumentation. Then the lingua democratica will be modelled as a
pattern, with which I will ‘enter’ the domains of social theory in order to create a
model of ‘stakeholders’.
In the last part, the patterns that have been developed will then be used to analyse
a current debate on artificially enhancing human intelligence, through which I aim
to pinpoint the places where such debates usually take a wrong turn. Lastly, I hope to
focus on the normative aspects of professionals and professional work, with which
the approach will have bridged the gap between the ‘two cultures’ in a more or less
coherent fashion. With complexity, the once strict distinctions between facts and
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norms can be considered in coherence, which opens possibilities for cross-lateral
approaches such as PAC, to allow different ‘mental landscapes’ to ‘slide into each
other’ in a more or less coherent manner.
Complexity needs to be a multi-player game, as ‘weaving mistakes’ along lateral
lines can only be corrected by those who combine specialist knowledge with a cer-
tain openness to other fields of enquiry. In this sense, both complexity and patterns
require team effort.
4.2.1 Society and Technology
Before delving into the pattern-oriented approach to complexity, the problem of the
lingua democratica will be exemplified by looking at some issues between tech-
nology and society. More specifically, some humanities perspectives on technology,
and those of technologists, are considered as being problematic based on the differ-
ent production systems they employ for the production of their theories. From this
perspective, the controversies between ‘reductionism’ and ‘pluralistic’ approaches
will be discussed, using the ‘pattern of organised complexity’ as a guiding concept.
With this, I aim to demonstrate that discussions are more complex than often as-
sumed, and how patterns can assist in making this clear.
It may also have become evident that I will not be looking into the problems
related to genomics as a novel technological development, but instead on the com-
munications that govern some of the debates. I do this for two reasons. First, it is
most directly related to the concept of the ‘lingua democratica’, and secondly be-
cause some of the major stakeholders —the techno-positivists— don’t really see
problems in the first place, but rather focus on the opportunities genomics has to
offer. I at all costs, want to prevent the discussion from being biased from the start
towards the ‘problematic’ side of gen tech, as this would render the whole argumen-
tation I aim to set up as useless for those whom I particularly would want to reach
with this approach.
4.3 Part 1: Preparation
The preparatory activities of this thesis concentrate on three issues. First, a num-
ber of approaches from engineering will be introduced, that are needed to address
complexity. Secondly, the base paradigms on (General) System Theory will be re-
modeled into a ‘version MMX’ in order to embed concepts from complexity. One
of the main concepts that will be introduced here is ‘uncertainty’.
Earlier, I have quickly and coarsely introduced some base concepts from the sys-
tem theories and expanded them by allowing the observer and the environment to
have certain agency. I have also diverted the focus towards the interactions between
these. It will be clear that this is far from sufficient to address complex systems, so
these will be expanded with the help of John Holland’s ‘framework of complexity’,
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in order to develop a base vocabulary for this particular enquiry into complexity.38
However, this embedding does not seem to be sufficient to address complexity.
As a last methodological construct I will use the notion of patterns, that was pio-
neered in building architecture and software engineering, as a means of analysing
complex systems. With this, a recursive ‘systems of systems’ view on complexity
can be developed.39
Besides this, three ‘perspectives’ on complex systems are introduced that are
–often implicitly— used in biology. One derived perspective, the ‘complexity per-
spective’, will provide the rules for this coherent ‘game’ of building vocabularies
and pattern libraries. The resulting ‘pattern-oriented approach to complexity’ (PAC)
will guide this exploration of a ‘lingua democratica’.
4.4 Part Two: A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Complexity
With the preparation completed, at least for this particular task, both the vocabulary
and a pattern library can be developed.
4.4.1 Feedback
Chapter four will cover the pattern of feedback in greater detail. Starting from the
elementary forms of feedback, an outline will be drawn on the technical implications
of classical feedback. Here I aim to argue that feedback is the backbone concept of
complexity that ties the various contributions that are currently being researched
together.
In electro-technical engineering, the power of feedback as organising mechanism
has long been known, so any theory of complexity, which largely revolves around
self-organisation, must take feedback seriously [109]. Starting from the notion of
‘order’, the ‘river of complexity’ is followed towards ‘chaos’, and the various side-
arms to the contributions in research of complexity and complex systems will be
pointed out. This river moves, amongst others, along distributed agent systems and
current thinking of intelligence as a result of massive parallel feedback (re-entry)
that is being developed in the neurosciences, such as reflected in the work of Dama-
sio [45], and Tononi and Edelman [69]. Lastly, some attention will be given to self-
organisation and self-referentiality.
4.4.2 Global Search
Chapter five focuses on interactions between system and environment, and draws
attention to the inherent feedback that is introduced between them. This will be
demonstrated through a tremendously fundamental pattern that is used especially –
but not exclusively— computational intelligence. This pattern is called convergence
inducing process, or ‘global search’.
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First this process is explored in greater detail. Problem solving is considered as
an activity of an agent that tries to find an optimal ranking set in a certain envi-
ronment. This ranking is based on internal goals that are defined within the agent.
This activity brings together system (the agent), environment (the problem domain)
and feedback. Based on the aspects of feedback described earlier, it will be argued
that this ranking in a very dynamic environment, needs to be very flexible as well.
The ‘no free lunch’ theorem argues that it is impossible to create a problem solv-
ing agent that behaves optimally in any environment, so practically such an agent
can only have an optimal mix of exploratory and optimising characteristics, that are
often related to certain characteristics of the environment. The pattern of ‘conver-
gence inducing process’ is essential for the preparation of a ‘lingua democratica’ as
it brings together ‘facts’ with ‘norms’ and ‘values’ in a very elementary fashion.
Contributions from agent networks as distributed problem solvers, will complete
this coarse model of a meaning system. The fact that networks of agent systems
are themselves agents, especially implies that these meta-agents pursue meta-goals
that span the internal goals of the individual agents. Conflicts between these goals
can impair the success of the entire network and so the adjustment of these goals
become an important issue.
4.4.3 System and Environment
Chapter six draws attention to the environment of a system. By granting the envi-
ronment certain agency, its role has to be reconsidered in a complex system. This
section will detail some of the characteristics associated with this agency. For one,
it is usually a highly dynamic interaction space in which the entities, objects and
systems interact.
Another aspect of many environments, most notably the biological environment
we usually call ‘nature’, is that they may have the characteristic of being resource
constrained. Resource constrained environments result in specific interactions be-
tween agents that require these resources. These interactions are the focus of Dar-
winian evolution theory. The actor/co-actor pattern aims to formalise these interac-
tions according to a logical format.
Constrained resources however, also create novel interactions between entities
that once had no relationships. This is due to the negotiated aspect of an interface.
As an example, in 2007 the increasing demand for bio-fuel caused the price of corn
to sky-rocket with dire consequences for the people in Mexico who rely on corn for
their meals [54]. Such emergent relationships are becoming more frequent and have
severe consequences on the success of evolutionary interactions.
4.4.4 The Pattern of Contextual Diminution and the Hourglass Pattern
Chapter seven will introduce two patterns, which aim to complete the pattern library
and are needed as preparation for a model of stakeholder interactions.
The pattern of ‘contextual diminution’ shows a relationship between the ability
of an agent to rank data and the characteristics of the environment.
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The hourglass pattern shows how the ‘systems of systems’ perspective of com-
plexity introduces novel interaction patterns beyond causality and reductionism, and
in which the observer plays an important role. The hourglass pattern also describes
interface concepts, which are seen as being tremendously problematic due to their
complexity. These patterns allow us to understand, at an abstract level, what enables
and constrains the interactions between actors in an agent network that, in rudimen-
tary sense, resembles a human society.
4.5 Part Three: The lingua democratica
As both the vocabulary as the pattern library are now forming a sufficiently com-
plete ‘workshop of complexity’, I will turn to the target of my enquiry, the ‘lingua
democratica’, and start to model/refactor the debates between technology and soci-
ety.
4.5.1 Tying Some Threads Together
Any methodology on complexity must describe its own approach. This self-referential
perspective reveals why feedback is the quintessential concept in the pattern library
that is developed. Feedback affects the processes between model, modellers and
subject matter. In chapter eight, a first step will be made to use the pattern library
and the vocabulary in coherence. This is meant as preparation that will make it easier
to understand the final part of this book.
4.5.2 Social Systems
Chapter nine will concentrate on social systems, which provide the context for
‘stakeholders’. The crude network that has been developed is compared with the
ideas of various social theorists. After a discussion of the validity and use of memes,
a concept from biology to pass ‘units of culture’ amongst humans, some ideas of,
amongst others, Niklas Luhmann and Bruno Latour will be ‘put in context’ with
PAC. The main focus will be on ‘communications’ between agents, as these match
with the notion of ‘lingua democratica’. This section can be seen as a ‘refactoring’
exercise, which is quite common in software engineering.
4.6 Part Four: Technology and Society
The last part of this thesis will focus on a very practical implementation of the
pattern library that has been developed. The theme of choice is the interferences
between technology and society, and especially the agenda of the trans-humanist
movement, which aim to improve the human bodies and minds artificially.
4.6.1 Stakeholders of Technology
As preparation of this part, chapter ten will first sketch a ‘context’ of technology,
using the patterns and perspectives that have been developed. This context is used
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to analyse the contributions of a number of thinkers on technology, which leads to a
number of observations on their argumentations.
4.6.2 On Intelligence
Chapter eleven will explore some developments on artificially enhancing human in-
telligence. Within the so-called ‘trans-humanist’ movement, a very techno-positivist
agenda is currently being pursued, which claims that within a few decades we may
transcend our current ‘limitations’ and become ‘infinitely’ intelligent [146].
Following the argumentations and motivations of some of these trans-humanists,
I will use PAC to try to show where implicit values bias the argumentation and where
PAC would draw different conclusions. The concepts of ‘contextual diminution’ and
‘uncertainty’ are especially pivotal in this argumentation.
4.6.3 Normative Professionality
In chapter twelve, I will use PAC to explore the issues of professional normativ-
ity and ethics for professionals. This section is more open-ended, and aims to of-
fer a point of connection for the humanities with respect to technological develop-
ments.

Chapter 2
Patterns in Complexity
When one aims to follow somewhat novel paths into scientific or philosophical en-
quiry –this particular enterprise is probably a sort of ‘complexophy’—, then one of
the first practical issues one needs to address is how to build up an argumentation in
this different fashion. In this particular case, one can start with building the pattern
library first and then move towards the problem, or one can start with the problem
and then develop the tools to deal with it. Both methods have their strengths and
weaknesses, so the eventual choice is rather arbitrary.
In this case, I have opted for the latter approach, by focusing on a debate between
the humanities and (predominantly) the natural sciences regarding reductionism.
This issue was briefly mentioned earlier and a complaint that is often heard. is that
science (and with it engineering) is too reductionist, and should be more ‘holistic’
or ‘pluralistic’.1 This chapter will take a closer look into this ‘problem’ from the
perspective of engineering and complexity, and a few patterns will be used to assist
with the analysis. With this, the manner of reasoning based on ‘patterns’ that will
be developed later, is going to be introduced rather bluntly in this chapter. Luckily,
the main patterns that are needed have been described by othersi, and so this should
pose few major problems.
1 Reductionism, Holism and Plurality
In the previous chapter, the issue of reductionism was already introduced briefly.
The natural sciences are often accused of being reductionist, in the sense that the
world is reduced to one of facts alone, of causal relationships, cold logic and de-
terminism.2 If something cannot be measured it does not exist. ‘Where is beauty?
Where is art and literature?’ one may ask, and the natural sciences will respond –if
they respond at all— that this is all hormonal and neural activity, a by-product of
evolutionary forces.
As a remedy for the apparent ailments of reductionism, holism and plurality are
often brought in. Holistic approaches aim to maintain an all-inclusive angle on sub-
ject matter, and try to keep a ‘complete’ picture of what is going on. Pluralistic
approaches depart from the idea that most scientific phenomena or themes are too
complex to grasp by experiment alone, and that one can get a more encompassing
view of a subject by incorporating different points of view, all of which paint part
of the picture. Pluralistic approaches follow the famous example of the blind men
who try to describe an elephant, one examining the tail, another a foot, the ears, the
i although they probably did not see them as being patterns
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trunk and so on. With pluralistic approaches, a big issue then is whether the various
points of view are mutually coherent, or whether they may contradict each other.
Of course, the moment a word or term matures, it usually begets a lot of different
meanings in various domains. Holism and pluralism are pivotal, or at least impor-
tant concepts in many areas –as is reductionism in the natural sciences—, where
they may have their specific meanings which have developed from the traditions
that exist within those domains. As the ‘lingua democratica’ in the way it will be
used here is focusing on cross-domain interactions between the critics and enthusi-
asts of the natural sciences, it would seem that the raw essences sketched above are
what actually reaches the target audience.
The French social theorist Edgar Morin sees many of these debates as being tips
of icebergs that obscure a very fundamental problem in contemporary science, or in
fact all forms of knowledge production:
At the same time, everywhere, error, ignorance, and blindness advance alongside of our
knowledge3
The blindness specific to science is, amongst others, related to the ‘domination of
the principles of disjunction, reduction and abstraction’, which are fundamental to
the natural sciences since the seventeenth century. The resulting processes of sim-
plification has resulted in ‘blind intelligence’:
Blind intelligence destroys unities and totalities, It isolates all objects from their environ-
ment. It cannot conceive the inseparable link between observer and observed. Key realities
are disintegrated. They slip through the cracks between disciplines [...]. Whereas the media
produces mass ignorance, the university produces high ignorance. The dominant method-
ology produces an increasing obscurantism; because there are no longer any links between
the disjointed elements of knowledge, so there is no longer an opportunity to truly absorb
them and reflect on them4
Although, at first glance, these poisonous arrows may seem to be directed towards
reductionism, Morin seems to consider holism to suffer from the same ailment:
In fact, reductionism has always provoked an opposing holistic current founded on the pre-
eminence of the concept of globality or totality. But the totality is never anything more than
a plastic bag enveloping whatever it found anyway it could, and enveloping too well: the
more the totality becomes full, the emptier it becomes5
As a result,
We are blind to the problem of complexity. Epistemological disputes between Popper, Kuhn,
Lakatos, Feyerabend, and others pass into relative silence. This silence is part of our bar-
barism. It makes us realize that in the world of ideas, we are still in the age of barbarism. We
are still in the prehistory of the human mind. Our complex thought will allow us to civilize
our knowledge6
Even though currently the debates amongst the ‘two cultures’ [252]—that is the
‘hard’ or natural sciences on one side and the social sciences and the humanities on
the other— have lost their sharper edges, the enduring ‘science wars’ make clear that
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a more or less inclusive approach to complexity that cross-fertilises contributions
from the various cultures is far from being commonplace7.
When one aims to look into the concepts of holism, reductionism and plurality
from a more or less neutral position –these debates are not so charged in engineering,
as certain forms of all three are used— a number of issues instantly are brought to
question.
First, one has to keep in mind that a call for ‘holistic’ or ‘pluralistic’ approaches
in science, without specifying how this has to be carried out, is in fact reductionist
itself. There are many disciplines in science, each with their own preferred tools,
methodologies and theoretical frameworks. It may have become clear that the sys-
tem theories are at least to some extent ‘holistic’. One might even say that, if knowl-
edge is fundamentally limited, any intellectual enquiry on a theme is reductionist!
If science is therefore criticised as being reductionist, the critique should include
a detailed analysis on the different cultures within the sciences, how and where these
holistic and pluralistic approaches should be embedded in the different methodolo-
gies that are used, what their strengths and weaknesses are and what they may con-
tribute to the established approaches in science. Only then a critique on reductionism
is itself based on a more or less holistic approach.8
With respect to pluralist approaches, the first simple observation of science
demonstrates that science actually is pluralistic. The full breadth from quantum
physics to socio-biology spans a great deal of different subcultures, each with their
own approaches, methodologies and paradigmatic departure points. Biology will
tend to hinge strongly on Darwinian selection, while physics may rely on Newto-
nian or statistical mechanics.9 The problem thus does not seem to be that science
is not pluralistic, but rather that most scientists are not satisfied with this, and still
aim to unite all our knowledge of the natural world in a unified body of knowledge.
Darwinian selection and Newtonian mechanics are not considered to be contradic-
tory or mutually problematic. The discussion then becomes, whether such an uniting
agenda is feasible or to what extent this is feasible. I do not feel competent to an-
swer this question, which probably only time can tell.10 Such attempts to unification
will however introduce the issue of granularity; does one aim for a deterministic and
causal unity, or will this unity aim for a looser kind of coherence instead?11
In regard to plurality however, another issue becomes interesting, and that is if
plurality itself is an effective means to advance science.12
In order to explore this question, I will consider theories to be the result of a pro-
duction system. This basically means that new theories are produced from existing
theories, with a certain aspect of novelty to make them interesting.13 This system
produces ideas, journal articles, tests, a lot of data, not forgetting discourses and
debates. From this vantage point, I will look into attempts at rigid unification on
one side, and pluralistic approaches on the other, by relating them to a pattern, the
pattern of organised complexity.
This is the first pattern that will be introduced, and is mainly aimed to demon-
strate how patterns are used throughout the book. Chapter three will give a more
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thorough methodological account of these patterns.
As was already argued earlier, in engineering the controversies between the dif-
ferent approaches in science are not really that big an issue, and so it is probably
good to first give an impression of what engineering is, and in which ways it distin-
guishes itself especially from (other areas of) science.
The main reason for this is, as was mentioned earlier, that the framing of this par-
ticular contribution to the ‘lingua democratica’ is strongly influenced and biased by
my professional training and background. However, one other reason for this focus
on engineering is that some thinkers of complexity implicitly or explicitly call for
an ‘engineering approach’ in order to advance in this field.14 Following the wisdom
of complexity, I think that such claims always hold the risk of replacing one limited
approach with another, but there are some interesting aspects of engineering —and
‘professionals’ in general15— that deserve closer attention.
For one, there has been a gradual move in both philosophy and science towards
a more action-prone stance. Ideologies based on certain theories have been ‘tested’
in human environments and, as of course genomics exemplifies, the same goes for
scientific discoveries. This development means that at least some areas of philos-
ophy and science have entered domains that were traditionally the realms of the
makers and the doers. However, it is often forgotten that any profession also in-
cludes a certain ethos that is often associated with a kind of professional pride that
one has with respect to one’s work. In science this is often the pride of discov-
ery, while in engineering it is related to making things work as may be expected.
As action-prone scientists and philosophers are increasingly ‘engineering’ human
bodies, society, economies and so on, one may wonder if these ‘engineers’ are suf-
ficiently appreciative of the traditions and ethos that has evolved in the professional
domains throughout the ages, and if the pride of discovery or knowing is sufficient
to guide their interventions in societal domains. I think that this, in fact, is one major
problematic aspect of Genomics as a societal issue, but this will be given extensive
attention later on.
The point that I would want to make here is that these professionals also develop
a highly pragmatic, but methodologically coherent intellectual opportunism that is
inevitable when things need to be achieved in finite time with finite means.16 I think
that this attitude is percolating more and more into the sciences as research themes
are becoming more complex. But complexity also does not respect disciplinary
boundaries that scientists may be comfortable with, and so I have chosen to radi-
cally throw together philosophy, science, practicality, technology in one intellectual
stir-fry pan for this particular enterprise. There are no clearly demarcated ‘frame-
works’, or other disciplinary boundaries which may obfuscate and restrain. Rather
an attempt will be made to engage in a form of constrained ‘theory-shopping’.
This approach, I think, is needed to address complexity, but it is also a good
preparation for a ‘lingua democratica’, and as a first exercise it may be good to ad-
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dress the topics of reductionism, holism and plurality, which have been dominating
many academic debates for decades now.
2 Science and Engineering
It was argued in the previous chapter that the observer is an active entity in any com-
plex modelling activity, and therefore can just as well be considered an observer-
actor. The modelling activity for this thesis is taking an ‘engineering approach’, so
it stands to reason that this approach is first elucidated, prior to focusing on the
model of the ‘lingua democratica’ itself.
When reading the literature on the philosophical issues concerning engineering
science, one is usually faced with the awkward, if not apologetic undertones in the
relationships between engineering and science.17 Engineering is often considered an
instrumental, pragmatic or applied derivative of the ‘hard’ sciences, such as physics
or mathematics. However, more and more thinkers on technology are coming to
the conclusion that this narrative is fundamentally incorrect, the most obvious rea-
son being that techne, the forerunner of technology, is much older than theoria. As
science has, historically speaking, always been considered a branch of (Greek or
Western) philosophy, it would seem that technology preceded science and therefore
cannot be a derivative, at least when taken from an historical angle.18
The stance that will be taken here considers engineering to be a specific form of
craftsmanship, in which typically the organisation of human skills (i.e. team effort)
in the production of artefacts, is a defining characteristic.19
The distinction that is created by historically positioning engineering in the crafts
allows a convenient watershed between ‘making’ and ‘knowing’. In engineering,
and most contemporary activities that are performed by ‘professionals’ for that mat-
ter, the accent lies on the ‘making’; from ‘making artefacts’ for techies, to ‘making
people better’ for surgeons and nurses, and ‘making organisations more efficient
or profitable’ for business consultants. Following Procee, I will therefore often use
‘engineers’, ‘technologists’ and ‘professionals’ interchangeably, as they have many
things in common.
Science still tends to focus on ‘knowing’, even though nowadays science usu-
ally produces a lot of technology and sometimes begin companies and institutes that
focus on the production of their intellectual spin-offs. I will reserve (amongst oth-
ers) Bruno Latour’s term technoscience for these activities. One has to keep in mind
however, that these distinctions are merely for convenience, for there are no rigid
boundaries between them.20 For this reason I also prefer to not make a rigid distinc-
tion between techniques and technology. This distinction may be very important in
some analyses, but such distinctions become very fluid in the day to day practices
of engineering.21
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Technological innovation has always taken its own pace, from the moment our
forebears started weaving clothes and chipping spear-points from flint, or even from
a more distant past when a common ancestor that unites the primates discovered
how rocks can crack nutshells, and twigs can be used to eat ants and termites.22
Conversely, some major technologically innovative eras were those when theory
was in many ways particularly stagnant, such as the European ‘Dark Ages’.23
The American philosopher of technology Don Ihde considers the omission of
the autonomous nature of technology in the official scientific narratives to be the
result of a certain bias in science. This bias considers theory to be more important
or more essential than the practical side of technology. However, the ‘injection’ of
(mathematical) theory into praxes that was perfected by Isaac Newton —what is
now commonly known as the ‘experimental method’— can just as well be reversed.
One could also argue that techne liberated (natural) theory from a very stagnant vice
between ancient Greek philosophy and Christian dogma that had led to very little in
five centuries or so, at least with respect to development of natural philosophy.24
Such re-evaluations of the history of engineering and science are often neces-
sary because once-simple distinctions tend to become more opaque as science and
technology itself progresses. Probably this applies to any history, for paradoxically
enough, it would seem that nothing is more undetermined as our past.
Dichotomies such as ‘hard science’ versus ‘engineering’ are usually made with
the knowledge of hindsight. Current understanding is relocated in time according to
dividing lines that may not necessarily be wrong, but perhaps are ‘naive and simple-
minded’ in the sense of Feyerabend.25 The narrators are keen to draw a time-line
between current practices and the classical scientists, the Homo Universalis who
pondered the meaning of life with equal zeal as that they tinkered with experiments,
methodologies, art and discoveries. Somewhere along the way, these activities be-
came separated, resulting in specialisations along the dividing lines we know today,
the ‘hard’ or natural sciences, social sciences, the humanities and philosophy.
However, there was a time when someone like Leonardo da Vinci could paint and
sculpt with equal ease as making gliders and other contraptions. Christiaan Huy-
gens was renowned for his craftsmanship that improved telescopes and other instru-
ments. Baruch Spinoza was a lense-maker by trade. Were they scientists, engineers,
philosophers, professionals or craftsmen? Probably none of these, for only later
these terms got their current assignment. And how did these different roles influ-
ence the others? How did the almost meditative grinding of lenses shape Spinoza’s
thoughts? When did one become a philosopher by virtue of knowing the work of
other philosophers? When were art and technology severed from their common roots
in the crafts? When did craft become science?
Whatever the reasons or motivations may be to support the fact that contempo-
rary engineering is a valid academic enterprise, this status has resulted in reflection
on engineering as an scientific practice. Besides philosophical contemplation on the
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consequences of engineering and its effects of technological advancement in society,
there is also quite a lot of research on what engineering practices are, which include
management issues typical to engineering, such as project management. There is
quite a lot of literature on these matters, much of which is targeted for specific dis-
ciplines. In the specific case of software engineering, Bruegge and Dutoit consider
engineering a:26
∙ Modelling activity: engineers deal with complexity through modelling
∙ Problem-solving activity: is aimed to provide solutions for a problem
∙ Knowledge-acquisition activity: data about the problem and solution domain is
organised into information and formalised into knowledge
∙ Rationale driven activity: the context of decision-making and the rationale behind
these decisions are just as important as the knowledge they produce
The tools that an engineer can use are:
∙ Principles and Mechanisms. Principles are rules that are considered true within
a certain domain. For instance, Physics and Mathematics provide collections of
such principles. Mechanisms are a composition of principles aimed to solve a
specific problem or to describe occurring phenomena
∙ Notations: a graphical or textual set of rules for representing a model
∙ Methods: repeatable techniques for solving a specific problem. Methods are
closely related to mechanisms
∙ Methodologies: a collection of methods for solving a class of problems
The rationale of an engineering activity is captured by the following properties:
∙ Goals: high-level principles that guide the engineering activities
∙ Requirements: features that should be present in the result of the engineering
activities
∙ Constraints: limitations that can be identified in the engineering activities
Besides this, the engineering activities themselves are subject to planning and
control:
∙ Activities are a set of tasks that are performed towards a specific purpose
∙ Phases are activities termed as units of time
∙ Work products are artefacts produced during the engineering activities
∙ Deliverables are work products that are presented outside the scope of the engi-
neering activities (such as the development of knowledge)
∙ Milestones are important points in time during the engineering activities. They
are usually deliverables termed as units of time
The above, rigid list of engineering traits make one point very clear, and that is
the fact that ‘knowing’, for instance the problem or the solutions that are proposed,
is only one aspect of engineering activities. The knowledge on how human activities
cause a certain problem to be solved is itself very important, so the roads that lead
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to the eventual solution are just as important as the eventual product itself.
Besides this, engineering includes a large number of informal practices that de-
velop in any human enterprise. For instance, one of the ‘rules-of-thumb’ for any
engineer is that one should always opt for generic and simple solutions for a given
problem if this is possible. This variant on Occam’s razor has a very practical rea-
son, as it allows a presented solution to the problem to be used for a large set of
similar problems, and often improves the robustness of the solution as well. Given
a number of solutions to a specific problem, generality and simplicity are often the
decisive criteria for the eventual choice and are the cornerstones for good engineer-
ing practice.27
The particular enterprise of this research is likely to include quite a few reverse
engineering or refactoring activities. Most of the issues that will be covered deal
with matters that already exist, or that have already been discovered by others. In
fact, often extensive attention will be given to some topics that for some (or many)
may be obvious, not to say trivial, in the hope of finding a few hidden jewels there.
A reverse engineering activity may point out the more plausible explanations
of certain phenomena, amongst given alternatives. It can contribute by finding out
why things exist, which sequences of events enabled their creation, and why they
developed the characteristics they are believed to have. Reverse engineering can
therefore contribute to increasing the selectivity –to filter— amongst various ideas
and hypotheses. If various schools of thought develop around a certain theme, a
refactoring strategy may assist in finding out why this has happened, which implicit
framing guides the various ideas, and in which way bias guides the explanations.
Science often focuses on novelty, but sometimes it may be good to assess what has
been done so far and look back, with the knowledge that has been acquired.
More specifically, reverse engineering tries to organise a very specific historical
account of a certain theme, or its evolution. Depending on the theme that is being
researched, such an evolution is a process that may have progressed through mil-
lions of years and, along the way, has produced an impressive set of deliverables
and milestones. The (re-)engineer faces the task to reconstruct this process based
on the deliverables and milestones that can be identified. This approach limits the
solution space that the regular problem solving activity of engineering normally en-
tails. For instance, one cannot choose freely from available mechanisms, as some
of them may not have been available at some point of evolution. An anemone fish
cannot have existed before there were anemones! There may have been a fish that
had the potential of evolving into an anemone fish, but this potential could only be-
come effectual when the first colourful little tentacles of anemones popped up on
coral reefs. So here is one of those constraints that we have to deal with.28
Note that evolution in this sense provides an answer to many ‘chicken-and-egg’
problems. When taking evolution into account, the answer to this famous riddle
would be neither, as it is more likely that that there were proto-chickens and eggs
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that co-evolved to their contemporary forms. Evolution therefore simply breaks such
logical knots by introducing the aspect of perpetual novelty. A number of these will
be pointed out as we move along, but it is worth pointing out that logical paradoxes
or inconsistencies are often by-passed rather easily by practicality, by simply by not
adhering to the rules of the logical game.ii
My training as an engineer returns in this treatise in a preference for pragmatic,
analytical research. Although the analytical part will be welcomed by the more for-
mally inclined of the hard sciences, the pragmatism often will result in a loss of
(formal)‘exactness’, which is often a critique of hard scientists to engineering prac-
tices.29 However, it allows an engineer to cover larger ground, and becomes neces-
sary if the ‘lingua democratica for the public debate on genomics’ is to be covered
from a lateral cross-scientific angle that allows a connection with the social sciences
and the humanities. Rigour experiences friction with the need to keep oversight, and
a delicate balancing act between the two is needed.
Here I can follow the ideas of a new school of historians who are interested in
‘Big History’. As with all new schools, there is quite a lot of criticism on this ap-
proach, the most obvious being the enormous strides that these historians make in
order to cover their research interests. In all honesty, it would give me considerable
difficulty to draw a time-line from the Big Bang, the primeval soup, the wetlands of
the Euphrates and the Tigris, Tyrannosaurus Rex, oil, Alexander the Great, the cru-
sades, the Prophet Muhammad, the 1973 oil crisis to, say, our current involvement
in Iraq.
I do have some training however in identifying ‘similar patterns of transforma-
tion at every level’, as William McNeill writes in support of Big History in David
Christians ‘Maps of Time’.30 Moreover, I think that these patterns are vital in un-
derstanding complexity and therefore I have no other option than to progress along
this path. Therefore I will draw on a few tricks that engineers normally use to assist
in their ‘puss-in-boots’ approach in order to meet deadlines, budgets and those other
nasty things that stand in the way of ultimate perfection. In one sweep, this will also
address the issue of reductionism and holism as it is approached within engineering.
2.1 Appreciating Nuts and Bolts
The Eiffel Tower can be seen as a beautiful and romantic destination in the heart of
Paris. One may enjoy the views from the platforms, or marvel at the abstraction of
raw metal against the background of an historical metropolis. Such experiences will
ii I have never managed to do ‘get into’ the fascination of logical games, such as paradoxes, as
somehow I thought, even as a child, that the world of formal logic often is awfully restrictive. It
has therefore never become a strength as my High School grades can testify. Even though many
years of professional use of formalism have increased my admiration for people who master in
formal logical reasoning, it will probably have become clear that I still am rather fascinated with
heuristics, rules of thumb and intuitions that seem to effectively bypass the restrictions of games
of logic so easily
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not be affected by appreciating the triangular construction that provides the strength
needed to support the weight, and the consistent approach in applying this structure.
But I think that the visitor, and not just engineers alone, will experience a more
encompassing sensation when this knowledge is included in the visit.31
The form and shape of Eiffel Tower has not been a random one, but was a result
of the rigorous application of the Laws of Newtonian Mechanics, and time itself
has proven the success in doing so. Anticipating matters that will be discussed at a
later stage, a good engineer should and usually will appreciate this aspect of formal
rigour. This rigour forces a methodology of logical steps of cause and effect, which
also helps in predicting the direction of the next steps.
In the specific case of engineering, this approach is reflected in the construc-
tion process. One can only build new things from existing materials and if these
fall short of the aims and goals that one has, the intermediate materials first have
to be developed before continuing further. This makes the construction a narrator
of its own history. This history does not tell the same story as a regular historian
would. One can read about Gustave Eiffels youth and his family life, or his struggle
with Parisian bureaucrats, investors, weather and deadlines. One can even read the
blueprints and the logs of the Eiffel Tower when it was being built. But the tower
itself tells its construction history, from the anchoring in the ground, the four legs
that makes up its base, to the fluent compaction of the available area as the tower
gets higher until the structure converges to the bell-like shape at the top. It tells the
story of design decisions that survived competition with others and resulted in a, for
that time unparalleled, construction destined to impress the audience of the 1889
Exposition Universelle, an international fair held in Paris that coincided with the
first centennial of the French Revolution. It also tells the story of a building that,
despite the more temporal aims of its constructors, has managed to withstand world
wars, pollution and the policies of the city council, as an icon of the achievements
of our ancestors of the Industrial Age.
Such an evolutionary narrative often forces one to reconsider the difference be-
tween that what is considered ‘important’ and what are considered ‘details’. The
evolution of any construction tends from small parts towards larger composites of
such parts, from older, well-known, and therefore often ‘obvious’ parts, to novel,
‘interesting’ ones. Such a difference invites a certain callousness to ‘details’ and,
especially in engineering, this can be a very risky attitude. Such callousness can
meet severe punishment, for one crucial bolt that is forgotten, or a miscalculation
of fractions of millimetres may already spell disaster.iii This is a crucial difference
between theory and practices, as theory often can afford to omit ‘details’ and get
away with it. This may yield certain aesthetics and elegance in the theories or, more
practically, allow for a better focus on the essential characteristics that one may want
to draw attention to, but it is and remains a reduction and introduces a bias between
‘essences’ and ‘details’.
iii As anyone who has seen an episode of ‘Minutes from Disaster’ on Discovery or National Geo-
graphic Channel can see
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Thus respect for details is vital in practices. Neglecting them not only blinds ob-
servation of the obvious, but also at a more practical level may cause inductions
of observed phenomena to diverge in other directions than which may be factually
correct.
I find myself in good company with my respect for (big) history and trivia, for no
other than the late Stephen Jay Gould begins his magnificent legacy, ‘The Structure
of Evolutionary Theory’ with an extensive reflection on the importance of history
and details to his topic of interest. The title in itself holds a promise for the inter-
ested engineer, for ‘structure’ suggests that evolution is a construction process, a
playground for engineers.32
In his opening statement, Gould observes that:
The statement that God (or the Devil in some versions) dwells in the details must rank
among the most widely cited intellectual witticisms of our time.33
This may of course, be known by many, but Gould extends another helping hand
only a few pages later when he introduces Hull’s view on the history of ideas:
[. . . ]as a narrative of entities in historical continuity, rather than as a disconnected chronol-
ogy of tidbits admitted into a class only by sufficient formal similarity within an abstract
ideological archetype34
He extends this notion with the concept of essences; the hard, identifiable basic
concepts that anchor a theory, to defend the title of his book and with that, the core
premise of his argumentation.
However, the itinerary we embark on here should eventually lead to the ‘Lingua
Democratica for the Genomics Debate’. One cannot spend infinite time on structur-
ing detail on detail, especially with such a fleeting issue as the opinio commonalis
of Genomics. The approach of the social sciences and humanities, to take the evo-
lution for granted, draw a line in the sand, and pursuing the matter from that point
forward may be much more practical. Gould faced the same problem and proposed
a ‘Goldilockian’ approach as guiding principle between too many (details) and too
little (essence). It is here also that engineering can provide clues on how to engage
in this.
2.2 Composition and Decomposition
The friction between essence and details is mirrored in those on the differences be-
tween reductionist versus holistic approaches that was discussed earlier. Following
Morin, one can already see that both tend to reduce information; reductionism the
whole for the parts and holism the parts for the whole. Actually, one might state
that the only difference between them, at least when they are pursued in a naive
fashion, is the accents that an observer wants to put on subject matter. Whether it is
the ‘parts’ or the ‘whole’, both introduce a bias between‘essences’ and ‘details’. It
should also be noted that this is inevitable when an observer has to work with lim-
ited knowledge; it is impossible to take every detail in account, and yet, if one would
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really want to pursue an agenda of all-encompassing knowledge of our life-world,
then this is the agenda one should aim for!
For this reason alone, any intellectual activity on a complex theme should ac-
knowledge the problem of limited knowledge, for this gives details their due respect.
They are not unimportant, rather they cannot be known because there is too much of
them. With this, reductionism has become inevitable. The problem of fragmentation
in science also, for knowledge must organise around pockets of ‘essences’ in a vast
sea of details.35
The first thing one has to realise is that observation is one of the sources of this
distinction. Observation has the characteristic of bias, which guides the observa-
tions, and focus (or amplification), which allows a clear view on that what is focused
on. Focus assists the observer to see things clearly, but at the expense of losing sight
on that what is beyond and around it.
The controversies between holistic and reductionist approaches can therefore be
partially resolved by looking at what the ultimate organs of observation –our eyes—
actually do. Our eyes are shifting focus all the time, and try to make a more com-
plete picture by gluing the different images together in a coherent fashion, often
completing it with illusions to complete the puzzle.36
Because of this, the observation of a complex theme requires holism and reduc-
tionism. Most of all, the act of observation requires motion. Instead of one or the
other, it becomes a matter of continuously focusing and shifting between internal
and external positions.
In engineering, and for that fact all those disciplines that cannot afford to discard
details, issues involving reductionism and holism are subject to the more important
practices of decomposition and composition.
Here reductionism and holism become tools which guide the construction pro-
cess. Both assist in the decomposition of a structure, by identifying and isolating
its sub-components and connecting them to the systems-mathematical domain, or
to other areas where one can rely upon ‘truths’ of logical inductions, the merits of
others, or working practices that have proven their worth by historical attest. Such
decomposition is often termed ‘top-down approach’, as it starts from as-is observa-
tions and gradually works its way down to the smallest components of the structure.
Composition is the counterpart of the previous process, and is the building activ-
ity of engineering. Starting from the bottom, small and well-known components are
selected and put together to build larger structures. Certain holistic approaches may
assist in keeping a focus on the expected results of this activity, while reduction-
ist approaches assist in keeping the construction activities secured and anchored in
what has been realised at a certain point. Composition and decomposition thus add
dynamics to the modelling activities.
In the fuzzy mix between essences and details, the essential will always lead to
reductionism, whether this reductionism is vigilantly pursued, or cloaked in equally
reductionist methods that are termed as their contradiction, such as holism or plu-
rality. Only processes that move between these two can cover, to some extent, the
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‘reality’ that lies between them. Thus ‘essences’ become subject to process, and are
the pragmatic markers of continuous exploration.
2.3 Minimal Requirements
If knowledge is assumed to be limited by definition, the resulting ‘blindness’ to de-
tails is very fundamental to any epistemological activity. In the particular case of
engineering this will affect the construction activities. Composition and decompo-
sition will be subject to this blindness, and lead to fragile constructions.
This, however, usually does not seem to be the case. The Eiffel Tower is still
standing, planes do not drop out of the sky, and bridges do not collapse, habitually.
Apparently there are some ways to overcome this blindness.
The practice of engineering experiences continuous tensioniv between the re-
quirement of formal correctness it shares with the hard sciences, and the empirical
observations and limitations of inherent complex systems it shares with the human-
ities. In order to cope with this tension in a sphere of limited time and resources,
a highly pragmatic approach has evolved that incorporates historical elements with
a practice of decomposition to minimal requirements, which is expected to solve a
certain problem.
One trick that engineers often use to attain a ‘puss-in-boots’ perspective in the
rigid world of logic formalism is to trade exactness with minimal requirements.
It is quite possible to calculate with extreme precision the size of the bolts that
are required at certain levels of the Eiffel Tower. However, an oversized (over-
dimensioned) bolt is likely to be easier to estimate and probably cheaper, as a stan-
dardised, larger bolt is less expensive than a smaller customised one, and equally
fit for its designated task. The most important advantage of this approach is that
formal logic based on minimal requirements is still formally correct. Inductions
based on minimal specifications of logic still lead to formally correct conclusions.
Of course, there is a drawback to over-sizing, which is that this cannot be done in-
finitesimally. Usually, the used components are only slightly oversized with respect
to the minimum requirements. This approach of ‘minimal requirements’ is likely to
be used quite extensively in this treatise. For instance, when talking of something
like ‘meaning’, I will start by using this in a very restrained way, namely ranking (of
data). With this I do not disbar the infinitely more complex levels of meaning that
have puzzled generations of philosophers, but I do claim that these more complex
variants still have this elementary quality of ranking.
In order to appreciate this perspective, it may be worthwhile to see what makes
formal logic so extremely powerful, and why its practitioners develop a somewhat
iv ‘Tension’ is more correct than ‘friction’ in this particular case, as these two are ultimately con-
nected
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different language than non-practitioners, often leading to all kinds of misconcep-
tions.
Terms and definitions used in the hard sciences and in technology often serve
modest claims, as they are mainly used as tokens for mathematical or logical con-
structs. This relationship between the phenomenon and its token is two-fold; on one
side it implies that the token adheres to its logical description, but also that the to-
ken stands for exactly that logical description it represents. One example I found out
‘the hard way’ is for instance the way engineers (and scientists) use the word ‘be-
haviour’. In this treatise the word behaviour is used according to its usual definition
in systems theory, which is ‘an observed response of a system to a given input’. If
I observe my hand retreating from a heat source, then this apparently is my hands
behaviour if exposed to high temperatures. Similarly, if my hand is exposed to high
temperatures, its behaviour is a retreating motion away from the source of the heat,
and nothing more! Every induction as to the why and how of this behaviour (Pavlo-
vian reaction, instinctive neural reaction, etc.) is not included in the definition, let
alone its moral and ethical consequences (‘Is it good and proper for me to expose
my hand to such extreme temperatures?’). Such inductions, however valid they may
be, for good reasons fall outside the scope of the definition. In mathematical or tech-
nical systems, every definition has to connect to its logical source, in the strict sense
of the word, as in ‘complying to rules of logic’. This guarantees that every defini-
tion and induction made remains logically valid, and every construction made with
these definitions remains anchored in a logically closed system. In other words, if
every entity consists of logical truths, the entire construction of these entities is also
logically true. This is the cornerstone of mathematical practice, which produces and
validates such logically closed components that can be used to make superstructures
that remain logically ‘true’.
Engineering is highly indebted to this practice, and will rely on this whenever
possible. However, engineering focuses on creating tangible complex constructions
in scarce time and with scarce resources, and cannot afford to wait for the inherent
slow progress of the construction of logical truths, if this is at all possible. Engi-
neering is, above all, a pragmatic discipline, and can and will use heuristics, the
merits of individuals who stand in high regard, historical ‘best practices’ or ‘proven
technology’ in their creative endeavours. Usually ‘truth’ will catch up and eventu-
ally provide solid proof for the effectiveness of these practices. Bricks, cement and
mortar were used in building construction long before the chemical ‘truths’ of these
materials were discovered. Logical truth is not a prerequisite for using such materi-
als and the legacy of engineering is, rather than formal logic, founded on heuristics
and best practices. Here again practices usually precede theory!
Definitions in engineering are often minimal prerequisites for certain inductions,
therefore enlarging the strict definitions of exactness, without contaminating the
logical essence of the definition. This allows ‘behaviour’ to contain social or ethical
intonations, but within the strict context of a definition. For instance, in the research
of so-called Rational Agents, the very ‘human’ terms of ‘belief’, ‘desire’ and ‘in-
61
tentions’ have become tokens for logical equations (BDI-logic) used by (software)
entities that can collaborate to pursue common goals. This approach does not imply
that human beliefs, desires, intentions are captured in this BDI-logic. By definition,
BDI-logic restricts the use of these words to logical constructs and leaves humans
out of its scope.37
This does not mean that we, as human beings, cannot learn anything from these
rational agents. In many ways, networks of these agents are a model of some aspects
of our society, and certain observed phenomena will have their equivalents in our
world. But these projections are to be pursued with care, as there is no one-to-one
relationship between the world of rational agents and us humans.
However, the world of rational agents is likely to uncover some of the minimal re-
quirements needed to facilitate certain phenomena on beliefs, desires and intentions
in human society. At least some aspects may be quite similar.
Engineering practice spends much time in specifying these minimal requirements
and bases its inductions on such sets. The logical inductions are of the kind: ‘this
phenomenon at least requires such and such elements to effectuate it’ or, to return to
the example of the hand, ‘the behaviour of our hand at least consists of withdrawal
from a heat source’. This allows an engineer to take larger steps in construction pro-
cess, whilst retaining a strong foothold in logical truths.
This approach is, I think, significantly different to that of the social sciences and
the humanities, which are anchored in, amongst many others, (empirical) observa-
tion, argumentation, heuristics and merits of others. And in the case of the social
sciences of course also statistics, which takes an in-between position between for-
mal logic and traditional research in the humanities.
Although this approach has its strengths, it holds a risk when engaging in a train
of inductions from such an anchor point, especially if there is a historical element to
the topic such as with evolutionary systems. Even though such a historical process
may be non-linear, the line between two historical references is likely to provide
clues in which direction correct inductions will progress. Puss-in-Boots, despite his
giant strides, still follows a coherent path through the world of formal logic and does
not dance over the forest’s canopy in an erratic fashion. For instance, if a certain
phenomenon is recognised at a certain stage of evolution, it is also likely to occur
at progressive stages and even if this assumption may be falsified at some point, it
should initiate serious analysis of the causes of such an anomaly.
2.4 Bias and Focus
The ‘minimal requirements approach’ may cover some of the ‘blind spots’ of lim-
ited knowledge, but it still does not cover all the possible blind spots that limited
knowledge brings in. Of course we humans have the quality of ‘consciousness’. We
can be conscious of our limitations, reflect on them, and to some extent anticipate
the consequences. However, despite these, it seems to lead to an interesting para-
doxical loop; can an agent with blind spots know its own blind spots?
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If an agent would know its blind spots, something could be done to resolve this,
but then there would eventually be no more blind spots, which is unlikely because
of the premise of limited knowledge.
It is here that a first pattern can be put into play, which is the ‘bias’ mentioned
earlier.38 A bias usually relates to a certain preference for something, for instance a
preference for essences over details as was discussed previously. Bias in the way it
will be used here is a systems-internal skewing of available data, that allows some
(observed) data to stand out with respect to others. Note that bias is often implicit;
it is very, very hard, if not impossible to give details their due credit, because they
are not in focus. Therefore bias is a very powerful organising mechanism, and in
observation it is even very important as it allows one to focus on things. However,
it also introduces certain risks. Don Ihde, the American philosopher of technology,
for instance, sees certain bias in the philosophy and science:
[. . . ] the linkage of philosophy and science might be termed theory-biased with respect to
its self-interpretations39
With the result that blind spots remain opaque:
Theory seldom reveals its own implications.40
Self-reflection inherently biases that what is reflected the best. Weaknesses tend to
be obliterated in the glare of that what has focus.
As a result, the rest runs the risk of becoming ‘details’; the pockets of knowl-
edge in the sea of details become more and more undulated, while the sea seems to
become flatter and flatter.
This means that any argumentation, theory, idea, hypothesis or other intellectual
activity can only say something about that what it focuses on. Something can only
be said about the islands, and nothing of the sea, and this is often –understandably
though erroneously— forgotten! If new theories are based on older ones, even when
they criticise them, bias will percolate through the production system, and often even
will be amplified. This effect can often be seen in historical narratives, where certain
events or people who are considered important in a certain era, become more and
more glorified and unique, with respect to other developments that happen at the
same time, or other people who also make significant contributions.41
For this reason alone, any theorist should have a basic understanding of systemic
dynamics, and not logic alone, because these dynamics influence the style of their
argumentation and the way the arguments will evolve. Theories are the results of
a production system, which are guided by effects of bias and amplification in the
production of theories.
Bias and amplification are patterns because —at least, this is the claim here—
they return in a lot of different areas. They are constraints that affect any observer
operating with limited knowledge.42
However, the effects of bias and amplification are also well-known. They are
known in electronics, and if Ihde is correct, also affect our intellectual endeavours.
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To some extent, these patterns can be known because they are patterns, as they
already manifest themselves in relatively simple things.
As bias and amplification also return in technical devices, it would seem that
they move beyond realms where one can speak of ‘observers’ in the proper sense,
to simpler forms where one might simply speak of ‘detection’ of input signals. This
correspondence between the simpler forms and more complex manifestations offer
a window to understand how these patterns work.43
With this rather coarse introduction of patterns, the issue of plurality can now
be addressed using a ‘pattern-oriented approach’. In this case, a somewhat more
elaborate pattern will be used.
3 A Pattern of Organised Complexity
Gerald Weinberg, an advocate of ‘General Systems Thinking’ has identified a pat-
tern which demonstrates a relationship between randomness and complexity.44
Fig. 1 Relationship Between Complexity and Randomness
Figure 1 shows a relationship between ‘complexity and randomness’ and is a
generalisation of the lessons of some four centuries of research in physics. Histor-
ically speaking, physics developed two important mainstreams. One followed the
experiments, and the empirical and analytical methodology of Isaac Newton. Typi-
cally, this research concentrated on interactions between relatively few objects that
had a few, usually causal, relationships.
The second mainstream developed from the study of gases. Here the subject con-
sisted of an extremely large amount of heavily interacting particles, where the type
of interactions are usually rather straightforward. These can be best described with
statistical means, and therefore this field is now usually called statistical mechanics.
In the figure above, deterministic physics is represented by the plane called ‘or-
ganised simplicity’, and according to Weinberg, problems of this kind can best be
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studied by analytical means. The plane with a large amount of randomness is called
‘unorganised complexity’ and can best be evaluated statistically. What remains is
the white plane of ‘organised complexity’, which has proven to be the most diffi-
cult area to tackle. In technical areas, only recently the tools and theory have been
developed which are needed to progress in this plane. In this respect, scientific evo-
lution can be considered a progression from organised simplicity and unorganised
complexity into organised complexity.
Now just suppose that Weinberg’s graph also applies to the production of theo-
ries, hypotheses, ideas and other intellectual seedlings! In this case, there will be two
extremes, of which one is based on relatively few, strongly related methodological
paradigms, while the other extreme would consist of a plethora of loosely related
theories that are weakly coupled and are based on a lot of different, highly unrelated
paradigms of certain themes. Of the first, the development can thus best be under-
stood through analytical means, while the other extreme can only be understood by
statistical means.
With this, the problems related to reductionism and plurality immediately fill the
planes. When applied to theories, ideas and hypotheses, Weinberg’s graph basically
introduces a relationship between the complexity of a certain theme and the means
one has to understand it.
In an analytical setting, reductionism can be an extremely powerful means of
modelling, but it runs into limitations when a theme becomes more complex. A
rigid form of unification would at best apply to themes within the plane of organ-
ised simplicity. If one accepts the human being in all its facets as being anything but
a manifestation of organised simplicity, it becomes clear that the humanities critique
that science tends to be reductionist, might rather be that reductionism is applied to
the wrong themes. For instance, some social and economic theories describe a hu-
man being as a utilitarian, rational, goal-maximising entity. This reduction may be
worthwhile, but this should not be mistaken with the reverse assertion, which would
define the human being as such. At best one can say that a human being may at least
have these traits, but it may be even more correct to assume that this only sometimes
is the case.45
Pluralistic approaches on the other hand, will be inevitable when addressing ex-
tremely complex themes, but a naive plurality that tends to an attitude where ‘any-
thing goes’ would do little to bring coherence to the various contributions, resulting
–like any rigid approach to unification— to a movement away from the complexity
of a theme. If a theme or phenomenon is described by a plethora of widely differ-
ent approaches which have little mutual coherence, then it quickly becomes almost
impossible to relate the various points of view, perspectives and angles with each
other. Within specialist domains, this may not necessarily be a problem, but for out-
siders –and this applies for most of the stakeholders of that theme— the resulting
multi-variety quickly becomes impossible to asses.
As an example, take the following interpretation of hermeneutics:
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[. . . ] there is no other possibility to determine the position of hermeneutics, which means
to say how hermeneutics aims to set itself against any means of analytical thought; how it
aims to position the specific manner of interpretation of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ against
the natural sciences, and how hermeneutics puts the finite nature of interpretations into play
against the claims of rationality by the heirs of enlightenment
And a bit later:
Thus hermeneutics is continuously in debate [. . . ] of course there is no such thing as ‘the’
hermeneutics, but rather that hermeneutics itself [. . . ] takes a kaleidoscope of views [. . . ]46
Without aiming to criticise such a pluralistic approach as a means to advance knowl-
edge in the humanities –I am not qualified to make such an assessment—, it is clear
that such approaches can only be understood by specialists who are willing to ac-
quaint themselves with all these interpretations and who can mutually compare and
assess them.
Within the lingua democratica, we are dealing with stakeholders who do not
have the time, the means, and often the will to acquaint themselves with all these
interpretations. They will have to rely on specialists who are willing to summarise
all these interpretations for them, but as these summaries are ‘just’ interpretations
themselves, the whole project fails for these stakeholders, even before it is started.
For an external observer, these interpretations run the risk of becoming totally mean-
ingless.
The willingness that stakeholders will have to acquaint themselves in a certain
theme, such as technology, will always be motivated by specific concerns or inter-
ests. In other words, there is already an intrinsic bias that will guide the selection of
the various interpretations. The most likely dynamics will therefore see a reinforce-
ment of ideas that were there from the start. Stronger minds may try to acquaint
themselves with ideas that contradict their own, but if these are phrased in a vocab-
ulary that is extremely hard for them to follow, then this becomes a daunting task.
This is a problem of any theory; as was mentioned earlier, theories tend to be elitist.
A stakeholder’s ability to choose amongst these interpretations will therefore be
compromised by a number of limitations.
First, if multiple interpretations are mutually contradictory then it becomes impos-
sible to differentiate in the resulting horizon of interpretations without additional
criteria. Note that this is amplified by the fact that various interpretations tend to
be formed through the act of criticism (on existing interpretations), which tends to
focus on differences between interpretations rather than on synthesising them.
Second, plurality is compromised by the fact that every interpretation of a certain
theme puts a strain on available time and resources.
Pluralistic approaches thus tend to require specialists who can devote their time
to understanding a certain theme, and this is not what one may expect from the other
stakeholders. As a result, professionals will tend to favour those interpretations that
already support their own biases, or they will favour the condensed information
provided by the media, with all the risk related to Morin’s ‘mass ignorance’ quoted
earlier.
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If a non-specialist faces multifarious interpretations of a certain theme, such as
discourses on technology which span a horizon from extreme optimism to utter
gloom, this will result in interpretations that, for that observer, are totally meaning-
less.47 They will either ‘take sides’ with positions that they already uphold –which
is not probably not the intention of such debates— or they will not acquaint them-
selves with these debates at all.
Unchecked, naive plurality may end up producing theory gas, a plethora of highly
unrelated ideas, thoughts and interpretations around certain themes that cannot be
mutually assessed or compared, that may be contradictory and offer no guidance to
rank one interpretation over the other. Theory gas is that point when plurality be-
comes ‘anything goes’, when multiple interpretations becomes statistics. Therefore
plurality should be countered by processes that keep them in check. At a later stage,
a few possibilities will be discussed to achieve this, but for the purposes here, the
main issue is that any call for ‘plurality’ without balance and counterbalance is not
likely to sort any effect for interested outsiders.48
The underlying problem of plurality is that of ranking. In a world of observers
with limited knowledge, and limited means of acquiring and maintaining knowl-
edge, any intellectual activity that asks for time, attention and resources, experi-
ences friction with other activities, however mundane they may be. The ability of an
observer to absorb information is therefore a defining characteristic that constrains
plurality. The observer determines when plurality becomes theory gas.
The question thus becomes, when a certain approach becomes naive? If every
production system creates its own blindness, then there is no longer a privileged
vantage point that can oversee everything. In fact, it is the ‘everything’ that usually
seems to demarcate the difference between usefulness and naivety. Theorists — or
probably, the most zealous of their followers— may have for long thought that their
theories and frameworks apply for ‘everything’, so that ‘everything’ becomes exis-
tentialist, reductionist, Freudian, post-structuralist or interpreted. The practitioner’s
point of view may rather see these a collection of cognitive tools, that are best ap-
plied for certain themes or problems. A theorist then becomes truly a master of her
or his ideas when s/he can make clear what that theory does not, or cannot address.
3.1 Information Overload
There is another reason why the problem of ranking has become more pressing in
the last fifty years or so, and that is, amongst others, sheer demographics. Opinions
are no longer the privilege of the few, and currently anyone can give their opinion
on technology –or any other theme for that matter— in books, blogs, tweets, arti-
cles and columns. If there is anything that has become plentiful in the past decades
–probably for the first time in history—, it is the availability of information, ideas
and opinions of a wide variety of people.49 In this state of continuous information-
overload, plurality and inspiration are not the issue; it is rather the problem of co-
67
herence.
Currently opinions, theories and ideas are finding themselves in stiff competition
with those of the many others that manage to claim a forum to express their ideas,
in the blogospheres, wikispheres, twitterspheres and snail media. In this world of
information slush, plurality is all around us. Such a world asks for selections.
It is the irony of our time that so many people are able to express their talents –
or lack of it— in the public sphere, while at the same time it means very little,
because so many people can do this. Weinbergs pattern of organised complexity
shows, I think, why this is the case. Unrestrained divergence inevitably leads to
meaninglessness, while convergence leads to rigidness and exclusion. A meaningful
world, is a world that manages to balance between these forces, on the delicate tight-
rope of organised complexity.
In this respect, I think that science is correct in being cautious with respect to al-
lowing external criticism to become actual change. New approaches, methodologies
and paradigms should not throw away the child with the bath-water.
At this point, we have ‘folded back’ to the theme of complexity. One may now
conclude that reductionism, holism, plurality and probably any other theme may
have a naive variant. Following Morin, it may become clear that the actual under-
lying problem is that of complexity. If stakeholders with different backgrounds and
vocations are to assemble around a shared theme in the plane of organised complex-
ity, then there will be a friction between the need to do justice to the themes that fill
this plane, and the simplicity that is required to share knowledge and experiences
amongst the parties involved. This is the challenge of this particular contribution to
the ‘lingua democratica’.
4 Wrapping Up
In this chapter, a number of patterns were introduced, and have been applied in a
discussion on reductionism, holism and plurality. At its core, this discussion aimed
to argue, with Morin, that these concepts largely miss the point. The point is ‘com-
plexity’.
It was argued that knowing a certain theme, introduces a relationship between
the ‘knowing’ agent and the characteristics of the theme itself, and with Weinberg’s
pattern, these themes can now be seen as taking up a place in a plane drawn by
complexity and randomness.
If one accepts that the lingua democratica deserves a place in the plane of organ-
ised complexity, then the following chapters aim to chart a pathway from organised
simplicity —that is from the plane that the natural sciences traditionally have under-
stood very well—, into that area where the ‘lingua democratica’ would be located,
that is, where there are ‘stakeholders’ and ‘debates’. This is an area that traditionally
has been the domains of the social sciences and the humanities. Similar endeavours
from these domains may help to create constructive connections with the analytical
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domains, in order to address increasingly complex themes. This means that this un-
dertaking is not only an analysis of the ‘problem’ of the ‘lingua democratica’, but is
also itself an attempt to achieve this.
One of the major problems for such a cross-scientific undertaking is, that it
hinges on a delicate balance between the desire for rigour that has traditionally
been strongly developed in the analytical domains, and the inherent complexity of
the themes that traditionally has challenged the social sciences and the humanities.
If complexity requires approaches that transcend the traditional mono-disciplinary
attitudes in science and philosophy, then it also forces one to consider new forms of
‘semi- or quasi-strictness’ that does justice to that complexity.
At this point, this raises a number of questions. One is whether this enterprise is
possible, another is how one might approach this task and last, why the suggested ap-
proach may actually achieve its intended goals. The following chapter will address
the ‘how’ question, and will propose to set up a workshop based on a co-evolution
of complexity, methodology and patterns, as preparation for this exploration into
organised complexity.
Chapter 3
A Workshop of Complexity
So far, the explorations on a lingua democratica between technology and society
would make it seem that technologists, and especially the techno-positivist breed,
are not going to be very impressed with concerns raised by the humanities, as the
biases and focal points that guide these criticisms are not shared by these technol-
ogists. Besides (and because of) this, the vocabularies are mutually incompatible.
Plurality, subjectivity, and relativism may all be very important for the humanities,
but it is my guess that argumentations based on these concepts will not really change
the mindsets of those who think that everything’s going just fine.
In this chapter, a start will be made to develop a vocabulary that might contribute
to a somewhat more inclusive angle. This vocabulary, as was mentioned earlier, is
based on ‘complexity’ and ‘patterns’, as I think that these pivotal concepts may in
themselves be fairly acceptable as departure points for both technologists as well
as the humanities. Weinberg’s pattern of organised complexity made it clear that
the challenge is going to be to explore the Himalayas of organised complexity from
two opposed planes, which, put a bit radically, map to traditional (op)positions of
academic enquiry. On one side, traditional analytical approaches may have to be
loosened up a bit. I think that this is already being addressed in some areas, and
especially the computer as a modelling tool has already allowed significant progress
in this direction. In fact, probably the computer has been the predominant tool in
understanding complexity in the latter half of the previous century or so.
From the other plane, the rash use of plurality as a sort of all-healing elixir based
subjectivism and relativism may be running into a boundary of scale. This does not
necessarily mean that these terms have lost their significance, but complexity may
show how subtly they operate, and that the problem has rather been the implicit as-
sumption that subjectivism is opposed to objectivism, and relativism to universality.
On both sides, there are many researchers who are currently exploring such
boundaries, usually because they feel that they hit a wall where traditional ap-
proaches seem to lose their effect. Complexity seems a recurrent theme in all these
explorations, and for this reason alone it is worth taking as a point of departure. In
fact, we are embarking on a long journey from the plane of organised simplicity
into the rugged, mountainous landscapes of organised complexity. On this journey,
patterns will play a determining part. They will come as we move along, but first
complexity itself needs to be addressed in more detail.
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1 Introducing Complexity
The theme of complexity already reflects the modesty that most researchers in this
field host. There are no ‘theories’ or ‘frameworks’, just complexity, complexity
thinking and complex (adaptive) systems. Currently, research in complexity seems
to form a ‘bricollage’ of at best loosely related dialects, which include chaos theory,
evolution theory, fractals, computational (artificial) intelligence, cybernetics, vari-
ous network theories, and so on. Any attempt to organise all these contributions is
going to be a rather complex activity in itself.1
As a starting metaphor, complexity thinking could be considered a rugged land-
scape in which a meandering river flows. This river has quite a lot of branches which
flow from the various complexity dialects. In the next chapter, I will aim to demon-
strate that this river has a name; ‘feedback’. This river will be followed downstream
until we reach the place where we can say something about the lingua democratica.
But first, the source must be charted, and this, as the source of any river, is enough
cause of uncertainty and dispute.
Coarsely stated, complexity thinking takes positions in between two extremes.
One extreme considers complexity to be a new challenge that will eventually be
more or less understood by science. This positivist stance sees complexity as being
a natural next step in understanding nature, and seeks theoretical and practical tools
and methods to assist in this exploration beyond mechanical causality, determinism
and reductionism. The ‘Santa Fe school’ of complexity thinkers are more or less
proponents of this stance.2
The other extreme is much less optimistic. Complexity, in this view, is the ac-
knowledgement that we can never fully understand our world, and that every at-
tempt to do so is fundamentally impossible. They consider a positivist approach to
complexity inherently limited, and use terms such as ‘restricted’ complexity to char-
acterise such attempts.3
As may be expected, a middle ground will be taken here as this is where the in-
teresting friction space between these oppositions can be found. There are a number
of arguments to support this stance.
First, the limitations of human understanding do not necessarily mean that we
should become paralysed. Engineering sciences, and any other discipline with a
strong operational focus for that matter, tend to operate in provisional and fleet-
ing environments and have developed means to deal with this, most notably a very
pragmatic attitude towards ‘truth’ and ‘knowing’.
Second, the friction between knowing and not-knowing that complexity intro-
duces requires one to consider those aspects that may be known (which follows the
positivist attitude), as this is the only road one can travel. It is also important to
relate this to that which will never be known.
Therefore, complexity will be considered an exploration in uncharted terrain,
from the safe premises of the hard sciences and the system dialects into the ambigu-
ous world beyond!
71
1.1 Setting Things Straight
When considering complexity, it is highly likely that an ‘at least’ perspective is
required, as was introduced previously. If complexity means that a complex theme
can never be completely known, one can at least start iterating around that which
one can know. This, of course, already unearths an epistemological mine-field, for
immediately philosophers will jump onto the discussion and ask what one can know
and how one knows.
It is probably a fairly safe premise that that human beings can store something
in their minds that corresponds in some way with sensory data or qualia, which can
also be recalled.4
Provisionally, that ‘what is stored in our brains’ will be called a model and, bor-
rowing terminology from research on metaphors, that what the model represents a
target.5
As a pragmatist, the famous maxim from project management will be followed:
‘good is good enough’.6 It is of little use to reason into ever finer details, when
there is little to gain from such an exercise. It is the prerogative of the observer
to determine the granularity of the model that will be made. If a crude model is
sufficient for whatever criteria the modelling is performed, then it is of little use to
delve deeper. The only reason for doing so is when model and target are in conflict.
This balancing act between‘too much and too little’ is sometimes captured by the
Medawar zone.7
Fig. 1 Medawar Zone
In the above figure, a relationship is depicted between the payoff of modelling
activities and the complexity of the model. Too much model complexity tends to
reduce the payoff beyond a certain optimum because the explanative power of the
model is no longer increased. Too crude models on the other hand may not yield
any interesting information about the target. Note that the Medawar zone implic-
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itly takes an observer-centric approach, which is more evident in the original graph
proposed by Craig Loehle [154], where ‘model complexity’ was replaced by ‘diffi-
culty’. At some point, there is little more to learn, or conversely complexity of the
target is beyond the reach of the (cognitive) tools at an observer’s disposal. In this
respect, as complexity goes, the Medawar zone predicts the end of a linear view
on learning and intelligence. It is not necessarily true that the more one learns the
‘brighter’ one becomes, or the more one will know about a certain theme. Things
are more complex than that.
Suppose you are walking with someone one evening under the brilliance of a
beautifully starry night. As you look up you see an exceptionally bright star and say,
”Look, what a bright star!”
In one scenario your companion looks up and agrees, ”That’s true, it’s a beautiful
star”.
Here we face one target (the bright speck of light in the night sky) and two models
which are distributed over two brains. Both models correspond in some way with
something we call ‘star’, and apparently there is mutual agreement that there is a
correspondence between the target and ‘star’.
In scenario two, your companion is an astronomer, who grunts and says, ”That’s
not a star; it’s a nebula!”
It is clear that the agreement of scenario one fails in this case. The astronomer
even contradicts your claim. Somehow the internal model of the astronomer is tuned
in some way to disagree. The most likely reason for this is that she has more knowl-
edge about the target and can differentiate more precisely between a ‘star’ and a
‘nebula’. If you accept your companion’s authority on these matters, your claim
might even have been falsified.8
The correspondence between model and target is apparently related to matching
certain aspects of the target with that of the model. If the match is made with a
very crude model, then you will get different results than when the model is very
sophisticated. The correspondence between target and model is one of certain equiv-
alence, but the assertion ‘the target is a star’ is only ‘true’ when the target matches
certain aspects of the model. The truth is therefore not ‘out there’, as the X-files
would have us believe, but rather ‘in there’. It is a derivative of a matching activity.
It is production rule of the type: ”if target matches model then true else false”. In
other words, we can at least assert one kind of truth that is based on matching things.
However, it had become clear that apparently some models trigger a ‘true’ and
others a ‘false’. Apparently different models result in different assertions, but in
both cases the observers only see a little shiny speck of light. Part of the model
will correspond with it, but apparently other things are included to complete the
picture of whether it is a ‘star’ or a ‘nebula’. A model can thus be split up into
two elements; something that represents the target, and something that provides
additional information to complete the picture. I will call the first aspect concept
and the second the context of the concept. The context is built up internally in the
observer’s mind, while the concept captures the correspondence with the target.
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Now, assertions about a concept can be ‘true’ or ‘false’ in a certain context. The
context itself is the result of previous experiences, training and learning.9
1.2 Rethinking System Theories
When starting to model a target, it may be tempting to bring in the metaphor of
a clean slate, a tabula rasa. However, a slate is never entirely clean, for it already
presents opportunities.10 It already has a potential for doing something with it. If
there is no potentiality, there is mere randomness.11 I will leave it to philosophy to
determine whether nothingness might be an alternative, or a precursor to random-
ness, but my guess would be that they are different. In nothingness, there is nothing
that has the quality of randomness.
A slate also has some means of effectuating its potentiality and turning it into
something distinctly novel, such as a model. Typically, a slate needs to have ‘distin-
guishables’ in order to make it useful, like chalk with different colours or distinct
shapes sketched on the board. In mathematical theory such ‘distinguishables’ are
usually called variables, but here another term will be used with a similar meaning,
namely data. In information science, a set without any (mutual) significance is con-
sidered data. Hence the word database as a collection of items, values, documents,
spreadsheets, and so on. Data typically are unstructured.
The only characteristic that data have is that they can be mutually distinguished.
Like a slate, data have certain potential, namely to become significant (for something
else), but in essence data are just there, and do not interact or do not influence
anything.
If data are mutually distinguished, they can be singled out and something can be
done with them. Thus, one of the most elementary things one can do with data is
select them.
So modelling at least requires data, and a process that selects data. A process
is an activity that can effectuate change, and a selection is the result of a process
that allows some data to become significant. In other words, the data gets ranked.
Ranking, or ordering, achieves the distinctions between data.
As a next step, consider the following definition:
Information is a selection of data.
This definition is a step away from many standard definitions of ‘information’,
which often tend to put the philosophically volatile notion of ‘meaning’ into play,
such as when information is defined along the lines of being ‘meaningful data’. With
the above, a somewhat more innocent word is used in order to bypass the philosoph-
ical problem of what meaning is exactly. Modelling now, is a process that creates
information by selecting data.12
The combination of the Darwinian concept of ‘selection’ with the concept of
data, basically embeds these in mathematical set theory; there are n variables, and a
subset of these variables make a new set that is called information.
Many people often implicitly take up an atomic view of information, which re-
flects the ideas of the founders of information theory, Claude Shannon and Warren
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Weaver. ‘Information’ is transmitted from a sender to a receiver as a sort of indivis-
ible unit.13
The problem here is that this implicit assumption —which was totally justified
considering Shannon’s very practical goals— seems to have taken up a life of its
own. Even in the simple example of information being sent from a sender to a re-
ceiver, it is often forgotten that there is a pre- and post-processing phase involved in
this activity, which can easily be demonstrated when a Dutch speaking person tries
to convey something to someone of a different tongue; the information gets ‘lost in
transmission’ .14
It will be proposed here that the data of the message remain, but the ranking gets
lost. Apparently something else needs to be done in order for the data to become
information. The definition above is therefore at least required, but not sufficient to
understand the concept of ‘information’. The ‘post-processing’ phase of information
transfer needs to be taken into accounti.
There are many clues in both science and philosophy on the nature of this post-
processing phase, and some of these will be explored at a later stage. For now, an
example from everyday use of computers will give a rough outline. This example is
probably known by anyone who has just installed a new operating system or bought
a new computer. At a certain point in time, you may get an attachment in an email,
download a certain document, or copy a file from a USB-stick or so, and get a mes-
sage that the operating system is not able to do anything with it. It usually does not
know the nature of the file, which is usually associated with the extension of the file-
name, and asks which programme is required in order to process it. Apparently the
selection of data that enters the computer misses something: a context. This context
is provided by the missing programme and allows the data to become information.
In other words, data must be ‘put into context’.
Take for instance a photoelectric cell, like the sensors that open doors in shop-
ping malls or start the elevator when you approach it. One may often hear that ‘in-
formation’ is being conveyed to the sensor, in this case about someone’s movement.
However, the claim here is that data is transmitted, which is transformed into infor-
mation by the design and calibration of the cell. The cell effectuates the concept of
‘opening the door’ because it is designed to operate on certain selections of data.
The beam of light is turned into a concept while the cell provides a context in which
the concept can do something. So the data becomes information (about movement)
in the cell. Information is therefore more or less contextualised in the cell.15
Information thus becomes a relationship between availability (of data) and ac-
ceptability (of a context in which the data can become a concept). If someone looks
up at the night sky and says ”look, a star!”, then this will only become information
for someone else if she knows what a ‘star’ is and if she can see it for herself, or
otherwise accept the possibility that there is indeed a star.16
i The pre-processing phase will be addressed at a later stage, as this is a bit more straightforward
when certain other issues have been introduced
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The resulting hierarchy in information theory that is now introduced has paved a
crude path from information theory to the systems theories, if a system is taken to
be certain kind of model. A target is never a system, at best it will correspond with
one. A ‘solar system’ is not ‘out there’ but ‘in there’. A system is a vocabulary of
concepts that describe a target.17
General Systems Theory (GST) therefore creates models that consist of ‘entities’,
‘relationships’, and an ‘environment’. These are the distinctions that are needed to
draw on the slate. These concepts are meaningful in the context of GST (and most
other system dialects, for that matter).
At a higher level of abstraction one can say that a system is itself a concept, which
consists of other concepts which, in turn, can provide a context for that concept. So
‘model’, ‘target’, ‘data’, ‘information’ are themselves concepts; in fact ‘concept’
and ‘context’ are concepts!
Things are getting complicated now, for as the concepts in a context are associ-
ated with other concepts, the modelling activities have become self-describing. A
model is a concept that, in turn, is used in a model!
A ‘system’ can now be built up out of other ‘systems’ in an iterative fashion, and
in this way, more sophisticated models of a system can be made by producing them
from other systems.18 This manner of self-describing production is not specific for
‘systems’, but for ‘concepts’, thus concepts can be made up of other concepts.
With this, complexity has kicked in.
2 Complexity
Even though the term ‘complexity’ is often used in our daily lives and people gen-
erally have a fairly good ‘feel’ for the word, it has no real clear definition, and even
scientists who dedicate themselves to this subject are careful to commit themselves
to a solid description that catches the topic.19 For the time being, a working defini-
tion will be used that is borrowed from information theory:
The complexity of a system is the amount of non-redundant information.
Because the ‘system’ is a model, and thus related to someone or something who does
the modelling —the observer— complexity is a relationship between the target and
the modelling agent. Finding the first fifty prime numbers may be a very complex
task for a lot of people; it should not be all too difficult for mathematicians. Like-
wise, the complexity of a cockerel may be overwhelming for a biologist, but hardly
for the sleep-deprived campers who just want it to shut up at five in the morning.
At a more subtle level, considering complexity from the relative position of ob-
servers reveals the many faces a complex system can have. Take for instance a comet
orbiting the sun. For an observer caught in the virtual attractor in the Oort cloud (or
wherever else in the inner regions of Dark Space the comet might have sprung from),
the comet will display a mysterious and fascinating dance around the observer’s po-
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sition, drawing nearer and nearer, then making a turn before heading back into dark-
ness. The observer stands the challenge to make sense of this strange behaviour, and
will probably concoct an information-rich story, such as, for instance, being a god
in the centre of the Universe, to which even celestial bodies come and pay their
respect.
If the observer moves away from his spot and takes sufficient distance to see
the full trajectory of the comet, he will realise that the comet’s movement is quite
simple, and its behaviour can be described in one mathematical equation. In fact,
the development of science often shows this reduction of complexity. The Ptolemaic
view of the movement of stars was far more complex than the Copernican, because
Ptolemaic astronomy positioned man in the centre of the Universe, while Brahe,
Kepler, Galilei and others saw the elegant simplicity of making the sun the centre of
earth’s orbit.20
It shows that a sophisticated model of a target does not necessarily mean that the
target itself is necessarily elaborate. In fact, a simple but correct model can often
be tremendously robust, in the sense that it can elucidate a lot of things with great
accuracy (it matches with the data from a lot of targets). Complexity, after all, is not
the denial of simplicity!
Now for the last part of the definition, which is the information intrinsic to the
system. As information is selected data, every titbit of information is the result of a
combination of ranking by the observer and the characteristics of the system. This
information is about the entities in the system, their characteristics, possibly their
autonomous behaviour or other temporal aspects, but foremost about their (mutual)
relationships. And this is of importance because relationships tend to cause a com-
binatorial explosion, which means that the amount of (possible) relationships grows
much faster than the number of entities contained in the system. Note that because
the system is a model, every relationship in that system is already significant, be-
cause it was selected to be used. A system with many relationships is therefore likely
to be complex as the information-density is potentially large.21
This stance follows the order of algorithms in mathematics and computer sci-
ence. There may be many aspects of a system that make it complex; however, the
relationships between the entities it contains will normally be the largest and most
defining aspect of this complexity.22
If the complexity of a system is largely determined by the relationships of the
entities, these relationships should correspond with aspects of the target that are sta-
ble and significant. Stability means that the relationship lasts sufficiently long for
the observer to notice it, while significance is related to the impact (or rank) of the
relationship on the observer. This means that the entities in a relationship have to
be observed as being distinct, without compromising their unity. If two spatially
distinct targets are ‘too close’, then they run the risk of being considered one sin-
gle entity, and if they stray too far, the observer may fail to register a relationship
between them. Note that the terms ‘near’ and ‘far’ do not necessarily have to be
spatial. One also can speak of ‘close’ friends and ‘distant’ family, even though one
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may live on another continent, and the other may be the neighbour next door.
In the optimal middle-of-the-road position, the information-density is max-
imised, as the observer will be informed about the individual entities, the meta-
object they form as a whole, and their mutual relationships which are sufficiently
stable in order to be significant.
As an example, take the meta-entity called our solar system. The standard model
puts the sun at the centre of a system that further consists of entities called planets,
comets, meteors, rocks, moons, asteroids, belts, rings, and all those other objects
that are usually associated with solar systems. A lot of these objects have a pretty
stable relationship with the sun, which is called ‘orbit’. If such an orbit is not stable,
as often is the case with asteroids; they get ‘swallowed up’ by the planets or the sun.
On the other hand, if an object strays outside the boundaries of the solar system, it
no longer is considered part of it.
It is interesting that in this optimum, there is also place for new meta-entities,
such as the Earth and the Moon, or the rings around Saturn. Apparently complexity
allows more complexity to form, as meta-objects are composed from quantum par-
ticles and forces to atoms, organisms up to planets, solar systems, galaxies, and so
on.
This is very intriguing, as it contradicts the second law of thermodynamics pos-
tulated by the French engineer Sadi Carnot in 1824:23
Heat cannot spontaneously flow from cold objects to hot ones.
or, in its current form:
Every physical system in our known universe aims for maximum entropy.
In order to understand the problem, one only needs to look at a star; where does
it get its heat from? If most of the universe is much colder than a star, then either
Carnot is wrong, or the heat in a star is not ‘spontaneous’. In fact, the heat in a
star is spontaneous, but not because of a ‘flow of heat’, but because of a flow of
particles. As chance conglomerations of mass-bearing particles attract other mass-
bearing particles, these conglomerations become heavier and start to amplify this
attractive force. As a result, the mass particles get packed closer together and the
friction between them causes heat, first due to friction from collisions, then because
of frictions at quantum level. At a certain point, the combined mass of these parti-
cles ignite nuclear processes, and a star is born.24
More interesting still, if most complex systems, such as biological organisms,
can maintain themselves while performing all kinds of activities that require energy
(and produce heat while doing so), how do they manage to maintain themselves in
a universe that is characterised by entropy?
There are a number of explanations for this, but all of them seem to acknowledge
that entropy can only be countered locally. Stars, organisms, and other entropy de-
fying objects can all be pinpointed in spatial terms. Besides this, they all draw their
energy from outside the system, which makes them open systems.25
78
The second law of thermodynamics is a key concept in modern physics, and has
also been applied to all kinds of fields in science besides thermodynamics, where
the term ‘entropy’ by now has connotations with ‘disorder’, ‘chaos’, ‘low energy
distribution’, and ‘mixed-upness’.26
Biologist Stuart Kauffman is fascinated with this emergence of local order, and
hints at the possibility of a new law that propagates order and increasing complexity
in these local environments. However, this idea is rejected by many other scientists
for various reasons, especially the awkward correspondence that some see between
‘increasing complexity’ and ‘progress’, which is often a cause for concern as the
latter clearly has a normative aspect.27
For the purposes here, it suffices to say that complexity resides in the relation-
ships between entities. In other words, complexity resides in networks.
Now consider that aspect of a complex system that is most rich in information; it
will be the juxtaposition of every unique thing that is significant. If one aims to com-
pletely understand a target, then every titbit of individuality needs to be recorded.
The individuality of a target is the most information-rich aspect of a system, if one
chooses to focus on this.
Traditionally, science has always tried to trivialise these aspects, and usually for
good reasons, but as this habit has often become an implicit feature of science’s ac-
tion repertoire, it is often forgotten that this leads to bias. Statistics, for instance, is
by definition a reduction of information. It reduces information about the specific,
the incidental, the individual, the unique. This does not have to be a problem, but
in a complex system, the specific, unique, or individual may still be a determining
aspect of a target. Suppose statistics-based research identifies a certain norm, say
that ninety percent of the human population conforms to a certain set of psycho-
logical classes. The problem then, is that the ten percent of leftovers, others, freaks,
create a combinatorial explosion of classes that fall beyond the descriptive vocabu-
lary of the research. For one, there is a big difference between people who cannot
live up to the standards of the identified classes, or those who choose not to fit the
descriptions. If one therefore aims to understand the full extent of humankind along
the scales drawn by the proposed classes, the majority of the research effort will be
spent on ever smaller groups of human individuals who manage to slip between the
characteristics of every new classification that is made, until in the end only rela-
tively time-consuming qualitative research is done on those individuals that can be
considered truly unique along the scales of the classifications that are introduced.
Likewise the experimental method of Isaac Newton is often constrained in sci-
ence by a rule that every experiment should be repeatable. This rule thus deter-
mines that only repeatable phenomena are subject to scientific enquiry. Besides this
of course, an experiment can at best only reveal what the experiment aims to reveal.
As a result, science’s quest for ‘truth’ tends to be biased on phenomena that are
more or less orderly.28 On the other hand, it should be noted that scientific theory
also includes many momentary phenomena that leave causal traces.
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Therefore in a complex system, statistics and experiment always need to be de-
ployed with this in mind. One ideally needs to account for any claim of triviali-
sation. If there is one thing that any complex systems theory will add to standard
approaches to science, it will be this fundamental awareness of the limitations and
constraints of any observation. The trivial, or details, become normative claims by
definition, because the observer ranks them as such!
But there is more. Intuitively, this new awareness of the importance of details as
being characteristic of a complex system, already shows that one can never know
everything about these systems. It is too much! This is the reason why they were
discarded as details in the first place, as a support for the observer. Otherwise s/he
would be swamped by them. A target that can be completely known is not a com-
plex target at all. To describe such, often still challenging targets, the South-African
philosopher of complexity Paul Cilliers prefers the term complicated.29
So the practical thing to do is to accept that the observer will never completely
know a complex target, and that modelling is by definition a reduction. But in order
to do justice to that what is left out, a move beyond ‘details’ is required. They can
no longer be trivialised. In order to do justice to them, an aspect of uncertainty will
be added to the modelling activities.
2.1 Uncertainty and Risk
A complex target communicates an ambiguous story to an observer. On one side, the
target displays a certain reluctance to reveal itself, but on the other hand it also offers
a helping hand. The target is complex, but not random, fickle, wayward, mixed-up or
any other description that would make it impossible to understand. There is some-
thing that allows the target to be ‘known’ (or modelled). This aspect of complexity
is often called order.30
In line with the system-observer approach to complexity that is developed here,
order will be defined here as a relationship between the two. Order typically con-
sists of those aspects of a target that an observer can model. Usually the observer
will implicitly discard all the other aspects of the target and conveniently call them
‘details’, and then assume that target and model are more or less equivalent. The im-
plicit assumption is that the target equals the model plus some details. A target can
thus become a ‘solar system’ with planets that can be described with nice elliptical
orbits that can be captured in mathematical equations.
However, this approach becomes problematic for complex systems as, for one,
the observer is discarding many details which may end up being more important
than assumed. A recent example of this in biology involved the so-called ‘junk
DNA’, which (in part) proved not to be junk after all, but an extremely important
regulator of complex processes involving genes.31
For the purposes of the modelling activities here, the difference between model
and target will therefore be called uncertainty. It might be tempting to use the more
straightforward opposition of order–disorder, but I think that this term does not quite
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capture the non-order side; we do not know if this aspect of a target behaves disor-
derly!32 Uncertainty is a way of giving details certain agency.33
Likewise, ‘order’ is different from ‘certainty’. Even if order is modelled correctly,
the model may still behave in different ways than expected. To put this even stronger,
that’s exactly why targets are modelled, to get to know something about it. Certainty
is in a way the ‘proof’ of a good model.
It may also be tempting to consider uncertainty to be the ‘error’ of the mod-
elling activities, but ‘error’ would fundamentally be a wrong term in this respect.
Error would mean that there is a ‘perfect’ or ‘ideal’ target that can be known, but
which currently is not the case. The resulting mismatch allows itself to be corrected
over time, but this would assume that observers —if they try their best— can get
to know everything about that target. This would mean that either the observer can
get to know every last detail, or that the target was not that complex in the first
place. If observers are assumed to operate with limited knowledge, uncertainty bet-
ter addresses the fundamental problem of complexity. Uncertainty implies that it is
impossible to model an equivalent of a complex target, but that it may be feasible
to ‘home in’ to certain properties of that target, certain aspects, thus reducing the
uncertainty.34
A target is now equivalent to the model (order) and uncertainty. As a model will
never be equivalent to its target, one can only aim to reduce the uncertainty. At best,
certain aspects of a complex target can be modelled. This, of course, reflects exactly
what a ‘model’ usually is, a simpler version of the target, at least when the model is
made to capture certain equivalence with a target. If a model equals the target, then
it is no longer a model.35
For some observers the ‘sun’ may be orderly in the sense that it rises in the
morning and sets in the evening, for others there may be order in the cycles of its
surface activity or in the quantum physical processes in its core. But in all these
cases the ‘order’ is related to what an observer can understand about the sun.
The aspect of uncertainty of a complex system promises to make science a great
deal more difficult. Cilliers has already proclaimed a ‘crisis’ because of this.36 But
for those who live their daily lives, the idea of uncertainty is not really novel. It
does mean however, that scientific theory will have to account for uncertainty, prove
details and trivialities, or verify such claims experimentally. Science can no longer
wish them away! More probably, science will have to account for what it can’t
explain, but I think most scientists are already aware of this. Uncertainty, I think,
is going to become one of the biggest methodological challenges for science in the
near future, and I think that this relates, at least in part, to Cilliers’ outcry.
On the other hand, it is here also that the power of theory deserves to be men-
tioned. At various places on earth, neutrino detectors are patiently waiting to detect
particles that have been theoretically predicted, and yet are waiting for experimental
verification. This may take a decade or two, but the confidence that physicists have
in their theoretical models —and up to now they have little reason to doubt them—
is clear proof of the power of many scientific theories.37
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Another term will be introduced here, that will become more important at a later
stage, risk. One can, at best, only truly understand the model, not the target. Many
agents will also act upon their internal models, which makes these agents ‘actors’.
Acting will be coarsely defined here as ‘causing change in an environment’, but will
receive proper attention at a later stage.
An actor who is able to model its environment will observe a target, and its
response will be based on that model. If the act is in some way coherent with the
model, one could say that the actor behaves rationally.38 But because there is uncer-
tainty between target and model, any act may have unexpected consequences. These
consequences are the effect of uncertainty in action. The probability that this ‘unex-
pectedness’ in acting will result in something undesirable, will be called ‘risk’.ii
As an example, take a motor cyclist who wants to jump over a number of cars.
He can make a model of the lined up cars, the required speed of the motor cycle, the
angle of the ramp, the weather conditions and so on. He can then make an assess-
ment of his chances to successfully complete the task. It will be clear that the more
sophisticated his model of the situation is, the smaller the uncertainty will be. But
during preparation someone spills some beer on the ramp, and it has not dried up
well enough when Evel Knievel takes up the challenge. There is a ‘risk’ involved
in the act of jumping over cars, which is increased due to the uncertainty that the
spilled beer has introduced.
Some definitions of risk also include the impact of the unexpectedness. If I over-
sleep, I run a risk of missing an appointment, but this risk is amplified when I happen
to be a president in wartime and not a Ph. D. student. I will not use risk here in that
sense, as impact requires a context in which the risk is acted out. Possible future
implications of unexpectedness in action will be called contingencies, and contin-
gencies can be embedded in a contextual setting. The contingencies of the actions
of a president in war-time are thus much more significant than those of a Ph. D.
student. However, both risk missing an appointment when they oversleep.
The ‘asymmetrical’ perspective between order and uncertainty on complexity
unleashes a very fundamental property of our universe. A universe in which every
observer can know everything about the world s/he lives in will tend to be a very
stable, if not boring, one. As every observer in our game of complexity is inherently
working with limited knowledge, every act in that universe will have a quality of
risk, and this will account, at a very fundamental level, for the fact that our universe
is in continuous flux. A universe containing actors from the tiniest quantum particles
to the most massive of cosmic aggregates, and from the simplest cause-effect actors
to complex, autonomous organisms, will never become stable. Uncertainty in action
therefore has two faces. On one hand it is a source of risk and contingencies, on the
other hand it is a quality that we have to be very grateful for, as it enables life.
ii A desired counterpart might probably be called ‘a pleasant surprise.’
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2.2 The Basic Elements of Complexity
So far we have ‘moved down’ from ‘systems’ to a few more fundamental con-
cepts that were borrowed from information theory and complexity. The result is
that concepts, such as ‘entity’ and ‘relationship’ have become pragmatic relational
distinctions from ‘system’, although they can themselves be sub-systems that are
composed of sub-sub-systems and so on. In the end they are all concepts. With
this, ‘systems of systems’ can be created, which would allow the modelling of self-
describing complex systems.
John Holland, one of the pioneers of research on complexity, considers a complex
(adaptive) system to be made up of a number of basic elements. Holland has pro-
posed a framework, in which he identifies seven elements to be vital in understand-
ing complex dynamic structures, such as biological cells, brains, cities, economic
markets, and societies.39
This framework is not to be considered definitive. It is meant to be expanded
with new tools, or trimmed down as more knowledge about complexity is gained.
Research on complexity is in an explorative stage where theories come and go, but
in the end hopefully a body of knowledge will arise that is useful to understand
patterns of similarity between, say, the human brain, a city, and stock markets.
As was mentioned earlier, the positivist stances on complexity —and Holland
could be considered a (moderate) proponent of this stance— tend towards the ‘or-
der’ of complexity. Besides this, Holland also takes an ontological view on com-
plexity; a system is ‘out there’. For the purposes here, these differences are not
really problematic.
As I consider order a necessary departure point for an exploration of complexity,
Holland’s framework can be seen as an important source in the landscape of com-
plexity. It is important to realise however, that the vocabulary of Holland’s frame-
work is still tightly coupled to that of traditional Newtonian physics. It is therefore
an important first step from the plane of organised simplicity into that of organised
complexity.
Of the seven basic elements of complexity that Holland identified, four are prop-
erties, intrinsic qualities of a system, and three of them are mechanisms, a means to
get things done, very much like a force in physics, or a task. A mechanism is closely
related to ‘process’, while properties can be both related to structure and process.
These basic elements allow a certain perspective on complex systems, and pro-
vide certain clues on how they may interact and form new complex units, meta-
entities that are formed by collectives of lower-order entities.
It will hopefully have become clear that the choice to start with Holland’s frame-
work does not imply that the consequent perspective on complexity that is devel-
oped here is an exclusive one. In fact, many other thinkers may prefer to see the
key understanding of complexity to be in the disorder, chaos and all those other
hard to grasp aspects of a complex system. The main reason I prefer to start from
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the premises of ‘restricted’ complexity is, because it follows the ‘nuts and bolts’
character of these explorations better and, as was pointed out earlier, is essential in
observing complexity.
As the vocabulary that is developed here will include these seven building blocks,
a concise summary will be given here, starting with the properties.
2.3 Non-Linearity (1)
Non-Linearity is obviously the opposite of linearity. Linear functions can be cap-
tured in the regular mathematical equations that form the backbone of a lot of high
school maths. A linear function satisfies two criteria:
∙ f(x+y) = f(x) + f(y), for all x and y
∙ f(α .x) = α .f(x), for all x and α
The function f(x) = 2.x is linear, as it satisfies both criteria:
∙ f(x+y)⇒ 2.(x+y) = 2.x + 2.y = f(x) + f(y)
∙ f(αx)⇒ 2(αx) = α(2x) = α .f(x)
Linear functions are at the heart of classical mathematics, and are highly pre-
dictable. This does not apply for non-linear functions.
Non-linearity is in many ways a very inappropriate name, as quoted by Stanislaw
Ulam, one of the pioneers in this discipline:
Using a term like nonlinear science is like referring to the bulk of zoology as the study of
non-elephant animals.
The term, however, has survived selective pressure, probably by lack of better alter-
natives, and so it is probably good to stick to it.40
One of the most common forms of non-linearity in everyday life is what one
could call ‘the unexpected turn’. You walk towards work, minding your own busi-
ness, take a turn and bump into an old friend, or an evangelist who inspires you with
her religious beliefs, a robber making a getaway, or the person you will eventually
marry. These events may instantaneously alter your life, sometimes forever after. In
other words, these events often cause an irreversible change of state. In an instance,
change materialises and determines future flow. This is continuously happening, and
sometimes these changes have minor consequences, but sometimes severe.
The unexpected turn is so common that one can immediately understand Stanis-
law’s remark. Life is ultimately non-linear; at best only some aspects may be linear.
From the above, it may become clear how problematic non-linearity is. As it is
all around us, it almost becomes trivial, but meanwhile it is non-linearity that holds
many of the biggest mysteries that complexity faces, mainly because mainstream
science discarded its manifestations as being ‘details’ for so long. Along the ranges
demarcated by ‘order-uncertainty’, non-linearity tends to move towards the uncer-
tain side of things. It will also be clear that non-linear dynamics, chaos theory, and
other (predominantly mathematical) exercises in non-linearity are pushing order into
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realms that were once exclusively uncertain. This will be demonstrated in the next
chapter and will return throughout this treatise, so it will not be further discussed
here. However, it is good to realise that non-linearity has more faces than those
typically investigated through mathematical means. It includes chance, unexpected-
ness, ruptures, novelty, disruptions, irreversibility, events, boundaries, provisional-
ity, uniqueness, individuality, otherness and so on. If there is one reason to promote
‘complexity’ as a new paradigm, it is because it embraces, or should embrace, all
these hard to grasp concepts as being fundamentally part of our existence, and there-
fore worth knowing better. It also intuitively directs a path towards themes that have
traditionally been the focus of the social sciences and the humanities, and therefore
provides one step towards a lingua democratica between the ‘two cultures’.41
Another very important form of non-linearity is optimality. Often ‘linear think-
ing’ implictly or explicitly assumes that adding a little more to something improves
it by definition. Add a point or two to the IQ and you become more intelligent, learn
a bit more and you become more ‘successful’ and therefore ‘happier’...42
As any cook will know, this manner of reasoning is often wrong, as certain
amounts of ingredients make the optimal mix. The Medawar zone mentioned earlier
is an example of an optimal curve. It seems almost trivial, and yet it is surprising to
see how often argumentations implicitly assume linearity. For instance, many claims
that aim to improve human traits assume implicit linearity, from intelligence, age,
wealth, to, of course, manlihood!43
2.4 Aggregation (2)
Aggregation is the art of putting things together in categories, and was described
earlier when the formation of solar systems and other meta-agents was addressed.
A ‘system’ obviously is an aggregate, or composite, form. The assembly of wheels,
motor, coachwork and frame, which hums along a highway, is called a ‘car’, regard-
less of its colour, type or location. Aggregation in terms of categorisation, simplifies
the observation of an object by consciously disregarding details, usually in such a
way that it can be used to group a large number of entities or concepts within one
term. It is such a common practice that the risks are often forgotten, and character-
istics of the aggregate are assigned to individual members, or the other way round.
Aggregation is associated with the process of composition.
Aggregation occurs when an external observer can identify in a target, both the
entities and the meta-entity they are part of. There is a relationship between these
two levels. These relationships can be the result of similarities in the intrinsic prop-
erties of the entities, but it can also be observed by similarities in their behaviour.
People dressed up in white aprons and mushroom-like caps are called ‘chefs’, but
we also have no problems in categorising as such, a naked Brit with fashionable,
spiky hair, who is rummaging in his kitchen. This form of aggregation into general
categories is usually called generalisation. In the perspective of complexity that is
developed here, ‘system’, ‘entity’ and ‘relationship’ are generalised into ‘concepts’.
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In the same way, an ant’s nest is more than just a collection of ants. It is, maybe
foremost, the collective behaviour of crawling little agents with six legs, antlers and
sometimes a nasty bite. An organisation is more than a collection of people; it is a
collective of individual contributions that serve common goals.
Aggregates themselves are entities, meta-entities, and they form relationships,
maybe aggregates, with other meta-entities, and also with the entities that constitute
them. A meta-entity therefore is the locus of relationships, some connecting to a
lower level, some to a higher level, and some horizontal with meta-entities at the
same order in the hierarchy. The ant nest provides a ‘home’ for the ants, provides
warmth, security, and maybe even a sense of ‘belonging’ for individual ants. On the
other hand, the ant nest is a beacon of food for fungi and anteaters, maybe also for
weeds or plants that cover the anthill and hide it from possible predators. It may also
influence the soil on which it is built, feeding off waste or cherishing the heat. In
turn, this attracts worms, eels or bacteria.
Just as an organisation, such as a company, will provide finances, career oppor-
tunities, targets and deadlines for its employees, make products that are used by
other organisations, compete with competitors, get loans from banks, and pay taxes
to governments, it will form coalitions and partnerships, unions and joint ventures,
mergers and take-overs. They will also split up, reorganise, return to core businesses,
and sell prior acquisitions.
In general, ‘organisation’ is a more complex form of aggregation, as it includes
more aspects than aggregation alone.
The decomposition of meta-entities, specialisation, is not addressed by John Hol-
land as such, although in information science it is generally considered to be the re-
verse of generalisation. Specialisation adds specific traits or characteristics to a part
of a meta-entity to make it stand out from the totality or the other parts. A special-
isation therefore, usually has an aspect of uniqueness with respect to that what it is
a specialisation of. An organisation is a specialisation of ‘aggregate’, because it has
some unique features. Likewise, a soccer team has strikers, defenders, mid-fielders,
all of which are still soccer players, but with distinct characteristics. The ant colony
has a queen, defenders, and worker ants, while a company has CEOs, specialists,
professionals, secretaries and marketers. They are all ‘employees’, but with distinct
characteristics.
Specialisation is not the falling apart of meta-entities to its lower-level entities
(reductionism); instead, the meta-level is the starting point of an ordering of lower-
level entities. The meta-level is required in order to allow specialisation, and usually
needs to persist in order to sustain the (new) lower-order entities. The soccer team
is still there despite the specialists!
2.5 Diversity (3)
The main aspects governing diversity have been covered in the discussion on spe-
cialisation. Holland mainly focuses the topic around evolution, where diversity is
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the result of filling in evolutionary niches of fitness. This aspect of diversity is a
major issue discussed in the next chapters, so I will return to this at a later stage.
For the purposes here, diversity is related to specialisation, but also concepts such
as uniqueness.
2.6 Flows (4)
Holland rightly points out that flows are not exclusively a property of fluids, but are
used also in terms such as ‘a flow of goods’, ‘flow of money’, or ‘flow of electrons’.
Flow is related to process. A system’s structure may be formed by distinctions (be-
tween concepts), but it is the understanding of flow through them that gives a system
its dynamics. A system without flow is dead.
In technical systems theory, a flow is coupled to an extensity, which is a quality
of an entity that can be observed externally. The volume of water in a bucket can be
measured in terms of height or weight. Just as the water starts flowing the moment
the bucket is punctured or tilted, extensities change when the stored quality gets the
chance to move away. Flow occurs in situations where something cannot stay in one
place.iii If it leaves one spot and it goes somewhere else, well, it’s flowing!
Flow has been extensively studied in technical and economical areas, and the ab-
stract descriptive nomenclature developed in this discipline is sufficiently powerful
to be used in many areas, whether it is water, electrons, produce, or money.
Particles are described as units that contain an intensity q which is specific for the
particle, and of the perspective of its use. Water can be measured in mass, electrons
in charge and/or mass, while money depends on the currency, unless someone is
interested in the weight that a vault can support. Besides this intensity, a particle
often has a second characteristic; it is a carrier, medium, or substrate. These two
aspects are closely related, but are in many ways independent properties. Money for
instance, carries an intensity we call currency, but its value changes with respect
to other currencies. So the metal disk or piece of paper with the e sign may have
different values with respect to other metal disks or papers with US$ or GB£ signs.
Note also that with currency, the carrier does not affect the intrinsic quality of the
currency; a crumpled up banknote is not worth less than a brand new one.iv
The same goes for human speech. On a carrier of longitudinal airwaves, electro-
magnetic radio waves, and other media, intensities are passed that do not rely (at
least up to some point) on the characteristics of the carrier. The meaning of words
differs on context, intentions, emotions, and expectations. Human speech therefore
is one of the most differentiated flows imaginable.
Flow is usually associated with a movement that starts at a source and flows
to a destination. But in many systems, flow can also be led back to its source (or
iii An exception may be in the use of the word ‘flow’ when being totally absorbed in one’s activities
iv At least, as long as it still can be identified as a bank note!
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somewhere else in-between source and destination). This aspect is called re-entry,
and the resulting systems are usually called feedback systems.
Here again, the observer often plays an active role. It is completely valid to de-
scribe the flow of a river in terms of one or more sources in the mountains, and ends
in the sea.v However, if one takes into account evaporation, cloud formation and
rain, this results in a wider perspective that describes a feedback system, as water is
transported back to the mountains. Note here that entropy pops up again; the energy
provided by the sun keeps the river flowing, and keeps the loop closed.
Feedback will be extensively covered in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to
understand that flow takes up two forms, namely open-loop and re-entrant. vi
With the four properties of complexity sufficiently covered, it is time to turn to
the three mechanisms.
2.7 Building Blocks (5)
Holland’s ‘building blocks’ view on complexity is indeed very much analogous to
making structures from smaller structures, the LEGOTM view on complexity. This
perspective was extensively dealt with previously when discussing composition and
decomposition. Aggregation also strongly hinges on the concept of building blocks.
2.8 Tags (6)
Personally, I think this is one of the most interesting mechanisms on Holland’s list.
It is not as much because tagging is so unusual or in any way different than the
way we tag (or label) things in our everyday life. It is mainly because all the other
topics have a very strong feel of ‘been-there, seen-it’ for those who are sufficiently
up-to-date with the current views on complexity, while it is a bit of an eye-opener to
become aware of the importance of tagging as a mechanism in complexity.
Holland uses the example of billiard balls on a pool table to describe the effect
of putting a tag on an entity. Without it, the jumble of balls is totally meaningless as
one cannot differentiate between them. The billiard balls are a selection of data!
Applying colours as means of tagging already makes a difference, for now the
balls stand out with respect to each other, and the player can start to anticipate on
the rules and the scores that have been assigned to each colour. The latter becomes
even easier by adding the scores as an additional tag to each ball.
A tag is a means of ranking data. If billiard balls are a specialisation of data, in
the sense that they carry the property of ‘being distinguishable’, then the tags create
the distinctions. Tagging links data to a context, just as the numbers on the billiard
ball ‘connect’ the ball to the rules of the game, and its specific role with respect to
v An interesting exception is Australia, where some rivers just evaporate while flowing into the
interior
vi I am a bit uncomfortable with the term ‘open-loop’ system, but it is often used in the technical
domains
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the others. In this sense, a tag creates a distinction. It typically leaves a crisp mark
on the tagged item, and allows certain properties of that item to clearly stand out
against a certain background. Tagging therefore stands at the base of symbolic rep-
resentations.
But Holland makes another interesting observation which transcends this rather
obvious usage of tags. He points out that the tags on a billiard ball also reveal the
rotation of the spinning ball, so it opens a window to some of the internal character-
istics of the entity. In Holland’s words, tagging ”breaks the symmetry of the billiard
ball”, allowing its internal properties to be observed by other entities. The others
can then respond to it.
A very interesting example (and a very important one) is when our body is in-
vaded by viruses. As the viruses enter the blood stream, the immune system creates
anti-bodies, our main line of defence against the bad guys who managed to get ‘on
the inside’. Anti-bodies act very much like keys, where the notches fit into a slot in
order to open the door. In the particular case of anti-bodies, the notches on the ex-
terior of the anti-body are adaptations to previous encounters with viruses, in other
words; they are models of the bad guys. Each anti-body tries to attach itself to a
virus checking its exterior for a ‘slot’ which fits with some of its notches. If the anti-
body manages to attach itself to the virus successfully (tagging), the superstructure
either becomes too big to enter a cell, or other agents, specifically macrophages,
can identify the tagged viruses and clean them up. If a type of virus has invaded the
body previously, then the immune system is still able to quickly reproduce the nec-
essary anti-bodies. If not, the anti-bodies adapt to try out new configurations which
hopefully result in one or more new forms that will counter the attack.44
This example also touches on another property that is not on Holland’s list,
namely redundancy. Redundancy is excess baggage, for instance information or re-
sources, needed as ‘backup’ in case this baggage is lost elsewhere. Many anti-bodies
will carry the same, or very similar, keys in order to compensate those anti-bodies
that decay, get damaged or otherwise can no longer perform their tasks. Redundancy
typically costs energy and resources, but compensates this loss of efficiency with a
more robust design.45 Airplanes and other machines that have to operate failsafe,
usually have double wiring and double instrumentation that ensures that at least one
is in operation if another fails. Even though this adds weight, requires extra energy
even in standby mode, and complicates design (the double wiring must be installed
in different areas of the airplane), the loss of efficiency is compensated by the in-
creased robustness of the machine.46
2.9 Internal Models (7)
The last mechanism Holland identifies, brings his framework into the modelling ac-
tivities of the workshop that is prepared here. This mechanism is the ability to create
internal models as means of anticipation and prediction. An organism for instance,
will have to possess some means of identifying patterns that may be beneficial or
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potentially hazardous. These patterns, complemented with certain ranking sets, can
then be used as internal models for previous successes.
Likewise mental maps we learn by teaching or experience are coded patterns in
our brains that can be used to anticipate future occurrences of the same or similar
events.
It will become clear that these models rely on the ability of an agent to retain pre-
vious states. In other words, it requires some sort of memory to store these internal
models. In some areas, like information science, this is called persistence. But per-
sistence is rather useless if nothing is done with it. Therefore persistence is usually
also paired with a form of action. Basically, persistence allows past events or states
to become actors in the present. The resulting non-linearity between past, present,
and future is also a vital quality of complex systems.47
Holland distinguishes two kinds of internal models, tacit and overt. Tacit internal
models are the straightforward actions based on implicit predictions of a desired
future state. This occurs for instance, when walking along a path to a point in the
distance, or that of an organism moving in the direction of a food source. In fact,
any goal-directed behaviour can be considered the result of tacit models, and they
often approximate causal determinism as there is one ideal means to achieve this
goal, if all the alternatives are known and can be compared. Under these conditions,
goal-directed behaviour can be very orderly.
Overt internal models allow exploration of alternatives, in the way a chess player
anticipates possible moves of an opponent. Holland calls this process lookahead.
The interesting issue of overt models is that these models do not necessarily re-
flect reality. They may reflect possible outcomes of future events, but they have no
one-to-one mapping with sensory input or other stimuli from the environment. In
an extreme sense, fantasies and dreams are overt models in our brains, the result of
processes that have strayed from everyday reality and reflect possible future goals,
alternative paths of our life, or are just there without goal or intention.
Internal models are by no means confined within individual agents, as they can
be distributed. Examples of these are the effect that a novel has on its readers, or
a film on its viewers. Both are aggregates of virtual worlds that allow people to
explore other walks of life, to enter a non-existent creation that is shared by many.
The virtual world of computer games even allows an active role in such shared
overt models that surpass the scope of individual human beings. In this respect,
these models are another step towards themes that are traditionally explored in the
humanities.
2.10 Securing
Besides the ones mentioned above, one additional mechanism will be introduced to
Holland’s list here, securing. This mechanism becomes very important, especially
when considering complex systems. Securing is closely related to flow, which can
move easily in one direction, but not in the other. Water flows from relatively high
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altitudes to lower ones; the other way round is much more difficult, and usually costs
a lot of energy.
In quality assurance literature, the metaphor of a wedge is often used to visualise
this. Often you see a picture of a person trying to push a heavy round rock uphill, and
then securing her progress with the wedge. In electronics, the invention of the diode,
a component that allows an easy flow of electrons in one direction only, caused
the true electronic revolution of the previous century, usually coined in terms as
‘miniaturisation’, ‘digitalisation’, or ‘siliconisation’, as the most complex electronic
components are based on complex structures of diodes and comparable components
that control flow. From this perspective, the electronic revolution already started
with the vacuum tubes one may remember from antique radios. These tubes are
diodes.
Buffering also is a powerful means of securing,vii as it allows relatively quick
storage of desired states (for instance foodstuffs), while it diminishes at a much
lower pace when the flow dries up. A dam in a river is often used to secure the
availability of water, for instance to create a stable source of water for irrigation,
households, or electricity. Memory also often relies on buffering. The unidirectional
aspect of securing is needed to manage the buffer. Note that this stability is con-
strained by the availability of quantities such as water or foodstuffs (or whatever
else is stored) and the capacity of the buffer. There is always a point when things
dry up again, or conversely, overflow.
Securing mechanisms are therefore a very fundamental cause of non-linearity in
a system, as it breaks the symmetry of flow from source to destination with respect
to the opposite direction.
3 Patterns
Holland’s framework of complexity has provided the first tools of the workshop of
complexity, but does not give many clues on how to guide the modelling activities.
How can the tools create new equipment in order to analyse complex systems? In
other words, how should the tools be used?
Modelling activities often aim to understand specific targets, but science often
aims to find common underlying concepts that unite different phenomena. Newton
united a lot of different target phenomena, such as planetary movement and falling
apples, in a coherent mathematical model that is now usually called (Newtonian)
mechanics, and which by now has been extended and refined to a sophisticated
body of work called physics. In order to achieve this, he simultaneously developed
the calculus that was needed to guide his observations and experiments. This co-
vii In electronics, memory is usually made by combining a buffer of electrons with a gate that allows
electrons to pour into the buffer, but not out of it. This gate is usually a complicated configuration
of diodes
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evolution of observation and methodology is an often overlooked aspect of Newton’s
genius.
The Newtonian ‘toolbox’ can describe different targets, and can even unite some
of them by demonstrating that they share common features. Planetary motion and
falling apples are united through the models and toolbox of Newtonian mechanics.48
There is a certain intuitive appeal for such models that can explain a lot of things.
First, every target that can be modelled with one set of tools reaffirms the strength
of the toolbox that is used. It is therefore not surprising, that the initial success of
Newtonian mechanics fuelled a strong scientific desire to describe everything with
formal logic and mathematics. These attempts eventually hit a wall, and currently
such attempts towards universality are no longer considered feasible for many sci-
entific areas. In the humanities, many dismiss the possibility of such universally
applicable laws or theories, either for their own research interests, or just altogether.
Subjectivity and relativism are seen to stand in the way of such an agenda and, as
was mentioned earlier, they consider our knowledge of the world to be, at best, an
interpreted one.49
It would seem that the social sciences take an intermediate position, where some
schools are still waiting for ‘their’ Newton or Darwin, who can unite the various
schools in the social sciences. Others tend to a relativist, interpreted or ‘construc-
tivist’ point of view.
It may become clear now that the view of complexity taken here will consider
both extremes to be equally right and wrong. Complexity —and also practicality,
for that matter— already restrains possible optimism for universal theories that can
explain anything, but this does not mean that objectivity and universalism are nec-
essarily incorrect. Science has clearly demonstrated that it can be worthwhile to find
frameworks that can explain a lot of things, and thus these possibilities should not
be discarded per se.
For the purposes here, there is one interesting angle one could take in order to
increase the toolset towards unification, and that is by trying to find a method that
allows phenomena that are well-known in a certain (scientific) domain to be used as
source of knowledge in another. This would both contribute to a lingua democratica,
as well as provide a means to extend the repertoires of enquiry in different domains.
If the hard sciences, the social sciences and the humanities are currently all looking
into ‘complexity’, then it stands to reason that at least some things must be fairly
similar. If these similarities can be abstracted in a common vocabulary, then the
various stakeholders who want to explore a complex theme can align their research
interests and, possibly understand the issues that the others bring in. With this, the
quest becomes to find those aspects of complexity that actually return in different
scientific domains. Again for the purposes here, one can wonder if Holland’s tool-
box is sufficiently ‘strong’ to identify such common traits between targets.
Intuitively the answer is no. Holland’s toolbox can identify an ‘aggregate’ called
‘solar system’, and one called ‘apple tree’, but Newton is still needed to unite
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these targets. Of course, Holland implicitly acknowledges the toolboxes provided
by physics, mathematics, chemistry, and so on.
However, as it is clear that at least some of the social sciences and probably
most of the humanities have had very little success with mathematical approaches
for their endeavours, the idiom of complexity that is pursued here cannot rely too
heavily on these tools. Another ‘power concept’ is needed to allow cross-stakeholder
communications.
This last section of this chapter proposes patterns as an additional means of mod-
elling to extend the means of finding correspondence between targets.
3.1 Introducing Patterns
Science often tends to advance understanding by means of metaphors, analogies,
and similes.50 In all these cases, something that is known –a source- is used as an
explanation for something that in some way corresponds with it. Sometimes the
correspondence is rather weak (”the sun is like a burning furnace”), in other cases
the correspondence is one of equivalence (”strands of DNA have the shape of a
double helix”).51
It is of interest to know that one’s understanding of a target is shaped by for-
mer experiences, which do not necessarily bear any relationship with that target.
Previous experiences apparently provide means to model the unknown by making
associations, and matching these with observations. These associations are often
called patterns. Heat, a pattern of friction,viii unites the sun and a furnace, and a cer-
tain shape called ‘double helix’ is observed at microscopic scales, but an architect
may also build a skyscraper with that shape.
A pattern typically is unknown, but already reveals some things that make it
familiar. In the literature on neural networks, a pattern can typically be matched
against forms that are already existent. A pattern can thus become ‘known’ if it
matches available forms or categories. A pattern of grouping may reveal an ‘ag-
gregate form’, but this conclusion can only be drawn if this form is known from
previous experiences or learning. The concept of ‘group’ needs to be matched with
the concept of ‘aggregate’. We could thus say that Holland’s framework of com-
plexity provides a context in which concepts such as ‘tag’, ‘flow’ and ‘aggregate’
get a certain kind of meaning. If a new concept is introduced, such as ‘grouping’,
which can be matched to one of the preset categories, such as ‘aggregate’, then the
vocabulary of complexity can be extended with this new concept, which can then be
used. As long as we cannot make such a match, the a concept will remain a pattern;
it resembles something, but it is not known at that point exactly what it resembles.
In this sense, patterns are pre-form. They seem to take an intermediate position
between data and information, if the latter is taken in its original meaning of ‘having
taken up form’. This may sound familiar to anyone who has ever performed data
viii note that ‘friction’ is used here in the broad sense that was defined in chapter 1, and not in the
more narrow sense that it used in physics
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analysis, how while scanning through the data (for instance on a measurement or a
questionnaire), it gradually takes up form and eventually becomes information (for
instance statistical or qualitative). A pattern therefore is a transition of a process
where data ‘takes up form’. Conversely, if ‘information’ means having ‘taken up
form’, then that what takes form, are patterns.
Although patterns are ‘pre-form’, they already may have certain characteristics.
They have the rudiments of structure. Patterns are not random. The most likely rea-
son for this is that patterns are themselves a ‘selection of data’. They already have
the quality to become information, but it is not effectuated (yet). One quality they
can reveal is organisation. Organisation will be given extensive attention throughout
this treatise, but for now it suffices to know that it is a specialisation of ‘structure’
and (therefore) ‘aggregation’, and (therefore) of order.
For example, take the concept of ‘orbit’.
If there is one thing that is relatively orderly in a solar system, it is an ‘orbit’.
‘Orbit’ is also used sometimes to describe the movement of electrons around a
nucleus in an atom. This is, at first glance, an analogy or simile.
However, some aspects of the ‘orbit’ of a solar system and an atomic system are
in fact stronger than analogous. They are equivalent. This aspect of the ‘orbit’ is
depicted by the relationship of the force (F) between two mass-bearing bodies and
their mutual distance (r). This relationship is an inverse square or, more generally, a
power law:ix
F = γ
m.m′
r2
This is of course the famous law of gravitation that Newton discovered and which
connects planetary orbits to falling apples. This equation is a power law as the force
F is depends on the square of the distance r.
Power laws are becoming increasingly important because of their role in achiev-
ing scale-invariance. Coarsely stated, scale-invariance means that the same phe-
nomenon can return at various scales of a complex system. This means that some
aspects of the ‘orbit’ that are related to the above formula are actually equivalent at
atomic scale and at the level of a solar system.52 To make this point even stronger,
it also returns at the level of milky ways and galaxies. These targets are mutually
connected through the aspect of the ‘orbit’ through the power law. It is no longer
a correspondence through metaphor or analogy; it is an isomorphism (from Greek
‘similarly shaped’).53
Isomorphy has always been a major focal point in system theories. In fact, it is a
major contributor to the ‘general’ in general systems theory:
A consequence of general systems properties is the appearance of structural similarities or
isomorphisms in different fields. They are correspondences in the principles that govern the
behaviour of entities that are, intrinsically, widely different.54
ix In order to complete the description of ‘orbit’, the speed of the object in orbit perpendicular to
the gravitational force needs to be included also, so that one gets the centripetal force
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The result of this equivalence is that different targets can become models of each
other. In fact, this is exactly what is assumed when one learns by analogy or
metaphor, in the sense that certain patterns that are already known are put in place
to understand ‘something completely different’. It is more and more presumed that
this is one of the most essential ways in which we can learn. Some consider our
brains to be pattern-processors.55
At this point, there are just two concepts called ‘target’ and ‘model’, and the
acknowledgement of a certain correspondence between them. The correspondence
may be metaphorical, analogous, a simile, or equivalence. All have their character-
istics, their strengths and their weaknesses. Provisionally we can now say that the
correspondence is provided by a certain perspective on the target. In other words,
a perspective provides patterns (concepts) that are used to model the target. This
approach is advocated for instance, in pattern-oriented modelling (POM).56
It was mentioned earlier that a model corresponds with a toned-down target, so
the target-to-target correspondence of isomorphy requires certain caution. Usually
only certain aspects of targets share isomorphic traits, and so we get a sort of ‘model
of the specific models’ of the targets that contain the isomorphy. It will be clear that
this model is in turn a ‘toned-down’ version of the specific models. To temporarily
confuse things further, we will call such ‘mini-models’ that represent more than one
target a ‘pattern’ also. Bear with me on this one!
Fig. 2 Isomorphy and Target-to-Target Correspondence
With this, a pattern is coupled with ‘system’ through the fact that both are mod-
els, and both share the characteristic of organisation.
This correspondence between pattern and system takes an unexpected turn in
building architecture. In the seventies of the previous century, the British/Austrian
architect Christopher Alexander used design patterns as a methodological construct
to design buildings and towns. To date, his seminal book ”A Pattern Language;
Towns, Buildings, Construction” is still a classic ‘must-read’ in architecture.57
Other scientific disciplines have started to use design patterns for their own en-
deavours. Most notably, it has become a major method in the software industry to
design software architecture ever since Alexander’s ideas were adapted for software
design.58
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In software, a design pattern usually takes the form of a ‘mini-system’ that is
part description and part drawing. Certain components are mutually grouped and
connected to a coherent whole, and their function is described, usually both their
internal structure as well as their interface with the outside world. The latter allows
software designers to understand how they can connect the design patterns in the
application that they aim to make, or how to integrate them in, or to other patterns.
Here of course, Holland’s notion of ‘building block’ returns, and indeed design pat-
terns can be used to create new patterns of increasing complexity.
Pattern: Model-View-Controller
Description: A simple diagram depicting the relationship between a Model,
View, and Controller
A.K.A:
Notes: The solid lines indicate a direct association, and the dashed
lines indicate an indirect association. Retrieved from Wikipedia
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image: ModelViewControllerDia-
gram.svg)
As an example, the figure above shows one of the most widely used patterns
in modern software applications called the ‘Model-View-Controller’ pattern, which
any frequent Web surfer will use daily. It shows how, on an abstract level, informa-
tion from, for instance a database (model), is transformed to a view that makes sense
for a user, for instance a web page on the Internet.59 The controller supervises the
interaction between the user and the model by monitoring user events —clicking a
button or a selecting a link of the view— and taking the appropriate actions.
One of the most important aspects of design patterns is that they are collected in
so-called pattern libraries. Alexander’s book is basically a pattern library of about
250 patterns that can be used to assist in designing a house or building, while about
twenty-three design patterns are commonly used in software development. Many
have added new patterns to these initial libraries, but most of the new contributions
are only of interest in specific areas.
In electronics, the schematics of electronic components can also be considered
‘patterns’ although they have never used that term, probably merely for histori-
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cal reasons. Electronic schemas were introduced much earlier than design patterns.
Probably most engineering disciplines will have their variants of ‘patterns’.
A pattern library introduces an evolutionary dimension to design. A pattern li-
brary is used to compose new patterns, and this introduces a sequential aspect to
patterns. Some patterns must first be in place before others can be built, or oth-
ers can evolve from them. This immediately introduces the methodological tools to
tackle another aspect of complex systems, namely their evolutionary nature.60
The reason why patterns are of interest for the lingua democratica is probably
best described by an extract of a list of benefits that was taken from a study book on
design patterns:61
∙ . . .
∙ They provide a common language for design discussions
∙ They reuse the experience of predecessors
∙ They communicate the insight already gained previously
∙ . . .
It will be clear that patterns have a deliberative aspect. Patterns may come and
go, but it is the community of their users that determines which patterns will remain,
how they mature, and how they are used. In a very pragmatic sense, a pattern library
therefore also enforces a certain democratic influence amongst peers. Everyone is
free to invent their own patterns or libraries, but the advantages of successful pat-
terns are such that they survive as they are adopted widely. These advantages are
related to the fact that widely used patterns make it easy for the stakeholders of a
software application to understand the application and learn its internal structure
and use.
The widespread use of pattern libraries are the main difference between contem-
porary software engineering and the system theories. System theories traditionally,
do not have this rigorous selective mechanism that constrains the evolution of build-
ing blocks. I think that if the system theories would have known something like
pattern libraries from the start, they would have remained more coherent amongst
different scientific disciplines.
However, as a tool for understanding complexity, design patterns have one major
drawback: they are targeted for construction purposes. Basically the model creates
the target! The framework of complexity that is developed here needs to be able
to analyse a target in order to capture it in a model. That is exactly the other way
round!
As a design pattern creates a target from the model, the uncertainty between them
is usually limited. A software application will adhere to the design patterns that are
used to construct them, and even though many aspects are not taken into account
(specific user interaction, computer hardware and so on), the target will be quite
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predictable under various circumstances. Having said that, as any professional en-
gineer will know, uncertainty can still be a major influence in construction activities.
When analysing a complex target however, the uncertainty is of major influence.
Uncertainty is usually the starting point of analysis! A pattern can only really model
aspects of the order of a target.
The success of design patterns as a means of construction something has obfus-
cated the dual intent of Alexander’s design patterns. Alexander also used design
patterns to analyse towns and buildings, and indeed his idea of design patterns was
based on appreciating the harmony he sees in medieval towns and buildings. As was
mentioned earlier, this ‘reverse’ direction is called ‘refactoring’ or ‘reverse engi-
neering’ in engineering lingo, and indeed some ‘anti-patterns’ have been proposed
to address this direction, although they never quite got the popularity of design pat-
terns.
For the proposal here however, the notion of ‘anti-pattern’ is not really useful, as
an ‘anti-pattern’ would give the impression that the target itself is, or can be ‘known’
and projected as a model. The uncertainty of a complex target refutes such inten-
tions.
Here we will stick to the notion that a pattern is a precursor to ‘system’, and that
it can model (aspects of) multiple targets. Note here that ‘pattern’ can also apply to
a mathematical formula. The inverse square of gravitational force mentioned earlier
can also be considered a pattern that unites the ‘orbit’ at an atomic scale with that
of a solar system. It even unites electro-magnetic orbits and other phenomena that
are the result of attraction in physics —the pattern, like many manifestations of iso-
morphism, is neutral with respect to the substrate— but again with the warning that
the isomorphy is restricted to exactly that what the pattern describes. The orbit at
the atomic scale is still very different to that of a solar system.
With this new notion of ‘pattern’, the term has gained two meanings, one as
a mini-system that models multiple targets through isomorphy, and the other as a
vaguely familiar structure in data. With the concept-context duality, these can be
seen as the two sides of creating information.62 A concept is the result of matching
the vaguely familiar structure that a perspective provides (availability), to existing
schemas which are constituted by the patterns that create the context (acceptability).
The two faces of ‘pattern’ basically signify the intermediate stage of a process of
selection that creates ‘information’ from data. Thus one can distinguish conceptual
and contextual patterns, and design patterns clearly belong to the last category.63
This ‘embodied’ view of information has three significant consequences as op-
posed to the ‘atomic’ view. First, it is by no means ensured that information that
is ‘patternised’ by a sender is correctly reconstructed by the receiver. If the context
of the receiver is different from that of the sender, the concept will be modelled
differently than that concept at the sender’s end.
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Secondly, this manner of transporting pattern without context is extremely effi-
cient. Only the most essential aspects of information (the conceptual pattern) need
to be coded without all the contextual patterns needed to reconstruct the message.
So there is a trade-off; loss of exactness is traded off with efficiency. For a lot of
messages this is perfectly okay; context tends to be cluttered with details anyway. If
you see a tiger approach, the notion of ‘tiger’, ‘big’ , and ‘approaching’ is enough
to get you running; the stripes and colouring are not that vital (in that context).
Returning to the previous example of the file that the operating system does not
recognise, the required programme provides a context for the downloaded file (con-
cept), which in this case is an (almost) exact match of the information that was sent.
The context only needs to be installed once, and from then on data can be transmit-
ted and effectively contextualised. The ‘atomic’ view of information in its extreme
on the other hand, would imply that concept-context is transported simultaneously
at all times.
Thirdly, information becomes a moment. Information is the detection/observation
of pattern. This implies contextualisation, and causes change. Patterns may be sta-
ble, but nothing can be said about them until they are contextualised.64
3.2 Some Limitations of Patterns
Because of the ‘harder’ claim of equivalence that isomorphy assumes with respect
to metaphors and analogies, the correspondence needs to be carefully tested and
reflected upon. This has always been a major criticism on systems theories in gen-
eral.65 Currently only mathematical equivalence and correspondence through power
laws can be ‘proven’, but even here care must be exercised as I will argue later. The
experimental method can either falsify or strengthen claims to isomorphy, at least in
scientific domains where this is possible.
As an example, take a pattern such as an exponential growth. These can be found
in interest rates (interest rates are exponential by design) and population growth. So
population growth and interest rates correspond with each other through the pattern
of an exponential curve. However, interest rates tend to keep on growing, while the
world-wide population rate is likely to stabilise in the next fifty years or so. Some
may use this to ‘disprove’ the correspondence between population growth and an
exponential curve, and this is a valid assertion, but others may say that the corre-
spondence is correct within an historical time-scale that starts with the first human
beings and ends in the coming decades.
Suppose now, that someone designs a non-linear mathematical equation which
shows a gradual increase and then suddenly plummets. Then he looks at the Dow
Jones index in the past few years, sees a resemblance, and claims that he has mod-
elled the credit crisis!
It will be clear that such a claim would be rather presumptuous. Even though
the Dow Jones index may correspond with the pattern of the mathematical model,
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this by no means implies that the model corresponds with a target called the ‘credit
crisis’. First, there is uncertainty between ‘credit crisis’ and ‘Dow Jones index’ be-
cause the credit crisis is much more than fluctuations of the stock market. It also
includes people losing their jobs and their homes, and companies that can no longer
do investments.
Secondly, the model only corresponds with the Dow Jones index within a certain
time scale, so these boundaries need to be taken into account.
Patterns, like the mathematical ones described above, run a risk of what Santa Fe
researcher Jack Cowan has called ‘the reminiscence syndrome’:
They say, ”Look, isn’t this reminiscent of a biological or physical phenomenon!” They jump
in right away as if it’s a decent model for the phenomenon, and usually of course it’s just got
some accidental features that make it look like something. The major discovery to emerge
[. . . ] is that ”it’s very hard to do science on complex systems.”.66
This is a clear warning that a pattern should never be used as proof by itself, but
needs additional contextual embedding to complete a claim to correspondence; this
it shares with modelling activities in general.67
Patterns amplify the risks associated with isomorphy due to their claim of target-
to-target correspondence. They can therefore never be used to prove such corre-
spondence; this requires additional criteria that may differ in particular scientific do-
mains. The correspondence between a target and a pattern can be disproven, though.
On the plus side, a pattern that is proven to exist in many targets can be extremely
powerful, as Newtonian mechanics has demonstrated in the last three centuries or
so for mathematical patterns.
The manner of contextual embedding may vary per scientific discipline for the
simple reason that ‘theory’ or ‘proof’ may be used in different ways. However,
having said that, these risks are often also latent in the analogies, metaphors, and
theories that are used in academia, and at least patterns are used explicitly, thus
opening them up for criticism by peers. As a practical consequence, the workshop
that is prepared here will not provide ‘theories’ or ‘frameworks’. The analysis fol-
lowed here is too coarse to have such pretences, and mainly focuses on the patterns,
so it is only prudent to mention this. Patterns alone mean very little. The contexts
can only be filled in by domain experts.
Rather, the intentions here are to develop a few tools that can assist in the analysis
of complex themes.
With this, the workshop on complexity that is prepared here will extend Holland’s
framework by developing a pattern library that will be used to analyse complexity.
The fundamental difference with the system theories is that this ‘pattern-oriented
approach to complexity’ (PAC) does not aim to fully describe a system; rather, it
puzzles with patterns and tries to see how these interact amongst themselves and
how they relate to the uncertainty of the modelling activities. PAC aims to be a
toolbox that can be extended in a recursive fashion; the equipment is built as the
analyses develop.
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4 A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Complexity
Pattern: Concept
Description: A base construct that allows itself to be linguistically captured in
a term or description
A.K.A:
Notes:
∙ A ‘place’ in terms of Alexander (1977), could be a specific
form of a space.
∙ ‘Entity’ is often also called ‘element’.
∙ The arrows with the white arrow heads show aggregation,
while the black arrows show an association, in this case a
‘contains’ relationship; A space ‘contains zero or more en-
tities and also processes’. Processes can, as will be demon-
strated later, also contain entities
With Holland’s framework, some preparations were already made for the pattern
library that will be developed in the next chapters. A pattern consists of ‘concepts’
such as ‘system’, and a ‘system’ consists of ‘entities’ with ‘relationships’, and in-
teracts with an ‘environment’. The latter are also specialisations of ‘concept’. As a
first distinction, the concept called ‘entity’ can be separated from the concept called
‘space’. An entity can be localised in a space, and a space can contain entities. An
‘environment’ is a specialisation of a ‘space’:68
Strictly speaking of course, a ‘concept’ should be defined somewhere along the
lines of ‘data that is in focus of a process of selection’ or something similar. How-
ever, as the modelling workshop here is performed by human beings, and it is as-
sumed that every interesting concept can be captured by a word or a phrase.
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4.1 Perspectives on Complex Systems
It will be clear that the workshop of complexity that has been prepared so far con-
sists of assembling a pattern library which may serve as a base to investigate a
wide variety of complex systems. One has to keep in mind here that no attempt
will be made to ‘invent’ patterns to describe these systems, but that current theory
in technology, psychology, philosophy and the social sciences are ‘matched’ to see
if such patterns can be found across those target domains. Some of these theories
may even be re-factored to make them ‘fit’ better. PAC does not aim to re-invent
established theories, but to use patterns as a ‘pidgin language’ for cross-scientific
or cross stakeholder communications.69 Hopefully domain experts, and especially
interdisciplinary groups of stakeholders, will further refactor this first initiative and
build novel patterns to improve the library that is developed here.
However, there is one thing needed to complete the modelling activities. As was
mentioned earlier, models are created and assessed by observing the target and try-
ing to ‘match’ the conceptual patterns it provides. This also implies that the model
itself must be observed, as this is the thing that an observer has the opportunity
to understand. An observer is a modeller! The model must be ‘picked’ up, moved
around so the observer can look at it from all angles. It will be clear that this intro-
duces various perspectives on the model.
At least three perspectives of complex systems can be identified. One is a per-
spective that focuses on the structure of a system. The questions related to this per-
spective revolve around structure, organisation and how everything is tied together,
and how all the resulting system affects its environment. It is an ‘inside-out’ per-
spective that, in engineering, is often called a ‘white-box’ approach. This structural
perspective includes reductionist approaches.
The other perspective, as can be expected, takes an ‘outside-in’ approach. This
perspective is sometimes called ecological perspective, and focuses on how the sys-
tem interacts with its environment and vice versa. This perspective typically deals
with the interface, or boundaries of the system. This also includes phenomenologi-
cal approaches. Engineering knows a special kind of ecological perspective, which
is called a ‘black-box approach’. This perspective assumes that the internal structure
of the system is hidden or unknown.
The third perspective was already shortly mentioned, and can be called evolution-
ary or historical. This perspective revolves around the questions of why the system
got to be where it is and what it is, and which consecutive phases were needed to
construct it. Engineering typically does not identify such an approach as it is usually
rather trivial; construction is always performed with the things that are at an engi-
neer’s disposal at a certain point in time. With evolutionary systems however, this
perspective is very important. If a biologist would discover a new butterfly in the
Amazonian rainforest that has evolved a microchip for its brains, then this should
immediately give some clues of its descent. . . it’s highly unlikely that this butterfly
102
has been around for a few million years!70
It is clear that, ideally, any theory of a target should account for all these per-
spectives, even if it is just a statement that one of the perspectives is trivial. These
perspectives provide the conceptual patterns that guide the modelling, based on ex-
isting contextual ones. In a way, these multiple perspectives contribute in making
the model ‘Medawar-zone compliant’.
Currently a lot of theories often only address one, or at most two of these per-
spectives. At a later stage I will argue that this often results in miscommunication
amongst peers and even runs the risk of oversimplifications. This, of course, is the
same criticism that is often heard when a call is made for pluralistic and holistic
approaches. In fact, the workshop that is being prepared here is going to pick up
these gauntlets in order to show the critics of reductionism that they’re heading for
some pretty messy business. But if that’s what they want, well, that’s what they’ll
get!
The three perspectives on complexty make clear why a ‘conservative’ approach
to complexity is taken here. Complexity’s ‘buzz-words’, such as ‘autopoiesis’ or
‘emergence’, are currently only known from a phenomenological perspective; their
structuring, and evolutionary nature are unknown. For this reason, they should be
used with caution when trying to capture certain isomorphy in a model. With this,
three perspectives constrain advance of theory. One can use ‘emergence’ and ‘au-
topoiesis’ for speculation and hypotheses-building, or in a metaphorical sense, but
it should be made clear that such advances are far from being ‘proven’.
There is also a kind of perspective in-between a structural and an evolutionary
perspective, which will be called the ‘complexity perspective’. This perspective ba-
sically follows the aggregation of a system into increasingly larger systems. This
perspective can be visualised by imagining oneself to be in an armchair and then
suddenly taken up in flight. While moving away from the chair, one first sees fur-
niture become house, then houses become town, then towns become planet, planets
become solar system, and so on. While moving away, entities become aggregated
into objects, which in turn become the entities of a larger system in a pulsating
fashion.
The complexity perspective partially aligns with a structural perspective because
it is an as-is perspective of a system’s structure, and partially with an evolutionary
perspective because lower-level entities need to exist in order to make the aggre-
gate. This perspective is equivalent to the ‘nuts and bolts’ perspective that was in-
troduced earlier, and is very important in itself because it usually allows a measure
for the complexity of a target. A solar system has a higher complexity than atoms
and molecules because a solar system has more relationships along the complexity
perspective. It is along this perspective that an attempt will be made to cross C.P.
Snow’s ‘two cultures’, but at this point it is only prudent not to jump too far ahead
of things.
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However, this is not the full story, for wasn’t there an isomorphism between solar
system and atoms that we had called ‘orbit’? Apparently this isomorphism can be
‘detected’ along this perspective!
As was said earlier, complexity is a relationship between observer and target,
and thus the perspectives on a complex target partially determine its complexity. If
we now speak about ‘increasing levels of complexity’, or ‘different scales of com-
plexity’, then this is related to the amount of information that is contained in the
model of the target. This is related to the complexity perspective. On one hand one
can know that the complexity of what is observe is increasing because the aggre-
gation is known along this perspective and therefore of the increasing relationships
between the various sub-systems. On the other hand, however, a reduction of com-
plexity is observed at regular intervals. This reduction is obviously related to the fact
that aggregation obfuscates the individual entities at some point; furniture becomes
‘house’, houses become ‘town’, towns become ‘planet’, and so on.
The issue here is that knowledge that the aggregates contains entities is taken up
in the complexity measure, and therefore this structural information is incorporated
in the modeling of the targets that are observed.
However, the observer only sees or detects the phenomenological pattern of ag-
gregation along the complexity perspective. Thus complexity can increase along one
perspective but decrease (or rather pulsate, in this particular case) along another. The
‘increasing scale’ of complexity is determined by the trajectory, while another per-
spective shows increasing and decreasing complexity through aggregation.71
It is here that, maybe, something can be said about ‘increasing complexity’. It is
clear that aggregation of systems introduces more relationships systems-internally;
an aggregate is more complex than its constituents, as long as the observer knows
both levels and the relationships between them. However, as this says nothing about
the external interactions between aggregates which, almost by definition, show a
reduction of complexity when observed purely as an aggregate form, the ‘increase’
of complexity is still ‘a matter of perspective’. A human being, due to the highly
dynamic and interactive nature of our brains and our social aptitude, may be more
complex than one of the cells in our body, but we still haven’t figured out why the
cell is alive, and we often don’t spend too much thought on people around us. In
the end, for most of us, a speck of light in the night sky is just a star, whatever an
astronomer may think.
It is now also possible to make clear why a definition of complexity will never be
found. The working definition presented earlier, is basically a measure of ‘compli-
catedness’. That is, as the number of known relationships increase, their mutual or-
ganisation, structuring and interactions grow and the models become, well, compli-
cated. However, this complicatedness is ruptured by increasing uncertainty. Along
the complexity perspective, the number of relationships of a target increases expo-
nentially (this is known), but this also means that the uncertainty increases, also
exponentially, as the observer will ‘loose sight’ of the many relationships that make
the target. In this light, complexity is a measure of that what is known to be unknown
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about a target.
It hopefully has become clear why PAC departs from ‘restricted’ complexity,
as this follows the complexity perspective. It is a matter of prudence to be wary
of any contribution to the theme of complexity that jumps on the band-wagon of
‘hip’ concepts, while others are struggling to find out what makes these concepts
tick. ‘Emergence’ is not a ‘proof’ of a complex phenomenon, if the elements that
together produce this emergence are not known. The same applies for ‘autopoiesis’
and ‘attractors’.
It may be true that restricted complexity still misses a lot of things, but significant
headway has been made despite this, and many of the concepts that were introduced
there have become part of the daily vocabulary of many scientific areas, and are
worth being shared with others. After all, that is what PAC aims to contribute to.
5 Wrapping Up
In this chapter a ‘pattern-oriented approach to complexity’ was introduced that ex-
tends concepts from systems thinking with Holland’s framework of complexity and
the notion of patterns, in order to create a set of principles and methodologies to
analyse a complex system. Besides this, the base paradigms of GST have been de-
composed with concepts of information theory, in order to better secure the pro-
duction system that is thus created to model complexity in established scientific
disciplines. It also made it possible to ‘embed’ the Darwinian concept of ‘selection’
as a fundamental paradigm.
This results in a perspective of ‘information’ as being ‘formed of patterns’. As
flow through a system is often contextualised, the more common, atomic, use of
information will often be used in the next chapters for convenience, unless contex-
tualisation is important to understand the process.
Lastly, three and a half perspectives on a complex system have been introduced,
the ‘half’ one being the ‘complexity perspective’, that scales complexity up into
ever larger aggregate forms. It is along this perspective that a pattern library will be
gradually built up which will ‘move through’ contributions from technical systems,
biology, psychology and social sciences in order to identify a number of isomorphic
patterns that return at various scales. This way, it will be possible to home in to the
environment in which a ‘lingua democratica’ can contextualise.
The aim here is not to develop a ‘new’ systems theory, for this is likely to re-
sult in less successful frameworks than the mature systems theories that are already
around. Rather, the patterns are used to ‘travel’ along the complexity perspective
from paradigm to paradigm, theory to theory, thereby sometimes offering a refac-
toring strategy that might make ‘more sense’ than the one offered, whether various
theories of a certain theme may have something in common, or maybe why they
are in conflict. These re-factoring strategies may be criticised, but hopefully the ap-
proach itself is worth following up on.
Part II
A Pattern Library of Feedback

Chapter 4
Feedback
I have always been fascinated with feedback, ever since my introduction to this
mechanism in the first grade of polytech in Leeuwarden, and the discoverer of re-
generative feedback, Harold Stephen Black (1898-1983), is one of my all-time sci-
entific heroes. Of course, discoveries often have many parents, and the ancestral
lines of feedback could be traced back all the way to Fibonacci (Leonardo of Pisa,
ca. 1170-1250) who described one of the first, and without any doubt the most fa-
mous of recurrent equations, the Fibonacci sequence.i The Scottish inventor James
Watt (1736-1819) already used feedback to improve his designs on steam engines,
and Georg Wilhelm Hegel’s (1770-1831) dialectic can also be considered a feedback
pattern.1
Harold Black however, coupled simple elegance with wide applicability which
allowed feedback to become one of the driving forces behind the technological rev-
olution of the early Twentieth century. Sadly enough, Black’s name has disappeared
from our collective minds, even in engineering, and so I always feel a certain obli-
gation to correct this.ii
1 A Pattern of Feedback
Feedback in the way that it is used here, is the pivotal concept that connects most
schools of complexity. The reason for this is that re-entry becomes almost an in-
evitability, because of the observer-centric approach to complexity that was intro-
duced earlier. The aim of this chapter is to make this more clear, while gradually
adding more complexity to the base distinction between target and model.
The pattern of feedback will be followed from order to chaos, from restricted
complexity towards general complexity. The pattern is depicted below:
i Naturalists like Richard Attenborough will be quick to point out that nature itself is the true
discoverer of feedback, as it can be found everywhere.
ii It is remarkable that in most books on cybernetics, which strongly hinges on the concept of
feedback, Black’s name often is not mentioned. As science, like philosophy, tends to only rely on
sources within their own domains, it would appear something does not exist until it is mentioned in
a scholarly article. This way, a lot of phenomena that are discovered elsewhere, such as in a patent,
are implicitly ‘kidnapped’ by science and philosophy. I do not think that, in general, this is done
by conscious act, but it is one of the reasons why the crafts often get less credit in academia than
they deserve
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Pattern: Feedback
Description: A flow where data from a source feeds back to it (re-entry).
A.K.A: Self-referentiality, when data that is strongly related to the iden-
tity of a source is reflected
Notes:
∙ Projected data are not necessarily entirely reflected
∙ Only a little bit of reflection is needed to alter the character-
istics of the source
∙ Feedback typically has four manifestations:
– Regenerative feedback stabilises around equilibrium states
– Positive feedback progresses towards boundary states
– Temporal effects may cause oscillations
– Complex feedback is typically the result of non-linearity
– These depend on the internal structure of the source
In the previous chapter, patterns were likened to a meandering river through the
landscape of complexity. In terms of the pattern-oriented idiom that is being devel-
oped here, this basically means that complexity provides a context in which patterns
like feedback can ‘take up form’. The vocabulary of complexity can provide the
ecological patterns that are at least needed to understand feedback, but its structures
and evolution are needed to complete the picture. For a relatively simple pattern
such as feedback, the evolutionary perspective can be drawn quite quickly. If pro-
jection does not reflect, then flow (of data) will maintain be open-loop. Note also
that when the observer does not see the reflection, then that observer will also as-
sume an open-loop situation.
Feedback is formed when data re-enters the source through reflection.iii In many
systems, the premises that need to be in place to make this happen can be surpris-
ingly complex. In many technical systems, especially when the feedback initiates
production, this bootstrapping or kick-starting of the feedback loop often requires
special attention. In evolutionary systems, this aspect is often still a mystery, for
instance what conditions were needed to kick-start the first living cells? Many steps
iii in this case ‘information’ can be used, as contextualisation has to take place in order for feedback
to occur
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have been more or less filled in by now, but some crucial transitory developments
are still open.2
2 Classic Feedback
Harold Stephen Black was an electronics engineer working at Bell labs in the time
that telephony was emerging as a promising new form of communication. Telephone
signals at the time were amplified through large transformer coils, which had to be
placed in-between a telephone line every other mile or so. Besides the price tag, this
had a few very undesirable side effects. For one, the amplification of the transformer
coils could not be precisely set, especially with respect to tone-height (or frequency
spectrum). Some transformer coils therefore had a higher amplification than others,
or amplified some tones better than others, resulting in barely audible long distance
conversations with your sweetheart, while her mother always got exceptionally clear
lines when she called to give her opinions on things.iv Besides this, the transformer-
coils also amplified noise and static picked up along the way, resulting in unpleasant
squeaks, cracks and glitches during many a telephone conversation.
As legend has it, Black got his brainwave on a ferry to work and managed to write
the principle of negative feedback down on a scrap of paper.3 These few scribbles
resulted in U. S. patent 2,102,671, filed to the United States patent office in 1932
(the official document was dated 1937), and one of the most widely applied control
mechanisms, in all its simple elegance, saw the light of day. This classic form of
negative or regenerative feedback will be described in the next section.4
2.1 Regenerative (Negative) Feedback
Negative, or regenerative, feedback relies on amplification. Say there is an input
signal i which is amplified 500 times (A = 500), then this will result in an output
signal o:
o = A.i = 500.i [4.1]
Suppose, like the transformer coils that Harold Black had to deal with, there is a
tremendous variation in the amplification level, say ±20%. This means that in the
worst case, the amplification is no more than 400 times,v while an extremely good
amplifier would give 600 times the input signal, which is one-and-a-half times the
worst case.
iv As Murphy proved a few years later with the famous law bearing his name
v A reduction of 20% means that 80% (or 0.8 times) of the average amplification is achieved: 0.8
* 500 = 400. Conversely, an exceptionally good amplification yields 1.2 times the average: 1.2 *
500 = 600
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Black wondered what would happen if a small portion of the output signal would
be rerouted back to the input, so that the amplifier would amplify:
i−R.o [4.2]
The reduction factor R is between 0 and 1. Note that a negative portion of the output
is offered to the input, hence negative feedback. This would result in an output signal
of:
o = (i−R.o).A⇒ (1+A.R).o = A.i⇒ o = ( A1+AR) i = ( 11
A+R
)
i [4.3]
If the amplification A is somewhere between 400 and 600, the factor 1/A will be
between 1/400 = 0.0025 and 1/600 = 0.0017. If R is large with respect to these
values, for instance 0.01, then the amplification of the resulting system becomes:
1
0.0025+0.01 = 80, and
1
0.017+0.01 = 85.5 [4.4]
Now the variation is less than 3 per cent around an average amplification of 82.275
instead of the 20 percent of the open-loop system.
A higher amplification means less variation. For very large values of A, the re-
sulting amplification of the feedback system becomes approximately equal to the
reduction factor R, and the variation will be determined by the variation of R.
As these reductions could be made with great accuracy in the days of Harold
Black, negative feedback offered a means of making more reliable amplifiers, albeit
with the trade-off that the maximum amplification of the feedback system was less
than the open-loop system.
Negative feedback also had another advantage. Suppose a noise signal was
picked up by the transformer coil. This was not unusual, as transformer coils pick up
electro-magnetic interference from the surroundings, such as when a bolt of light-
ning strikes in the vicinity. This interference is amplified as well, resulting in an
error signal e at the output of the open-loop system:vi
o = A.i+ e [4.5]
Adding this signal to the feedback system [4.3] results in:
o = A.i−R.(o.A+ e)⇒ (1+A.R).o = A.i−R.e⇒
o = ( A1+AR )i+(
R
1+AR ).e [4.6]
If the average amplification A is 500, and R is 0.01, then A.R = 5 and:
( R1+AR ).e =
0.01
6 e = 0.002.e [4.7]
vi The error signal e is at its worst at the output, because of the amplification
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So feedback causes a reduction of the error signal. Therefore feedback is also often
applied in situations where noise needs to be kept as small as possible.
Is there anything to learn from positive feedback? There is, but this is a rather
straightforward issue. If a positive portion of an output signal is added to the input, it
basically means that the input is reinforced. So a little bit of positive input signal will
result in an amplified positive output signal, which is added to the input, amplified,
resulting in a larger portion of the output offered to the input, and so on, until the
output reaches its bounds. This situation will only change when enough negative
input is applied to overcome the positive output, which then reverses the reinforcing
character of the structure and pushes the output to its negative bounds. So now the
system works as a switch, alternating, or toggling between the two boundary states
of the output.
Even though positive feedback is quickly described, it is of extreme importance
for complex systems, because it accelerates to boundary states quite quickly. If a
medium hosts a process of positive feedback, it tends to dominate and can only be
countered by an equally forceful counter-process.
Typically, the dynamics of feedback follow exponential curves. These come in
different forms, sometimes starting slowly and then accelerating, or sometimes start-
ing very quickly and then gradually slowing down as the equilibrium or boundary
states are reached. This is not surprising, as exponential curves are typical for pro-
duction systems where every new value depends on the previous ones.
Feedback can be opposed to open-loop systems, but also with feed-forward.
Feed-forward is associated with prediction or anticipation. A feed-forward system
typically measures something that is expected to happen and uses this information
to adjust a control. For instance, if someone is driving a car and sees a steep slope
ahead, she will give a bit more gas in order to maintain her current speed. Holland’s
lookahead is another example of feed-forward.
Harold Black’s feedback loops show that if a little bit of information about a
system’s output is returned to its input, its overall behaviour can be stabilised or im-
proved, if set against certain goal criteria, such as a desired amplification. Feedback
therefore, can be an important determining factor of the behaviour of the overall
system, as the differences between positive and negative feedback demonstrates.
The fact that only a little bit of reflection is needed to change the behaviour of a
system, makes feedback a nasty process when working with complex systems. It is
possible that the portion that is reflected is not, or cannot be measured, as it flows
in the background of more dominant flows. Yet this does not mean that its influence
can be discarded.
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2.2 Oscillation
In the previous section, the equations assumed that there is no time delay between
input signal and its amplified correlate at the output. In practical systems there will
always be a short delay before a change at the input manifests itself at the output.
Normally this will have little effect on the feedback system. However, time delays
can cause feedback to behave very differently than expected, for instance cause a
continuous shifting between positive and negative feedback. The system then can
start to oscillate between the two boundary states of the output, or in other words,
produce a waveform which no longer relies on the input.
This effect is demonstrated in a rather irritating fashion when one holds a micro-
phone near a loudspeaker box. Obviously there is an amplifier (the Hi-Fi set) be-
tween the microphone (input) and loudspeakers (output). There is feedback as well,
because the microphone picks up the signals coming from the speakers, initially just
noise.
But there is also a time delay, as the sound waves travelling through the air be-
tween the speakers and the microphone do this at a finite speed of about 343 meters
per second.vii If the sound the microphone picks up from the speakers surpasses a
certain threshold value, which occurs if the microphone gets too close to the speak-
ers, a high-pitched tone is suddenly emitted from the speaker. In other words, the
closed-loop system consisting of microphone, amplifier, speakers and air, starts to
oscillate between the boundary settings determined by the volume knob. This form
of feedback is often called audio feedback.5
This effect may be undesirable in this particular case, but it is also often con-
sciously used. In electronic equipment, certain combinations of components allow
designers to determine the frequency of the oscillation with high accuracy, which
results in the beeps of a mobile phone, the microwaves of a microwave, or the trans-
mission frequencies of a radio or a wireless set.6
For the purposes here, the most interesting observation of an oscillating system
is that it is able to maintain itself. Provided it is supplied with energy of some kind,
the system no longer requires an external input signal to define its behaviour; it has
become more or less independent.
2.3 Recursion
Alternating forms of feedback, such as oscillation, can often be described in discrete
steps, or iterations, where every consecutive step depends on the previous ones.
Mathematically, these iterations can be described in recurrent equations, which is
often a more practical means of investigating all kinds of delayed feedback systems
vii This also depends on the temperature of the air
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rather than hard-wiring them in Hi-Fi sets. The following formula is an example of
a recurrent equation:
xt = xt−1 +1, x0 = 0 [4.8]
A recurrent equation normally consists of two parts. The premise is an initial set of
values at a certain time (often t = 0). The second part consists of a rule, an equation
that shows how a value xt at a certain time t depends on its previous value at xt−1. In
[4.8] the premise is zero (the value of x at t = 0 is zero, or: x0 = 0) and every con-
secutive value xt is created by adding one to its current value. So [4.8] is producing
a set of values {0,1,2,3,4,. . . } of all positive numbers. A recurrent system generates
values. Instead of having to store every value between zero and infinity separately,
it is sufficient to have a premise and a rule that determines how a set of values can
be generated from this premise.
Note that this system is a positive feedback system, as the values are heading
towards a boundary value, which for a mathematical system, is infinity (∞).
An example of negative recursion is:
xt =−0.5.xt−1,x0 = 10 [4.9]
This results in the following set:
{10,−5,2.5,−1.25,0.625,−0.3125,0.51625, ...}
This set seems to converge to zero given sufficient iterations. The pattern also reveals
a wave form, especially when plotted in a graph:
Fig. 1 Overshoot in
Negative Feedback
Loops
The waveform is the consequence of the iterative character of recursion, which
emulates a time delay, just like audio feedback.
The system seems to ‘miss’ the eventual value, zero, at first attempt (t = 1), then
it reverses but overcompensates again, although less severely than the first time.
This is called overshoot. In a number of consecutive iterations, the system fluctu-
ates around the eventual value with ever less overshoot until it finally reaches its
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equilibrium, or becomes so small that the fluctuations can no longer be observed.
Overshoot is a very common phenomenon in feedback systems. If the dampening
factor of the waveform is left out, then oscillation remains;
xt =−xt−1,x0 = 10 [4.10]
It is evident that this equation toggles around two values, namely 10 and -10, and
will carry on doing so infinitely. This explains why the previous example of the
squeaking microphone always produces one tone; it is that tone where the amplifi-
cation of the feedback signal is exactly one. A classic sound effect in electric guitars
uses this effect through a device that amplifies the guitar sound just a little below
one, say 0.999 times. This leads to an overshoot that lasts for a few seconds or even
longer, resulting in the distorted, ‘whiny’ delay of the sound that one often hears
in rock songs.7 The result of making the amplification of the feedback signal larger
than one is demonstrated in [4.11]:
xt =−2xt−1,x0 = 10⇒{10,−20,40,−80,160,−320, . . .} [4.11]
This brings us to probably one of the most —if not most— famous of recurrent
equations of all times. This equation is also one of the first to be documented, and
was devised by Leonardo di Fabonucci in 1202. Di Fabonucci wanted to calculate
the following:
‘A certain man put a pair of rabbits in a place surrounded on all sides by a wall. How many
pairs of rabbits can be produced from that pair in a year if it is supposed that every month
each pair begets a new pair which from the second month on becomes productive?’8
The famous Fibonacci sequence, which is a positive feedback loop, is as follows:
xt = xt−1 + xt−2,x0 = 1,x1 = 1 [4.10]
The resulting set is: { 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 233,. . .}
Hence the phrase ‘breeding like rabbits’...
In the previous section, positive feedback was said to run into boundary states.
In the case of the Fibonacci sequence, this doesn’t seem to happen as the numbers
keep rising. The reason for this is that mathematical systems do not have a bound-
ary, save the concept of infinity (∞). Real rabbits will never be able to reproduce
to infinity as they will run out of food and space well before that. Practical systems
are always constrained, and these constraints can contribute to non-linear behaviour.
From the viewpoint of complexity, there are two issues that become important
here. First, a recurrent equation describes a production system that creates new val-
ues from existing ones. This is related to process. When someone sees a set of
seemingly unrelated numbers, this set may appear to be complex —if not random—
, but when the underlying recurrent equation is known, immediately things become
much more simple. Here again, one can see the importance of understanding a phe-
nomenon from multiple perspectives; the ecological perspective may only display
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randomness, while the structural/evolutionary perspective (the process or equation)
may be surprisingly simple. Again, this is a clear sign that complexity always is a
relationship between observer and target.
It may also be good to make a watershed here between ‘complex’ and ‘difficult’,
which seems to be the meaning of complexity in everyday life. If, as in chapter two,
science and philosophy are considered complex, it is not because they are difficult,
but that they are a recurrent production system that produces theories, experiments,
procedures, methodologies and so on. If these production systems share patterns
with the simpler mathematical production systems described here, then these sys-
tems may depend on initial conditions (premises). This match gets some confir-
mation from Ihde’s observations of bias in philosophy and science. Bias and de-
pendency on initial conditions therefore seem to be, and also exhibit, patterns that
manifest themselves at various levels of complexity.9
Besides this, these patterns are also persistent within a closed production sys-
tem. If a certain bias guides these self-referential productions, then every iteration
will maintain, and maybe even amplify, the bias. Now just consider the custom of
scholarly production, to base their work on references to other scholarly work, to
get an idea of how this bias can persist in these kind of production systems. From
the viewpoint of complex production systems, it is inevitable that this occurs! It is
the pay-off in order to maintain coherence in the production system.
3 From Oscillations to Chaos
Previously oscillations were introduced as independent behaviour that occurs when
temporal effects are introduced to a feedback system. The output of such a system
starts to fluctuate between its boundary states, resulting in a recurrent pattern of the
output signal, usually a sinusoid or rectangular waveform if the output is projected
as a function of time. This pattern is comparable to the trajectory of a comet, moving
in an orbit near the sun to some spot in the outer regions of our solar system, some
of them with such predictability that it can be calculated exactly when and where the
comet will be at a certain time. Once, long ago, they were considered messengers
of the sky, usually bringing evil tidings, until the hidden order of their elliptical
trajectories were discovered and they got their place in the parkland perspective of
our minds. Such elliptical trajectories consist of two points around which an object,
such as a comet, can move. One of these points, both called focus, is provided by the
centre of the sun, while the other focus does not have a visible tag. In anticipation
of more chaotic motions, the focus will be called attractor from now on.
If the comet moves towards the outer regions of our solar system, it slows down
by the gravitational pull of the sun, until this pull becomes so strong that the comet
starts to head towards the sun. In this phase, the speed of the comet builds up until it
shears past the sun, moves around it at a relatively short distance before the comet
starts to head away from the sun. Then the process of slowing down starts all over
again until the comet has reached its farthest point. This sort of oscillation plotted
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Fig. 2 Trajectory of a Comet
against time, results in a very predictable waveform. Yet oscillations, besides be-
ing of fundamental importance in our lives in the forms of biorhythms, heartbeats,
seasons and the routine of everyday life, need little adjustment to become more
interesting.
Fig. 3 Elliptical
movement around one
point attractor and
a circle
The above figure shows an oscillation that is projected around one point. This is
more likely to represent the actual trajectory of a comet in our solar system as it is
highly unlikely that it will return to exactly the same spot with every revolution. The
movement is still symmetrical, which means that every revolution can be matched
exactly by applying a mathematical projection, such as turning a few degrees clock-
wise or counter-clockwise.
In the late Sixties, the American toy company Kenner introduced the spirograph
under license from the British inventor Denys Fisher. The Spirograph consisted of a
set of gears and other devices with cogs that contained holes, that could fit the tip of
a pen or pencil. By fixing these devices on a piece of paper and moving them around
other cogs with a pencil, all kinds of magnificent shapes could be drawn.
Spirograph pictures are also the results of non-linear oscillatory movements, as
the pen rotates within the boundary states provided by the location of the holes in
the rotating gears. The magic of spirograph pictures was the result of juxtapositions
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Fig. 4 Spirograph
of these oscillations within the constraints determined by the gears that were used.
A good example of a do-it-yourself spirograph can be demonstrated by getting
a piece of paper with grid pattern (for instance a square grid of 5 millimetres) and
draw a point somewhere in the centre of this paper. This point is the starting point of
a ‘turtle’ whose movement is determined by two rules that are applied recurrently:viii
1. Draw two lines of 5 units (the width of a grid element) from the last drawn point
perpendicular to the preceding line in clockwise direction (staircase). The line
from the initial point is horizontal (premise).
2. Draw a line from the last drawn point to halfway the initial point.
The following figure shows the process of repeating these two rules a number of
times.
The resulting, somewhat Picassian impression of an American windmill may not
be as beautiful as a spirograph, but it does demonstrate a few interesting features.
In the first place, the process seems to get ‘trapped’ in a circle revolving around the
initial starting point. This is the result of the opposing directions of the two rules.
Rule 1 allows the turtle to ‘run away’ from the starting point (divergence), but every
attempt to escape is smothered by rule two that forces the turtle back in the direction
of the centre. The two rules together make non-linear system of positive (rule 1) and
negative (rule 2) feedback in longitudinal direction (that is, pointing in the direction
of the centre), and result in a recurrent oscillation around the aforementioned circle.
Another interesting phenomenon occurs when the turtle has made one revolution
after sixteen iterations. It does not exactly end up where it started, but this mismatch
becomes smaller as the turtle progresses until it eventually is in phase with its previ-
ous path. From then on, it will keep on walking along its previous path. Apparently
viii Or another animal or thing. ‘Turtle’ was a term used in some graphical drawing packages of
home computers in the eighties
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Fig. 5 Drawing an
Impression of an
American Mill
(1,2, 16 and 32
Iterations)
there is not only convergence in longitudinal direction, but also in transversal di-
rection, or perpendicular to the line through the centre. The reason for this is that
the two rules create a pattern (the spikes) around the circle and this pattern has a
certain length in transversal direction. As the circumference of the circle has a dif-
ferent length, the pattern can only fit on the circumference a certain number of times,
with the likelihood of mismatch with spikes that were drawn previously. Therefore
a bit of the pattern that completes the circle will not match the first pattern that was
drawn. However, it is only a matter of time before this mismatch is resolved as the
system converges to a circumference that exactly matches the distance of a number
of complete patterns.
3.1 Algorithms
At this point, a small diversion is needed to give a bit more attention to the fact
that the windmill is the result of recurrently applying two consecutive rules. Such
processes that consist of a set of well-defined rules carried out one by one are very
common. The recipes in a cookbook are good examples:
. . .
1. Take one egg and put it in a large bowl
2. Add 500 grams of flour
3. Add 400 ml of water
4. Add a tablespoon of sugar
. . .
The menu of any restaurant also contains such procedures, in the form of (menus
of) meals of multiple courses, or the programmes one may get at the theatre (espe-
cially operas).
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One very distinctive feature of procedures, is that they call for a strict form of
enactment. A three-course menu will not work if there are no cooks to make the
meals, or if they decide to serve something completely different, just as a theatre
programme will lose its meaning if the actors decide to ignore the programme.
Procedures are both a promise of what can be expected, as well as an imperative
guideline for those who need to carry out the rules it contains. This implies that a
procedure has to be set up in a way that the actors can understand (meals for cooks,
and acts for divas).
A special category of such procedures were investigated by the Persian mathe-
matician Muˆusaˆ al-Khowarizm in 835 CE. His interest lay in procedures that con-
sisted of rules of arithmetic, which were carried out one by one. When his work was
translated in Latin, his name was ‘latinised’ and became algorismus. Currently his
name lives on in the English word algorithm, a procedure that consists of mathemat-
ical or formal logical rules which are at the heart of computer science, as a computer
relies on algorithms to do what it has to do. The hard disk of any computer is there-
fore packed with data and algorithms that process this data.
The formal rigour adds a number of characteristics to such algorithms:10
1. Substrate Neutrality: it does not matter if an algorithm is jotted down on a piece
of paper, a beer mat, in the bits and bytes that a computer can understand, or any
other medium for that matter. As long as the actor can carry out the algorithm,
the results will always be the same. The pictures of the American Windmill, for
instance, were generated by a computer program, but it can also be carried out
with pen and paper and would result in the same shape.
2. Underlying Mindlessness: the actors are expected to carry out the rules without
question or debate. Every rule has to be sufficiently simple so that the actors can
understand them, but they carry them out, well.., mindlessly! Good examples are
bugs in computer programmes, which are almost always errors in the algorithms,
not in the actor (the microprocessor) that carries them out. If the algorithm pre-
scribes a bug, then the actor will cause one!11
3. Guaranteed Results: Whatever an algorithm may do, it will always yield the same
results. As Daniel Dennett calls it, ‘an algorithm is a foolproof recipe’.
The second and third characteristics of an algorithm do not necessarily apply for
a procedure or a programme. An algorithm is therefore a specialisation of a proce-
dure. An algorithm can be considered a pattern, that is related to process.
A nice example of a non-linear algorithm used as a problem solving process is
one that is learned at school: dividing by hand.
To avoid possible confusion, indeed the outcome of a division is a regular num-
ber, on which linear operations can be carried out. However the process of dividing,
basically the generation of a sequence of numbers based on the rules of division, is
non-linear. The non-linearity is caused by the fact that the process has to work with
numbers between zero and nine. In other words, the boundary states of the process
are defined by zero and nine (both inclusive). Another constraint is imposed on the
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remainder of each step of the division, which cannot exceed the divider.
Take, for instance, the division of 123456 by 12. According to the rules of divi-
sion, the following numbers are generated:
123456∖12 = 1, remainder = 0;
03456∖12 = 0, remainder = 3;
3456∖12 = 2; remainder = 10;
1056∖12 = 8; remainder = 9;
96∖12 = 8; remainder = 0;
So the answer is 10288. If the generated numbers are plotted in a graph, they will
take the following shape:
Fig. 6 Generating
Numbers Through
Division
The process looks a bit like overshoot, eventually settling down at a constant
value of zero. This outcome is not always the same:
311∖3 = 1, remainder 0;
011∖3 = 0, remainder 11;
11∖3 = 3, remainder 2;
2∖3 = 0, remainder 2, add a zero;
20∖3 = 6, remainder 2;
20∖3 = 6, remainder 2;
20∖3 = 6, remainder 2;
. . .
This process stabilises at the number 6. On a pocket calculator, the outcome would
be 103.666667, because of rounding of the last digit. More delicate recurrent pat-
terns are also possible:
311∖11 28.2727272727272727. . .
311∖7 44.428571 428571 428571 428571. . .
311∖81 3.839506172 839506172 839506172. . .
311∖17 18.29411764705882352 29411764705882352. . .
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In fact, if one divides any two different numbers, using a calculator that can show a
lot of digits (like the ones often shipped with the operating system on a computer),
one can easily see that most divisions have these recurrent patterns, which is the
result of the process itself. The process basically starts with the left-most digit and
works its way through to the right-most one (or infinity). The remainder can cause
potentially indefinite successions of new digits. However, the digits themselves are
always constrained from zero to nine. This means that, at some point, the process
will generate a combination of digit and remainder it encountered previously. From
then on the system gets ‘trapped’ in the recurrent sequence. For some divisions this
recurrent pattern is immediate, as when 311 is divided by 3. For others it takes two
steps (311/11), or more (311/17).
The process of dividing is therefore very similar to that of the American wind-
mill, starting off with wild fluctuations, but eventually settling in recurrent se-
quences. As some divisions yield very orderly results and others are less easily
spotted, there seems to be a relationship with phase transitions, one of the hot topics
in non-linear dynamics, as it has its equivalents in many physical, biological, and
probably even economical and social systems. Try dividing 311 consecutively by
two, three, four, and so on.
311∖2 155.50000000000000000. . .
311∖3 103.66666666666666666. . .
311∖4 77.750000000000000000. . .
311∖5 62.200000000000000000. . .
311∖6 51.833333333333333333. . .
311∖7 44.428571428571428571. . .
311∖8 38.875000000000000000. . .
311∖9 34.555555555555555555. . .
. . .
As the table above clearly shows, all divisions between one and ten converge to sin-
gle digits, except for seven, which appears to be an island of liveliness in a further-
more boring sea of predictability. These sudden changes have also been observed in
many physical and biological systems.
The mechanisms behind many of these phase transitions are still very much a
mystery, but there are some scientists researching complexity who think that these
‘edges of chaos’ enable complex interactions, and with them life, consciousness or
intelligence. The ‘edge of chaos’ is a fundamental concept for some thinkers on
complexity, especially the Santa Fe school, and is a very interesting ‘side-arm’ of
the river of complex feedback.12
In the specific and orderly case of dividing 311, or any other number for that
matter, one can easily see that prime numbers play a special role in the observed
pockets of liveliness, probably owing to the fact that they are the most anarchistic
of numbers.
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A non-linear process can be made even more unpredictable by adding random be-
haviour to the system. Returning to the previous example of the American windmill,
suppose rule one is changed by only allowing the turtle to move along a staircase
pattern away from the centre, starting with a horizontal line with a length of five
units, and then a coin is used to decide whether rule one (heads) or rule two (tails)
is applied. A possible outcome is depicted in the following figure.
Fig. 7 Graph with
Random Behaviour
The graph clearly shows that the figure is allowed to ‘grow’ more, as the random
aspect no longer confines it to a circular motion. However, even though a number
of consecutive heads may allow the turtle to move away from the centre for quite a
distance (following a ‘staircase’ pattern), rule two relentlessly pulls the turtle back
and keeps it from straying too far. The more successful the escape attempt of con-
secutive heads, the harder the punishment of tails.
It takes only a little fantasy to see, besides possibly a fine display of Soviet Art,
a parallel with ice crystal formation.ix Indeed this also is a process where growth
consists of orderly physical rules and random aspects due to small contaminations
in the material often required to initiate the growth.13
ix I have had the good fortune of working in the eastern part of Germany only a few years after
the reunion. As there were still many remains of the former Socialist Republic, I once stayed in
a hotel in the beautiful Thu¨ringen forests that used to be a holiday camp for the comrades. When
my colleagues and I drove to the entrance of the hotel, we were welcomed by a display in steel
and concrete, of a man drowning in steel spikes, spears and arrows, which we imagined to be the
artist’s impression of the follies of war. Closer inspection however revealed that we were actually
looking at a lumberjack amongst pine trees . . .
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4 On the Edge of Chaos: Malthusian Growth
Thomas Malthus, the 18th Century curate from Albury, Great Britain, may probably
be one of the first environmentalists of modern times. His 1798 essay, ‘Essay on the
Principles of Population’, explored the consequences if we humans kept breeding
like Fibonacci’s rabbits, that is without any external force to keep us in check.14 His
sombre conclusions were that a population explosion would lead to famine and all
other kinds of mishap as a result of limited resources. This, as Malthus pointed out,
will lead to a population crunch, as many will not be able to produce offspring, or
support them to maturity. Malthus’s population explosion acts like a swing that first
shoots past its equilibrium, and then has to move back equally rigorously, causing
the original growth to take over again. Ironically enough, it is the unchecked growth
of a population, not the inevitability of the crunch, that Malthus is remembered for.
Malthusian Growth is, like the Fibonacci sequence, a recurrent equation:
xt+1 = r.xt , r > 1 [4.11]
As r is larger than one, each consecutive value of x will be increasingly larger than
the previous, until it shoots right out of the graphs. Malthusian growth is equal to the
growth of capital in a bank account. Suppose one start with an initial capital (x0) of
1000, and the interest rate is a stunning 8% (r = 1.08). The annual growth of capital
is plotted in the following graph.
Fig. 8 Growth of
Capital
If this same scheme is applied for a population that was very much governed by
the Old-Testamental maxim ”Go forth and multiply!”, with families of six or more
children (r > 3), one can understand Malthus’s concerns regarding the prospects of
the lower classes of the Dickensian life and time he found himself in.
So how about adding some ‘crunch’ to this equation, as is done in [4.12]
xt+1 = r.xt .(1− xt),r > 0 [4.12]
Equation [4.12] is called the logistic differential map and shows how the positive
feedback of Malthusian growth is countered by the negative feedback of the addi-
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tional term.15 This means that the most interesting fluctuations take place when xt
is larger than zero but remains smaller than 1. If xt becomes larger than 0.5, the
‘crunch’ becomes smaller than 0.5, which causes the resulting value of xt+1 to be-
come smaller. This equalising pressure becomes larger as xt gets closer to 1.
If xt and (1− xt) are kept between 0 and 0.5 (leading to a maximum of 0.25
for the multiplication), then the most interesting results are likely to occur when r is
chosen between 2 and 4. It is not hard to see that smaller values will force xt towards
zero as r makes each consecutive value a bit smaller in this case. Likewise, choosing
r larger than 4 is guaranteed to blow up the sequence to infinity, as xt will become
larger with each equation. Note also that the sign will alternate with each iteration
step, so that xt will switch between positive and negative values. So both extremes
are fairly predictable, but how about in-between?
Actually, the logistic differential map gives surprisingly complex results, and this
was only discovered with the advent of computers. Before this, most scientists were
satisfied with relatively modest values for r, which resulted in predictable conver-
gence.
Fig. 9 Logistic Map
with r = 2.0
Increasing r gradually introduces a bit more liveliness to the system. The two
terms containing xt start to interact, as can be seen for r = 2.95. Increasing values
of r further show an increasingly strong oscillation that takes longer to dampen out.
At a value of 3.2 the dampening has become unnoticeable.
So far the process is still fairly at par with a child on a swing. Increasing the
values of r is similar to pushing the swing harder, until at some point, the swinging
motion goes back and forth with great consistency. But what happens if we comply
with a child’s thrilled cries to ‘go higher’ on the logistic differential swing?
Something strange has happened. Somehow the system has started to produce
two waveforms which are alternating. As things are slowly getting messy, the pic-
ture is redrawn in a different way, by only plotting the peaks of the waves and
compressing them.
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Fig. 10 Logistic Map
with r = 2.95
Fig. 11 Logistic Map
with r = 3.2
Fig. 12 Logistic Map
with r = 3.4
The top and bottom lines show the peaks of the large waveform, while the in-
between lines show the peaks of the smaller waveform. This is analogous with the
recurrent sequences while dividing numbers. Instead of sequences of numbers, we
get a sequence of two waveforms.
The attempts to restore order by choosing another graphical representation, is
short-lived. As values increase, more wave patterns are introduced in the system:
Until eventually all that seems to remain is true ‘chaos’. . .
The analogy with the sequences when dividing numbers is striking. In this case,
increasing patterns of waveforms are formed in an environment constrained by two
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Fig. 13 Logistic Map
with r = 3.4
Fig. 14 Logistic Map
with r = 3.6
opposing forces of feedback, instead of a certain amount of numbers.
The logistic differential map makes clear yet again, the importance of different
perspectives. The equation (structural perspective) is very orderly, but its manifesta-
tion (ecological perspective) varies from dull to random, depending on one variable.
In electronic engineering, this is a well-known problem with black-box approaches;
observation ‘from the outside’ (alone) quickly becomes undoable with even the
slightest of phenomenological complexity. For instance, systems with memory will
quickly make a black-box approach useless. One only needs to try to deduct the in-
ternal structure of electronic components of a PC, by observing the windows that an
operating system produces, in order to understand how useless such a project would
be. And yet, for many complex systems, this perspective may often be the only one
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Fig. 15 Logistic Map
with r = 3.8
Fig. 16 Logistic Map
with r = 3.95
available.
It took well over another century and a half before the intricacies of Thomas
Malthus’s explorations on growth and crunch were better understood, and the dy-
namics of populations that were long observed in nature and in human society found
an explanation in mathematical equations that combined positive and negative feed-
back.16
4.1 Self-Similarity and Scaling Invariance
Manfred Schroeder introduces his view on the key concepts of ‘Fractals, Chaos and
Power Laws’ with the remark that in the range between order and chaos, ‘one funda-
mental bulwark often remains unshaken’, namely self-similarity, an invariance with
respect to scaling. Such invariance concerns multiplicative changes of scale, not ad-
ditive, and basically implies that certain aspects of an object remain unchanged after
increasing or shrinking its size. The inverse square of gravitational force that was
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mentioned earlier is one example.17
Although this may seem a bit unnatural at first glance, as most objects become
bigger or smaller after respectively increasing or shrinking their size, it pops up
everywhere once you know where to look. Humans have many scale-invariant prop-
erties which do not change during their lifetime, for instance the number and place-
ment of our head, arms and legs on our bodies. This structural scale-invariance
emerges in the early stages of our foetal development and does not change, even
though we become many times the size of a foetus.
One simple example is drawing a line through the natural numbers (0, 1, 2, ...),
something one often does when making an axis in a graph. The same line is drawn
if one draws a line through every even natural numbers (0,2,4,...). In fact, lines can
be drawn through any multiple of the natural numbers.
Self-similarity is an almost inevitable result of repeating a certain operation over
and over again, on ever-smaller scales. Conversely, any object that is the result of
repeating an operation on increasing scales will be present at various smaller scales.
As an example, consider the Koch snowflake, proposed by the Swedish mathe-
matician Helge von Koch in 1904, which is constructed by erecting a triangle in a
line l with lengths of the sides being 1/3l. This process is called the generator.18
Fig. 17 Generator of
Kochs snowflake
The resulting form has a total length of 1 1/3l, which is one-third longer than
the original line. If one starts with a triangle, the first four steps of creating Koch’s
snowflake are as shown in the following figure.
Fig. 18 First Four
Steps of Creating
a Koch Snowflake
It is easy to see that every step of this operation creates new, ever smaller, trian-
gles, while the perimeter becomes longer.
The Koch snowflake raises an interesting question which applies to all self-
similar objects, and is related to the size of the perimeter of the object that is being
created. The size of the first object, a triangle, is quite easy; three times the length l
of one side. The next step shows that overlaying the second triangle creates twelve
new lines, one third of the original length l, so the perimeter is = 4l.
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Step three creates 48 lines of 1/9 the original length so the perimeter becomes
5.333l.
With every step of the construction, the perimeter becomes longer, but somehow
this is disturbing when one looks at the total picture, because as the triangles become
smaller, the snowflake more and more takes up its definitive shape and does not
appear to change that much at all. There is a sort of mismatch in our understanding
of the generating rules (structure), which affects the local situation in the object, and
the perception of the global object (phenomenon).
This same mismatch occurs when one tries to measure the perimeter of a country,
say the coastline of Great Britain. One can grab a map of the country and a ruler and
calculate the perimeter if the scale of the map is known. However, if the results
are compared with that of a larger map, it will appear as if a severe miscalculation
was made as the perimeter is likely to be larger than that was calculated earlier.
One could try to resolve this matter by buying a yardstick and taking a sabbatical
to measure the actual coast-line, but then again the actual size will appear to be
much larger than the maps used earlier. When even finer measuring devices are used,
the perimeter of the coastline will increase even more, until the coastline of Great
Britain will have become infinitely large when measured in the size of sand-grains.
On one hand there is a country that takes up a distinct position in the Atlantic, and
on the other it has an infinitely long coastline!
Intuitively the answer lies in the scale of the yardstick that is used, but the math-
ematical answer lies in the fractal nature of a coastline, just like the Koch snowflake.
Ever since Descartes, we are used to working with three linear dimensions for
spatial calculations. The first dimension draws a line, the second a plane and the
third a volume. Relatively simple objects like squares and balls will allow them-
selves to be scaled with ease along these co-ordinates. However, most non-linear
objects are not so orderly and reside in broken dimensions, or Hausdorff dimen-
sions, named after the German mathematician Felix Hausdorff (1868-1942). The
Koch snowflake, for instance has a Hausdorff dimension of 1.26. Along the yard-
stick of such a dimension, the snowflake is completely self-similar. If one makes
the yardstick larger, it will converge to zero size, and smaller yardsticks will make
it infinitely large. But at the dimension of 1.26 it can be resized at will and will still
remain a Koch snowflake.
Here again, the relationship between target and observer (or measurement) is
very important.
4.2 The Lorenz Attractor
So what about the famous Lorenz butterfly, the one that could start tornadoes in
New York just by flapping its little wings? Well, it actually is a non-linear recurrent
equation consisting of three equations:
1. x′ = a(y− x)
2. y′ = x(b− z)− y
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3. z′ = xy− cz
where x′ stands for the differential of x in time.
The meteorologist Ed N. Lorenz studied these equations around 1963, as a sim-
plified model of convection in the earth’s atmosphere. To his surprise, the results
depended heavily on the initial values (premises) and besides this, the equations
formed a pattern that (sometimes) vaguely resembled the wings of a butterfly, or-
biting around two strange attractors, but never passing the same path twice. This
means that the system will never reach a stable state, which is often called deter-
ministic chaos.
Fig. 19 The Lorenz
Butterfly
Lorenz’s 1963 article on this system’s behaviour is generally considered a defin-
ing publication for research on complexity.19
4.3 Conway’s Game of Life
A last fine example that combines some of the issues discussed in this chapter is
Conway’s Game of Life simulation concocted by the mathematician John Horton
Conway and his students, who pioneered a field in Computer Science called ‘Artifi-
cial Life’.20
The Game of Life can be played on a checker board, or another plane with grids,
by placing a number of checkers to form a pattern. From then on, the following
algorithm is applied for each grid on the checker board:
1. For every grid, count the number of neighbouring grids (eight in total)
2. If the grid is empty and there are exactly three neighbours with checkers on them,
then place a checker on that grid
3. If the grid contains a checker, and there are two or three neighbours with check-
ers, then the checker can stay. Otherwise it is removed
In the following figures, the ‘evolution’ of some patterns are shown:
131
Fig. 20 Evolution of a Line
A line will ‘die out’, because the grids at the end of the line only have one neigh-
bour with a checker on it. Therefore, with each ‘move’, the last two checkers will
be removed.
Fig. 21 Evolution of a Square
A square is the other extreme; it always stays the same. This is because every grid
with checker on it has three neighbours with checkers, and therefore it will remain
‘checked’. The pattern in figure 22 is called a ‘glider’. It appears to move by taking
up two kinds of shapes which do not return to their original positions.
Fig. 22 A ‘Glider’
Besides these gliders, a large number of different shapes with all kinds of be-
haviour can be obtained. Some of them are even able to ‘eat’ other shapes if they
encounter them!
The rules of the Game of Life have not been chosen without a reason. There is a
rule that allows the amount of checkers to increase (growth), one that allows check-
ers to stabilise themselves, and one that leads to starvation. So, just like all the other
examples, there is a non-linear recurrent rule-set where growth and crunch maintain
a delicate balance. In this particular case, the grids are agents with two states (they
do or do not contain a checker), which are related with other agents through the rules
that have been defined. As a result, there is emergence, the behaviour of groups of
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checkers that demonstrate behaviour of a different descriptive level than that of the
individual checkers.21
One of the implicit features of Conway’s experiment is that it draws attention
to the relationships between tags, structure and process. In the paradigm of clas-
sic general systems theory, a system was composed of elements and their mutual
relationships. These relationships are often, if not usually, associated with flow, or
in other words the processes that are present in the system. The elements influence
this flow, and so they are needed to ‘canalise’ the flow through the system. In Con-
way’s Game of Life however, ‘process’ is related to the rules that are carried out
over and over again. This process is entirely invisible, and only the checkers allow a
window to witness its operation. This applies for most of the feedback systems that
have been discussed so far, which can be split up in rules and tags that are subject
to these rules, such as numbers, turtles or checkers. These tags allow us to see the
effects of applying the rules in an iterative fashion. This is one of the reasons for
the ‘substrate neutrality’ of these processes; as long as there is a substrate that can
provide tags (i.e. ranked data), such rules can be applied. Hence the iteration of rules
is the process that causes the shapes and forms of otherwise unrelated entities, and
therefore these rules can be observed as being and causing patterns.
Human beings are very visually inclined, and so we tend to pay a lot of atten-
tion to things we can observe. In Conway’s Game of Life we see the checkers and
impose observable traits as being part of the structure of the aggregates. So we see
‘squares’, ‘gliders’ and ‘predators’ and spend a lot of time evaluating these man-
ifestations. This can be worthwhile in its own right, but the relationships between
the phenomenological observations (and descriptions) and the underlying structure,
are completely different. The groups of checkers form tags in the sense that Hol-
land uses them, and they both re-enter internally as being states to which the rules
respond, as that the emergent patterns (squares, gliders and so on) may be new
building blocks for further aggregation.
The problem of observing the structure of complex systems therefore requires
careful consideration whether observed elements in the system are structural, in the
sense that they are required to make the system work in the way it does, whether
they are tags, or a combination of the two.
In this sense, the checkers form an interface that seems to obscure the inside
from the outside and the other way round. Only when both sides are known can
the observer start to understand the various aspects of that system. But it may also
have become clear that the structural perspective makes it easier to understand the
ecological perspective, but that this does not apply the other way round.
An issue that is related to this is that of the boundaries of a system. Many sys-
tems have clear boundaries that play a vital role for the system itself. A biological
cell has a membrane to protect its internal processes from its environment, and it
is vital for the cell to maintain its homeostasis. However, as Conway’s game of life
demonstrates, boundaries are often also tags of an underlying process and do not
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necessarily have to play a role in maintaining the superstructure. If two shapes are
put on the checker board, the ‘boundaries’ between them are a kind of no-man’s land
where the processes exert no influence. Only when the shapes enter a friction space
with each other, the rules will start to work on the aggregate form. (Visual) bound-
aries therefore can be less important than assumed by visual bias, as a structural
perspective may have less explanatory power than one that focuses on the processes.
Therefore, in itself it makes good sense to take reductionist or analytical ap-
proaches, because this allows a window to identify the structure of a system. How-
ever, one should always keep the limitations of such approaches in mind. As a con-
sequence, different, opposing theories or perspectives on a complex theme, may
be understood as expressing the scales and boundaries of the idioms that are used,
rather than that this addresses the theme itself.
5 Autonomy and Re-entry
One of the aspects of feedback that is often overlooked is that it localises a process.
Re-entry closes the process, and basically allows a boundary to be drawn around it.
Therefore they often can also be pinpointed, whether it be as large as milky ways,
galaxies or conversely the size of atoms.
Feedback is stable, in the sense that it tries to preserve itself by using its own qual-
ities to manage the input it relies upon. A classic feedback system uses its property
of amplification to achieve this, while more complex systems such as a biological
organism may put a plethora of characteristics in place, such as storage of energy,
attractors, foodstuffs or information.
While open-loop systems can always include more entities and still maintain
its self-similarity with respect to its being ‘open’, a feedback system more or less
captures the process in a finite number of system entities that make it a ‘whole’,
even if it is taken up in a larger system. A feedback system therefore also reflects
the notion of autonomy, an ability to operate as a unit. Such autonomous systems
consist of a number of entities that are connected by the feedback process. An au-
tonomous system cannot be fully described in terms of input and output signals, but
has characteristics that can only be understood as being systems-internal. Most of
the examples that were covered previously have this trait, but it would be dangerous
to make a sharp distinction between autonomy and dependency. Autonomous sys-
tems still depend on their environment,x for energy or information still flows into or
through them. Even the recurrent mathematical equations need a computer, a human
being or some other processor to run. As we move along the complexity perspective,
agents will get more and more autonomy, so this aspect will return quite often.
It may have become clear now, that I consider feedback to be the predominant
operator of organisation. This bias is personal, but is shared by many other scientists.
x I can think of no example where they are fully self-supporting
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This stance means, however, that in order to understand organisation, one has to
learn to observe often invisible, dynamic processes. The consequences of this bias
will return in many forms and shapes throughout the coming chapters.
5.1 Massive Parallel Re-entry
Up to now, the various patterns of feedback have been flowing through different
kinds of structures, from electronic devices to mathematical numbers. Yet there was
one constant: there was only one process at work.
Now consider a number of feedback processes working simultaneously, interact-
ing with each other, changing each other’s structures and acting upon each other’s
manifestations. Add the fact that new feedback processes may be formed at certain
moments that some may cease, and this all happens in a bounded space, then it will
not be difficult to appreciate the fact that the resulting jumble is a very complex
process.
The resulting complexity of this massive parallel feedback (or re-entry) is in the
focus of some areas in neurophysiology as it may elucidate processes happening in
our brain, that may lead to an understanding of consciousness or our sense of ‘self’.
Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi argue how processes of massive parallel re-entry
may lead to a theory of consciousness.22 Antonio Damasio, although less explicitly,
sees the same kind of processes at work for the constitution of a (embodied) ‘self’,
both at biological level as at higher cognitive levels.23
Coarsely stated, they consider the brain as a processor for all kinds of massive
parallel feedback loops. Their theory considers a brain to be an organ that stores
internal maps of patterns that it perceives from the data coming from the sensory
organs. These maps are fairly similar to the tacit and overt models of John Holland.
However, these maps are far from static, for they also continuously interact with
each other and influence each other’s outcomes. Thus, when a burst of data (qualia, a
‘trigger’ or an ‘event’) initiates this process of massive parallel feedback, the internal
maps that are affected create pulses of data themselves, which are re-entered in the
process until a new stable situation is formed and the process calms down. Needless
to say, this re-entry is synonymous for feedback, but the massive parallel nature
makes this form of feedback a lot more difficult to understand than the systems
described so far.24
5.2 Self-Describing Systems and Self-Referentiality
The feedback systems that have been described so far have still been fairly orderly
in another sense; the processes and the tags they operate on (numbers, checkers and
so on) were distinct. Suppose now that every number is a tag for a process, so that
when a certain number is generated, a certain process is started, which generates a
new number which, in turn starts a new process. In order for this to work, a set of
tags is required that feeds back to a set of related processes.
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Starting from a premise, this process starts to generate tags in tremendously com-
plex ways. In a more constrained way, a computer follows this pattern and a branch
of artificial intelligence called evolutionary algorithms studies such patterns.25
Fig. 23 Self-Referential
Process
There are many signs that this particular pattern is also at work at the level of
genes. In this view, alleles (the containers of genes) serve as a kind of database in
which some genes come to expression when certain conditions have been met, usu-
ally when certain chemicals are available in the cell that contains the genes. These
genes express themselves by facilitating the production of new chemicals which, in
turn, allow new genes to express themselves. This way, a biological organism can
develop from foetus to a fully grown entity, and certain phases in this process of
maturing can be coordinated at the level of the genes.
It may be clear that these processes can be extensively studied using comput-
ers and recent developments such as bio-informatics, but the neurosciences also
show how biology, chemistry, engineering, physics and mathematics are converging
around these forms of complexity. It is worth pointing out that these interdisciplinary
and cross-disciplinary research initiatives, all implicitly or explicitly acknowledge
the isomorphy of these patterns of feedback in different substrates and also at dif-
ferent levels of complexity, usually along aggregation.
Formal systems (such as mathematics) are all based on a set of rules (axioms)
that generate certain symbols, such as numbers, concepts such as ‘true’ and ‘false’,
certain operators and so on. A formal system therefore is a production system that
produces formal truths based on other truths that have already been proven, such as
theorems.
In 1927, a young mathematician called Kurt Go¨del decided to turn the then most
comprehensive work on the foundations of mathematics, the principia mathematica,
into a self-referential system, by assigning a number to each axiom of the principia,
a Go¨del number. The idea was that if mathematical systems always produce proven
statements, it should never yield statements that are both true and false, that is, ev-
ery statement should be consistent. However, Go¨del showed that when the principia
mathematica is taken up in a self-referential system, there will always be a state-
ment that is inconsistent. There will be a contradiction somewhere, but no one can
pinpoint where or when this happens.26
This discovery initiated extensive philosophical reflection on the implications.
It also was a setback for the attempts of the logical positivist movement to counter
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what were to their eyes, obscure philosophies based on ideology, mysticism, roman-
ticism and so on, most notably the philosophy of Hegel and Heidegger, and return
to the original enlightenment ideas of reason, logic and facts. That the high altar of
formal logic would be inherently ambiguous did not really serve that agenda.27
For the purposes here, the simplest interpretation of Go¨del’s theorems is that the
axioms of the principia mathematica describe many aspects of our physical reality,
and most notably those aspects that assume an absence of ambiguity. This would
align with an orderly Carthesian mechanistic world-view, where everything is pre-
determined and can be deduced by finding out the initial conditions of the Big Bang.
But with Go¨del, such a world already contains the seed of ambiguity and with that,
complexity.
There is a subtle consequence related to this assumption. Often ambiguity is
added to an orderly formal system in order to make it complex. This will undoubt-
edly expand the descriptive repertoire of formal systems, but one has to realise that
basically in this case a tag (symbol) is associated with ‘randomness’, ‘ambiguity’,
‘disorder’, ‘noise’ and other concepts that may not have been in the standard vocabu-
lary of the principia mathematica. In other words, order determines when ambiguity
may do its thing.28
For PAC, it is clear that ambiguity and indeterminacy are sources of uncertainty.
In fact, they are almost synonymous, but uncertainty has a stronger observer-centric
essence, while ambiguity, indeterminacy, randomness or disorder may be a charac-
teristic of a target. However, as the logistic differential map already demonstrated,
these may also be observed, while the underlying structure is quite orderly. For
PAC, therefore ambiguity tends towards target, while uncertainty tends towards the
observer, but there is a large overlap between them. Indeterminacy is, by the nature
of the word, an ambiguity identified in order. Strictly speaking, Go¨del has therefore
identified an indeterminacy in the Principia.
With the interpretation of Go¨del’s consequences as depicted above, formal sys-
tems at best represent those aspects of a complex target that can be described without
ambiguity. In a self-referential setting, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem may even
pinpoint the moment or event when a formal system becomes undetermined.
Another aspect of self-referential formal systems also deserves to be mentioned,
and that is the fact that they fully reflect their states. Whereas feedback systems
reflect small portions of the data they project, self-referential formal systems only
work with discrete symbols which are generated and associated with complete pro-
cesses. This type of feedback is only possible with relatively simple systems, in the
sense that a source can be fully described, fully projected and fully reflected so as
to generate a new internal state.
It is therefore a bit problematic that self-referentiality has become en vogue with
many social theorists and other researchers and thinkers that work with very com-
plex systems, as feedback is the most likely, and probably the most fundamental
form of re-entry in human beings, social systems and other complex targets. Of
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course, the ‘self’ has an enormous appeal in the social sciences and humanities, as
it has clear connotations with psychological and philosophical issues. However, the
isomorphic scale-invariance of self-referential systems is more constrained than that
of feedback. Self-referentiality is a specialisation of feedback, but feedback as pat-
tern, percolates further through complexity. As a result, self-referential conundrums,
as they are known in formal systems, are not likely to be defining issues in highly
complex systems.29
Related to this is the issue of self-organisation. from an ecological perspective,
it is known that many systems manage to organise themselves and keep themselves
from falling apart. This means that these systems must have some form of sense
of their internal states and processes in order to keep everything in order. In other
words, they must have a certain sense of ‘self’. It would be tempting to assign self-
referentiality to the processes that manage this, and in many ways this is probably
the most correct word to describe this fundamental self-awareness.
However, there is a fundamental difference between a situation where self-
referentiality is managed by one process that fully reflects ‘self’, and a situation
where massive parallel re-entry distributes many flows of feedback at different mo-
ments to various locations within (and around) the source, which then reflect back
into it. As we will see later, this latter scenario is the most likely of the two candi-
dates, and this has some repercussions for any speculations about what ‘self’ is and
how it is maintained.30
As an example, it is often considered ‘paradoxical’ that most of the cells in the
human body are renewed ever so often.31. In many ways, I am no longer myself,
because almost all the cells in my body are different than the ones I had a few years
ago. However, given the fact that, at any given time, only few cells are renewed, the
‘self’ is fairly constant. It only becomes ‘paradoxical’ for an observer who witnesses
the process in intervals of a few years. Besides this, these renewed cells are taken
up in a context of existing cells that, at least in part, shape their lifecycle and their
growth. In this sense, these cells are not ‘tabula rasas’, completely free to express
novelty, but rather constrained to ‘fit’ the ones they replace.
6 Edgar Morin
So far, the river of feedback through the landscape of complexity has moved pre-
dominantly along the safe flows of ‘order’. Feedback has been introduced as a pow-
erful process of organisation and complexity, and as a lot is known on how feedback
works, it is not too difficult to manipulate feedback in such ways that it operates
somewhere between orderly and chaotic. Feedback however introduces a new aspect
to the pattern-oriented modelling activities, for it influences the process of modelling
itself!
In a previous chapter Edgar Morin’s very critical view on the current situation
on science had been briefly introduced. His remedy also embraces the notion of
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complexity, and his scienza nuova is a next side-arm of feedback, but now directed
to the process of science itself.32
Morin tends to have an ontological focus on complexity. That is, his principles
apply to the target, while PAC (for now) mainly concentrates on the modelling ac-
tivities, and thus has an epistemological bias.
Morin identifies three principles that should guide scientific query. The first prin-
ciple is that of dialogic. With this, Morin means that different, often seemingly op-
posed processes, actually work together to create stability, complexity or something
similar. The ‘paradox’ between freedom and constraint that started this enquiry into
creative friction is a good example of a dialogic, and of course most of the ex-
amples that have been covered in this chapter demonstrate this. Morin also sees
order-disorder as ‘collaborating enemies’ that produce organisation and complexity.
In Morin’s words:
The dialogic principle allows us to maintain duality at the heart of unity.33
The second principle is called organisational recursion. This principle means that
a process becomes a producer and a product at the same time. Basically the prod-
uct ensures the process and the process ensures the product. The pattern of self-
referentiality is of course an equivalent, and also the example of numbers spawning
processes that, in turn, spawn numbers.
Morin sees this principle return in the fact that we are all human individuals,
and products of a process of reproduction that precedes us. However, our existence
also ensures that reproduction can continue. Note here that Morin implicitly ac-
knowledges that patterns of feedback are manifest in the social. In other words,
the isomorphy of these patterns is scale-invariant within the ranges of mathemati-
cal models and substrates that include human agents. The logistic differential map
could therefore return as a pattern of growth and decay in human society.
The notion of ‘systems of systems’ (or concepts of concepts), finds a process
in Morin’s second principle. Of course, this principle is very strongly visualised in
Conway’s game of life where certain forms allow the continuation of a process de-
fined by the rules, which in turn creates the forms.
Morin’s last principle is the holographic principle. This principle touches on
Morin’s criticism on reductionism and holism, and is best characterised by Blaise
Pascal:
I cannot conceive the whole without conceiving the parts, and I cannot conceive the parts
without conceiving the whole34
According to Morin, this apparent paradox can be tackled by the recursive principle:
This apparently paradoxical idea immobilises the linear mind. But, in recursive logic, we
know very well that what we acquire in terms of knowledge about the parts feeds back on
the whole. What we learn about the emerging properties of the whole, a whole that cannot
exist without the organisation, feeds back on the parts. So we can enrich knowledge of the
parts through knowledge of the whole and knowledge of the whole through knowledge of
the parts, in a single productive movement of knowledge35
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A previous discussion on composition and decomposition can be seen as a pragma-
tist’s way to perform this principle. The ‘agile argumentation’ that is followed here,
which starts with a crude model that is refined in an iterative fashion, also gets a
better theoretical founding in Morin’s three principles of complexity.
But there is another principle that has now started to take effect. It has been subtly
introduced, and therefore may deserve to be specifically mentioned. If a pattern such
as feedback can ‘percolate’ from a modelling environment into an environment that
includes the modeller through the principle of isomorphy, then this means that every
pattern that is introduced may say something about the modelling activity itself. This
of course, is one manifestation of the principle of organisational recursion, but pat-
terns show the structural and evolutionary foundations of this principle. Feedback,
(limitations of) scale-invariance, bias and other concepts of the vocabulary of com-
plexity that PAC introduces, re-enter the modelling activities. In other words, model
and methodology are continuously co-evolving! Model constrains the methodology
and the other way around. This is reflected in the somewhat ‘conservative’ approach
to complexity that is followed here, for the three-and-a-half perspectives of PAC tell
which concepts are mature —that is, they can be accounted for from these different
perspectives— and which concepts must be considered uncertain. One can advance
argumentation with these uncertain concepts— i.e. extend the vocabulary that one
aims to develop— but these extensions will be fragile, and so will the developed
vocabulary, unless of course the perspectives will be strengthened through re-entry.
Self-referentiality and self-organisation will be used more cautiously than feedback
or aggregation, because the latter are better known or, in other words, are contextu-
alised with less uncertainty.
This is another approach that the craftspeople may know; the continuous ‘be-
ing with’ subject matter that both gives in, and resists the pressure of the modeller.
Morin’s principles basically enforce an intellectual ‘crafting’ of knowledge in a re-
current fashion, which both advances and constrains. The observer has been swept
into a process of modelling, is part of and is being influenced by these processes,
as was already coarsely outlined at the outset of this enquiry. The three entities
called system, environment and observer that we started out with, have become a
self-referential meta-system.
With all these recusive aspects, the ‘external observer’ is no longer priviliged,
but instead seems somewhat poorly equiped to deal with themes that show even the
slightest forms of complexity. Observation is a roller coaster ride that enters and re-
enters a complex target and tries to gather information at every different level. But
this does not mean ‘difficult’, for patterns offer a helping hand in this continuous
exploration; if we understand a pattern, then we can start looking for them at highler
levels of complexity until they cease to be of influence. This is how we ‘know’!
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7 Wrapping Up
This chapter has described various forms of feedback, ranging from the classical
feedback as described by Harold Black, through iterative processes, to complex
forms of non-linear feedback and re-entry. The examples have also demonstrated
the importance of including multiple perspectives, as even these relatively simple
forms of feedback can often not be understood by focusing on one of them alone.
In one sweep, feedback has also been coupled to the methodology. In a way, the
claim here is that no intellectual enquiry into complexity can ignore feedback. A
theory without feedback can never describe a complex target!
The following chapters will follow various forms of feedback as it percolates
through different contextual settings, and ambiguity will be given more form. A
number of things will be worth keeping in mind:
1. Feedback changes the overall behaviour of a system, even if a tiny portion of data
is reflected back into the system.
2. Simple systems, seen from one perspective, can create complex behaviour when
seen from another perspective. The logistic differential map is a simple equation
(structure), yet can cause all kinds of phenomenological patterns, from linear
ones to chaotic ones. Likewise Conway’s game of life shows transitions between
structural (process-related) and phenomenological perspectives.
3. We can know these patterns. Feedback does not necessarily result in paradoxes,
self-referential conundrums and infinite regression. This means that even when
an observer is part of an aggregate form that hosts these processes, they may still
be known.
Chapter 5
Ranking, Problems and Networks
In chapter 2, bias was introduced as a system-internal characteristic of observa-
tion and modelling. However, it was only described as a phenomenon, and as yet
no attention has been given to the structure and evolutionary aspects. The latter is
quickly explained, as bias is considered a fundamental property, that is, there is no
evolutionary succession of aggregation, and therefore one only needs to look for a
bootstrapping mechanism that allows bias to form. This form, when described in
terms of concepts or patterns, immediately gives clues to the structural properties of
bias.
Amplification/focus was another characteristic of observation. From a structural
perspective, this can be explained as a self-reinforcing feedback loop, although it is
worth pointing out that there are more structural forms that are capable of amplifica-
tion. However, amplification due to self-reinforcing feedback loops, in combination
with bias, stand at the base of a specific kind of feedback that will be called con-
vergence inducing process. This process, as will be argued, allows goal-directed
behaviour and therefore is a more likely candidate for amplification in observation.
At least, this model is more detailed, and probably more correct, than the classic
notion of an external, universal observer that can understand subject matter by re-
flection and contemplation ‘from a distance’.
This chapter will first discuss bias as an effect of ranking and difference. Then
convergence inducing process will be introduced as a pattern, and finally some at-
tention will be given to another class of patterns, called networks, which stand at the
base of organisation and collaboration.
1 Ranking and Difference
Previously a set of variables without any (mutual) significance was introduced as
being data. Data requires an additional quality in order to become information, and
this quality is significance.
There are two main ways in which data can become significant. Data items can
be compared with others and if this makes them ‘stand out’, they obviously become
significant. One only needs to walk into a local book store to see how the best-sellers
are positioned near the entry, or how the discounts are presented on tables along the
main paths. But the intrinsic characteristics of a book, its size, the cover photo, pa-
perback or hard-cover; all these qualities can also make a book more significant than
others. This aspect is closely associated with conceptual patterning, and is based on
141
142
observed, extrinsic characteristics.
The second way that significance is added to data is through intention. In this case
it is the observer who determines the significance. If someone walks into a book-
store with an aim to catch up on a specific topic, then the best-sellers or the discount
section will be less interesting, and one may end up buying an ugly paperback, a stiff
read by an author who is an expert in the field but hardly a good writer. This aspect
is related to context. Significance therefore may sometimes tend towards extrinsic
qualities and sometimes be more closely related to intrinsic qualities of the observer.
Data therefore only have significance through their relationships with other data,
or through processes that use this data. In either way, the available data is ranked.
Some data items will be ranked as unimportant, uninteresting, or trivial, while oth-
ers will get a more favourable nomenclature. Tagging was already mentioned as a
means of ranking data, but so far it has not been made clear how data can be ‘tagged’
or ‘ranked’.
In general, a staggering amount of data can be ranked along at least three cate-
gories:
1. Data that can potentially become significant
2. Data that are insignificant
3. Data that are significant
The latter two both make ‘selected data’. Note that the list is reverse reciprocal
with the amount of data, for there is an almost infinite data that has a potential to
become significant, insignificant data also are quite extensive, while significant data
tend to be relatively orderly.
In order to make data significant, more data are needed which can rank the set.
Every variable of the initial data set is overlaid with a corresponding rank. The cat-
egories above allow data to be ranked according to three tags {potential, insignifi-
cant, significant} which are data items themselves. While data can define a plane,
it is ranking data creates the landscape, according to some criterion or criteria that
allow comparison of the values (see figure 1).
Figure 1 shows the decomposition of the various components of a ranking mech-
anism. An important element is the mapping of ranks on the raw data, which even-
tually leads to the desired result, a set of significant data. This mapping transforms
data into information, based on the criteria (or perspective) that one has on the raw
data. Information is therefore the combination of selected data and the criteria that
guide the ranking mechanism.
Recalling that information was earlier described as an interference between con-
ceptual and contextual patterns, this means that one pattern can provide the ranking
set of another (and possibly vice versa). A ranking mechanism therefore allows two
(or more) patterns to ‘form’ in a very rudimentary sense. Basically, this mechanism
describes how patterns can interfere in order to become information or, in other
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Fig. 1 Decomposition of a Ranking Mechanism
words, how conceptual patterns (input patterns) are ‘contextualised’ by overlaying
these patterns with ranking patterns.
In order to exemplify this idea, consider a set of numbers {0,1,3,4,5,7,9,10,11}.
This set has already discarded a large set of potential numbers; that is why it is a
selection. In terms of PAC, this set is nothing more than a pattern, and therefore
nothing can be said about it. If you look at the set and think you see a certain or-
ganisation, then your mind is already creating interferences in order to make the set
‘meaningful’. That is, your brain is automatically at work to find certain criteria that
would give meaning to the set. However, there is nothing intrinsic in the set that
makes these numbers meaningful; it is pattern.i
Suppose now that a criterion is added to the set, for instance ‘find the maximum
number’, or ‘find the minimum number’. Only now the set is providing information,
because the criterion defines a very simple ranking pattern which is overlaid on the
set. This ‘overlaying of pattern’ may become more clear when the following crite-
rion is used: ”find the prime numbers in the set”, or ”find the even numbers in the
set”. Now the linearity of the previous criteria has been broken, and a resulting set
is formed that picks a few numbers from the set (significant data) while ignoring the
rest (insignificant data). Note that the criterion determines how the set of numbers
‘forms’, by creating a certain bias on the set. Different criteria on the same set create
different formations, which allow different numbers to ‘stand out’ with respect to
the others (focus/amplification), to become significant.
The idea of interferences of patterns is not so unusual in itself, but we humans
have a strong tendency to see each number as an atomic entity and assign certain
innate characteristics to these atoms, whilst forgetting that our minds are actually
filling these in. The take home message here has already been mentioned a few
times; a pattern in itself has no meaning. It needs at least the interference of another
i Notice that no definition of meaning is given here, but rather the minimum prerequisites are
described that need to be satisfied in order for pattern to become meaningful. If meaning were as
simple as the above description, it would not have eluded so many generations of philosophers
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pattern to become meaningful. That is, pattern needs to be contextualised to become
(or provide) information.
It is also worth pointing out that if the resulting set is to be used by another
process in such a way that the meaning is preserved, then the criterion has to be
provided to that process as well. If this is not done, then that follow-up process will
only have a new pattern — {11}, {0}, {0,4,10} or {0,1,3,5,7,11}— and has to
reconstruct the context system-internally.
With this bit of work, bias and focus have now become embedded in the pattern-
oriented approach as fundamental mechanisms. ‘Fundamental’ can be considered as
‘having no, or a minimal, evolutionary component’. They can form with the proper-
ties and mechanisms that were described in the chapter three.
1.1 Ranking and Observation
When a fly sees a chameleon approaching it, it has to somehow decide when the
distance between them becomes problematic. Somehow the fly has to distinguish
between ‘far’ and ‘near’ and the latter should mean ‘danger’. It is such a simple
problem that even relatively simple organisms soon learn this trick; if you want to
survive then move away from danger!
Yet this heuristic becomes quite a challenge for researchers who want to train an
artificial entity, for instance a robot, to learn this behaviour. It is easy to implement
if the designer programs this behaviour, but learning it is another matter. Of course,
the programmer faces a challenge if the robot has to learn this seemingly trivial be-
haviour before the chameleon flips its tongue!
The fly’s response to the threat on the other hand, does not have to be determined
in the face of clear and present danger. The decision is instinctive, coded genetically
by generations upon generations of ancestors, and probably started with lineage of
proto-flies that had a predisposition of certain wariness towards proto-chameleons.
Just as the proto-fly’s more callous uncles and aunts helped the proto-chameleon to
decide that flies are a pretty good meal, the lineage of the cautious ancestors coded
wariness to an eventual instinct to fly away. The success of the survivors may have
started with a chance bias that existed generations ago.
A ranking, such as when a distance is ranked with the set ‘far’ and ‘near’, often
seems simple; something is significant or not significant, and every value of the
problem domain is ranked according to this criterion. The criterion is binary; there
are two possible ranks. The resulting production systems are often called two-valued
systems.
Research on neural networks, which are mathematical models of certain aspects
of our brains, have shown that such networks can be trained to learn these logical
constructs. Even quite simple neural networks are able to learn very complex binary
functions.1
However, binary distinctions are often a reduction of the target that is modelled.
Take for instance the sensory data that the fly gets from an approaching chameleon.
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The fly, with the Damoclean sword of survival dangling over its head, has to make
a split decision on the patterns its sensory inputs, eyes, ears, the skin and so on,
receive. One of the most important aspects is being able to filter essence from details.
Thus the projection of the approaching chameleon may be translated as being ‘far’,
which in turn could be translated with ‘safe’. At a certain distance, this changes into
‘near’ and ‘dangerous’.
So far this seems rather obvious. Yet even this simple example shows how brains
influence the perception of an environment for the sake of efficiency. There has to
be a certain moment that the chameleon is neither far nor near but something in-
between these values. If the fly is only coded to understand the concepts of ‘far’ and
‘near’, then this intermediate area will contain an area where the switch is made.
However, without additional support, there usually is a whole range of distances
when the ranking is undecided or ambiguous. In this in-between area, the chameleon
is both far and near, or neither.
In electronics, switches with a very crisp, unambiguous transition are usually
difficult to implement, at least with respect to the rather simple ‘problem’ that is ad-
dressed. When does it switch from one state to another? Usually the implementation
will determine this, and there are various means to achieve this, each having its own
results.
As an example, consider a bipolar light switch, like the ones in most houses. A
light switch is a ranking machine that transforms an (analogous) angle of the switch
into a binary classification, which is normally called ‘off’ and ‘on’. Normally the
switch operates well beyond the intricacies of the in-between region, and only one
of the two stable states is selected, which lie at the two maximum angles. However,
if one carefully applies an increasing amount of pressure on the switch, then at some
point, the system will decide when ‘off’ becomes ‘on’ and vice versa. This transition
point is determined by system-internal properties, such as the springs, and the shape
of both the contact and the construction of the body that the switch rests upon. Every
switch will have a (slightly) different transition point.
As a result, an inevitable aspect of ranking is that it creates ‘zones of ambiguity’.
A ‘crisp’ ranking can only be approximated by making the zone of ambiguity as
small as possible. In this sense, a logical or formal system therefore always has
the nature of an idealisation, as it purports to have diminished the innate ambiguity
of ranking. This could result in a Cartesian, mechanistic world. But the seed of
ambiguity, and with it uncertainty, is already present in-between ranks, at least in a
practical setting. With this, ambiguity can be considered a source of uncertainty.
Besides this, every observer or detector will have its own reaction in this am-
biguous area. It is not possible to state ‘as a fact’ that a chameleon is nearby or
far, because this fact can only reside in a context in which this ranking has been
determined. Ranking is fundamentally value-informed. With this, uncertainty and
order are twins that are born from ranking. Mathematics traditionally has been the
language of the crisp, symbolic world, while the uncertain and indeterminate have
never had a voice, save perhaps in poetry. Natural language, the language of ‘being
in’ a complex world, having elements of both.2
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Although the ranking of a light switch has an innate aspect of ambiguity, it is
possible to tap into the mechanism and change the behaviour of the switch in this
indeterminate zone. A sensitive switch is useful when the presence of something
needs to be detected, like in an alarm system. Other switches may require a late, or
‘heavy’ switch. For instance, the smoke detector of a sprinkler installation should
not respond to cigarette smoke, or that of a candle. The goals of the designer of the
switch determine at which point one state switches into another. There are manufac-
turers that make an enormous variety of switches, each constructed for their specific
purpose, and yet, all functioning as a ranking system between ‘on’ and ‘off’.
This aspect is related to the external criteria that are injected into it by the manu-
factorers. A ranking can thus be constituted system-internally or by deliberate inter-
vention in the process. Only in the latter case one could say that a certain criterion
guides the ranking. But the process itself does not need such explicit input, as the
process can select system-internal characteristics only. In its most elementary form,
the ranking mechanism will behave randomly, crunching away on data and guided
by random internal state transitions (for instance thermodynamic noise). However,
by consciously ‘tapping into’ the ranking mechanism and injecting a goal-function
into it, the process becomes subject to external guidance. So, a ranking mechanism
can operate on both internal and external criteria.
1.2 A Pattern of Difference
Ranking introduces a new phenomenon, namely that of difference. If data items
are ranked it introduces a distinction between them. Along the argument that is
developed here, this difference is an aspect of the modelling activities. The target
may be built up of things that can be distinguished from each other, but they only
acquire meaning in the context that a model supplies. A difference therefore, is a
very powerful means to organise observations.
However, this also implies that a difference is subject to observation. When ob-
servation is taken up in a feedback loop, where a model determines that what is
observed, which in turn guides the modelling activities, the act of observing a dif-
ference becomes a dynamic activity.
The most essential aspect of the resulting process is that it enforces the initial
bias in the observations by increasingly giving them higher ranks. In other words,
bias in observations can be self-reinforcing. Some things are considered more im-
portant, valuable, or essential than others. When observation implies selection, this
is a necessary and vital aspect. It both allows an observer to focus, and also immedi-
ately organises observations by discarding insignificant data. At a most fundamental
level, observation causes a bias between essence and details, making observation a
normative activity.
However, a difference is also usually framed against a common underlying ref-
erence. If one draws a horizontal line between two concepts, say ‘left’ and ‘right’,
then the line is a visualisation of a common underlying reference. Another frame
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could be based on the letters that make the words ‘left’ and ‘right’, in which case
the alphabet would be a common underlying framework.
Likewise, the six numbers on a dice are distinctive, but still mutually related.
This difference is related to numbers as ‘being part of’the dice. The numbers have
a different meaning than those of a telephone number. The ‘off’ and ‘on’ of a light
switch find a common reference in the ground wire that determines the ‘zero’ volt.
This means that a difference is always based on the framing provided by a com-
mon context. If not, the distinction can only be observed as being undetermined,
which can translate to anything from indifference to confusion. The process that ob-
serves the different concepts, senses their being different, but is not able to set them
against a common reference. Indeterminacy is another source of uncertainty.
This does not have to be problematic per se, and there may be various gradients
between distinction, indifference and confusion. In a dynamically interacting world,
confusion or indifference may even become a distinction or vice versa.
A ‘difference’ can now be decomposed into distinction, ambiguity and a common
frame of reference. These three at least make that what is generally called a differ-
ence, but often the observation of difference tends to focus on distinction alone. A
difference can now be modelled as a pattern of observation.
Pattern: Difference
Description: A difference between two concepts
A.K.A:
Notes: A difference always depends on a common frame of reference.
If not, there can only be undetermined. Depending on the ob-
server, difference increases from the level of common framing
(no difference), via a zone of ambiguity to a distinction.
With this, the vocabulary of PAC has been extended with ambiguity and inde-
terminacy as being sources of uncertainty. Both of these are related to conceptual
patterns. Basically they describe a breach in the isomorphism between target and
model, of which ambiguity is more constrained to the modelling activities. Indeter-
minacy is a fundamental incapability of placing observations in the model, it is an
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inability for observations to ‘form’ a concept.
If a process aims to select from amongst mutually ranked concepts, then the zone
of ambiguity becomes tremendously important. For it is here that a systemic fluidity
is present that allows the process to make a ‘jump’ from one concept to another.
Once a concept is selected, the process will experience a sort of resistance that pre-
vents it from moving into the zone of ambiguity, but once there, it becomes easier
to jump over. The process may even decide that the difference is not that important,
which allows the concepts to ‘dissolve’ into the region of their common frame of
reference. With this, the zone of ambiguity, instead of being a detrimental aspect of
a selective process, is actually needed to enable a choice. The zone of ambiguity is
an unstable, hypercritical region that allows a process ‘ to make a choice’. A choice
is seeded in ambiguity. Without ambiguity, a difference would be a deep gap that
would require extensive energy to cross.3
For those who may consider this decomposition of a difference to be pushing the
trivial to its extremes, it may be worth pointing out that differences are currently
being heavily reflected on, from post-structuralist forms proposed by Derrida to
autopoietic operations in Luhmann’s social systems, which are sometimes brought
together under the banner of ‘post-ontological philosophies of difference’.4 As an
example of the ideas that are developed in this area, consider the following quote
from social theorists John Smith and Chris Jenks:5
Complexity theory, in other words, sees the emergence of difference as process, not simply
between being and language, but between being and a host of forms of responding.
Even though this insight may be a major step forward in social theory —I do not
know—, it is clear that this idea will not be followed here. First ‘emergence’ remains
an underdeveloped concept and thus is uncertain. Secondly, ‘difference’ is not an
emergent property, but simply the result of ranking, or interference of pattern. A
‘difference’ can be seen when waves on the water’s surface interfere.
More practically, one can see the pattern of difference when following the devel-
opments at a building site, where for instance houses are built. First one may see a
crude assembly of equipment, material and other things that are needed to build the
houses. At this point, the potential for different forms and shapes is still quite large
(although not unlimited). The available material forms the common frame of refer-
ence for the various houses that could be built with it. This potential is gradually
reduced as the construction activities proceed. In other words, the zone ambiguity
is reduced as the houses ‘take up form’. At the same time, it becomes ever more
difficult to undo the formation, as the hypercritical region in which choices are still
possible, gradually closes. It takes considerable effort to change the houses once
they have taken up their final form, which usually means demolition.
Differences are getting more attention in science itself, especially beyond a cer-
tain level of complexity. The (problems related to the) custom of categorisation of
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certain observed characteristics, is only one issue that is related to this.6
For the purposes here, the pattern of difference becomes interesting when it is
taken up in a self-describing production system. If the system generates concepts
that are distinct, then the system can operate on these distinctions, but those as-
pects of a concept that form the common frame of reference are, at best, only re-
inforced. This means that a production system that operates on these differences
will be ‘blind’ for the common frame of reference. Put in another way, the com-
mon frame of reference tends to be in the background of the system’s operations. If
the two top stories of the Empire State Building are sealed off from the rest of the
building, and all the windows are blinded, then people working on either story will
experience a two-story building, unless they know that they are on the top.
The idea of ambiguity as driving choices derives some confirmation from neu-
ral networks. Neural networks typically learn a number of patterns which are laid
down in an abstract mathematical space that is constituted by the weights of the
network. These weights are associated with the ranking. The patterns may be mutu-
ally distinctive, but they may also overlap, usually when two patterns share common
characteristics. The shape of the number ‘1’ is fairly similar to that of ‘7’, just as
‘3’ has a lot in common with ‘8’, so depending on the ‘crispness’ of the training of
the neural network, the patterns associated with ‘1’ and ‘7’ may have some overlap,
while ‘1’ and ‘8’ may have nothing in common.
If a trained neural network now has to recognize a hand-written number that is a
bit in-between ‘1’ and ‘7’, the network enters the zone of ambiguity and the neural
network will enforce a choice system-internally. If the network can still learn from
this choice, the (in-) correctness is assessed and the weights (ranks) are adjusted
accordingly, which will alter the zone of ambiguity with respect to these numbers.
The zone of ambiguity may be reduced or biased in a certain way. Note here that the
common framing of ‘1’ and ‘7’ occurs at the level of the weights, while the common
framing between ‘1’ and ‘8’ occurs at the level of the network’s structure and oper-
ation. In other words, ‘1’ and ‘8’ are related only by the fact that the network can
recognize them, while ‘1’ and ‘7’ share commonalities in terms of the overlapping
of their corresponding patterns.
1.3 The Zone of Ambiguity
As the seed of ambiguity is in the ranking of observations (or any sensory data
for that matter), one can now start to follow this ambiguity as it percolates into an
actor’s life-world.
For instance, suppose someone in a workshop doing some carpentry, grabs a
hammer to drive a nail into a plank. From a functional or instrumentally focused
observer’s point of view, this task will match with his models as long as the carpenter
is hitting the nail. This is the common framing between the observed act and the
models of the observer.
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However, the carpenter suddenly misses and the hammer smashes into his thumb.
As the thumb is bruised pretty badly, the carpenter is taken to a doctor for examina-
tion. In this scenario, there is a crisp distinction between the observations and the in-
ternal models, which will be trivialised as being an anomaly. However, the anomaly
percolates extensively into the societal setting in which the carpenter works. People
are warned, doctors are called and taxis are ordered. A slight ambiguity fans out into
carpenter’s life-world and causes irreversible change.
However, the point of this example is not the fanning out of crisp alternatives,
but rather the alternatives in-between common framing and distinction. The carpen-
ter may miss both the nail and his thumb, or he does hit his thumb, but does not
need to go to the doctor. At the first end of the range of this zone of ambiguity, the
carpenter can resume his activities, in which the event ‘folds back’ to a regular func-
tional or instrumental scenario, maybe with a slight delay. At the other end of the
scale there may be some ripples of change in the workshop, the household, and the
neighbours who may share the experience in a somewhat unsophisticated manner.
Then the bruised thumb is cooled with water and a bandage is put on the wound,
after which the scenario may ‘fold back’ to the instrumental one, or otherwise end
up so that the carpenter will have to stop for the day.
The zone of ambiguity is the reason why we do not live in a mechanical, deter-
ministic world. Everyday life is saturated with these little ambiguities that determine
the various paths, strategies, and alternatives that a given situation offers, and which
may result in irreversible changes of state that percolate through a medium or sub-
stratum, such as a physical body, a household or a society. These are so common,
that usually not much attention is given to them. This is also what makes theories of
complex themes incomplete, and is the main reason why so much attention has been
given to them here. Theories based on crisp symbols and on ontological distinctions
can at best only address certain aspects of a complex theme, and even there, am-
biguity will always be something that influences these theories. It is the theorist’s
fallacy to believe that the model is equivalent to a complex target and the latter can
be put in the straight-jacket of a theorist’s ideas.7
As a practical consequence of the pattern-oriented game that is developed here, a
difference is not going to exacerbated. Differences are a useful aid for observation,
which may reveal a common framing, ambiguity and distinction, or combinations
of these. In the game of PAC, both difference and identity are formed from pattern,
and PAC can be considered a ‘sort of’ philosophy of pattern and information. It is
worth pointing out that such a philosophy can only be formed in a world where
information and pattern have become embedded in a daily societal repertoire. A
philosophy of pattern and information is an inevitability in the computer and Internet
age, not because it is more ‘true’ than philosophies of matter, identity or difference,
but simply because currently the vocabulary of pattern and information is available
for such a philosophy.
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2 On Problems and Problem Solving
At this point, ranking and difference have been introduced as a very elementary aids
in detecting or observing something. Both are seen as the result of the interferences
of patterns, and thus, information has qualities of bias, focus, ranking, difference,
but also ambiguity.
Things become (even) more interesting when a ranking mechanism is taken up in
a feedback loop. A specific configuration is studied extensively in the field of com-
putational intelligence, and is used to solve very elementary problems of the kind
where one aims to find or locate an optimal set of data in a certain environment,
which is often called the ‘problem domain’. This type of problem solver is often
called global search.8
In its most basic form, a global search can be described with the set that was
previously introduced {0,1,3,4,5,7,9,10,11}, and a criterion (or goal) to find the
maximum number. A global search has to find this maximum number by first se-
lecting a random number in the set (say zero), after which a number of rules are
applied that will guide the search towards the desired number. Notice that this is a
production system with certain premises and one or more rules, as was described in
the previous chapter.
Suppose that the following search strategy is used, which consists of six steps:
1. Select an initial random number x and store it as xs (premise 1)
2. Select a direction d amongst a set {left,right}. Initially d = right (premise 2)
3. Select a new number x, based on xs and d, which is the number on the right-hand
side of xs, or left-hand side respectively
4. If (x < xs) then switch direction d
5. If (x > xs) then xs becomes x
6. Go to step 3 until the maximum number is found.
Starting from a premise {xs,d} = {0,right}, the system will ‘walk’ towards the
maximum number from zero, by testing every number from left to right. If the
premise would be {7, le f t}, then the process will first go to number five, notice
that it is going in the wrong direction, because of step 4, and then go back to seven,
nine, and so on.
It is worth pointing out that step five describes a securing mechanism, which is
based on storing the highest value that is found at a certain point (memory). Also,
the problem domain (set of numbers) on which the strategy operates is very for-
giving. Say, for instance that the following set is provided {0,1,4,5,7,9,10,3,11},
then the strategy will fail on both premises that were used earlier, because the search
strategy will not be able to get past number three.
It will be clear that most searches in real life are far more complex than this one.
One only has to consider the challenge of finding a certain web page based on a
set of keywords, like a search engine, to envision a practical application of global
search, but the resulting feedback pattern is still similar to the one above.9
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This pattern will be called ‘convergence inducing process’, as this fundamentally
describes what the pattern does. Besides search engines, it returns in organisms
trying to find foodstuffs, and basically in most forms of goal-directed behaviour in
any process that has to do something in a certain environment10
2.1 Problem Solving Theory
Often a problem is defined somewhere along the lines of ‘a difference between a
current and a desired situation’. ‘Desire’ in global search often translates to ‘goals’
or ‘goal functions’ and they are needed to guide the search, like the ‘criteria’ in the
ranking mechanism. In effect, the data in a problem domain are selected and ranked
by the search process, and this ranked data are used to make a new selection, that
hopefully gets even better rankings. The process, in a very rudimentary sense, in-
creases its knowledge of a problem domain, by testing and evaluating the unknown.
As the process selects the data, which in turn guides the next selections, these
algorithms are iterative, feedback systems. The goal functions guide this feedback,
and so the same process with different goal functions will select different sets of
data in the same problem domain.
Like the simple ranking mechanism described earlier, many problem-solving ac-
tivities do not explicitly define a norm or goal. An antelope undoubtedly has an
innate ‘goal’ to steer clear of an approaching lion, and a bacterium may have a goal
to ‘swim up a glucose-gradient’.
In general, agents may often be observed as having goal-directed behaviour. The
agent aims to achieve a certain goal by acting in such a way that its observed inabil-
ity to achieve the goal is minimised over time.
This observed goal-directed behaviour can become problematic, as was ex-
pressed by Richard Dawkins in the Niko Tinbergen lecture on evolution theory
in 2004. In reverence of his former tutor, Dawkins recalls Tinbergen’s four ‘why’
questions on animal behaviour and presents his own quadruple, the four ‘what’s’ of
evolutionary theory:11
1. What survives Darwinian Selection?
2. What is the vehicle of the surviving entity?
3. What is improved?
4. What has designed the surviving entity?
Dawkins argues that the fourth ‘what’ mainly applies for artificial entities, such
as human designed objects. This ‘evolution by design’ is so common in our everyday
life that we tend to forget that autonomous evolution is also a valid possibility in
nature. In Dawkins’s words:ii
ii Following from a translation from English to Dutch and back to English, the statement bears a
high risk of Dawkinsian mutations in the original words
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To start with the fourth question, the idea of purpose is deeply entrenched in human con-
sciousness. All our waking hours are spent developing and executing schemes and plans,
surrounded by social partners performing the same activities, and applying artefacts de-
signed for a specific task. From the moment we wake up and drink our first coffee from a
cup designed to contain coffee, to the moment we stretch ourselves on a mattress designed
to be soft, under blankets designed to keep us warm; all this time it is completely obvious
what their purpose is [. . . ]
This tendency is so strong, that many people take this too far and start to wonder what
the purpose is for objects that are not designed, such as the Sun and the Earth, where the
question of purpose is irrelevant.
This argumentation also applies for goal-directed behaviour. Even though an agent
or process may seem to be heading somewhere, it is not necessarily goal-directed
behaviour. The universe expands to a state of maximum entropy, not by a goal (or
purpose) to minimise the energy per unit of volume, but under influence of impulse,
gravitation and other physical forces. Natural organisms evolve to states of (sub-
) optimal fitness not by grand design, but under governance of fitness selection,
implicitly aiming to solve the problem of their survival and that of their descendants.
This ‘apparent behaviour’ is what Maturana & Varela consider the ‘natural drift’ of
evolution.12
With the ranking mechanism described earlier, this natural drift can be seen as
ambiguity ‘at work’. Patterns take up form in self-referential processes that cause
interferences with conceptual patterns from the environment, and the zones of am-
biguity cause minute differences in the rankings of agents, which become more
prominent after a large number of these cycles. This means that two very similar
agents, operating under the same circumstances will eventually still go their own
way.
However, by injecting a criterion or goal in this feedback loop, the system be-
comes subject to external guidance, and this can result in a convergence inducing
process, or global search. For the purposes here, global search is interesting because
the process does not know beforehand which selections are best, considering a cer-
tain goal. These processes therefore acknowledge uncertainty, and therefore are a
step away from organised simplicity towards the plane of organised complexity.
2.1.1 Global Search
Generally speaking, a global search can be defined as:
a process that aims to make a selection of data in an unknown environment that best ap-
proximates a certain goal (function)
A process that can perform a search is therefore always embedded in a certain envi-
ronment, the ‘problem domain’, and the processes in computation are the algorithms
that are designed to process the data. These algorithms aim to make a selection of
this data based on some criteria.
Generally speaking, there are three processes that guide a global search:13
154
1. An exploration process that samples a sufficiently diverse set of points in the
problem domain. This often includes an aspect of randomness
2. A guidance process that evaluates the points sampled so far and biases the explo-
ration process to move to regions of high-quality solutions
3. A convergence-inducing process that ensures optimal convergence of the search
to certain optimal solutions
The last two sub-processes can, generally speaking, be considered an optimising
process. A global search therefore requires a balance between a divergent process of
exploration and a convergent process of optimisation which are carried out simul-
taneously. Such processes are often called strategies, a means to get things done.
Both strategies collect data from the problem domain which are evaluated and used
to determine which areas will be ‘homed-in’ to for optimisation. It will be clear that
this process is a form of feedback between a process and its environment:
Fig. 2 Convergence Inducing Process
This feedback consists of a ‘testing phase’ (setting the output) and an ‘evaluation
phase’ (evaluating the corresponding input). As the process consists of two distinct
strategies of divergence and convergence, it is clear that the latter should dominate
in order to make ‘global search’ a ‘convergence inducing process’.14
Coarsely stated, a problem domain can be likened to a mountainous landscape
like the Alps or the Himalayas, and the process is like a command centre that has
to send airplanes into the unknown territory by night to do something there, for
instance to find the highest peak. The strategies that are deployed are comparable to
the routes that the airplanes take, and the only thing they do is to parachute probes
everywhere, which measure the height at the location where they are dropped. These
probes relay the data back to the command centre, after which the airplanes are sent
back for a new run. The aim then is to complete the task as quickly as possible,
using the least amount of probes and a minimum amount of flights.
Intuitively, an optimal process is likely to start out with mainly exploring the
problem domain and will end mainly with optimisation. As more probes are dropped,
some will give readings of above average heights, which may indicate that they are
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lying on slopes of very high mountains. As the trials continue, the planes will in-
creasingly concentrate on these areas so that more probes are dropped in places
where the highest peaks are expected.
This means that the process has to find a balance between exploration —which
is relatively inefficient, as the pay-off is uncertain— and optimisation, which has a
high pay-off as long as it can optimise. If a probe is dropped onto a low, but ex-
tended hill, while there is a steep, high mountain in its vicinity that is missed each
time, the search may favour the hill for the mountain. This problem is called ‘getting
trapped in local optima’, or sometimes premature convergence.15 Therefore explo-
ration is necessary in order to improve the chance of finding the mountain.
This intuition has been proven by Holland in 1975. In his ‘Proof of the Multi-
Armed Bandit’, Holland demonstrated that a problem solving process that consists
of multiple strategies will be optimal if the strategies that perform best get an ex-
ponentially increasing amount of resources with respect to other, poorer, ones. Ba-
sically this proof, and especially the novel theory he developed in which he linked
this result to the way genes try to optimise their fitness, greatly advanced a field in
artificial intelligence called genetic algorithms, which was pioneered by Alan Tur-
ing.16 In genetic algorithms, a problem domain is therefore often called a ‘fitness
landscape’ that is fairly analogous with the mountain metaphor. Note that this ap-
proach implies a securing mechanism in order to work. The process must be able
to store previous values and use them for further evaluation. The resulting pattern
called ‘convergence inducing process’ is depicted below:
Pattern: Convergence Inducing Process
Description: An actor samples its environment by an iterative cycle of testing
and evaluation until a certain goal criterion has been met
A.K.A: Problem Solver, Global Search
Notes: The actor typically maps the evaluated variables with the goal
function that typically contains a securing mechanism that stores
high-ranked variables, which are used for further evaluation.
The securing mechanism is represented by the white triangle
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3 Convergence Inducing Process
A convergence inducing process establishes a relationship between the strategies
and the environment in which the strategies have to operate. This relationship in part
is determined by the implicit or explicit goal functions that drive the convergence
inducing process; it makes a big difference if the planes have to find the highest
peaks, or conversely the valleys.
Besides this, the question arises whether a certain set of strategies can be devised
that give superior results in any kind of problem domain. For instance, if the moun-
tains are very steep and small, or have the shape of needles, then it is highly likely
that the probes will miss them time and time again. Low, but extended hills may
then claim the prize of being measured as being the highest mountains.
For a while there was some hope that maybe genetic algorithms might prove
to be universal problem solvers, that is, that they would give superior results in any
problem domain, but it has become clear that there is no global search that can make
such a claim.17
This intuition seems to hang like a Damoclean Sword over every endeavour to
create perfect optimisers, and is called the ‘no free lunch theorem’ (NFL). Coarsely
stated, this theorem, developed by David Wolpert and William Macready in 1995,
but based on an old economic wisdom from Milton Friedman in the Sixties, states
that there is no problem solver that will behave optimally in any given problem
domain.18 This means that a global search can be optimised for some specific types
of problem domains, but will not necessarily outperform others with different kinds
of problems.
The mountain analogy gives some clues why this is the case. A mountainous
landscape is basically a collection of slopes. The probes that land on the slopes give
some information about the height of the mountains, and two probes that have fallen
in each other’s vicinity give clues on the direction where the peak will be found. But
this is only certain if the slopes are continuously rising to the summit. When slopes
are more unpredictable —and most are— the readings on the probes at best can be
interpreted as giving probabilities on the whereabouts of the peaks.
In this view, any search strategy will have to combine trial-and-error (random
strategies) with optimisation of probable high quality regions. This pragmatic inter-
pretation of global search confirms NFL. Note that this means that a global search
combines processes from the plane of organised simplicity and those of unorganised
complexity.
In the last few years, a lot of theoretical support has been generated in academia
to prove the NFL’s worth. A small contribution from my side aimed to explain the
exponential character of optimal problem solvers from a more intuitive and prag-
matic perspective. From this stance, a problem solving process can always be con-
sidered to be the combination of three base strategies, one which develops increas-
ingly better values, another that develops increasing worse ones, and the third that
yields comparable results to previous tests. It can be proven that if the improving
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strategy manages to get at least one better value with every evaluation, as opposed
to the data that has already been collected, this strategy will make it increasingly
difficult for the strategy that is collecting worse values to find new results. This
process of ‘starvation’ has an exponential character if there are a lot of possible so-
lutions in the problem domain. From this perspective, exploration can be considered
a fairly ‘neutral’ strategy, sometimes supporting the improving strategy, and some-
times (even often) generating downright bad values. As long as optimising processes
manage to find more ‘desired’ data however, the problem solving process performs
optimally.19
Although NFL suggests that there is no global search that can operate optimally
for any problem domain, there are of course search strategies that work very well in
certain classes of problem domains. For example, consider pitching a very high pole
somewhere in a soccer field (which will be the highest point in that field), and then
ask someone to find the pole blindfolded. It will be clear that any strategy will be as
good as any other. The only optimisation that is possible is to prevent returning to a
spot that is already visited (securing mechanism).
However, if the blindfolded person asks if a sheet of cloth can be put over the
soccer field that covers it completely; the search becomes a lot easier as the veil
now creates slopes that reveal the direction of the pole. Such problem domains can
usually be tackled with very simple search strategies (exploration is not even needed
in this case). This was basically done with the search strategy that was used to
introduce global search. The set of numbers (problem domain) was already ordered
in increasing numbers, so a simple search strategy could simply ‘walk up the slope’
to the highest number. These strategies are (therefore) usually called hill-climbing
strategies, which usually work well in relatively ‘undulated’ problem domains. They
tend to be very susceptible for getting trapped in local optima, as was demonstrated
in the previous set, when number three was repositioned to break the upward trend
of the slope. Note that this strategy did not include exploration, which is one of the
reasons why it only works in very specific problem domains.
Many problem domains that may appear to be very rugged and unpredictable at
first glance, can often be ‘smoothened’ out to some extent by trying to find certain
underlying patterns in the slopes, for instance between global and local trends. If
such patterns are known or expected in advance, the problem solver can be opti-
mised to include this knowledge for those particular classes of problem domains.
In other words, there is often a relationship between the algorithms and the problem
domains they operate in, and this relationship determines the success of the conver-
gence inducing process.
As exploration often tends to be a (pseudo-) random activity, a convergence in-
ducing process typically combines orderly, deterministic approaches from the plane
of organised simplicity, with probabilistic ones from the plane of unorganised com-
plexity. A convergence inducing process therefore, is probably one of the simplest
forms of organised complexity.
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3.1 Global Search and Observation
The reason why global search is an interesting pattern for PAC, is because ‘problem
domain’ can be seen as a specific form of a ‘target’, and the problem solver a specific
and elementary form of modelling. A convergence inducing process tries to make
a model of an unknown problem domain, and this model aims to inform certain
conceptual patterns of the problem domain depending on certain goal criteria, which
are needed to guide the process.
The extensive research on convergence inducing processes can now give some
clues on how data can become pattern. That is, how the ‘mountainous’ landscape of
the problem domain is recreated in the modelling environment.
It may have become clear by now, that a convergence inducing process is being
proposed as a model of observation, which goes beyond that of a target being pro-
jected onto a mental representation in a linear fashion. As conceptual patterns are
observed, they get ranked and are placed in internal maps that contextualise these
patterns. However, these maps also guide the observations through bias and am-
plification. This recursive and proactive stance to observation is quite different to
the detached observer who can oversee everything in equal proportion, and better
resembles the craftsperson who is continuously interacting with subject matter.
3.2 Information Overload
Another aspect of ranking is related to the issue of ‘how many’. According to the
pattern of difference, it is distinction that sets data mutually apart and thus con-
tributes to its divergent nature. The more data that is distinct, the more differences
there are. However, the aspect of numbers brings with it some problems for the
observer of these distinctions. Selections will have to be made in finite time with
finite means, and thus there will always be a point when the number of differences,
move beyond the observer’s oversight. Needless to say, this is particularly an issue
in np-complete environments.
Beyond this point, the observer will, explicitly or implicitly, discard some of the
data through internal ranking criteria. This means that if the ranking of a multitude
of data has been done outside the observer, the observer will disrupt this ranking
through the internal maps she holds. Moreover, if the multitudes of data are meant
to reside side by side without any ranking –they are, as differences, all equally valid-
then, beyond a certain point, ranking will occur because the observer has to make
selections. If these various unranked data sets also contain contradictions, then the
data for that observer is completely meaningless, ambiguous, paradoxical, undeter-
mined or useless. Too much choice results in information overload, which forces
the observer to make selections. It is for this reason that ranking should be seen as a
very fluid process. External and internal criteria flow into each other and determine
how the observation is guided.
Global search usually operates in problem domains that are too extensive to cover
completely. This means that most data will never be tested and evaluated and will
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remain as potential. Of this potential samples are taken to which a certain rank is
assigned according to their significance for the goals that are pursued. This subset of
data will initially grow with each iteration step, but as the process continues, a fairly
orderly amount of information will stand out with respect to other information and
it becomes less likely for new data to ‘outrank’ this set. Eventually the probability
of finding better values becomes so minute that the process can best be terminated.
This does not mean that the best values have been found, for they may have been
overlooked by the characteristics of the search strategy that is used. However, the
probability of finding these best values may have become so minute that it becomes
better to settle for the ones that were found. This is merely a matter of practicality,
especially when problems have to be solved in finite time. Every problem solving
process that terminates before all the data in the problem domain has been evaluated
leads to sub-optimal solutions, which means that there is a probability that the best
results were missed. However, most problems can settle for ‘good enough’ results,
which are much easier to find.
Note that due to the fact that the problem-solving process aims to maximise rank-
ing through feedback, this process has a convergent character. Due to the bias of
high-ranking selections, the process will be guided to follow directions of increased
ranking based on data sets that are already ranked. Exploration will sometimes break
this bias, but the process is largely determined by ‘past experiences’ and initial
choices. The only way to break this bias is to make a ‘clean start’ with different
premises. It may be clear that a ‘clean start’ is usually only really possible in rela-
tively simple systems that are able to erase the previous selections.
It is a long stretch along the complexity perspective to relate the convergence
inducing process to human brain function. Although many pieces of the puzzle of
human intelligence have been laid down on the table, many are also still missing,
and it is as yet unclear how everything fits together.20 There are theories on mind,
consciousness and self, but all of them are far from being proven. There are many
models, some order, but very little certainty on the theme of human intelligence.
Because of the high level of uncertainty, only a few steps can be made along
the complexity perspective from the base pattern of convergence inducing process
to a more complex form. For one, of course, sensory organs provide multiple con-
ceptual patterns that are contextualised in what neurophysiologist Antonio Damasio
calls ‘mental maps’ of the brain, and which have been likened earlier to ‘mental
landscapes’.21
However, despite the inevitable complexity, there are enough signs that the hu-
man brain follows a convergence inducing process on many an occasion. Obviously
goal-directed behaviour is inevitably convergent, such as walking towards a desti-
nation, grabbing an apple from a bowl or solving a puzzle. The human ability for
exploration is impressive, but there are sufficient clues that this is bounded as well.
For one, there is no difference between the ‘unknown’ of complex observers with
respect to simple ones. Even though the extent of anticipation and informed guesses
is much larger for the former, there is always a point where exploration becomes
purely random.
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Besides this, with the pattern of difference, exploration still has to relate to the
common frame of reference that is built up of previous experiences. This inevitably
constrains exploration within the ranges of the already known on the one hand, and
indeterminacy on the other.
4 Networks
In this last section on problem solving, a pattern will be explored that seems to be
part of the focus of many scientific disciplines, from deeply technical ones to the so-
cial sciences.22 Again, ‘network’ is derived —at least according to the likely sources
of this word— from the weavers, as it is the assemblage of ‘net’ and ‘work’. It is
not clear if ‘work’ refers to the working on nets, or whether —as its contemporary
usage indicates— that the net works out of itself.23 The isomorphism is usually re-
lated to the net-like shape, but contemporary research shows that dynamic networks
also share many similarities.
The base notion of a network is that of nodes that are mutually connected. A sys-
tem is almost by definition a network, as the entities (nodes) are mutually connected
through their relationships. Networks, as an aggregate form, typically have emer-
gent behaviour, as the functioning of the network cannot be purely understood from
the individual nodes. The structure of the nodes also affects the behaviour of the
network. There are two configurations that determine the boundaries of a network.
On one hand, there is a fully connected networks, where every node is connected
with all the others. On the other end, there is a sequence or a cycle, where every
node is connected to one or two others. Below that the network starts to fall apart
in different sub-networks (fragmentation) until eventually only a loose grouping of
nodes remains. At this point a network ceases to be a network.
From the viewpoint of complexity, as always, the most interesting networks seem
to be in-between fully coupled networks and sequences. Sparse networks are net-
works where every node is connected with relatively few others, but all the nodes
do span the entire network. A traditional (fish) net is a good example, as every knot
in the net (node) is connected with four others.
Sparse networks become interesting when nodes are allowed to grow and decay,
and the children, or descendants, are connected to their parent nodes. Starting from
one initial node, new nodes are created according to certain rules or algorithms,
thus (usually) building up a sparse network, as nodes are connected to their ances-
tors and their descendants only. If a certain decay is introduced, which means that
some connections or nodes are removed to counter the growth, a network structure
is formed that usually consists of certain hubs, nodes with relatively many connec-
tions, while others only have a few connections. There is increasing support that
this particular configuration of a sparse network is extremely robust. The most well-
known example of such a network is the world-wide web. Certain websites draw the
most people, while the majority of websites remain relatively obscure.24 This con-
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figuration is very common in nature; growth/decay of course is very fundamental
in our life-world. The relationship with robustness also seems to be an interesting
demarcation point between machines, which are highly reliable, static, but hardly
self-maintaining, and organisms, which are dynamic and robust. Along this scale,
robustness becomes a characteristic of agents operating in the plane of organised
complexity.25 Machines are systems, while organisms tend to be better described as
being networks. More correctly, a system is a specialisation of a network, where all
the elements are connected to each other in a fixed way. Robust networks, however,
organise differently, and are able to adapt to changes in their environment. The idea
of networks therefore seem to provide a better means to describe forms of organisa-
tion in the plane of organised complexity.
A machine in a production hall is able to work extremely well because the pro-
duction hall facilitates its functioning. If something goes wrong, there is usually
trained staff to repair the machine and to put it back in operation. If the environ-
ment is less predictable, or more uncertain from the perspective of the algorithms,
then solution strategies in the plane of organised complexity become the preferred
choice. These may be less efficient than machines, but they are more robust and can
handle the uncertainty better. It will be clear that living organisms are all forms of
organised complexity. This relationship also feeds back to deterministic and strictly
causal processes which usually determine machine function.26
A network is a specialisation of aggregate and brings at least two characteristics
into play. The first is coherence, an ability to maintain itself despite change and
contingencies. The second is emergence, which means that the properties of the
network cannot be completely described by the properties of the individual agents.
The way that they are connected or interact also determines the behaviour of the
overall network. In some social theory and in economics this ‘sum is more than the
parts’ effect is sometimes called the ‘micro-macro problem’, but this can already be
seen at relatively simple levels.
The micro-macro problem, for instance, returns in physics in incompatibilities
between deterministic and statistical approaches, which for Prigogine stand at the
heart of the irreversibility of time. Such issues are therefore strongly related to the
plane of organised complexity.27
In fact, some of the technical areas of complexity research, such as cellular au-
tomata, focus strongly on these effects, as it has been found out that under certain
conditions these networks are capable of computation. That is, despite the relatively
simple behaviour of the individual elements, the network is able to display overall
computational intelligence. To give a hint of the enormous impact of this idea, just
imagine the idea that an ant colony or an immune system is able to perform opera-
tions similar to that of a computer, purely through the network structure the ants or
the antibodies span! This is basically also what our brains do, but it could be that a
social system consisting of social agents is also computing at a level that we cannot
imagine, even though we, as human agents are part of that system!28
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For the purposes of PAC, the micro-macro problem brings in a problem when
traversing along the complexity perspective. As this perspective follows aggrega-
tion, the micro-macro problem may create ‘gaps’ of uncertainty, which implies that
the structural perspective of the aggregate form (i.e. the network) may be the only
point of departure for consecutive levels of aggregation. In other words, if certain
patterns are known to exist in the plane of organised simplicity, they may return at
more complex levels, but strictly speaking, the uncertainty gaps break the scaling of
these patterns along the complexity perspective.
There is at least one explanation for these uncertainty gaps. An aggregate can
consist of many constituents, which means that the relationships between these con-
stituents are np-hard. As long as the constituents are all similar, a network can be
understood at the level of the constituents, and at the aggregate level. The np-hard
nature of the interactions is the only source of uncertainty, and depending on the
specifics of the constituents, this can be tackled with analytical and/or statistical
means. In other words, many forms of networks allow themselves to be described
by analytical or statistical means. However, if the constituents are mutually differ-
ent, dynamic and contingent, then both approaches will fail. This does not mean that
the aggregate (network) will be beyond knowing, but it no longer can be described
purely by the descriptions of the constituents. This is one, very elementary form of
emergence.
If one then wants to pursue these patterns at level of, say, ‘living systems’, the
best point of departure may then be the most obvious one, namely that point on the
complexity perspective where life is formed. On the other hand, these uncertainty
gaps do not block the patterns are developed per se, so some patterns (like feedback
for instance) may not be affected by them.
In a similar vein, in a proper reductionist framing, we should have an extensive
mathematical idiom that proves every step along the complexity perspective from
Newtonian mechanics to a living organism. This has currently not been achieved,
and so one can only accept uncertainty gaps as a pragmatic choice along these scales.
As a human observer (currently) does not have a complete reductionist model of a
living organism, it follows that every model of a living system is uncertain. But this
also applies for the living organism itself! That is, as a living organism (probably)
does not know all of its own states, it follows that it must incorporate uncertainty in
its own functioning, behaviour and so on.
The aspect of the ‘sum is more than the parts’ is just one of the characteristics
that set a network apart from an aggregate. If the nodes of a network allow the flows
through the network to re-enter them, this may result in a change of their behaviour,
as this is a characteristic of processes of feedback. In other words, the aggregate
form may influence its constituents. This means that, along the complexity perspec-
tive, a linear progress from entity to aggregate is no longer sufficient, but one often
has also has to follow the reflection from aggregate form to the individual elements.
With this, the game of composition and decomposition is bounded by the scales
where the patterns are formed (emergence) to those levels where their interferences
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no longer exert any influence, but which may nonetheless span multiple layers of
aggregation.
According to Ulanowicz, the ‘gap of uncertainty’ between individual entities and
their collective behaviour can also be seen in mathematics, when one encounters a
‘reversal of directions’ (of gradients). In this case, it can take an extreme value (run
into boundary states) or undergo a ‘catastrophic discontinuity’ , which takes the
shape of
either a discontinuous jump, or a pathological singularity, either of which serves as a barrier
that degrades prediction and controls from the other side.29
Ulanowicz calls this transition an organic fold.
Although the ‘sum is more than the parts’ effect is widely recognised by now in
many areas, the opposite effect ‘the parts are affected by the sum’ is still, I think,
undervalued. Although this is not the place to delve into these issues, I think many
open questions on evolutionary drift, and especially the statistical improbability of
increasing complexity of organic forms will eventually, at least in part, find an an-
swer in this reversal.30
For the purposes here, the above, extremely condensed summary of the concept
of network is a preparation for the highly dynamic types of interaction networks.
In these networks, nodes can be more or less autonomous and engage in interac-
tions with other nodes in a more temporal fashion. The connections between nodes
are moments or events, which means that the network is continuously at risk of
falling apart. At any given moment, a network must produce sufficient events of
maintaining a sparse network structure, at least if it is a robust network. Note that
the nodes have to generate these events in order to create a robust network, but a
robust network also is proof that the nodes manage to achieve this.
4.1 Divide et Impera
As legend has it, this term was first phrased by Phillippus II of Macedonia (382
BC -336 BC), who used these tactics in his wars against the Greek city-states. How-
ever, Julius Caesar perfected the strategy of causing division amongst one’s enemies
(physically or politically) and so, many generally attribute the phrase to him.
In problem solving approaches, ‘Divide and Conquer’ has become an established
pattern and consists of many different algorithms or strategies that aim to divide
a problem over a number of dedicated problem solvers and tackling it as a team.
Strictly speaking, this form of ‘divide and conquer’ is different to Caesar’s, as it
is more closely associated with organising a taskforce, instead of creating havoc
amongst one’s enemies, but there are many reasons to believe that Caesar was very
proficient with this form as well. For the purposes here, this strategy combines the
pattern of convergence inducing process with that of networks.
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In engineering, this concept has been used for many decades and stands at the
heart of the successes of the Industrial Age. Modern day contraptions are so rig-
orously compartmentalised that someone usually has few problems identifying the
various specialisations. A car has wheels for rolling, a steering wheel for steering,
brakes for braking, a motor for power, and fuel as a power supply. These main func-
tions are split up in gearboxes, combustion compartments, spark plugs, venturis...,
all dedicated to fulfil a specific purpose in the grand design of the car. And they
themselves are assemblies of even smaller dedicated parts, and so on, and so on,
until the self-similarity of ‘divide and conquer’ ends at the boundaries of raw metal
and composites.
Despite the magnificent achievements of this compartmentalisation in the techno-
sciences, the systems that were being created and investigated, all lacked one quality
that most biological organisms have in abundance: dynamics in the relationships.
For all the grinding, churning, exploding and turning, the entities of most classic
systems have fairly static connections with the others. The fuel tank is connected to
the motor through fuel hoses and a fuel pump; the motor connects to differentials,
bars and stabilisers and no matter how fast the car pulls up, or whatever the PKs of
the engine, the relationships are fixed unless the car breaks down. This is entirely
different in many organisms, but also social structures, where entities engage in re-
lationships that can change in time and can even end at some point without affecting
the system’s overall behaviour.
Daily life gives ample examples of this kind of dynamics. We meet people daily,
they become colleagues, friends or partners. They introduce us to parents, sisters
and brothers, who become part of our own family. We may have children who make
friends at school and we invite their parents over for coffee or tea. Sometimes we
also divorce, fight, argue and never see those who were once close to us again.
Such dynamics (in technical systems, at least) were hardly studied, partially be-
cause the equipment needed to model these interactions only came available with the
advent of the computer. Of course, dynamics is a matter of perspective; geologists
do see dynamics in the movement of tectonic plates that go unnoticed for most other
observers. In software engineering however, the more extreme forms of dynamics
really only were studied in their own right as Pnuelian Reactive Systems, after the
Israeli scientist Alexander Pnueli who first investigated such systems (Wooldridge
2000). Nowadays the spin-offs of these systems are better known as agent systems,
where agents are the descendants of the aforementioned ‘entities’, but have also
been equipped with a certain autonomy to decide with which other agents they want
to interact. As Alexander Pnueli puts it:
. . . each individual module in a concurrent system is a reactive subsystem, interacting with
its own environment which consist of the other modules
This short sentence already reveals a wealth of specific traits of an agent system:
1. Concurrency; agents work simultaneously. Therefore an agent system consists of
a number of processes (agents) running in parallel (in time).
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2. An agent is a reactive subsystem. Its behaviour is no longer described solely by
its response to an input signal, but can also have a life-cycle, or internal states
that determine its behaviour. An agent has certain autonomy.
3. The environment is no longer set apart from the system, but from the individual
agents. This means that the environment can partially determine or influence the
relationships and therefore becomes part of the network.
Note that the latter aspect of an agent makes it very comparable to a convergence
inducing process, although the cycle of testing and evaluating in the case of the
agent becomes more complex. Whereas a problem solver exists to ‘make sense’ of
its environment, for instance in order to fulfil a certain goal, an agent can do much
more with this information, such as communicating the results to others, mapping it
to higher-order goals and, very importantly, using it to ensure its autonomy.31
The (partial) autonomy of agents also has consequences for their importance as
‘actor’, or its ‘behaviour’. The autonomy of agents introduces a more subtle form
of interaction that transcends such terms. Both ‘behaviour’ and ‘acting’ breathes
activity in the sense of consuming energy. An autonomous agent however can also
initiate change by its presentation, by its ‘being there’ [136]. Every agent sends
signals through posture, expression or even by simply being at a certain place; the
seat at a banquet, a pedestal or a stage. In living organisms, the information stored
in a gene is expressed in the environment, both through the actions of an organism,
and by its shape, colours and so on. This is generally referred to as the phenotype,
the observable characteristics of an organism.
For this reason, the more general term of manifestation will be used. An agent
can manifest itself to its environment in all kinds of ways, including its behaviour,
acts or presentation. Note that this draws attention to a previous discussion between
‘entity’ and ‘tag’. Although a tag may not influence a system’s internal state, it often
does allow interaction with other systems.
There is an interesting correlation between the autonomy of an agent and the
characteristic of it being a reactive subsystem. Autonomy presupposes a certain clo-
sure of the agent with respect to its environment. A part of the agent’s manifestation
cannot be purely described from its relationships with its environment, but has to
take in account qualities of the ‘self’ of the agent. These qualities mainly refer to
its internal states. Even though its manifestation, its skin, form or shape, may help
in identifying the boundary between the ‘self’ and the environment, it is not really
what makes the agent autonomous. A droplet of oil floating on the surface of water
is visibly distinctly closed from its environment, just as a pebble on the roadside or
a leaf floating through the air. Yet these can hardly be considered agents, as they
miss reactivity. Their motions are determined by their environment alone, and even
though their manifestations may influence their environment, they are not initiated
or controlled by them. These are passive entities.
An agent, on the other hand, is a reactive system, and its autonomy can be ob-
served by its (re-)activity. The autonomy is based on the closure of its internal pro-
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cesses, and not by its boundaries. These processes flow through the boundaries into
the environment of the agent and are reflected. The agent is autonomous because it
has one or more internal feedback cycles that allows it to react to stimuli from its
environment. Autonomy is the result of a closure of a process, not of a manifesta-
tion. Autonomy can present itself through manifestation, but the (closed) process or
processes contained in the agent cause it to be autonomous, just like the ‘gliders’ in
Conway’s Game of Life were the result of the rules and not of the checkers.
The process circles around the various manifestations of an agent like an aura,
sometimes clearly visible, such as when they include tags, sometimes contained
within the visible boundaries of the manifestations, but just as often floating around
the manifestations and opaque. Take for instance the evolution of a biological or-
ganism. We define the ‘being’ of an organism by its observable properties, skin,
shape and form. When we look at its evolutionary properties however, we see genes,
phenotypic manifestations of chemical reactions that interact with and shape their
local environment. The selection through the environment of successful mutations
of genes, close the process and provides the minimal requirement for autonomy.
This aspect of autonomy, as a correlate of a closed process through the environ-
ment, is a radical breach with many views of autonomy being correlated with an
entity. We can observe the autonomy of an agent only through its interactions with
its environment. If the agent is fully closed, it no longer belongs to its environment
and is comparable to a free-floating bubble without meaning for the system that is
observed.
In this respect, a distinction is often made between closed and open systems.32
I would personally not be tempted to use this distinction because it tends to draw
attention to the boundaries of a system instead of focusing on the processes. An
open system may be fully described by closed processes, that is, processes that
do not interact with the environment even though they are projected and reflected
through it. Besides this, most systems at best approximate a closed system, as a
fully closed system is often, at best, a theoretical construct. A radio is systemically
as far removed from a biological organism as any machine, and yet a radio is very
open, picking up airwaves, transforming them and blasting the result back into its
environment.
4.2 Adaptation and Adaptability
Adaptive behaviour is a very fundamental characteristic of an agent that has to do
something useful in its environment. Adaptiveness implies an ability to change, to
overcome the challenges imposed by the environment. This applies not only at the
level of individual agents, but also at the level of the network itself.33
It does not really matter why or how agents or network adapt, as long as there is a
certain degree of freedom to allow this. In this specific context, a degree of freedom
means having the ability to adapt which is related to both, qualities intrinsic to the
167
agent, as well as the possibilities and constraints imposed on it. Besides this, the
adaptability has to be related to the goals that the agent has in that environment. If
the adaptability of the agent is unrelated to the goals, then it is evidently incapable
of goal-directed behaviour.
The coherence of a system relates to the stability of a system. Cities are bustling
with activities of their agents. Buyers, sellers, workers, visitors, come and go, yet
the city remains a city, as if it is hardly affected by all that liveliness. For some this
is a central characteristic of complex adaptive systems, coherence under change.34
Individual people are, from the perspective of a city being a city, largely redun-
dant. However, when they are all gone, or a certain critical lower limit is reached,
the city becomes silent, dead. Ironically enough, in a way the same happens when
there are too many agents. Traffic jams, queues and waiting cause stagnation and
immobility. Again there is an optimum between too much and too little, the bound-
ary states in which the system is vibrant and full of energy. Weinberg’s pattern of
organised complexity seems to pop up here.35
There is a subtle difference between adaptation and an agent being adapted to its
environment. ‘Being adapted’ means that an agent, such as a biological organism,
does not disintegrate. It is conserved, or in other words, its condition of adaptation
is an invariant. Being adapted is therefore a conservative property of an agent, while
adaptation is a progressive one; it is a process of (continuous) change. Note that
progression is not used here in the context of improvement.36
A system that is coherent under change therefore, is the ‘proof of being adapted’.
The system may change continuously and yet remain the same system. The hu-
man body replaces most of its cells ever so often and yet we remain who we are.37
If the human body is considered a network of cells, then at any moment the net-
work is breached because nodes (cells) are removed and replaced. However, due to
the redundancy of connections and nodes, the network as a whole remains intact.
Therefore the robustness of a network is related to its coherence. The system can be
severed, impaired, damaged or it may decay; but as long as the network is able to
maintain the essential nodes and connections between them, and preferably repair
them, the aggregate form will not be affected in its manifestations.
4.3 Concurrent Problem Solving
The convergence inducing process described previously consisted of one solitary
agent that scourged the problem domain, trying to rank the data it ‘grazed’ upon.
Most forms of global search studied nowadays consist of multiple processes, which
divide the problem domain into specific areas and process it in collaboration, ac-
cording to a divide-and-conquer strategy.
However evident the advantages may be, it does have some consequences, espe-
cially if the problem solving agents have to learn this collaborative behaviour. For
one, it is hardly beneficial if the agents are all scourging the entire problem domain.
The best solution may be found quicker as more agents are involved in the problem
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solving effort, but the energy it takes is still at best similar to that of one agent taking
things a bit slower.iii If the agents do not have some strategy to divide the problem
domain in portions that can be assigned to individual agents, the effectiveness of
problem solving will even become worse as the agents will test areas that have al-
ready been tested by others. From the viewpoint of problem solving, it demonstrates
that teamwork is not an advantage by definition.
Even if the individual problem-solving agents manage to communicate some
kind of divide and conquer strategy, the sum may at best still be the whole of the
parts. Ten agents splitting up the problem domain in ten sections will indeed man-
age to speed up the process tenfold, but the total energy at best is still equal to one
agent taking ten times as long to perform the same task. Practically, the effort of
the team is still worse, for some energy will have to be spent in dividing the prob-
lem domain (preparation), and communicating the findings amongst each other. As
communicating preliminary results amongst each other is at worst np-hard, there is
a viable chance that the energy spent in communication will quickly take up most of
the energy of the system. In human organisations, this aspect is easily identified by
the quick increase of bureaucracy as the organisation grows. If this goes unchecked,
you end up with the well-known organisations where one spends more time in meet-
ings and filling out paper work, than getting the job done.
As with organisations, the np-hard character of mutual communications can be
countered by establishing agents specialised in dispatching the information, in other
words, making them hubs in the network. This way, every participant in the network
only has to communicate with one, or a fairly limited amount of other agents, which
prevents the combinatorial explosion of the relationships. This can be done by es-
tablishing hierarchies in the network, which incidentally do not necessarily have to
be divided along the lines of the power structure.iv In technical systems, the hierar-
chy is often established along the lines of specialisation, especially in the means of
dispatching and monitoring of information through the system.
Specialisation however, does not necessarily make the problem solving process
more efficient, for instance energy-wise, and if the specialised dispatchers only serve
as distributors of information to all other participants in the network, the combina-
torial explosion will not have been resolved. At best, the workload is concentrated
iii The term ‘energy’ is used in a more abstract way than it is used in every day terms, and can be
considered the cost involved in performing a certain activity. For instance, computer algorithms
take up an amount of computing time of the central processor, while biological agents need carbon
hydrates and vitamins to do what they have to do. Whatever the definition in a particular setting,
in the end this abstract notion of energy always has a one-to-one relationship with the way we
commonly use it. CPU time, for instance, is related to electrical power consumption, while food
relates to Joules or calories. In systems theory, this abstraction is comparable to the mathematical
notion of an energy function, which is related to an externally observed change in the state of a
system.
iv In most organisations, it is a well-known fact that janitors, secretaries, guards and the reception
desk are often very powerful hubs in an organisation.
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around the dispatcher agents.
Note that passing information is usually fairly cheap. Sounds, signs, and signals
are created and processed by highly optimised and efficient organs. The process-
ing of information is mainly done by a centralised organ (the brain) that is multi-
purpose, so it can also be used for other tasks as well. This partially compensates
the additional effort required to maintain the effectiveness of the team.
Concluding, teaming up is still not a proven success over ‘DIY’-ing through the
problem domain. Apparently there are some issues to be resolved before teamwork
can become an advantage. However, it can be beneficial in order to tackle problems
that are too large for an individual to handle. If, for instance, an individual agent can-
not cover an entire problem domain, but a collective can, then team effort becomes
a viable option.
5 Friction Space
In an agent network, autonomous entities in their most elementary form perform a
continuous feedback loop of observation, modelling and acting. In a network, act-
ing quickly becomes (or includes) inter-acting, that is, some actions affect the other
agents in the network and vice versa. With this, feedback ‘flows through’ the vari-
ous agents that span the network, and becomes a determinant for the coherence of
the network. If a group of agents interact in moments or events, then there is a con-
tinuous uncertainty present in the network. The observer of these interactions is in
continuous doubt if the agent is (still) part of that network or not. Some agents may
fill the same space as other agents in the network without interacting at all, others
may spawn an event very rarely except at very crucial moments, while others may
be continuously engaged in relatively unimportant tasks, but manage to keep the
network together just the same. The observer of such a network may derive certain
goals that drive the network as a whole, but which are not present at the level of the
individual agents (for instance the robustness of the network).
It may be clear that this highly indeterminate situation reflects what was called a
friction space earlier. In this highly dynamic, volatile, fragmentary and provisional,
and yet orderly space, a certain frame of reference needs to be established. Does one
depart from the order and then keep a close eye on the uncertainty in the complex
brew, or is it better to depart from the uncertainty and point out the moments of
order that rise above the undetermined?
Henri Atlan in his discussion on mysticism and rationality, returns to the ancient
Greek myths and opposes Themis, daughter of the Earth, to Metis, daughter of the
Ocean:
Themis represents ‘the aspects of stability, continuity and regularity in the world of the
gods: the permanence of order, the cyclical return of the seasons,...the fixity of destiny’.
On the side of Metis there are mobility and flux, obscurity, contradiction, uncertainty, but
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also that that what makes it possible to triumph over them —cunning or the intelligence
that ‘operates in the realm of what is shifting and unexpected in order the better to reverse
situations’ . At the same time ‘a power of the waters, fluid and polymorphic, who promotes
fertility and nurtures growth’.38
Atlan, reading the interpretation of Detienne and Vernant, sees in Metis the
‘crafty wisdom’ of the Greeks, a ‘cunning reason’ that has both sly and devious,
as well as being creative.
As the concept of ‘friction space’ has been put in a highly dynamic, momentary
and fluid setting, the choice becomes whether to relate this concept to Themis, or
should one opt for Metis instead? This is not an innocent statement, for Themis
represents the mythical source of Western rationality:
What we have to deal with here, in this ‘proper logic of myths’ or ‘rationalized cosmologies’
is not separatory, classifying and ordering reason, the ideal of ‘pure reason’ of Western
science and philosophy.39
This is the world of symbols with crisp meanings, of experiments that can be re-
peated and which yield the same results. The children of the Earth can look outside
through their windows in the evening and see landscapes that are still there when
they wake up the next morning. If they wake up and find the landscape has changed,
this will lead to disorientation and confusion.
For the children of the waters, things are continuously changing and yet many
things stay the same. It would seem to me that this is the most correct way to look
at the concept of ‘friction space’. In fact, it would be the most correct way to look at
‘complexity’ in general! If the sea and the ocean are sources of the vocabulary that
is being built here, and which naturally includes concepts such as ‘craft’ and ‘pat-
tern’, then we may conclude that complexity feeds off an entirely different mythical
source than science and philosophy. The crafts will, just as was done with the ex-
perimental method, have to assist the children of Themis yet again!
Studying complexity —real complexity—, as Atlan argues, will require crafti-
ness, a fluidity in thought and observation. Complexity means stepping into the
water and learning to swim. Maybe this captures the struggle in the first decades of
the Twentieth century when quantum physics was being formed; maybe the wave-
particle dualism captured a point in time when Metis and Themis worked together
in an almost literal way.40
It is not (only) a metaphorical game that I am, and have been playing, for there is
a deeply practical consequence in choosing to see complexity from the shores, or in-
stead living it from the waters, and this has to do with the framing of subject matter.
As theories, frameworks and PAC are all production systems, and therefore depen-
dent on initial premises, it makes a big difference whether the production departs
from order, or indeterminacy instead. PAC follows a process-orientation that aims
to address uncertainty, ambiguity and indeterminacy, from the premises of these
concepts.
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As a result, a vocabulary is being developed where the words, phrases and pat-
terns are loosely laid down in a network of relationships that was called ‘context’.
At every place possible, I have tried to keep them loosely connected, not to tie
them together rigidly, instead to allow the fluidity between them to remain. As am-
biguity has been positioned in the moment of ranking, that is, the moment when
symbols are made, and I aim to do justice to its role in research of complexity, the
frame of reference of Themis is no longer adequate. At least, this is how I read and
understand Atlan and Morin, and how I understand my own experience with com-
plexity.
How then do the graphs and terms of PAC relate to crisp definitions, and de-
tailed concepts, that can be carefully scrutinized in the way a scientist or philoso-
pher would prefer to see them?
When departing from Themis, that is, from the stable and fixed shoreline, one
will, mostly implicitly, depart from order. Words will be chosen carefully; their cor-
responding concepts will be looked at from all angles, and will be carefully posi-
tioned in theory and argumentation. Then, to their surprise, the unexpected turn will
bring the unwelcome guest of ambiguity, the disorderly or the undetermined. It is
the weed that one aims to keep out of the garden. The only way that one can work
with this unwelcome guest is to give it its own symbol and allow it grudgingly to
have its own place in discourse and theory. But by capturing the undetermined this
way, the fluid, undetermined nature of Metis is constrained. Ambiguity has become
a category, a theme, a symbol, made to fit in order.
What I propose here is something different.‘Context’, ‘mental landscape’, ‘model’
and ‘friction space’ are to be seen as waves on the water’s surface. Some move
calmly and allow anticipation, while others may emerge at an instant, tower over-
head and disappear before the observer can respond. From this perspective, concepts
can be likened to the tops and troughs of such waves, and assist in our orientation
of observing something that is more complex, more fluid than we can handle. With
this, we may get a window on what happens when we observe something that is
complex. The choppy surface contextualises in our mental modelling environment,
and the most distinct features are projected in the models. As observation has be-
come a form of feedback, the distinctive features are reinforced, thereby reducing
the other features of the total landscape, and with it its complexity. For those with a
predisposition for order, the eventual model may provide a wonderfully elegant and
simple model with a few clear features, while others may wonder where the sea has
gone.
For those who take an interest in complexity, the sea has to remain in the model.
Therefore, a model of autonomous, eventful agents that form a robust network will
not be clearly and crisply defined. Agents are scattered around, interacting or not,
moving away and coming back, decaying, being removed, replaced, emerging, and
being formed. In this kind of setting, a water metaphor is more correct than one that
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aims for definitions, symbols and stable states. From this perspective, order is a mo-
ment of coherence, a valuable moment, as at that point the network is maintained.
This ‘Metis prerequisite’ makes the issue of coherence a bit less enigmatic. From
a point of reference of extreme fluidity, any act of organisation, however momen-
tary or provisional it may be, already contributes to observed coherence. Coherence
becomes enigmatic when order is assumed (like the example of the city), and am-
biguity is seen as a disruptive element in this order. Order, in this sense, is delayed
disorder!41
6 So What’s The Point of All This?
As the patterns are getting more diverse and complicated, some may wonder why
this pattern library is being developed in the first place. As a preliminary answer
to this question, it may be good to loosely connect a few topics discussed so far in
order to get an idea where all of this is heading.
If one can accept that a lot of cognitive activities consist of modelling complex
targets, and that the idea of these modelling activities is to capture certain character-
istics of that target so that the model is a collection of certain isomorphisms with that
target, then these models can always be described as a network that consists of con-
cepts. Every concept aims to address one ‘little truth of matching’ of the conceptual
patterns that the target provides, and thus the complete model takes up the form of
a conceptual network.42 As every concept can be observed, they are subject to bias
and amplification, which can potentially skew and distort the model with respect
to that aspect of the target it corresponds with. Besides this, there is an aspect of
uncertainty between target and model. It has also become clear that every concep-
tual network will have an innate ambiguity between the concepts, which partially
reflects the uncertainty between target and modeller, but is also associated with the
inherent ambiguity within a complex target itself. In this case, the ambiguity corre-
sponds with aspects of that target. In the previous section on networks, a conceptual
network has been made subject to coherence and robustness; that is, if the model
describes a target, then unexpected or undesired conceptual patterns from the target
should not make the model unreliable, or fragile. If the target does complex things,
and the model can account for this, or does not fail to fulfill its claims, then it can
be considered robust.
A fragile theory can be likened to a sea defence that works fine, provided there is
no tidal movement, there are no storms, and nobody damages it. A robust theory, or
framework, on the other hand, can absorb many of these influences, and still prove
its point. This is an ‘engineer’s perspective’ on theories, that they should account for
contingencies, disruptions, uncertainty and all those other things that practicality
tends to ‘communicate’ back to our intellectual endeavours. This is why ‘details’
have been replaced with ‘uncertainty’.
Suppose now that a theory or framework is itself a conceptual network. Then all
the work carried out so far, is basically aimed at describing the process of developing
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these theories and frameworks. The methodology of PAC is describing the activi-
ties of developing such a methodology! With this, concepts such as ‘robustness’,
‘fragility’, ‘coherence’, ‘bias’ and ‘amplifications’ become means of assessing the
views, mind-sets, ideas, theories and so on of the various stakeholders of a target.
Instead of wondering whose right or whose wrong, PAC is developing an entirely
different vocabulary that uses concepts like the ones mentioned earlier.
7 Wrapping Up
This section has introduced three patterns; the patterns of difference, convergence
inducing process, and networks.
As multiple agents can connect and interact with each other through the environ-
ment, it becomes clear that the totality of (dynamic) interactions can never be within
the grasp of the individual agents. All the agents would have to internally model the
internal models of all the other agents —themselves included—, the temporal states
of these models, and all the qualities of the agents, like their positions, relationships,
interactions, forms, shapes, etc, in order to fully describe the situation they are in.
They will also have to model themselves and their internal models as being part of
that environment, which runs a risk of infinite regression. As, by definition, a model
that includes its environment and all kinds of interactions is more complex than the
model itself, there are only very few, relatively simple situations where the model
might grasp itself as being in its environment, such as when the interactions are
limited (analysis) or very similar (statistics). In these cases, the interaction patterns
can be mapped in the models. For most agents however, this ideal is fundamentally
impossible. The environment of the agent is complex beyond the agent’s abilities,
no matter how intelligent the agent becomes! Therefore an agent will usually have
to deal with uncertainty, and its actions will always introduce risk, changes and con-
tingencies.
The convergence inducing process also demonstrated that this uncertainty can
be ‘embraced’ through feedback, which may reduce the uncertainty. But the un-
certainty also allows unexpectedness, exploration and novelty. Risk and novelty,
creation and destruction, success and failure go hand in hand.
It has been argued that a convergence inducing process demonstrates the effects
of bias and focus in a process of contextualisation, in a rudimentary manner. If this
process is seen as an abstraction of observation, it also traces the source of values
into this process. In other words, there is no crisp distinction between ‘facts’ and
‘values’, for observation is already impregnated with values; ranking patterns are
needed to make observation possible. Within the vocabulary of PAC, a ‘fact’ can
only be established in a context that allows a conceptual pattern to be matched.

Chapter 6
Environments and Evolution
A ‘shock-doc’ on the Washington snipers who killed ten people in 2002 revealed
that science can learn from police investigators. As the first shootings occurred in
a concentrated area in Montgomery County in Maryland, it took some time to con-
nect reports from other areas with the serial killings. However, a certain openness
to include incoming reports from Virginia prevented the investigating officers from
making the wrong assumption that the cases were unrelated due to the differences
in location. This appears to be a striking example of a one-liner one often hears in
TV-shows on a theory in crime scene investigations: ”just follow the bodies”.
The previous topic on problem-solving concentrates around processes that ‘move
through’ an entity (agent) and its environment. However, the agent has been the focal
point so far.
This section explores the environment, and especially the fact that this environ-
ment often changes with the agent. In other words, the agent and the environment
co-evolve. Instead of overemphasising the difference between system (or agent) and
environment, it may be better to ‘follow the process’ and see how patterns of change
percolate through the model. This stance may already get rid of many, what I tend
to call ‘superman-questions’ (is it a bird? Is it a plane? No..., it’s superman!). Many
discussions in academia seem to revolve around such questions: is it genotype or
is it phenotype? Is it system or is it environment? Is it culture or is it nature? Is
it ontology or is it epistemology? In the pattern-oriented approach to complexity,
one may often find that it is more convenient to see all of these as manifestations
of a process, and it may sometimes be better to ‘follow the flow’ between such di-
chotomies. There are many examples in everyday life where the ‘ripples of change’
move far beyond an agent’s immediate surroundings, as the family, friends and rel-
atives of the victims of the Washington snipers can testify. These ripples of change
not only cause interactions between formerly unrelated agents, but can also propa-
gate through time and history.1
Philosopher of science John Dupre´ has proposed a ‘two-way flow of causal in-
fluence’ when trying to understand (the origins of) living organisms:
[. . . ] these entities must be understood not only as inheriting causal powers from their struc-
tural components, but also as recipients of causal influence from the larger entities of which
they are part.2
In biology there has been a strong tendency to explain living organisms or the be-
haviour of animals or human beings from a ‘gene’s-eye view’. The consequent the-
ories can be considered as following an ‘outward’ causality, and move from entities
to aggregates of these entities. In that sense, the ‘gene’s-eye view’ aligns with the
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complexity perspective that is followed with the approach taken here. This perspec-
tive has been the locus of most heated discourses on the limitations of reductionism
in science. There are strong supporters and critics of the idea that a human being ‘is
the sum of the genes’, so to speak.
Of late, more and more biologists are becoming aware of other interferences in
this causal flow, and are willing to grant certain agency not only the environment,
but also the aggregate form in which genes take a less central place. Some of these
contributions, like PAC, tend towards a process-orientation.3
This is not a trivial development, for the moment the gene ‘took up form’ as a
double helix, it also focused the attention of scientific observers; we humans are vi-
sual creatures, and the moment process creates or reveals a tag, it becomes difficult
to see the tag ‘in perspective’ of the processes that flow around, and through it.
This chapter will start by ‘following the flow’ from genes towards the various en-
vironments in which they come to expression. This path is predominantly explained
in the vocabulary of the ‘selfish gene’ metaphor, because it has been a dominant
(and also powerful) descriptive vocabulary in the past.
However, more differentiated views within biology are showing the expressive
boundaries of this metaphor, and it has also met severe criticism from other scien-
tific domains, such as the social sciences.
The more or less ‘classic’ evolutionary narrative is interesting, because a lot of
these discourses are at the heart of current developments in genomics. With PAC, a
number of implicit assumptions from different sides may be unveiled, and a more
inclusive perspective may be developed.
As this more inclusive approach grants the ‘environment’ certain agency, it may
be worthwhile to first sketch some of its characteristics along the perspectives that
were introduced earlier.
1 Some Characteristics of Our Universe
1.1 Historical Perspective
Our Universe is estimated to be about 13 billion years old. According to our current
knowledge, the dawn of our existence started with a singularity, an infinitesimal, but
tremendously heavy ‘something’i that already contained the Universe’s current mass
and energy, packed together with a density that goes beyond human imagination,
save perhaps those of astronomers and physicists.4
i Strictly speaking, a singularity is not something that can be described with what we can compre-
hend. Only from the moment immediately after the Big Bang, our universe can be described with
physical laws, and currently the first fractions of fractions of seconds are still a mystery.
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At the moment of birth of the Universe, this singularity exploded, which is fondly
call the ‘Big Bang’. Ever since, our Universe has been expanding. It is not known
what lies beyond the boundaries of our Universe, but this expansion is not likely to
stop or reverse.5
This expansion causes the overall temperature of the Universe to cool down.
Coarsely stated, temperature is, amongst others, correlated to friction between par-
ticles, so that if there are fewer particles in a body of volume, there is less friction,
and therefore that body of volume is ‘cooler’ than when there are more particles.ii
As the universe expands, its entropy increases.6
Mass and energy in our Universe are subject to conservation laws, which basi-
cally state that they cannot be formed ‘by magic’, but have to be harvested from
somewhere else. Besides this, one can never harvest more mass and energy than
is available in the volume it is extracted from. This means that in an expanding
universe, it becomes increasingly hard to extract mass and energy from a given vol-
ume as time goes by. Besides this, a 100 percent conversion will never be met, as
it costs energy to harvest mass and energy. Some energy therefore is wasted during
the process, usually in the form of heat. As mass and energy are mutually related,
the conservation laws apply to the total of mass and energy of matter that an entity
contains.7
In the more formal dialects of the system theories, energy is related to observable
change. If something in the universe changes, it may have an impact on its surround-
ings. If an observer senses this impact, then this perceived change can be considered
an energy function. A flow of water for instance, can be observed by collecting the
water in a bucket. The flow will become visible in the increasing water level in the
bucket. This change in height thus becomes an energy function.
In order for energy to be effectuated, the entity that observes this change also
needs to be able to act on this change. In simple particles there is usually a causal
relationship between energy and action —the energy flows from one entity to the
other— and the consequent interactions are usually described in the mathematical
vocabulary of physics. For the purposes here, the concept of energy is interesting
because it acts as a window to observe change caused by an underlying process. En-
ergy is therefore not necessarily something in itself, but is often more closely related
to the concept of a tag rather than a flow.
Currently, the total number of simple particles in our Universe are estimated to
be somewhere between 1072 and 1087.8 Some of these particles contain mass; some
can interact with others. These interactions are predominantly relatively simple, and
boil down to two forms: attraction or withdrawal.
The effect of interacting particles have caused clustering of mass and energy in
the Universe, pockets where mass and energy are concentrated, while other regions
ii Provided the amount of ‘energy’ the particles contain are relatively equal. We will return to
‘energy’ later. It should be emphasised again, that ‘friction’ is used in a more casual way here than
the way it is usually used in physics
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are almost fully void. The void actually takes up the largest part of our current Uni-
verse, and its state is called one of vacuum, a body of volume that approximates an
(observed) absence of particles.
Attraction between particles can have one of three outcomes. A collision can
alter the characteristics of the particles which then either take their separate paths
(usually high energy collisions), or become one new entity (usually low energy col-
lisions). A collision between mass-bearing particles therefore can result in a new
mass-bearing entity that contains the combined masses of the particles that collided.
In other words, the aggregate, or composite entity, has become heavier. Some char-
acteristics of the original entities may not return in the aggregate. For instance two
electrically charged particles with opposite charge will form a neutrally charged
aggregate, but can also result in a dipole, such as water molecules, that maintain
opposite charges locally. A dipole therefore can be considered a form of simple
emergence. A dipole approximates a neutral charge at large distances, but is binary
at small scales.
A collision can also cause other, novel, effects, such as the formation of new
particles that leave the aggregate. For instance, many high-energy collisions between
particles create quantum particles that leave the aggregate in the form of radiation.9
The third pattern of interaction is one where the entities form a stable relation-
ship that allows them to be observed as an aggregate without losing their individual
characteristics. Our ‘solar system’ for instance, consists of a star we call the sun
that contains the majority of mass and energy of the system. However, the solar
system also contains other mass bodies, such as planets, cosmic belts, comets and
planetesimals that have their own characteristics. Such aggregates are the result of a
balancing out of attraction and withdrawal. Our universe allows many such ‘stable
states’, groupings where entities can form aggregates without losing their individual
traits. The isomorphism of interaction patterns that balance out attraction and with-
drawal, spans a range from quantum level up to galaxies and beyond. It also includes
biological organisms, human individuals and societies of human individuals.
From a pattern-oriented perspective, the evolution of the universe can be seen
as a production system of forms, shapes and processes, which are built up from
smaller forms and shapes. This is not a linear process, as chance characteristics of
the shapes that are formed, determine with which other shapes they can form stable
aggregates. Besides this, the repertoire of possible interactions may hit (temporary)
boundaries, until certain events break open the stalemate. For instance, it is known
that the chemical elements of the periodic table have been formed through the lifecy-
cles of stars. First stars were formed from amassing hydrogen, which formed helium
when the stars died. Helium was then dispersed, and taken up by other stars. When
these stars died, heavier elements were formed and dispersed, until eventually the
entire periodic table was created. Uranium seems to be an upper bound to this pro-
cess, as heavier elements cannot be formed or are not stable enough to maintain
themselves under normal circumstances. Such elements can therefore only exist in
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laboratories.10
A very special chemical element is carbon, which is one of the most flexible
elements in the periodic table. It is able to create a great deal of different aggregate
forms, from something as loose as graphite to the hardest natural material on earth,
the diamond. In combination with other elements, its versatility becomes even more
remarkable. Organic life on earth is predominantly based on carbon-based chemicals
and water. This explosion of forms and shapes was only possible after the Universe
was old enough to contain the elements necessary to enable life.
Note that the production of novel forms —which in terms of complexity might
be considered a straightforward form of emergence— ‘folds back’ to the simpler
forms. The introduction of one new form or shape amplifies the potential diversity
of new aggregate forms, as the new form can potentially bind with many forms that
are already existent.
1.2 Scarcity
Conservation Laws provide one of the most elementary reasons why a natural en-
vironment has certain agency. If an agent requires and claims a resource, then this
resource is usually no longer available for other agents. This means that any en-
vironment in our universe has a potential for limited resources. Resources such as
food, energy, and material for building and maintenance, are not infinitely available.
Scarcity therefore stands at the heart of two very influential and heavily debated
concepts in (evolutionary) biology, namely selfishness and competition. Selfishness
follows from the need to claim resources, regardless of the consequences for others
who might also need these resources, while competition immediately derives from
this, as an agent must be first in line in order to successfully claim scarce resources.
These concepts are inevitably amplified when adaptive agents are also capable of
reproducing, as the demand for these limited resources increases, usually in an ex-
ponential fashion.
It is therefore understandable that these concepts were very appealing for the vo-
cabulary of (evolutionary) biology, but as we will see later, they also introduced a
severe bias in biological theory, that necessitated the question if the resulting theo-
ries still captured the isomorphisms of the themes they were addressing.
Scarcity has a characteristic that is often overlooked; it can forge relationships
that do not exist when there is no scarcity. For instance, it is becoming clearer that
the increasing interest in bio-fuel may have an enormous impact on food security
and certain ecologies.11
This aspect of scarcity can also easily be recognised in the growth of human
population. As long as (human) populations were sufficiently small so that small
bands of our ancestors could settle in new terrains and live of their own produce,
the interactions between the different groups were limited. As populations grew, the
necessary expansion of the territories caused increasing pressure between groups,
changing and increasing the patterns of interactions between them. Due to the com-
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binatorial effects of these interactions (i.e. dynamic relationships), they tend to grow
much faster than the amount of entities engaging in these interactions, with the result
that scarcity can quickly accumulate complexity between these entities.
Note that since our world has become globalised and the population has increased
exponentially from five hundred million in the 1500’s to well over six billion today,
the number of interactions have exploded due to the np-hard relationships of these
interactions in finite space. This contributes to the enormous complexity that can
currently be witnessed on a global scale.12
One of the consequences of this emergence of relationships and interactions, is
that causality emerges with it. In contrast to many causal interactions in physics,
causal flows can form in certain environments that are characterised (for one) by
scarcity. These forms of causality can therefore only be described in the context of
certain dynamics in the environment. So the assertion A causes B can become:
A causes B under the premise of C (D, E,...)
Take for example, an agenda. If one has a lot of appointments, then at a certain
moment time becomes scarce. The most effective way one can deal with this, is to
plan the appointments in such a way that they neatly follow each other. At this point,
these appointments become both deterministic, as well as causal influences for each
other. Maximum efficiency (order) then is achieved when every appointment neatly
follows the others; the day is now fully planned!
However, the result of this efficiency measure is, that one disruption is enough to
percolate through all the other appointments. A train is delayed, a meeting runs late,
and immediately the consequences are felt throughout the day, and also jumps over
to the other attendants, as they have made very efficient (orderly) agendas as well!
In practice, many little contingencies will amplify the delays as it percolates through
the day, and ends with many people working late in the evening, as the contingencies
are amplified and distributed over all those involved. Any project manager knows
how dangerous these effects can be, and usually they are countered by planning ad-
ditional time, for instance by adding half to every planned task, in order to put some
‘grease’ in the planning. This resulting redundancy (in time) makes the planning
more fit to handle contingencies and therefore is usually more realistic. However, as
this redundancy also costs money, sales managers usually don’t like these tricks, and
therefore most projects are sold with tight budgets and tight timelines. This leads to
highly fragile plannings, and often projects that fail to deliver what was bargained
for. The take-home message here, is that an orderly world tends to be a fragile one,
because of the combinatorial effects of scarcity.
For this reason, the environments of human societies are currently not, or no
longer invariant with respect to the societies themselves, but rather is co-evolving
with these societies. The human environment, whether it is seen from a biological or
ecological perspective, or from the perspectives of social systems, is highly reactive.
Actions from individual human beings, groups or societies, reflect back through the
networks of interactions that the environment spans. Besides this, the environment
partially shapes and forms human societies and their evolution.13
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In a previous chapter, it was argued that a resource constrained environment
has some built-in mechanisms to deal with overpopulation. A Malthusian crunch
is maybe a bit dramatic, but an effective means to deal with vastly reproducing enti-
ties. However, evolution also discovered a number of more subtle tricks. An agent’s
quest to obtain scarce resources that are also needed by others, results in a plethora
of novel interactions. The study of these interactions and their consequences is what
is generally called Evolution Theory.14
2 Evolution Theory
There are many good books on Darwin and neo-Darwinian evolution theory, and
so it is not very useful to pay extensive attention to this here. However, there are
a number of often implicit assumptions, especially in the biological dialects of this
theory, that need to be made explicit when expanding them to domains outside their
specific contexts, especially since they sometimes have far-reaching consequences
for how we look at our evolutionary past.
The scientific discipline of biology has probably been one of the most dynamic
in the past fifty to sixty years, and in many respects can be considered as having
taken over the momentum that physics had in the first half of the previous century.
It is also a domain that is interesting because approaches from the hard sciences ex-
perienced friction with the approaches more common in the social sciences. At one
extreme there is the story of genes, basically carriers of information, which can be
analysed with tools from mathematics and information theory. At the other extreme
there is the study of social bands of primates, which brings science awfully close to
our human world and, in general, human experience.
When Charles Darwin wrote the seminal book ‘On the Origins of Species’ in
1859 [48], many pieces of the puzzle of human origins were already laid out on the
table. Adam Smith had explored the economy of supply and demand, and Malthus
had just published his article on population cycles. Besides this, many biologists
and philosophers were wrestling with ideas on how humans could have been cre-
ated with the tools of science that were available at the time. Of course, in a day
and age where the dominant view was still based on Divine intervention as depicted
in the Genesis, there were increasing doubts whether the Bible should be taken
literally. There were problems concerning the time scale of the Genesis, which po-
sitioned the creation of Man about four thousand BCE, while mounting evidence
from fossils pushed this back with many millions of years. There were also logical
inconsistencies with the notion of a Creator, the most evident being ‘who created
the Creator?’.15
Darwin was amongst the first to come to the insight that a Malthusian crunch
would provide a purely natural means of selection, one where species better equipped
to exploit their environment would have better chances of surviving than species
which were less fortunate, a process he called ‘Natural Selection’. This notion,
backed by a wealth of evidence he had collected on his journey around the world on
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the ship ‘the Beagle’, and supplemented with an even larger amount of evidence he
had collected in his own back yard, formed the basis of ‘the Origins’, which became
controversial almost the minute it was published.
Natural selection became the base paradigm of what soon came to be called ‘Evo-
lution Theory’, which basically turned the origins of human beings around from a
top-down approach (through a Creator) to a bottom-up approach. Through an algo-
rithmic process, as Dennett calls it, where small changes within a species provided
the necessary variation to withstand selective pressure, and an accumulation of small
changes over time, led to different species altogether.
This theory inevitably meant that we originated from ‘proto-humans’, or pre-
human species, which would also have formed other species, our distant cousins.
It soon became clear that the most likely candidates for this family line would be
chimpanzees, gorillas and other apes, which was an appalling thought for many
Victorians of Darwin’s time and, coincidentally, a great number of contemporary
human beings as well.16
There were other problems besides this. At the time, it was not known what kind
of information would be passed from the parents to their children, a mechanism of
heredity, let alone mechanisms that would explain the changes that were needed to
create the observed variety. This information had to be very accurate in order to pass
the improvements to the next generation, but not too accurate, in order to create the
variety which was needed.
There is a subtle difference between copying and reproduction. Copying means
recreating an exact match of an original on or in another substrate, such as on paper.
Another form of re-creation occurs for instance when a chalk is split in half, or a
bunch of grapes is cut in half. The result of this fracture results in two new instances
of the original class, but which are not exact matches of their parent. Reproduc-
tion implies that the offspring of parents belong to the same class, but are not exact
matches of their parents.17
Another issue revolved around the question of how information responded to
sexual reproduction. Would traits of the parents be mixed up as in a blender, or
would it be a bit from one and a bit from the other? And why would this lead
to improvements? Would, as the famous story goes, the marriage of Einstein and
Marilyn Monroe indeed result in super kids, or instead blondes with moustaches
and large tongues?
The French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck had proposed in as early as 1809,
that maybe talents acquired during an organism’s lifetime could somehow be passed
on to the next generations; so a giraffe stretching its neck to eat leaves from a tree
may have passed this ‘trick’ on to its offspring. We know that this talent acquisition
often happens in our brains and call it learning (by imitation). Could the body proper
of an organism ‘learn’ to improve its chances and pass on the results to its offspring?
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With Darwin’s new concept of fitness, a certain responsiveness of a biological
agent to natural selection, the race was on to find the mechanisms behind evolution
theory. James Mark Baldwin was amongst the first to adapt Lamarckian evolution to
natural selection, and proposed that successful organisms of a species could ‘show’
their neighbours their good tricks, which would fan-out through the entire popula-
tion. Some others also proposed this so-called ‘Baldwin-effect’, but again it did not
tell how the good trick had entered the population in the first place.
The rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s 1865 article on his experiments with pea
plants in 1900, by Carl Correns in Germany, Hugo de Vries in the Netherlands and
Erich von Tschermak-Seysenegg in Austria, opened up ways to investigate heredity
by systematic and statistical means. Red roses that are fertilised with yellow roses
may not necessarily produce offspring with orange roses, but instead produce a cer-
tain percentage of red roses and a certain percentage with yellow flowers. But if the
offspring with yellow roses are fertilised amongst themselves, a certain percentage
of the roses of the second generation may have red flowers. Even though the per-
centages may vary on the trait, and some may blend (or appear to do so), it was
clear that heredity conformed to mathematical and statistical rules, Mendel’s Laws.
This was a clue that information about an organism’s characteristics was stored in-
ternally, the genotype, while the way this information is expressed in the organism,
the phenotype, was only indirectly involved in passing heredity to a next generation.
It was not the stretching of a giraffe’s neck that was passed on directly to its off-
spring, but instead the internal information that determined how long the neck could
become, combined with certain ‘incorrectness’ in this information that would lead
to an adjustment of these traits.
The discovery of the double helix called deoxyribonucleic acid, which is bet-
ter known by its acronym DNA, by scientists working at Cavendish Laboratory in
Cambridge, and King’s College in London in 1953, was a major advancement in
understanding the process of heredity.18 The X-ray photos from Rosalind Franklin,
and the models from James Watson and Francis Crick immediately created a strong,
captivating image that would be an icon of scientific progress in the latter half of the
previous century.
This discovery soon interpreted DNA as being the ‘database’ of our genotype, our
genes. A gene is not really a clearly identifiable part of a chromosome. In general,
a gene can be defined somewhere along the lines as being a ‘base unit of heredity’.
It is that part of a chromosome that is sufficiently stable to return through various
generations. It may be coupled to a trait of an organism, but could also be a set of
related traits that depend on each other at the level of the phenotype.
Sometimes a gene is considered a unit of information that specifies a living being,
but Maturana & Varela make a strong argumentation why this should be considered
incorrect. They argue that this confuses the
[. . . ] phenomenon of heredity with the mechanism of replication of certain cell components
(DNA) [. . . ]
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And,
[. . . ] when we say that DNA contains what is necessary to specify a living being, we divest
these components [. . . ] of their interrelation with the rest of the network.19
With the discovery of DNA, the discussion about what drives reproduction entered
a new stage. For many, reproduction had always had strong connotations with the
(female) organism, as a being gifted with the miracle of life. In the course of the
previous century, a new perspective emerged where the organism was basically a
construction of the genotype, optimised to facilitate its reproduction. This perspec-
tive was popularised and radicalised through the ”Selfish Gene” perspective, which
sketched a genotype that will ruthlessly apply any trick it can come up with to re-
produce itself, while the organism is subject to the gene’s manipulation.20
Soon, many articles appeared —more or less scientific ones, but especially in
the popular press— that reduced organisms to mindless victims of a genetic arms
race.iii As this perspective was consistent with a dominant view of competition as
the driving force of evolution, male-aggression; jealousy; sex-drive; and rape were
considered the results of a violent arena of relentless selfish genes that, at best, main-
tained a delicate truce of checks and balances.21
However, nature seems to have ample manifestations of more cooperative strate-
gies, such as sexual reproduction and symbiosis, and there are many organisms that
are willing to ‘sacrifice’ themselves for the sake of the community they are part of;
altruism.22
Although many of these strategies could be explained within the framework of
selfish genes, especially symbiosis (or mutualism) seemed to be pushing the limits
of this metaphor. As evidence increased that symbiosis stands at the base of life
and the success of higher life forms, phenotypic arguments have begun to reclaim
some ground, although usually still within the limitations of a fiercely competitive
environment.23
3 Selfishness and Natural Selection
At this point the narrative of the ‘gene’s-eye view’ is based on the premise of a
‘selfish gene’, which can come to expression through a corresponding phenotype.
The phenotype results in a certain fitness which drives natural selection. Successful
genes manage to reproduce and can therefore prolong and increase their presence in
nature.
There are quite a number of questions that can be, and have been, raised regarding
especially the consequences of this view. For the purposes here, a few issues related
to the process that evolution describes are worth giving some more attention.
iii Note that Richard Dawkins has never considered human beings as being ‘mindless victims’ of
our genes.
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3.1 Selfish Genes
In 1989, Richard Dawkins introduced the notion of ‘selfish gene’ in his, book with
the same title, which is now considered a classic read. In this book, he presented the
extremely insightful importance of genes, as units of successful, but also ‘ruthless’
design information, that were passed to offspring. This shifted the discussions in
biology from the importance of the species as the ‘unit of evolution’ to the DNA.
In the wake of the enormous success of this paradigm, both in the scientific com-
munity as well as in the popular press, there were many attempts to capture human
traits in theories that could be traced back to the manipulations of our genes. Male
aggression became a ‘natural’ expression of selections amongst our hunting forefa-
thers, while the nurturing qualities of women deemed them less suitable for certain
tasks, according to the dictate of the genes. That this eventually was severely criti-
cised from for instance sociology and gender studies will be evident.24
Even if a gene is given certain agency, a lot of theories that overly emphasise
the importance of the gene can be found wanting on, amongst many others, the
following:
1. The extent to which genes can express themselves in their environment
2. The influence of the dynamics in the environment of organisms, on reproductive
success.
Regarding the first, one has to realise that fitness selection is in many ways a
rather crude mechanism. A gene’s adaptive abilities are constrained by the reproduc-
tive cycles of organisms, which can be very slow in, for instance, many mammals
such as humans. Both successful and erratic traits must be commonplace amongst
a population, and they must affect the success of reproduction in order for those
traits to have influence on the genetic heritage of a species. This means that only
those patterns that have statistical relevance for reproduction can guide successful
evolution.
As an example, it is highly unlikely that a gene will successfully code a specific
reaction to cars, in the urban species that many humans have become. Traffic is
too fast and too volatile a phenomenon for a gene to respond to. A gene can code
certain cautiousness, or conversely certain agility, as coping mechanisms against a
high threat killer in our modern lives, which can influence reproductive success.
Such behavioural patterns may statistically prove beneficial for reproduction.
However, the most likely strategy for genes is to invest in that organ that can
effectively assess a plethora of traffic situations and engage in coordinated action
based on these assessments. This strategy however, will limit the ‘gene’s eye view’
on survival in the urban jungle. It will be clear that in this case, the brain is a bet-
ter starting point to explain the success of urban survivors. The genes, at best, may
record successful adaptations of the brains, if any. However, as an explanation of the
survival skills of urban life, a gene has little added value.25
186
This example has a high ‘duh!’-factor, but it is worth pointing out that many
theories on genetic ‘causes’ of human or species behaviour enter this ambiguous
zone where nice one-to-one (causal) relationships between gene and expressions in
a wider environment are no longer that easy. The expression of genes may or may
not take place in their surroundings or in a wider environment, and similarly, ex-
pressions at species level may or may not be traced back to genetic coding. In many
scientific areas, this stance is still far from being mainstream, as for instance can be
seen in psychiatric genomics.26
Although genes —like Fibonacci’s rabbits— replicate exponentially, the metaphor-
ical ‘selfishness’ of genes can just as easily be replaced by humble —and often
failing— explorations to find successful tricks. Besides this, there are increasing
clues that the operations of genes are even more complex than the rough sketch
given here. A field called ‘evolutionary developmental biology’ is proposing that
genetic switches are more important in understanding phenomenological expres-
sions, rather than genes themselves. Of course, this depends on the specific traits,
but the idea that some genes —ironically enough, some of which were considered
‘junk-genes’— are needed to regulate the cycles of activation of other genes, which
in turn influence the phenomenological expression. Due to the combinatorial explo-
sion of possibilities, this may elucidate why a phenomenologically complex organ-
ism such as a human being, has relatively few genes, most of which are shared with
observably simpler organisms such as mice.27
It is also worth pointing out that contemporary research has demonstrated that the
gene is only one repository of information. Even within a biological cell, genes take
their place in a complex network that distributes information over different enzymes,
all of which depend on each other to maintain the cell. This research amplifies the
necessity of feedback mechanisms in which genes play a somewhat more modest
role, with respect to the ‘selfish gene’ metaphor. Although the function of these
patterns of feedback are known by now, it is still a mystery how they are structured,
and which evolutionary bootstrap mechanisms allowed these cells to become robust,
self-maintaining machines.28
3.2 The Natural Artificer
Besides ‘selfish’ genes, many narratives of evolution theory also tend strongly to-
wards interpretations of the biological world as an arena where brave organisms are
constantly engaged in a brave match called ‘competition’. The winner goes to the
second round, while the loser, at best, gets commemorated in a fossil layer, natural
selection being the referee in this never-ending sport.
Even the more differentiated contemporary views on evolution, with all the ac-
quired data to tell a more sophisticated story, still often hold on to this notion of
competition and ‘the force’ of natural selection as the ‘natural artificer’ of all crea-
tures great and small. There is good reason for this as most species are born in
environments that have scarce resources. However, from the previous section it will
be clear that environments are not scarce per se. It would be more correct to con-
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sider natural environments to have a potential for scarcity, which is effectuated when
population growth passes a certain threshold, or when changes in the environment
(for instance catastrophes) limit the availability of resources. Below this threshold,
there is little need to compete, and it might even be wasteful, energy-wise, to evolve
competitive traits. Besides this, scarcity is a relational concept between an organism
and available resources; an ant-eater will not directly experience scarcity of fish or
honey.
De Waal, for one, has theorised that the very non-aggressive and emphatic traits
of our close cousins, the bonobo apes, reflect their rich habitat with an abundance
of fruit.29 Therefore natural selection may have different faces, depending on the
specific circumstances of the environment.
Another problem with natural selection as artificer is that it does not explain
how things are built. Natural selection is like the big, bad wolf in the ‘Three Little
Pigs’, who came and blew down the straw and wooden houses of the lazy pigs, but
could not overthrow the brick house of the prudent pig. The tough friction between
the houses and the tremendous lungs of the wolf, explain what forces had done the
selection, but it does not tell why the houses behaved as they did. The characteristic
traits of the big, bad wolf, do not account for the bricks and mortar, the supportive
pillars and other design issues the prudent pig had to deal with while designing his
house.
Competition and natural selection may weed out bad design choices in evolution,
but this is only part of the story. It says nothing about a creative process, or proba-
bly a suite of processes, that together form the ‘universal glue’ of evolution theory.30
A more complete story of evolution may, as most patterns discussed so far, may
be found on the ‘edge of chaos’ between destructive and constructive processes, the
results of which are continuously tested by natural selection. Stuart Kauffman is a
well-known advocate of this stance. He considers natural selection to be only part
of the story. As he states in Investigations:
First, Darwin’s theory of evolution is a theory of descent with modification. It does not yet
explain the genesis of forms, but the trimmings of the forms, once they are generated.31
His bets are on self-organisation, more or less similar processes of feedback that
have been discussed so far, which he sets against (or rather, complements with)
natural selection. These feedback loops, as may be expected from the stories so far,
move from agents to their environment, and back.
3.3 What Benefits?
As may have become clear, the first decades after the discovery of DNA and es-
pecially Dawkins’s ‘selfish gene’ metaphor, the discourse within biology became a
very competitive arena where ideas that aimed to explain a plethora of issues were
developed. These gene-based theories were very competitive themselves, did not al-
low rivalling ideas, and so heated debates were waged as to who was right and who
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was wrong. As an example, take the argumentation that Richard Dawkins started in
the introduction of ‘The Selfish Gene’ (in 1976) against the ‘benefit of the species’
view of some of his colleagues. Apart from the evident hostility against this alter-
native view, it is remarkable that in his book the two perspectives were considered
mutually irreconcilable.
The trouble with these books [which support a ‘benefit of the species’ perspective, C.P] is
that their authors got it totally and utterly wrong. They got it wrong because they misunder-
stood how evolution works.32
As time progressed, a bit more came to be known about how evolution might work,
and a more recent book titled ”The Devil’s Chamberlain” reflects many of the com-
plex relationships that an organism has to deal with.33 Within biology, researchers
such as Frans de Waal have investigated the fullness of complex interactions in pri-
mates without overly relying on genetic explanations.34 Game theory has demon-
strated emergent cooperation in selfish agents provided the conditions are favourable
to support this.35
In his recent writing, Dawkins has called genes that harmoniously cooperate to
sustain the ‘joint enterprise of building bodies’ as ‘selfish cooperators’.36 However,
de Waal and others point out that the metaphor of ‘selfishness’ has been a dangerous
one, as in humans this also reflects an intention to be selfish.37 Genes obviously do
not have intentions, and so probably a better description of their agency is to con-
sider them as having certain adaptability to optimise their reproductive rates.
Socio-biologist Edward Wilson draws attention to the fact that benefit at one level
(say the individual organism) may be detrimental at another (say the family level),
and yet again beneficial at population level.38 The resulting ‘compromise gene fre-
quency’ will therefore require careful consideration if it is used to explain things. It
will not come as a surprise that Wilson, a bit later on, warns for ‘pithy statements
about causation’ and substantiates this with some examples in socio-biology. In fact,
socio-biology provides many examples where genes, the environment of the species
and the organisation and complexity of their society, all affect and influence each
other. Yet again, it demonstrates that in complex systems, even differentiated views
may not be differentiated enough if one is not careful.
However, having said this, there seems to be general consent in biology that ge-
netic adaptation mainly is beneficial at the level of individual organisms and not at
species level, mainly because other factors determine the ‘success’ of a species than
pure fitness selection alone.39
Benefit tends to be a lump sum issue; you take a bit away from one place and add
it somewhere else and on the whole it looks ‘okay’ or ‘fit’. However, when one is
dealing with a feedback cycle:
gene→organism→species→fitness→gene
then overemphasis on one of these may very much become a matter of naive re-
ductionism. The moment one starts tying the various concepts together, ‘benefit’
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(or lack of it) will flow through the various concepts and will be radiated through
the entire system, super-system, super-super system, and so on. Besides this, as was
discussed earlier, feedback only requires a little bit of reflection in order to change
the behaviour of the system as a whole. This reflection may travel ‘under the radar’
of an external observer (i.e. measurement), but as long as it is sufficient to ‘close the
loop’ it is an influence that cannot be discarded.
Note that due to the resulting feedback loop, a lot of ‘theories’ may end up being
circular as well. For one, ‘benefit’ runs the risk of becoming an interpretation of
the observer, in the sense that ‘an agent appears to benefit from something, so this
benefit drives its success’.
Besides this, the loop is indeterminate due to time delays. ‘Man is a hunter’ does
not mean that adaptations to improved hunting skills are beneficial in our contem-
porary times. The success of many genes may lose their meaning due to changing
environments. In the words of the Wilson on a discussion on the adaptability of
certain traits of an organism:
A trait can be switched from an adaptive to a non-adaptive status by a simple change of the
environment.40
In fact, many explanations on the traits of a species can be better explained by look-
ing at the specific environment (or ecology) in which the species evolved. From this
stance, genes are not ‘ruthless replicators’, but records of successful tricks that are
maintained in a distributed fashion amongst the species.41
It is becoming more and more accepted that often, if not usually, there is no direct
link between gene and its expression. It is already difficult to pinpoint a ‘gene’ on
a strand of DNA, and molecular genes often participate in many different processes
that might express themselves in very different areas. Apparently the ‘sum of the
parts’ that fully describe an organism is coded in a distributed, if not convoluted,
manner in DNA.42
When the wolf huffs and puffs, who will benefit from the prudent pig’s hard
work? Is it the bricks, the mortar, the house, or the prudent pig (and his lazy broth-
ers)? The house ‘benefits’ as it remains a house, the bricks do and don’t for some
may get broken, ‘sacrificing’ themselves for ‘the sake of’ other bricks or the house.
The benefit of mortar becomes even more difficult. Here it becomes very evident
why words such as ‘benefit’ and ‘sacrifice’ are basically very inappropriate, just as
‘selfishness’ is; bricks just break. . .
In the end the house remains a house, bricks remain bricks, mortar remains mor-
tar and the pigs are happy and dancing.
‘Benefit’, like ‘selfishness’, is a dangerous concept, because it tends to accu-
mulate a lot of meanings that obscure the intended isomorphy between target and
model. At this level of complexity, benefit and survival translate to ‘contributing to
the stability that allows the aggregate (organism) to reproduce’. That ‘selfishness’ is
a more ‘catchy’ term will be evident, but these terms are in friction with the themes
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they aim to address. A ‘selfish gene’ is a metaphor, and not a theory.
As we are moving up the complexity perspective, the friction seems to increase
between the conceptual patterns of a target, and the descriptive vocabulary that is
used to model that target. These discourses are interesting for both PAC as for the
lingua democratica, as will become clearer in the next chapter.
3.4 Autonomy and Autopoiesis
One other problem of the current narrative of evolution theory is that it still does not
provide an answer on how an agent begets something that we call ‘life’.
Biological organisms are not only agents that are able to maintain themselves,
but they are also able to reproduce the totality of resources, information and organi-
sation in such a way that their offspring are, or become, fully functional beings. This
means that not only the blueprint of the organism’s design is replicated, but also the
environment in which this blueprint can come to expression. In other words, the au-
tonomy of the organism is reproduced as well!
According to Maturana & Varela, the key trick that these agents have learned is
a mechanism that allows them to produce the components they need, including the
internal structure of these components and the processes that are needed to maintain
themselves. They basically design themselves! This trick is called autopoiesis:
An autopoietic machine is a machine organised as a network of processes of production of
components that produces the components which:
1. through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the
network of processes that produced them; and
2. constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the compo-
nents) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.43
This definition makes clear that a lot more is reproduced than ‘just’ the genetic code.
Basically both the code as well as an environment in which this code can express
itself is reproduced, but besides this, everything is put in place for this reproduced
entity to function as an autonomous agent.
Entities in an autopoietic system have to divide their energy in self-maintenance
and in the maintenance of the autopoietic aggregate. This inevitably restrains the
autonomy of these entities, as any ‘selfish’ act that is detrimental at the level of the
aggregate (the autopoietic system) can backfire and end up in severe ‘punishment’.
Yet again, this makes clear that the use of terms, such as ‘selfishness’, ‘punish-
ment’ and so on, should be used with extreme caution. It is probably better to say
that agents deploy certain strategies that may be more or less beneficial for achiev-
ing certain goals.
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It is worth mentioning that Weinberg’s pattern of organised complexity returns
here. The scales drawn from organised simplicity to organised complexity depict a
relationship between machines on one hand, and living cells on the other.
Machines are (complicated) products of unorganised simplicity, and are charac-
terised by high efficiency for their intended purposes, which are usually also well-
defined. Machines are also highly fragile, in the sense that they are unable to deal
with relatively minor disruptions from their environment. Machines are put in pro-
duction halls, in clean rooms, and other environments that are dedicated to allowing
the machines to do their thing.
Cells on the other hand, are often less efficient in doing something; more cor-
rectly, their ability to produce things is usually derivative. If a cell is observed as a
producer of something, they contain a lot of redundancy that does not directly serve
this production. However, they are much better equipped to deal with contingencies,
at least as opposed to machines. In a way, cells are usually very efficient in being a
cell!
The redundancy is often needed to facilitate repair, to keep backup information
in case primary information sources are corrupted, and to facilitate all kinds of other
restoration strategies. This redundancy requires energy and resources, and usually
resides in the background of the cell’s primary (or observed) function for a large part
of its lifecycle, but is also essential when needed. The importance of redundancy
therefore is typically event-based; it is wasteful while it is not needed, but essential
when it is needed.
3.5 The Current State of Affairs
As biology itself is venturing further into complexity, the criticism of the ‘selfish
gene’ metaphor has become stronger and stronger, also because the oversimplified
‘theories’ remain appealing in both science and the popular press.
This leads to some discontentment among those who are deeply aware and appre-
ciative of the complexities of biological themes, such as is reflected in the following
note from philosopher of biology John Dupre´, included in the Spinoza Lectures he
gave in Amsterdam in 2006:
See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene [...] and many subsequent books. There is a good
deal of more sophisticated theoretical work on evolution currently under way, though none
unfortunately, that threatens to compete with Dawkins’s sales volumes [...] Recent insights
[...] have undermined the simplistic gene-centred picture of evolution [...]44
From the previous discussion, and following Dupre´, it would seem that an organism
can be seen as a locus of processes of outward and inward causality, and it may be
interesting to model some key aspects of evolution theory with a number of patterns
that have been developed so far, in order to see if PAC can provide some novel, and
preferably more inclusive insights to the debates on genes and evolution theory.
Of course, the topics that were highlighted already was biased towards certain
questions and phenomena that serve as preparation for this modelling work. Infor-
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mation, agents and agency, environments and interactions, benefit and goal func-
tions, have already been injected in the idiom in order to model some aspects of
evolution theory ‘as a pattern’.
4 PAC, Genes and Environments
From the previous, extremely succinct description of evolution theory, one can iden-
tify agents (e.g. organisms, populations, species) that interact in a given environment
(nature). But the organisms themselves seem to be the environment of other agents,
the genes.
One may wonder if a ‘gene’ really has any autonomy or agency in the first place.
It may be more correct to consider DNA as being a repository of patterns, that can
somehow start to flow through a cell, organism, population and species, and is able
to contextualise (i.e. come to expression) at various places. This would do justice to
the ambiguity between genetic data and the various ways they are informed. This
‘database metaphor’ of genes also repositions the agency away from genes, towards
processes that can access and modify the genetic data. On a side note, it is worth
pointing out here that that DNA, as repository of pattern, ‘performs’ contextualisa-
tion by overlaying the two strands of patterns of the double helix.45
For starters, evolution theory, as a pattern, can be considered a multi-stage pro-
cess that crosses various aggregates, from the level of cells, organisms, populations,
species, etc. At all these levels of complexity, agents address their survival, by con-
verging to certain niches where they are most successful.
At the lowest level, strands of DNA form collections of genes (patterns, not infor-
mation!) that test and evaluate their surroundings —their metabolism— and which
drive phenotypic change at various levels of complexity. Some of them are immedi-
ate and concern themselves with activation sequences of chemical reactions, which
in turn allow other genes to express themselves. Others come to expression in a
larger environment through manifestations at the level of the organism, such as eye-
colour, the type of hair, or behavioural traits.
All these traits can be observed by other agents, and thus these transformations
of hereditary data of the genes become information for the other agents in the envi-
ronment. This contributes to the environment as being an interaction space.
For instance, standard evolution theory acknowledges the fact that certain man-
ifestations of genes make an organism more attractive for a potential mate. This
basically ‘closes the loop’ from genetic pattern to expression, to fitness, and this
flow includes two agents and the interaction space they inhabit. A gene comes to
expression, and another agent acts on what it observes, in this case by granting or
rejecting mating privileges. With this, at least all the genes that both mates share
can be reproduced, and an ambiguous mix of those genes that are different in both
parents (mutations) will be passed on.
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The manifestations of a gene are therefore very similar to the energy functions
that were described earlier; they are tags of hereditary information. That is, they
allow certain external observers (potential mates) to assess the ‘quality’ of these
genes. Usually this is simply called ‘fitness’.
So now one can see a projection of patterns and a reflection through fitness, and
thus evolution adheres to a convergence inducing process. That is, expressions that
are ranked highly along the scales defined by ‘fitness’ manage to reproduce more
strongly, while poorly ranked expressions are weeded out. But as there is not neces-
sarily a one-to-one relationship between an expression and the patterns stored in the
repositories, modifications at the level of DNA or genes may be very ambiguous.
It is by no means a novelty to consider evolution a process of feedback. The field
in evolutionary computation called genetic algorithms (GAs) basically follows this
interpretation almost in literal sense, although the bias there tends to focus on the
operators (algorithms) rather than the entire feedback loop.46
Whereas the convergence inducing process of the previous chapter was governed
by internal or external goal functions that operate in or on the agent, it is often the
environment of biological organisms that act as a sort of ‘referee’ for success or
failure. The consequent rankings are re-entered in the agents, where failure usu-
ally eventually means that the agents are left with surroundings in which they can
no longer express themselves, a condition we normally call ‘death’ at the level of
organisms or ‘extinction’ at the level of species.
In this sense, genes of living organisms are not only ‘blueprints’ of an organism’s
construction, but are also a kind of certificate of momentary success, which is effec-
tuated when the organism produces offspring. This way, the hereditary information
is divided over multiple organisms, and so when one or a few organisms die, their
‘blueprints’ are secured in the survivors. It will be evident that successful organisms
ensure high reproductive rates either through quality (longevity) or quantity. It is
this ‘distribution of success’ that makes statistical approaches good tools to trace
heredity.
The result of reproduction is the formation of groups of agents with similar char-
acteristics which, in the case of biological organisms, are called species. Within
these species, populations are subgroups that may be specialisations of the species
they belong to, and who may also sometimes closely interact, most notably social
species. Not only do species and populations secure their hereditary information,
but they also form a multi-agent network where organisms apply the same ‘tricks’
in order to survive.47
In a resource-constrained environment, this approach quickly becomes quite
complicated, because the agents within a species require the same resources for
their survival. The resulting competition for these resources drives a process where
the discovery of new tricks (for instance acquiring a new source of food) releases
this increasing pressure temporarily. At genetic level this is possible due to muta-
tions in the genetic material, which results in organisms that acquire unique traits not
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inherited from their parent or parentsiv Because of this, they may acquire a different
design, which is tested by the environment through natural selection. The manner
of ‘problem solving’ —-survival— is through these designs. These designs may or
may not be better adapted to the environment than their parents, or they may open
up new niches in their environment. This ‘testing by design’ leads to a redefinition
of the environment, to what Dennett calls Design Space.48
This design space is the set of all possible designs a (expression of a) gene/ or-
ganism/ population/ species can potentially have, and which are ranked according
to their fitness determined by natural selection. In biological organisms, this diver-
gence may result in a situation where the mutations become such, that breeding
within the originating species is no longer possible. This usually is considered the
point where the mutated organisms are considered to be a different species, although
this distinction is not a clear-cut one. The pattern of difference returns here, as the
movement away from one species to another usually implies that a ‘zone of ambi-
guity’ is entered where intermediary forms must exist, even if only temporarily.
The emergence of new species introduces another aspect of the agency of ‘en-
vironment’. The environment that we call ‘nature’ is reactive, which means that it
reacts to the emergence of new species. Suppose a mutation of a certain bird, say
a finch, manages to exploit a berry that has not been ‘claimed’ by other finches. It
will be clear that this mutation has found a new ‘niche’, which makes this adapta-
tion a successful one. However, the bush may be highly dependent on a ground hog
that eats the berries and is vital in fertilising the seeds. As the finches disrupt this
relationship, an initial successful trick may eventually spell disaster for the ground
hogs, the bush and the finches. It may also result in a new delicate balance between
the trio.
With this, the resulting convergence inducing process that may provide a minimal
model of evolution theory would be as depicted in figure 1.
Fig. 1 Fitness Feedback
iv The human genome consists of about thirty thousand genes that are actually used for creating and
maintaining our metabolisms. About one hundred of these are mutated when they are reproduced.
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Genes project flows of change through various levels of aggregation and at all
levels that they may contextualise through genetic expression. At all these levels,
reflection may occur which contributes to the fitness of the organism’s genetic make-
up. The gene’s ‘benefit’ is related to survival and reproduction, while the environ-
ment provides a sort of certification of this goal. Success means that genes have
reproduced, thereby distributing their patterns over multiple organisms, and reduc-
ing the probability that they are lost when an individual organism dies. Note again
that ‘benefit’ is used in a very restricted sense here, which is similar to ‘stable’,
‘long-lived’, ‘having survived’, or ‘have successfully reproduced’. It is not (neces-
sarily) the ‘benefit’ in economics, of maximising utility.
With the convergence inducing process, the ‘double direction’ of the inward and
outward causality is taken up in a larger process —or rather processes— of feed-
back. One process follows the ‘ripples of change’ from the gene towards various
phenotypic manifestations, while another follows a path that begins in the envi-
ronment and ends in —-an often implicit— ‘certification’ of specific genes. One
direction can explain why genetic expressions occur through a historic narrative of
ancestry, while the other explains specific or momentary conditions and challenges
of organisms. Basically, the evolutionary and ecological perspective are covered in
one process. In this sense, the above pattern does not really see controversies be-
tween a ‘species’ view and a ‘selfish gene’; there is no reason to assume that one
perspective excludes the other.
However, there is certain friction between the scope of an agent’s actions and the
complexity of its environment. For a simple agent, even moderately complex envi-
ronments quickly become ‘confusing’ and often ‘counter-intuitive’. A behavioural
trait that is beneficial may only be so in certain specific conditions, and so agents
will be continuously caught in friction between specialisation and certain oppor-
tunism. If an agent is caught in an environment with ‘fleeting benefit’, then this will
be reflected in the genes, and so the process that describes how genes affect the phe-
notype is never complete without the process that describes how the environment
has influenced the genes.
Some biologists may consider the reflection at population or species level to be
negligible, while others may argue that feedback at the individual level is hardly an
issue as these individual differences will usually be subdued by the dominant genes
in a population. However, diversity will start with mutations of individual genes,
which are amplified when the individuals that host these mutations are successful
in reproducing. The wider the feedback loops, the more disruptions from the envi-
ronment will interfere in the various processes. On the other hand, it was already
mentioned earlier that even a slight portion of reflection can radically change an
agent’s behaviour, especially self-reinforcing positive feedback loops, so even a sta-
ble pattern of reflection that flows under the radar of external measurement can still
be effective.
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The above figure also raises the question of what is happening at the boundaries
between cell and individual, individual and population, and population and species.
This will partially be addressed in the next chapter, but strongest forms of feedback
will likely be within the cell and the individual, as the contingencies from the en-
vironment will be less disruptive at these levels. Beside this, the larger aggregates
may also serve as a filter for the lower-level aggregates. This idea gets support from
biological research, as was mentioned earlier.
Currently, the resulting minimal model of evolution theory, as pattern, does not
address how genes project these patterns through the various media. Within the
cell’s metabolism, enzymes and other complex chemicals regulate which patterns
can ‘start flowing’ at which moment, towards a context where they can come to
expression. One could say that, in the vocabulary of PAC, gene and metabolism
together form the duality of concept and context.
This duality is not a static one. As a gene expresses itself in the metabolism of the
cell, it alters it, which in turn can cause other genes to become active. In other words,
the concept-context duality is taken up in a self-describing production system, and
this production system guides the growth of biological organisms from foetus to
maturity.
Although there are many other interactions between the various levels, the feed-
back towards the genetic level is the one that is known to cause changes that can be
passed on to an offspring.
A convergence inducing process was said to have a securing mechanism that
stores high-ranking values. In the case of genetic mutations, this securing is estab-
lished by the fact that most successful mutations only cause slight changes to an
organism. The berry-eating finch described earlier still has all the traits that make
the organism a finch, and these traits are secured despite the mutation. Besides this,
if the mutation is detrimental, then the mutation is not likely to reproduce success-
fully.
In general, one can often see here that changes in the offspring of the genes either
tend to cause radically different expressions, which usually rarely lead to improve-
ments, or small changes in existent expressions which have a much better chance of
being an improvement. The balanced mix between exploration and optimisation of
the convergence inducing process, returns here in genetic reproduction.
It is also worth mentioning that changes in genes do not necessarily create a dif-
ferent species. Every individual of a species has a unique DNA print. However, a
lot of mutations do not result in altered expressions at species level, or some ex-
pressions may be relatively minor. Here again, there is usually a zone of ambiguity
between individual organisms and the species they belong to.
One remaining question on the relationship between evolution theory and the
convergence inducing process is if the process of evolution is really convergent, or
whether it is divergent?
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There are two ways of looking at this. One might go for convergence for the sim-
ple reason that it is the nature of selection to reduce things, and natural selection is
not different in this respect. This stance is confirmed by most research on similar
processes. In many ways, the potential of designs in design space is tremendous,
and natural selection only tends to select those designs that have an above average
fitness; in effect, the process of natural selection aims for the highest peaks in the
Himalayas of design space, in the context of above average chance of reproductive
success. Besides this, the formation of new species tends to be a slow process; even
though mutations occur with every reproductive cycle, it takes a while before mu-
tations move beyond the zone of ambiguity and can be observed as distinctly new
species. A great many more mutations do not even make it to this stage as their fit-
ness is below average.
However, because of the dynamics and reactivity of our natural environment, the
peaks in design space are continuously shifting and moving. This means that new
peaks are continuously formed, which in turn provides new niches for mutations.
As this leads to differences in organisms, populations and species, mono-cultures
are prevented from forming, and this of course, keeps the process well in the plane
of organised complexity. As a result, it would seem that, in general, nature tends to
be prevented from ‘coagulating’ to an orderly, but also fragile state.
If the various levels of aggregation are generalised to being the ‘environment’
of an actor, then natural selection can be condensed to the following feedback pat-
tern:49
Pattern: Natural Selection
Description: A model of (natural) selection
A.K.A:
Notes: ‘Survival’ may be translated into ‘stability’ or ‘endurance’, at
least until the first successful reproductive cycle
This pattern is basically a specialisation of the convergence inducing process.
The main difference is that the feedback typically reflects in the environment of the
actor, and that this reflection is partially determined by the agency of the environ-
ment.
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One could say that the environment, through the constraints it imposes on an
actor, is an enabler the feedback loops because it transforms the flow that describes
the evolution of organisms. This describes the survival of an agent in terms of a
relationship between its internal characteristics and environmental conditions that
surrounds that agent.
The securing mechanism typically involves reproduction of patterns to offspring.
It is worth mentioning that the process of natural selection is, of course, ex-
tremely complex, and this pattern hardly does justice to the enormous research that
is currently being done in evolutionary biology and related areas. However, I do feel
confident enough to claim that the pattern of the convergence inducing process is a
powerful operator of natural selection, and at least gives a more complete descrip-
tion than many other interpretations that tend to focus on a unidirectional causality.
5 Interaction Patterns
When evolution theory is seen as a form of a convergence inducing process, the en-
vironment contributes tremendously to the complexity of this process. The environ-
ment that is normally called ‘nature’ provides a space where actors inter-act. These
interactions have the tendency to be np-hard and are amplified by the characteristic
of scarcity. Besides this, the interactions tend to be dynamic and the environment
is reactive with respect to the actor’s influence. With this, the environment has be-
come a specialisation of a space —it has become an interaction space— with the
characteristics mentioned above.50
Table 1 Some Characteristics of a Complex Environment
Property Remarks
np-hard Results in a combinatorial explosion of the search space
Linear-nonlinear Usually increases the uncertainty in trends, such as curves
Static-Dynamic ‘Static’ means that the problem domain does not change while it is
being processed. A dynamic environment can change during opti-
misation.
Reactive This implies that the problem domain is influenced by the actor. A
reactive problem domain is always dynamic as well.
Contingency The environment can disrupt the interactions
A number of issues regarding the pattern can now be described in detail. For one,
the complexity of the environment becomes a determinant for the patterns that can
be stored at genetic level. Besides this, the environment now has become a space in
which agents that host a property of benefit, can demonstrate a number of interac-
tion patterns. These interaction patterns are not exclusive to living organisms, for
most are also deployed in technical systems, but the majority of them have first been
identified nature. They have also been most extensively researched in biology —
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technical systems usually have looked at biology for inspiration for these patterns—
and therefore it is only proper to introduce them at this level of complexity.
It was said earlier that nature is a space in which agents interact with each other.
Agents can be cells, organisms and even populations and species. The environment
of these agents has certain agency. If an external observer can assign a quality of
benefit to the interactions, then logically speaking, this means that certain interac-
tions can be beneficial, detrimental or fairly neutral. This results in a table such as
the actor/co-actor pattern.51
According to the perceived benefit of the agent that engages in the interaction
(actor) and the agent that is responsive to the interaction (co-actor), one can draw a
table as depicted in table 2.
Table 2 Actor/Co-actor Patternv
Strategy Sub-strategy Benefit
actor
Benefit
co-actor
Predator-
prey
Also known as
Co-existence 0 0 No
Competition + - adversarialism
Bully
Altruism 0/- +
self-sacrifice - +
Parasitism + +/0/- Yes
Commensalism+ 0
Mutualism + +
Symbiosis + +
Synnecrosis - -
Spite
The various forms of interactions will be given more attention further on, but
already the actor/co-actor pattern puts competition ‘in perspective’ with other forms.
The list is also not exhaustive, for it only cuts one slice of possible interactions in a
complex environment, that can include more complex forms. complex interactions
that flow towards the domains of game theory and the likes, and which includes
famous games such as the ‘Prisoners Dilemma’.52
In this table, competition is interpreted in the classic sense of game theory where
one agent wins and the other loses, just like in sports. Some authors prefer adver-
sarialism to describe this particular kind of interaction, as competition in biology
seems to have become more a container concept that may include all kinds of inter-
actions that aim to address the problem of survival.53
There are two distinct forms of interaction between the actor and the co-actor.
In one situation, both actor and co-actor are interacting through shared resources,
such as food or territory. In the other situation, the actor or co-actor is actually the
resource of the other, a predator-prey relationship.54
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Historically, this distinction has often implicitly been used to set parasitism apart
from competition. With altruism and symbiosis this distinction is less important,
and as was mentioned earlier, competition as it is used in biology tends to be used
as a container concept, so predator-prey relationships are often considered to be
‘competitive’ in that context as well.
Another interesting relationship occurs when the co-actor is the aggregate of
which the actor is a participant. In this case ‘competition’ may become ‘subver-
sarialism’.vi
It is also worth keeping in mind that for many agents the above interactions may
be dynamic and momentary, and the signature of these interactions may change at
different moments.
Probably the biggest drawback of a categorisation such as the actor/co-actor pat-
tern, is that it is often limited to what an observer can witness. This is the reason
why the interactions are defined from the angle of what is perceived. As will be
pointed out in the various discussions on these interactions, there is often ‘more
than meets the eye’, and many interactions often prove more intricate when they are
studied with care. The actor/co-actor pattern therefore, is nothing more (or less) than
a convenient way to categorise certain interactions in a more or less logical manner.
5.1 Co-existence
Co-existence is a strategy where various agents live in each other’s vicinity without
any perceived form of interaction, besides of course through the space they share.
Herds of zebra and gnus may graze the same grasslands, and even mingle, but there
is no apparent relationship between the species.
Although co-existence may hardly seem noteworthy at first glance, closer in-
spection may reveal very intricate and subtle interactions, which prove that in fact,
co-existing species may be more dependent on each other than expected. Of some
herds of grazers living in the wild it is known that each species feeds on specific
kinds of grass or shrubs, and by grazing on these plants, they create space in which
plants that other grazers feed on can grow.55
At an even more subtle level, the various types of grass or plants may be related
through the soil they share. Some plants may need bacteria, worms, fungi, or other
organisms that require the plants other animals graze on. So co-existence can host
very subtle interactions.
5.2 Competition
As was said earlier, competition is the prize-fighter of many views on evolution
theory. Competition is often considered the status quo of the type of environment
we live in, and all the mechanisms and strategies that organisms acquire, are to serve
one ultimate goal: to compete.
vi If this is a proper English word
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There has been serious criticism of such a perspective, and it has been accused
of being a very (white) male-inspired perspective [124]. Some contemporary con-
tributions from biology itself also acknowledge this bias.56 There are also strong
supporters, especially in economic theory and business sciences.
From a viewpoint of the lingua democratica, it is worth pointing out that these
theories are not necessarily incorrect, but that they are often described in terms of
vocabulary that opens up Pandora’s box of meanings and implications that radiate in
a much wider environment than the context of those theories. In biology, the popular
press has played a powerful role in such naive extrapolations of biological theory,
but many biologists have been very receptive for this attention, which resulted in a
positive feedback loop that outshouted more differentiated views.
There are clues that the perceived ultimate character of competition has strong
historical ties. Indeed Herbert Spencer’s popularisation of Darwin’s ideas, and es-
pecially the notion of ‘Survival of the Fittest’, had a strong competitive connotation,
like in sports where players stride for a prize that only one can claim.57
For every winner, there are many losers; this is at the heart of competition, to
make a ranking from best to worst, but ultimately only the best is worthy enough to
be remembered.vii Amongst researchers of artificial intelligence, this specific form
of competition is sometimes called adversarialism.
The Cold War era inspired a lot of research on military strategies that had an
adversarial bias, or were based on the premises of conflicts, such as game theory.58
This research proved very useful to explain specific issues regarding evolution
theory, but also introduced a bias towards adversarialism and conflicts.
Lastly, it has become clear that a lot of cooperative strategies tend to be more
complex than competitive ones, so these could only be investigated with more com-
plex instruments, such as the computer. These more recent developments have grad-
ually ‘stretched’ the meaning of competition in many scientific areas, which can
cause some problems when they are taken out of these specific areas.
In the actor/co-actor pattern, the stricter meaning of competition is used, as in
game theory. It is considered a strategy where agents aim to secure the same, lim-
ited resources. The essence of competition in this sense is clear. It ranks agents
according to their ability to acquire the resources, a ranking of fitness.
Competition often gives a statement to the environment, to other agents, about
an individual’s qualities. This may provide valuable information about the genetic
material of a potential mate, which may be passed on to a new generation.
vii Sometimes the worst players may be very successful. A speed-skating crazed country as the
Netherlands cherishes the memory of the Spanish speed skater Gomez, whose skating skills were
worse than many a Dutch child (at least, of those who were born before global warming). Yet his
perseverance and loyalty to the game made him someone to remember, while the names of so many
talented others have by now been forgotten. The British alpine skier ‘Eddy the Eagle’ is, of course,
another fine example.
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It is however good to realise that nature does not, as most competitions in sports,
necessarily aim for one winner. Nature allows many races, and the appropriate sports
metaphor would rather be, for instance, speed skating. In speed skating there are
winners that take gold, silver and bronze, just like any other competition. But there
are also track and personal records to improve, and other individual challenges to
be fought. In many ways, speed skating has many winners at various levels and all
of these achievements serve a purpose.
Many competitive battles are waged against unequal adversaries, a bully strat-
egy. Bullying is competition between agents where the actor —the aggressor— is
observably stronger than the co-actor. In biological organisms within a population,
this form of interaction can cause spirals to boundary states, which usually establish
a crisp pecking order. Changes in hormonal processes in both winner and loser of-
ten guide the social behaviour that is required for the social status of the individuals,
such as submission or dominance.
However, bullying can also initiate adaptations in the co-actor to counter the pres-
sure, which may result in a new balance. In predator-prey relationships, the prey will
(have to) evolve traits to outsmart the predator.
Thus an interesting question arises: why has competition become such a quintessen-
tial part of the (evolutionary) biologist’s vocabulary, to the extent that there is a
strong tendency to translate fitness in terms of assertiveness, aggression, dominance
or adversarialism? Besides the issues mentioned earlier, such as (gender-) bias and
historical developments, there is at least one environmental condition that facilitates
competition, and that is a Malthusian crunch.
In an environment of abundance, there is obviously little need for competition.
Abundance usually leads to unchecked growth of the population, until essential re-
sources run out and scarcity arises. This change leads to both competition over
scarce resources, as well as increased selective pressure. Less successful individ-
uals not only ‘lose’ the game, but are also marginalised through poorer health, less
opportunity to mate, and may even die of starvation or other reasons.
Scarcity therefore, tends to reward individuals who are competitively strong, and
increases the selectivity within a population or species by amplifying ‘success’. Ex-
amples of this can be seen at the sales events at Harrods or its equivalents, such as
the Dutch ‘Dolle Dwaze Dagen’ at the Bijenkorf superstores. Here extreme self-
interest, competition, assertiveness and aggression can pay off due to the extreme
resource-constraint nature of these events. As a result, genes that support such traits
find themselves on a speedway to successful reproduction during times of scarcity.
After the crunch has passed, for instance due to a decimated population, a new
period of relatively little selective pressure will take over, but now with a population
whose DNA consists of competitively stronger strategies than the population before
the crunch.59
However, despite the impression one may get, there are limits to ‘competitively
strong’ strategies. First, it is not evident that competitive strategies are also prefer-
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able in calmer times. Second, feedback loops in the interactions may ‘ricochet’;
competition may ‘turn sour’ in the long run if the actor ultimately depends on the
co-actor (see also parasitism a bit further on). A strategy needs to serve a purpose,
and ‘too much’ often proves counter-productive.60
It is possible, even likely, that the stability of relative abundance is needed to
diversify without the immediate threat of reproductive failure. In an environment of
abundance, it may be less pressing to be less successful. Certain mutations may ex-
ist in relative marginality during these stages, but will not necessarily be threatened.
Abundance may allow gradual diversification, which is tested when the crunch an-
nounces itself, just like the sportsman becomes a winner through long, laborious
and relatively invisible training sessions, tested within minutes during the match.
Competitiveness is a powerful mechanism in resource-constrained environments,
especially because of its ability to manifest itself when selective pressure is high.
The importance of competition can therefore not be underestimated as a defining
force of our evolution. Competition however, is not a constructive mechanism, but
merely ranks what is already there. As a strategy, it tends to work well when one
can select amongst agents, and can rank them according to some criterion.
5.3 Altruism
In the actor/co-actor pattern, altruism is the logical counterpart of competition, and
is an interaction where an actor appears to limit or forego its own benefit for ‘the
sake of’ one or more co-actors. Despite intuition, there is a rationale behind al-
truism, at least from the ‘gene’s-eye view’, which has been mathematically eluci-
dated by William D. Hamilton.61 In fact, altruistic strategies are quite common in
nature, and colonies of social organisms, such as bees and ants, are altruistic soci-
eties where sisters of an egg-laying queen will lose their ability to reproduce and
even risk losing their lives for the sake of the colony. Hamilton has quite exten-
sively demonstrated the conditions under which it becomes statistically probable to
evolve altruistic behaviour at genetic level, usually within descendants of the same
kin. Generally speaking, genetically coded altruism tends not to extend beyond the
cousins of a family.
In highly cognitive social species —social behaviour seems to be a prerequisite
for relatively high cognitive skills— one can see altruistic behaviour in the sentries
of for instance meerkats, who take positions on high locations in order to oversee
the area where the others are foraging, with the risk of being caught. In these cases
altruism tends to be reciprocal, as all or many of the individuals in a population take
turns in exposing themselves to danger or threat. Another common form of altruism
of course, is the bravery of many a parent when their children are in danger.
Here again, altruism tends to concentrate on members of the same species, and
usually is restricted to families or clans. Of course, there are accounts of dogs which
are willing to dare extreme danger to save their bosses, and even of dolphins fighting
sharks in order to save an unfortunate swimmer, but these seem to be exceptions.62
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Altruism is a very pivotal interaction pattern for evolutionary theories on moral-
ity. De Waal distinguishes two views on the evolution of morality. One is the so-
called ‘veneer theory’ that considers morality to be a thin layer over the core of
self-interested agents, while the ‘evolution of ethics’ considers morality to be an
‘outgrowth of social instincts’.63
5.4 Parasitism
Despite the negative connotations, parasitism is a very interesting and surprisingly
delicate interaction strategy. First, the actor/co-actor pattern shows a similar effect as
with competition, but whereas competition is a mechanism that involves a struggle
of agents over the same scarce resources, parasitism is a predatory mechanism where
the actor uses the co-actor as a resource. Historically, parasitism is also usually
reserved for little buggers that feed off bigger ones.
As with all predation, a subtle relationship has to be established between preda-
tor and the prey, owing to the fact that the predator will jeopardise itself if the prey
is wiped out completely. The more volatile the predator is, the earlier a Malthusian
crunch is likely to occur, so a predator has to evolve certain strategies to limit this
risk.
In the specific case of parasitism, one often sees this development happen. In
general, the initial phase of a parasitic relationship is highly predatory, if a species
has ‘discovered’ another species as a source of nutrition. Examples of this are the
many viruses and bacteria that threatened human life in the past, such as the Black
Plague in the Middle Ages, or the Spanish influenza that took millions of lives in the
previous century. David Christian also recalls the ‘assistance’ of influenza common
in Europe in the conquest of the Americas.64
Successful parasitism is the result of adaptations in the predator-prey relation-
ships to become less of a threat to the prey. As the prey has not yet evolved defence
mechanisms against the attack, the death toll is usually extremely high in the initial
stage of the relationship, with only a few survivors who are best adapted to with-
stand the assault. But as the relationship evolves, it will result in more balanced
interactions that aim to spare the prey. Childhood diseases such as chicken pox are
examples of parasites (viruses) that have become less virulent with time, and now
hardly pose a threat. Note that parasitism is not restricted to bacteria and viruses.
Many economical interactions follow the same interaction patterns. In a way, one
could say that any company tends to be parasitic towards its consumer base, in the
sense that they try to extract as much money as possible from consumers. Compa-
nies that only rely on single sales can afford to be more aggressive than companies
who rely on long-term relationships, as the interests of the latter are not served by
‘bleeding out’ their consumers. Note also that, because consumers are also employ-
ees, there are very subtle feedback mechanisms at work in these relationships.65
This process of becoming less of a threat may lead to a new form of parasitism,
commensalism, where the parasite feeds of its host without the latter suffering any
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harm, as for instance a host of bacteria in our gastric system. Mutualism is the third
stage, where both actor and co-actor seem to benefit (other bacteria in our gastric
system).66
Mutualism has become a major concept for theories on the origins of life. A
widely accepted theory in biology considers mutualism to be a bootstrap mechanism
of organic life, when four prokaryotes engaged in a mutualistic relationship form the
first eukaryotes. What started out as a predatory move, turned into one of mutualism
that allowed the formation of living cells.67
5.5 Symbiosis
Symbiosis has a number of definitions which range from ‘stable’ to ‘mutually bene-
ficial’ relationships between dissimilar organisms. The previous section made clear
that symbiosis can be the result of gradual adaptation of an initial parasitic relation-
ship (mutualism), and indeed many biological textbooks take this stance.
However, many symbiotic relationships known in nature are hard to explain from
the premise of an adaptation of parasitism. Take for instance the symbiotic relation-
ship between an anemone and an anemone fish. The anemone provides an ideal
protection for the fish’s eggs, as the poisonous tentacles ward off possible predators.
On the other hand, the anemone fish will fiercely defend its territory—and with it
the anemone— from dangerous elements that come too close, which includes ani-
mals of many times its own size, as any diver who has visited a coral reef may have
encountered. The anemone fish has evolved to have a skin that is resistant to the
anemone’s poison, while the anemone does not (or will almost never) sting the fish,
as it would do with other animals. How did this relationship start? It seems unlikely
that this initially started as a parasitic move on the side of the anemone fish.68
One can see here how important the bootstrapping mechanism (in other words,
the evolutionary/historical perspective) is in order to clarify interaction patterns.
A categorisation of as-is observations, both structural or phenomenological, often
omits the very important analysis of the genesis of these patterns, which results in
fragile theories.69
The mathematical model that I developed for my master thesis takes the premise
of co-existence as the base for a symbiotic relationship. Therefore this relationship
is not parasitic in nature.70
This model, called symbiotic networks, focused on the conditions that are min-
imally required to establish an enduring, mutually beneficial relationship between
agents. The model had to be sufficiently simple to allow symbiosis at relatively low
levels of complexity, preferably at the level of chemical molecules.
In these symbiotic networks, actors provide a service that can be used by co-
actors. This service can be a waste product of the actor’s autonomous processes, or
a distinctive trait or characteristic, such as a highly defensive attitude of an anemone
fish, the ability to dig burrows, or anything else that can benefit the co-actor.
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However, the existence of such a service is not sufficient to create a sustainable
relationship. The co-actors must somehow know who provides the service, or at
least be able to identify the location where the service originates from, or where it
is manifest. In order to do this, the actor has to release a kind of ‘homing signal’, a
stress signal. If such a stress signal is inversely proportional to its ability to provide
the service (the more stress, the lesser the service), then the stress signal can also
be used to negotiate the actor’s own needs. If the co-actor can provide this, then an
optimising (negative) feedback loop is formed between the agents (that now have
become both actor as well as co-actor), that allows them to optimise their need for
the mutual services they provide. In other words, the agents must be able to ‘tune’
that aspect of their behaviour that is related to providing the services, based on the
stress signals they pick up in order to facilitate the other.
This rather complex feedback mechanism can best be illustrated by the relation-
ship between a parent and her baby child. The child needs affection, nourishment
and protection from the parent, and negotiates these needs by crying. In other words,
the baby emits a stress signal. For the sake of argument, suppose that a parent derives
a benefit from the baby as well, such as a certain fulfilment or something similar.
When the baby starts crying, the parent hears the baby’s stress signal and is able to
find out where the baby is. She also is informed that the baby encounters stress of
some sort, and responds to this by changing her behaviour in order to service the
baby’s needs. The parent will stop doing whatever duties she was engaged in, and
go to the kitchen to warm up a bottle of milk, or to comfort the child, or to change
the diaper. For symbiosis, both (or rather all) the actors in the network need to be
able to service the others, so the analogy between a parent and a baby ends here.
As a result, if two agents are able to:
1. provide a service to each other,
2. emit stress signals to negotiate their needs,
3. change their behaviour in order to adjust to the need of the service for others,
then two feedback loops are established between the agents, which are mutually
beneficial and sustainable. Evolutionary pressure will then be sufficient to reward
agents that are better capable of optimising the feedback loops, which will result
in an increasingly strong relationship over the generations. In other words, a small
benefit between (for instance) initially co-existing species, can be enough to initiate
a process of increasingly stronger symbiotic bonds.
It was argued earlier that small initial benefits can occur quite easily, such as
‘safety by numbers’ or (other) subtle interactions amongst co-existing species.
An interesting aspect of this model of symbiosis is that any emitted signal can
be used as a stress signal, provided it is related to the service the agent provides.
Besides this, the optimisation is not restricted to two agents, but can be expanded
over any amount. The response to the stress signals does not have to be very specific
as well. Any change of behaviour that results in a decrease of the stress signals in
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the network will work. In symbiotic networks, the agents can learn to change their
behaviour based on the stress signals, which makes the collective behave as a pro-
totype of a neural network in some ways.
Generally speaking, a symbiotic network requires two things. First, one or more
agents need to be able to detect deviations from a goal function, and secondly, other
agents must have certain freedom to address these deviations and solve them. The
network can be configured to learn which agent is best equipped to resolve a cer-
tain deviation, and try to bring the ‘messenger of the bad news’ in contact with that
agent. This is not as obvious as it may appear at first glance, because often it is not
known which agents can provide a certain service. Under the conditions that define
a symbiotic network, the aggregate can learn patterns of communications which can
create such partnerships. In other words, to some extent, the network can learn to
find out who can best service who.
The ability to continuously communicate stress amongst the participants in a
network, allows the networks to optimise even in very volatile and dynamic envi-
ronments. They work relatively poorly for the standard benchmark problems in the
plane of unorganised simplicity (predominantly static problem domains that con-
sist of fixed mathematical functions). In this sense, symbiotic algorithms are bet-
ter equipped to operate in environments in the plane of organised complexity. In a
way, symbiotic agents ‘embrace’ the volatility in the network and try to deal with it
through the feedback loops that are formed. They are continuously monitoring the
environment, and spring into action when a disruption is detected.71
The problem with larger groups of agents is that it becomes harder for each agent
to service the others. If every agent has to deal with only one other, it can fully
concentrate on the needs of the other, but things become more difficult if there are
more members. The stress signals become noisier, conflicts arise between the needs
of the individuals, and some may be more dominant in expressing their needs than
others.
Without additional aids, such as an ability to switch or prioritise between the
stress signals, the resulting symbiotic network will balance out the different stress
signals in such a way that the overall stress of the network is zero, but there is still
stress at the level of individual agents. This may elucidate observations in nature
that most symbiotic relationships are between two agents only. Symbiosis in larger
groups is possible if the participants all share very similar goals, such as a shoal of
fish (although, strictly speaking, this is not considered a symbiotic relationship, as
they are of the same species). Large-scale symbiosis between dissimilar species that
require various services is, according to the model, quite difficult, although up to
some extent there is always some improvement.
Symbiotic networks vividly demonstrate the ‘micro-macro problem’ of net-
works, which is to be expected considering the highly dynamic nature of the individ-
ual interactions. At the level of individual agents, certain behaviour can be described
with mathematical accuracy, and the (optimising) behaviour at the aggregate level
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also. However, it is impossible, and totally useless to try to record the deterministic
behaviour of each agent while they are optimising in a certain environment. Some
general heuristics and rules can be applied to improve the optimisation, but to try
to calculate this behaviour deterministically is not sensible, because the payoff is
already known at the aggregate level, and the exercise would be daunting. It is not
rational in the sense of Medawar compliancy, if it is at all possible. These networks
are basically more complex variants of the three-body problem, which can also not
be solved analytically.
As a result, one can analyse the individual agents, and the aggregate, but not the
intermediate area. This means that there is an uncertainty gap in-between the net-
work and its constituents, but also that the aggregate level is a sort of ‘bottleneck’
where analysis and mathematical rigour can return as a means to understand the
progress along the complexity perspective. With this, mathematical rigour as means
to address themes in the plane of organised complexity, will not be able to follow
strict deterministic and causal rigour, but may manage to regain some strictness at
various levels of aggregation. The consequence of this is, that different converged
systems will usually never produce exactly the same results, and so the deterministic
analysis has been ‘broken’ by the combinatorics of the uncertainty gap in the net-
work. However, the end of deterministic certainty does not mean the end of know-
ing; there are still enough ‘little truths of matching’ at aggregate level that can be
determined.
Probably a regatta may be a good analogy; there are some buoys the boat must
pass, but in between, the skipper may determine her or his own course. This evi-
dently is the approach that is followed here, sometimes manoeuvring towards phi-
losophy, sometimes more scientific and technical, practical or using common sense,
but always eventually trying to move back to what is currently generally accepted
knowledge. The eventual ideal course will never be the same, as it depends on the
starting conditions (premises) and the specifics during the race. However, some as-
pects of the regatta will be known at the finish, the most obvious one being that
the winner took the best route, given the circumstances during the race, and in the
context of the available competition.
5.6 Synnecrosis
Synnecrosis is a situation where the actor and co-actor get involved in a relationship
that is mutually detrimental. Dawkins’s recollection of Gould’s ‘Irish Elk’ story
could be considered a synnecrotic system. This particular species of elk is believed
to have gone extinct because evolutionary pressure (in this case by the nitty-gritty
preferences of the female elks) favoured huge antlers that became too much of a
burden for the male elks, and eventually drove them to extinction. Dawkins recalls
this as an example that evolution is not necessarily progressive.72
Synnecrotic interactions that can be elucidated at genetic level are, for obvious
reasons, very rare, as they tend to be short-lived and not beneficial for reproduc-
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tion. There are some interesting examples in human society that can highlight the
dynamics of such systems.
In many human societies, an attack on one group (for instance a family, clan or
nation) can lead to retaliation by members of the group that is attacked, which again
may result in a counter attack. In order to overcome the pre-occupation with destruc-
tion which is likely to wipe out entire families, clans or nations, usually all kinds of
social rules, such as ‘revenge-of-honour’, or counselling by independent third par-
ties or wise people have emerged to prevent this destructive spiral of actions from
occuring. This has also been observed in so-called ‘consolation behaviour’ in the
great apes.73 The constitutional laws of many countries, or religious laws, play an
important role as referee in such conflicts. There are many examples of tribes where
actual warfare has taken up a more symbolic nature, in order to prevent such syn-
necrotic spirals from occurring.
A special variant of synnecrosis can occur in entity-aggregate relationships,
where the actor is a constituent in an aggregate (the co-actor). Usually this form
of synnecrosis occurs when an actor aims to benefit, but negatively affects the sys-
tem as whole, which eventually ‘backfires’ (probably ‘ricochet’ would be a better
word here) on the actor that initiated it. Similar effects have been witnessed in net-
works, for instance power grids, where a failure in one node starts a synnecrotic
cascade that can eventually damage a substantial part of the network.74
Here, a special variant of the micro-macro problem can also become synnecrotic.
In a competitive interaction space, individuals may aim to claim more resources than
others in order to improve their own chances. However, if all the entities aim to do
the same, or at least so many that the aggregate form can be described as having
this behaviour, then the system as a whole will harvest these resources in an expo-
nentially increasing fashion, with the result that the aggregate will eventually race
towards a boundary state at warp speed, and face a severe correction when this
boundary state is crossed. At an instant, the entire system collapses as the resources
are no longer available.
An interesting example of this form of synnecrosis is the story of Rapa-Nui, or
‘Easter Island’ as most Westerners know it.
When the island was discovered by Europeans in 1722, it was barren, with only a
handful of natives living in extreme poverty, and a host of immense statues of stone
that their ancestors must have erected in times when life was better. However, those
ancestral stories were no longer part of the collective memory of their descendants.
A careful reconstruction of Easter Island has revealed that it once had a flour-
ishing community, that the island itself had forests and could have provided enough
food and resources to sustain human society. However, population explosion may
have put stress on the available resources, and in order to please the Gods, the vil-
lages started to erect statues, probably for worship.
Tribal competition soon started a process where each tribe erected increasingly
larger statues, which required extensive constructions to transport rocks. These con-
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structions were made of wood, and so in their zeal to ensure favour from the Gods,
they deforested the island and secured the fate they were trying to avoid. A spi-
ralling synnecrotic system eventually left Rapa-Nui barren and their descendants on
the brink of extinction.75
It is worth pointing out that this collective behaviour is currently promoted un-
der the banner of ‘economic growth’. Economic growth is inflationary, which often
is metaphorically depicted as a ‘bubble’ that can expand (and sometimes bursts).
This metaphorical image seems to imply that as the bubble grows, that more agents
are included in the bubble. However, there is another configuration, which actually
better explains inflation as it is felt in the wallets of individual human beings. This
configuration can be likened to a toroid (e.g. a tire or donut shape) that gets bigger
and bigger, while the ring does not really change that much in width. As more suc-
cessful agents raise the standard, more agents fall behind because the average level
inflates. For this reason, the scores of sports events of a few decades ago will not
impress athletes who are currently training for world championships. This is also the
reason why people who cannot, or choose not to follow the rationality of economic
growth run a risk of ‘falling out of the system’.76
5.7 Opportunism
It may have become clear that genetic determinism becomes more difficult when
explaining more complex forms of behaviour, and causal flows start to interact with
other ones. Of course, categorisation is the result of human observation and dif-
ferentiation, and therefore is prone to bias and cultural interference. That is, these
categories may not be visible or existent at gene level. Besides this, even at genetic
level, various traits may be coded side by side, while they may seem to be contra-
dictory at phenomenological levels.
Genetic patterning is the result of adaptation under different environmental con-
ditions, and is an opportunistic process. Competition is a successful strategy in con-
ditions where there is high pressure on scarce resources, such as during a Malthusian
crunch. On the other hand, altruism or symbiosis can be very effective in securing a
strong population in both harsh times as well as in calmer ones. The gene pool is a
reflection of a historical mix of all these circumstances and therefore it is quite un-
derstandable that contrary mechanisms may evolve side by side. At cognitive level,
opportunism —the ability to engage in multiple strategies that are best for whatever
the circumstances require— become more apparent. The ‘plasticity’ or ‘flexibility’
of the brain allows this more than the fundamentally digital coding of genes.
It is also worth pointing out that diversity can be considered a form of oppor-
tunism (or conversely, opportunism is a form of diversity), as diversity is nature’s
way of testing various forms in design space. This creates some redundancy, that
takes up shape in less-than-optimal forms in a certain momentary context, but it
does result in a more robust ecosystem.
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6 Birth of Order
With the environment as an interaction space, the last steps can be made to under-
stand such spaces from the Metis prerequisite that was introduced earlier. As was
argued then, this prerequisite considers such spaces to be highly undetermined; pat-
terns flow in, out and through them, juxtaposing with other patterns, or becoming
probability waves with only a certain chance of (re-)emerging somewhere. There is
only one thing that can be said with certainty, which is that an observer can usually
not make any easy predictions about this space.
However, if an observer recognises a pattern (that is, a pattern is matched), a
moment of order is established, as happens when an agent successfully interacts with
another one. At these moments, interaction patterns are momentarily formed and
conceptual patterns may be successfully transferred to the co-actors (even though
the pattern may contextualise differently). As these moments of order move from
agent to agent, there is a probability that at some point it re-enters agents it had
visited before.
In this setting, interactions are moments at which processes open a gateway be-
tween entities and spaces. In software engineering such (temporary) processes are
often called threads, which seems another appropriate tribute to the weaver’s vocab-
ulary.
In order to get a bit of a feel on how these threads may work, consider ants in an
ant colony that are foraging in an unknown environment. Due to the massive paral-
lel nature of the colony (millions of ants), they initially forage in a predominantly
exploratory fashion, until an ant stumbles on a foodstuff. From this moment on, the
ant will release a pheromone signal that leaves a trail as the ant brings the food-
stuff back to the nest. This pheromone signal acts as a tag, which allows a ranking
of the locations in an environment in terms of availability of food. Other ants pick
up this trail and start following it in the direction where the foodstuff was found,
reinforcing the trail when more foodstuffs are found which, in turn, attracts even
more ants. However, when the food runs out, fewer and fewer ants will reinforce the
trail until it finally dwindles and ceases. The trail’s lifecycle records a moment of
order with respect to foraging activities (goal). Note that during the existence of the
trail (thread), other trails are formed, which extend the moments of order, and create
coherence and stability for the entire colony.77
Along these threads, patterns flow through interaction space, sometimes forming
feedback loops that establish moments of order that may last a bit longer than oth-
ers, and may temporarily embrace the indeterminacy of the interaction space. And
in these pockets of relative stability, another thread may close a loop, reinforcing
the moment of order, while yet another takes over, until a web of threads manage to
maintain the stability in cooperation. This way, order allows for more order.
In PAC, the concept of ‘thread’ will be used as a description of a process that es-
tablishes a moment of order. The patterns discussed so far can all be seen as threads
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that describe a structure, but the path that is being followed along the complexity
perspective is another thread.78
Note that ‘stable’ simply means that its decay is delayed long enough for an
observer to witness this moment of order. These threads can be likened to sequences
of such moments of order which, when creating a feedback loop, may even reinforce
their own stability. As was mentioned earlier, stability means ‘delayed entropy’!
From this point of view, any complex agent is a node in a network where pat-
terns continuously flow through, momentarily contextualising in order to propagate
change, and then disappearing. A complex agent will, and must, have an extremely
large amount of such threads in order to be robust as every individual thread is ex-
tremely vulnerable. However, if every broken thread is complented by many others
that prevent the agent from disintegrating, entropy can delayed longer and longer,
especially for threads that require very little energy once they are formed.
With this, the ‘sea metaphor’ of Metis no longer seems to be appropriate, be-
cause the frame of reference has become even more volatile, dynamic, eventful and
momentary. The gradual shifting of the bias of our observations into this indetermi-
nate world of Metis is the most important contribution of being part of ‘interaction
spaces’ and ‘friction spaces’. This world still allows order; it is not opposed to it.
Rather it proposes a more complete view in which order is embedded in a fluid in-
determinate world.
Theories about a certain target can now be understood as a certain kind of narra-
tive that follows a pattern as it moves through interaction space. A gene will spawn
threads which flow through phenotype, population and species, which are reflected
at various moments and flow back to the source. If these threads produce or use
certain tags, like the checkers in Conway’s Game of Life, then an external observer
may see an entity. Entities thus are not the starting point of analysis, but rather must
be seen as manifestations of moments of order in friction space.
The ‘Metis prerequisite’ becomes important because it defines a frame of refer-
ence of ambiguity and indeterminacy, from which order can arise. Instead of en-
capsulating ambiguity in a straightjacket of order, order is seen ‘forming’ in the
sea of indeterminacy. The difference is that a notion where a ‘gardener has a hard
time keeping the weeds out of the garden’, is replaced with one where the garden
is formed in symbiosis with the weeds.79 It is also different to notion of ‘Order out
of Chaos’, unless ‘chaos’ is understood in the sense of mathematical chaos theory,
which acknowledges an aspect of order in chaos.80 The Metis prerequisite rather
would bypass the whole issue, by departing from indeterminacy on which order can
form.
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7 Wrapping Up
Along the complexity perspective, we have entered the realm of living cells and
moved away from that of machines. By following some discussions in biology,
and especially on the friction between threads of upward causality and downward
causality, the stage was set to analyse many contemporary discourses on gene tech-
nology from the pattern-approach of PAC.
A convergence inducing process was proposed as a possible major thread on
the complex theme of evolution theory, which extends the threads of upward and
downward causality with processes of feedback. The goal of this exercise was not
to propose a theory of evolution, although PAC certainly supports the more differen-
tiated narratives, but to see if patterns can be worthwhile tools in themes at this level
of complexity. By combining the convergence inducing process with a collection of
interaction patterns described in actor/co-actor, a more complex model was drawn,
that incorporates various flows of causality that have been proposed with respect to
a ‘gene’s-eye view’ of complexity. Conversely, the environment was given certain
agency through characteristics such as scarcity and interaction spaces, which sup-
ports bi-directional and temporal approaches of causality.
Again it should be stressed that these patterns are well-known in areas of compu-
tational intelligence, and so they are not novel, apart from maybe explicitly deploy-
ing them in evolutionary theories. Another difference may be that this alternative
stresses processes of feedback as operators of evolution theory rather than (atomic)
genes. It is also worth pointing out that this process-orientation is still perfectly
plausible in an upward-causal reductionist framing; it is merely a matter of extend-
ing the agency of the ‘parts’ that make the whole, and including more ‘parts’ as
the observer follows the various threads of causality. A major challenge to reduc-
tionism, determinism and strict causality, is the combinatorial explosion of dynamic
interactions in the networks that these threads span.
Along the complexity perspective, the concept of life seems to be a first major
gap caused by uncertainty. Living organisms are clearly existent at phenomenolog-
ical levels in biological domains. However, there are many uncertainty gaps in the
explanations of life, from structural and evolutionary perspectives, and currently life
seems to be one of the big mysteries of science. In fact, even many of the prereq-
uisites for living organisms are as yet unknown, such as sources and bootstrapping
mechanisms of autopoiesis.81
For the purposes here, along the complexity perspective, the markers ‘gene’ and
‘organism’ seem to introduce this emergent concept called ‘life’, and the question
arises if this concept may be a boundary of scale for the patterns of feedback that
were followed so far. As a first intuition, the answer would be no. Living organisms
interact with each other, and are known to engage in goal-directed behaviour, such
as when scourging for food. In fact, some of the patterns discussed so far, may
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only now become visible ‘beyond life’, as for instance ‘observation’ now enters the
contexts in which it is normally (and properly) used.
In the next chapter, the discourses concerning genes, evolution theory and specif-
ically human behaviour, will be intensified as the interface between biology and hu-
man society is explored. Criticism from sociology towards the ‘gene’s-eye view’ of
human behaviour will be discussed in greater detail. Two additional patterns will be
developed to assist in the analyses of the clashes at this level of complexity.
Chapter 7
Contextual Diminution and the Hourglass Pattern
So far, patterns of feedback have been followed along the complexity perspective
from (at best) complicated systems in the plane of organised simplicity to complex
ones in the plane of organised complexity. A few other patterns, such as the pattern
of difference and interaction patterns, were introduced to do justice to the increasing
complexity of the themes, and some discourses amongst theorists at different levels
had been concisely mentioned, mainly to demonstrate that the increasing complexity
makes it much harder to follow threads of causality and determinism.
Along the way, the patterns crossed the biological domain, which made it pos-
sible to address some themes that are vital for the theme of genomics. In order to
get there, a first boundary needed to be crossed, demarcated by the concept of ‘life’,
which did not seem to impose a limitation for the patterns. Bias, amplification and
feedback can still be used in models of living organisms, but concepts such as au-
tonomy, adaptation and plasticity seem to become more powerful at this stage, with
the result that ambiguity and uncertainty have increased.
It is worth remembering that the route along the complexity perspective is still
heading towards a social context, in which the concept of a ‘lingua democratica’
can be contextualised. There is a biological entity called ‘the human being’ which
engages in social interactions, and somewhere in these social interactions there is a
friction between technological developments and the social impact of these devel-
opments. After three quite technical chapters on patterns, it is good to recall this
itinerary to mind.
The transition from biological domains, to social domains is characterised by an-
other boundary called consciousness.1 This boundary is likely to severely ‘disturb’
any relatively simple pattern, because a conscious agent can know these patterns and
choose whether or not to adhere to them. At least, this is a theoretical possibility.
At the ‘simple’ side of the divide, there are two patterns that can be added to the
pattern library which may assist in the crossing.
One of these is related to context. ‘Context’ so far has been mainly used in its
colloquial sense, in the way that ‘such-and-such’ needs to be seen in this-and-that
context. This will change here, as context is going to become a bit more dynamic.
It will also have become clear that the complexity perspective so far, aligns with
the ‘outward’ perspective of John Dupre´. Even with the acknowledgement of ‘gaps
of uncertainty’ and processes of feedback, this perspective may become less domi-
nant in the increasingly complex contexts it is now moving into.
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1 Biology and Language Games
In the previous explorations into the realms of biology, it became clear that the fric-
tion between terms and the meanings behind them is increasing. When expanding
a pattern or phenomenon along a path of increasing complexity, it is likely that a
theme emerges at a ‘proto-stage’ and may not have the fullness of meaning that it
begets at a different level of complexity, such as was discussed in the ‘selfishness’ of
genes. Even though one may aim for clear distinctions, each with their own nomen-
clature, there is no denying that there will always be gray scales between terms. It
will be evident that a gradual approach will inevitably be directed into these waste-
lands in between such pockets of linguistic clarity.
As was argued in chapter two, the hard sciences often use terms in a very spe-
cific and constrained manner. There is no real problem in defining information as
‘meaningful data’ or genes as being ‘selfish’, as long as these terms are used in
a very specific context. The problem however is that this usage is often taken for
granted, and is hardly contested until it is taken out of their specific contexts and
used elsewhere.
Specifically when entering the realms of agents that we normally call ‘human be-
ings’, there is yet one mysterious quality that sets these agents apart from the agents
that were discussed so far, and that is consciousness.
For all its mystery, there is one property of consciousness that radically changes
a lot of discussions on agents, and this is that the agent has a certain knowledge of
‘self’ and (therefore) can beget a certain autonomy to choose its own actions. At
this point, ‘intentions’, ‘choices’ and ‘deliberate acts’ are used in the proper sense
of their meaning. This ‘proper’ sense of course, specifically applies for words that
are used in everyday life, where it has a certain ‘richness’ which cannot be main-
tained in the world of non-conscious beings. This richness is associated with a word
that has so far been diligently left out of the vocabulary of PAC, namely ‘meaning’.
This concept will get some more attention in the next chapter; for now it is worth
realising that if modelling activities aim to capture certain isomorphy with a target,
and the modelling uses a certain vocabulary to describe concepts, then the ‘match-
ing’ of a word with the corresponding aspect of a target becomes a delicate task. A
word chosen to describe a concept may become too rich or ‘narrow’, because of the
meanings it can have.
Practically, consciousness affects the explorations along the complexity perspec-
tive. On the downward slope towards organised simplicity, analysis, causality and
determinism seem to work fine, but many themes under investigation in biology are
clearly in the plane of organised complexity, and they are often also still largely un-
known. One of those boundaries that was already crossed is the concept of ‘life’, for
which there currently is no theory that goes beyond (informed) speculation.2
On the far side of the scale, ‘consciousness’, ‘meaning’ and ‘intelligence’ seem
to increase the uncertainty, at least if one assumes that these concepts are unique to
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‘living systems’, such as organisms.
For PAC, and probably any intellectual endeavour concerning these themes, these
boundaries introduce some problems. So far, patterns of feedback have been fol-
lowed into increasingly complex domains, from relatively simple forms such as
negative feedback to those described in more complex patterns, such as the conver-
gence inducing process. Do these patterns ‘move through’ these scale boundaries or
do they cease to be of influence?
Intuitively, a pattern such as a convergence inducing process does not seem to
be restricted to a-conscious phenomena, as organisms, humans and human societies
seem to display goal-directed behaviour, for instance when looking for food in the
case of organisms and humans, or maximising economic growth in the case of na-
tion states. However, in the particular case of consciousness, these patterns are at
least going to be affected by the assumption that a conscious agent may know that
it is engaging in, or is part of a pattern. With this, the full repertoire of desires, in-
tentions and choices as we humans may experience them, affect these patterns and
may complicate them.
This raises the problem of terminology mentioned earlier, which is quite pressing
because the intention of PAC is to develop a kind of general purpose vocabulary to
address themes in the plane of organised complexity.
There are two possible strategies to deal with this problem. One is to introduce
new terms and definitions every time the meaning of a term is stretched, while the
other option mainly uses certain words as explanatory analogies. Thus, a technical
system, an organism and a scientist can ‘observe’ and ‘understand’ something; the
technical system can ‘understand’ that the beam of a photo-electric cell is crossed,
while a gene or organism can ‘understand’ its environment.
It may have become clear that PAC often opts for a somewhat loose approach
to words and definitions, although strict definitions are certainly preferred if this is
possible. The reason for this is simple; because it is the aim of PAC is to navigate the
zones of ambiguity between these buoys of clarity. If Metis’s craft aims to ‘ride the
waves of complexity’, then this is where the friction space is. And this friction space
is tightening as the sea becomes more rugged. At the outset there was little problem
assigning agents certain ‘rationality’ by giving them ‘beliefs’, ‘intentions’ and ‘de-
sires’, but now a point has been passed where it is becoming problematic to assign
‘selfishness’, ‘purpose’, ‘benefit’ and ‘punishment’ to genes and other concepts with
questionable agency; isomorphy may wear very, very thin at this point!
However, the point I want to make here is that this friction is occurring, and for
the lingua democratica, it is of interest to see why this appears to take place at this
level of complexity.
A loose approach does hold a risk of confusion. For instance, ‘knowing’ in the
way human beings may ‘know’ or ‘understand’ things, is highly unlikely for, say,
an ant. Yet an ant, even in a most rudimentary form, must be able to make some
internal representations of its surroundings, and thus the question arises whether
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the ant ‘knows’ or ‘understands’ certain aspects of its environment. If the answer
is a clear ‘no’, then immediately the problem arises of when a certain sentience
becomes knowing or understanding. Is consciousness a prerequisite? If so, does a
mouse, or a hamster or dolphin have a certain consciousness? Should one aim for a
terminological scale of ‘knowing’ along such a gradient?
Edward Wilson pays extensive attention to this issue in his monumental work
on socio-biologyi and, in his discussion on methodology, he warns against science
that ends up being a form of ‘terminological bookkeeping’ which, although very
important, may end up taking up more time than the hypothesis-inductive approach
that science ideally should be. On the other hand, he understands that pushing the
meaning of definitions in order to fit an unwilling reality, usually makes an uncom-
fortable straightjacket, and so quoting Hardin (1957), he specifically warns against
the phenomenon of panchreston:
a word, or ‘concept’ covering a wide range of different phenomena and loaded with a dif-
ferent meaning for each user, a word that attempts to ‘explain’ everything but explains
nothing3
Within the vocabulary that is currently developed in complexity thinking, especially
emergence runs a risk of becoming a panchreston. Emergence without premises, or
bootstrapping mechanisms, can become quite hollow if it is used to advance theory.
It is here, that I prefer to restrain the urge of terminological book-keeping and
opt for as few words as possible. Thus, in PAC an ant may ‘know’ or ‘understand’
things, but in the context of an ant. I will also try to restrain the use of such terms
if it can be avoided. Furthermore, it should be noted that this ‘loose’ approach runs
a severe risk of metaphorical contamination, that implicitly more meanings are in-
correctly ‘injected’ in the concept, as for instance the metaphorical ‘selfishness’
of genes has demonstrated. There seems to be certain friction between descriptive
clarity and carefulness at this level of complexity.
It is worth pointing out that a pattern can also become a panchreston. In fact,
Hardin’s warning seems quite similar to the ‘reminiscence syndrome’ mentioned
earlier.ii
2 Incomplete Learning
Adaptive agents usually have the implicit or explicit trait of learning. The agents
usually adapt by storing the results of an evaluation of the problem domain, and
readjusting their behaviour accordingly.
In many learning systems, such as neural networks, the learning phase is dis-
tinctly different from their operational phase. During the learning phase, the neu-
rones learn certain patterns such as representations of handwritten numbers, letters
and so on, by first exposing them to so-called training sets of what they have to
i Which is probably not surprising, considering his field of specialism.
ii It may therefore be worthwhile to introduce a BS-pattern, which generalises all patterns that are
used inappropriately
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learn. The networks will be trained by readjusting their weights if the outputs of the
network do not correspond with the desired results. If, for instance, the network is
attached to a camera that reads the numbers zero to nine, the weights of the network
will be readjusted if it recognises a ‘3’ if the number ‘8’ is scanned —I am referring
to the shape of the numbers here—, or a ‘1’ if a ‘7’ is scanned.iii
The most classic approach to training a neural network is based on increasing
or decreasing weights every time the network has chosen a certain pattern. The
weights are changed depending on whether the chosen pattern corresponds with the
correct result or not. An incorrect decision is fed back to the neurones that fired,
which makes them less sensitive to the particular learning pattern on the input of
the system the next time. One could consider this a ‘punishment’ for making the
wrong choice. This manner of training continues until the network no longer makes
any mistakes. The similarity between ‘3’ and ‘8’, or ‘1’ and ‘7’ in the example was
consciously chosen as the network often has to learn to make distinctions between
very similar, yet different, patterns. The difference between a ‘3’ and an ‘8’ may
still be very clear if they have been produced by a nice and tidy computer font, but if
the network has to recognise this difference in handwritten numbers, such as postal
codes on an envelope, the distinctions become very fuzzy.4
The training sets need to be carefully chosen as a neural network is very vulner-
able in the learning stage. The input patterns that have to be stored in the network,
which in the example represent the numbers 0-9, are mapped on an abstract, math-
ematical ‘chart’. Coarsely stated, every pattern can be drawn on this chart as a form
with a distinct location and surface area, a bit like dropping pebbles of different
sizes and weights in a pond. The smaller and lighter pebbles create small ripples
that dampen out quickly, and the larger, heavier ones make larger ripples that travel
further. All of the ‘drop zones’ of these pebbles can be compared to the ‘ideal’ shape,
and the extent of the ripples represents the area in which the network will have no
problems identifying a detected number. As the pebbles representing ‘1’ and ‘7’ (or
‘3’ and ‘8’) fall relatively near each other, they will both create a plane where the
ripples interfere. If a detected number is positioned in this ambiguous zone, the net-
work will ‘decide’ on one or the other systems-internally.
During the learning stage, the network ideally has to be trained in such a way that
there is no overlap between the areas, for this would mean that some input signals
would be matched with multiple learned patterns. On the other hand, these areas
should ideally remain as large as possible in order to cover as large as possible an
area on the chart. In the initial phases of learning, the overlap will be tremendous, but
iii I used to do a lot of organised hikes when I was young. For some of these walks you would get
a silver medal after completing ten hikes, which was recorded by adding a small silver tag with
the bronze medal that showed the completed hikes. Naturally, many tried to fool the organising
committee by turning the tag with number ‘6’ around, so it seemed as if they had completed ‘9’
hikes. The committee checked this vigorously. I discovered a loop-hole in the system when I semi-
accidentally handed over number ‘4’ upside down, which sufficiently resembled number ‘7’ in
order to get me a jump in the ranking.
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as more learning sets are provided, the circles become increasingly small, until the
network is no longer ‘punished’, and the zone of ambiguity is as small as possible.
An approach that is often used is to begin training with idealised sets, which quickly
result in distinct but small circles, and then expanding the variety in input patterns
(for instance different handwriting styles) in order to expand the circles. It will be
clear that there will always be a point where it is unreasonable to expect that a
neural network can still distinguish between two patterns (for instance with very
bad handwriting such as my own), and that errors will occur more quickly between
a ‘1’ and ‘7’, or a ‘3’ and ‘8’, than between a ‘1’ and ‘8’.
A neural network can only learn to differentiate between these often small differ-
ences if they are trained with all the numbers they need to recognise and sufficiently
large amounts of these numbers in various forms and shapes (for instance fonts or
handwriting styles) are provided in order to make the correct decisions once they
are put to work. If, for instance, the training set does not include number ‘8’, the
neural network may decide that it is dealing with number ‘3’ instead, even though
it is ‘punished’ every time it makes this decision. It is a simple truth that a neu-
ral network will never learn a pattern that it has never been offered to learn!iv This
omission of training sets is, for obvious reasons, called incomplete learning.
Whilst a neural network usually has two distinct modes of operation, namely
a training phase and a normal (recognition) operation, many learning systems, in-
cluding us humans, are continuously combining these modes. Learning is therefore
intertwined with ‘acting’ (and being corrected on these acts by external influences),
and while this usually is a tremendously powerful activity, it means that the environ-
ment serves as a referee for these actions. Learning follows a convergence inducing
process, as acts based on this learning —-for instance by doing an exam, or trying to
ride a bicycle— are evaluated by the environment. The environment both provides
the ‘training sets’ and determines the quality of (the responses to) these sets. A very
stable environment will tend to reward a limited amount of highly effective actions,
which is comparable to specialisation in nature. Conversely, a very volatile environ-
ment (many different training sets) will reward a large range of actions that may be
less effective than those of specialisation, but allows a greater amount of adaptation,
such as for instance in the case of opportunism.
To summarise the above, this process is a convergence inducing process that con-
sists of a learning agent in its environment.
Whereas other animals are largely subject to the learning sets that nature pro-
vides, we humans, homo faber, are masters in adapting our immediate environment
or surroundings, to our personal benefit. The resulting stability is often what is con-
sidered ‘orderly’ in the colloquial sense of the word. This stability is often the result
of applying securing mechanisms to the environment. Dams are built to stabilise
iv Actually this is not quite true, as some very sophisticated neural networks can learn to combine
known patterns to create new ones. With a little fantasy, the poor tormented neural network could
‘decide’ that a combination of a ‘1’ and a ‘3’ might make a reasonable ‘8’ if it does not get punished
for this choice
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the flow of water, houses are built to stabilise the fluctuations of the weather for its
inhabitants, and so on. For the purposes here, these agents could be called securing
actors, assuming that they can learn to secure their surroundings.
A securing actor creates a very specific form of re-entry between itself and its
surroundings. The surroundings are continuously adjusted in an artificial manner,
but this also reduces the training sets provided by the environment.
Another means that an agent can use to reduce the training sets, is by simply
filtering observations. As was pointed out earlier, observer agents are continuously
ranking data and their actions are based on these rankings. If these rankings bias
orderly phenomena with respect to random or volatile ones, then the illusion of
order is given. However, when a securing agent is biased with the illusion of order,
this can to some extent result in a positive feedback loop that reinforces the illusion.
In a way, over time it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as long as the (wider)
environment does not interrupt.
The ranked mental models are put in place to reshape the surroundings, result-
ing in a tendency to converge to a limited amount of ranked sets that become in-
creasingly important. In other words, the tendency for specialisation is amplified. If
there is too little variation in the learning sets that are offered (or which are artifi-
cially blocked out), this would mean that increasingly smaller sets of highly ranked
concepts can be formed. As sets of high-ranked data become increasingly small,
they create increasingly incomplete learning sets, which converge to tiny sets of ex-
tremely highly-ranked data.
Pattern: Incomplete Learning
Description: A securing actor stabilises its surroundings and –possibly- filters
its observations in order to bias order. In general, if the acting
confirms the observations, then a loop of increasing incomplete
learning is enforced
A.K.A: Surroundings are sometimes called neighbourhoods
Notes: It can be argued that ‘incomplete learning’ is incorrect, as it as-
sumes that ‘complete learning’ is possible. Learning essentially
requires disruptions of the actor’s internal models with novel in-
put
As a hypothetical analogy, consider a C.E.O of a multinational oil company and,
for the sake of argument, let’s assume that the person is concerned about his com-
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munity, the world he lives in, and he truly shares the ideal of making this world a
better place for all its inhabitants. But he also has a multi-billion euro company to
run with thousands of employees and a lot of shareholders who demand value for
their investments. With these immediate responsibilities, this person will prefer to
read the Financial Times rather than pamphlets of a small anti-globalist group that
is concerned about global warming. The Financial Times is likely to focus on issues
that the C.E.O can relate to, such as the activities of the competition, the political sit-
uation in the areas where his company is active, and on the developments of salaries
of other C.E.Os. Thus his attention will tend to focus on these matters. Even though
the C.E.O is a reasonable man, and concerned with the world around him, the fact
of the matter is that there are only 24 hours in a day and that the company is sucking
up all of his time and energy. It is not that he does not sympathise with the concerns
of the pamphlet, but to him it is relatively insignificant.
Every day the C.E.O is trapped in this convergent, positive feedback loop of opti-
mising ranking on issues of his company, his salary, and the group of high potentials
in his management team who say he’s a great leader and doing a good job.v In his
spare time he is amongst his peers, with similar, successful careers, who probably
all read the Financial Times as well. There is nothing that warns him that he is
trapped in the feedback loop of incomplete learning, until one day a strong external
trigger from the environment in the form of an outraged strike by his personnel,
confronts him with his gigantic annual pay rise while a reorganisation in his com-
pany is putting a lot of people out of work. As the media jump into the commotion,
it soon becomes apparent that the company is paying bandits protection fees that
are being used to finance terrorist activities, and that oil spills in certain regions are
contaminating natural reserves and local communities. Within days the process of
incomplete learning has been breached and the fullness of a wider interaction space
has replaced one set of highly significant selections with others.
Obviously this explanation of a hypothetical story we may read about in the
papers is only one of many others. Women (and increasingly more men) read mag-
azines that tell them how to dress, how to behave and even what they should think.
They read such magazines out of interest, but this interest can initiate a process
where interest becomes obsession. The positive feedback is related to the fact that
the magazines amplify certain interests which then are reflected back to the group
that determines the importance of these interests. An initial bias, for instance a trend
that is depicted as the latest thing to keep an eye on, can be amplified and re-entered
and thus can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Likewise men (and increasingly more women) get initiated in contemporary rites
that revere symbols associated with alcohol, soccer clubs, fast cars and scarcely
dressed women (or men), which can trigger positive feedback processes that may
result in hooliganism, lethal accidents and abuse.
Of course we have to be careful here, for all these examples are on the far side
of the conscious divide. It is up to psychologists, sociologists and other specialised
v They would probably not be considered high potentials if they told him he sucks big time . . .
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domain experts to determine whether the patterns described in the vocabulary that is
developed here may be source of inspiration for experiment and theory, and if, and
how, they affect human individuals, human societies and their own interferences
with subject matter. The only argument made here is that these patterns are known,
and maybe they are isomorphic at the level of complexity of social agents.
The main point is that actual processes may be much more involved than those
of linear causality or determinism. It would take a number of consecutive measure-
ments, repeated certain moments in time, to capture the trends that these processes
elicit in a certain environment. Not forgetting the additional effects, when the test
results become known to the test subjects.
The pattern of incomplete learning, I think, is an interesting candidate for many
processes where agents can ‘mould’ their surroundings through filtering and secur-
ing.
Here again it is worth pointing out that a distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’
systems can be problematic. When looking at the processes, a system becomes
closed when there are no interruptions in the processes from the environment. In
this case, as is clearly demonstrated, the closure involves an open actor who is in-
fluenced by a portion of its environment, while the feedback loop can be closed as
long as the environment does not interfere.
Conceptual patterns can now become disruptive, which means that they alter the
internal models of the actor. These disruptions either reinforce existing concepts
(i.e. they become more significant with respect to others), or they provide novel
patterns, which could be considered learning in the stricter sense of the word. The
pattern of difference becomes an influence here. If conceptual patterns interfere with
contextual ones, then the aspects of those patterns that form the common frame of
reference will be reinforced, while the distinctions create ambiguity or novelty.
However, this does not mean that any conceptual pattern that is offered to the
agent can be ranked according to these options. In fact, most patterns will hardly
have any effect on the internal models, as they are (considered) insignificant. Some
additional prerequisites are needed, in order for a conceptual pattern to be disruptive.
3 Closing Domains
The pattern of incomplete learning is partially dependent on the interactions be-
tween environment and surroundings. In one situation, the environment is totally
sealed off from the surroundings, the interactions do not interfere with the goals
of the agent, or the agent effectively manages to filter out the disruptions. In these
cases the convergence to limited learning sets will not be disrupted.
At the other extreme, environments may be extremely dynamic or volatile for a
certain agent, there may be no surroundings to speak of, and filtering may be absent.
In this situation, an agent may not be able to rank the observed input, with the result
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that it cannot identify any conceptual patterns. There are at least two situations in
which this can occur. The first is when the agent does not sense any pattern in that
environment, and only randomness or noise is observed. In the second, the agent
may be sensitive for certain patterns in the environment, but they fail to contextualise
in the modelling environment. The patterns may be too complex, or they may simply
not match those in the agent’s internal repository.
In both cases, the modeller can follow two strategies. The first strategy is that
the conceptual pattern is approximated with patterns that are at the agent’s disposal.
This introduces some uncertainty which depends on the quality of approximation.
When the agent acts on these approximations, then the uncertainty will result in
certain risk.
The second strategy is to model the conceptual patterns as being random. This
may result in an inability to act effectively, or act at all. In both cases, the com-
plexity of the target is reduced towards either the plane of organised simplicity, or
unorganised complexity.
Apparently there is a relationship between an agent and the environment it finds
itself in, which follows a gradient between two extremes. The first extreme is
an environment that is very stable or static for the agent. This is often the case
with problem–solving agents that were described earlier, for instance with software
agents that are mining data. This situation allows the agent to be taken up in a
convergence-inducing process that optimises very effectively, and results in rela-
tively small sets of high-ranked data. In its extreme, this may lead to a state of
absolutismvi, in the sense that few patterns are embedded in a limited context. Most
data is insignificant, and the few patterns that are contextualised are extremely sig-
nificant. If the agent has to act on these concepts, it will be highly efficient in that
environment. As (long as) the environment does not contest these rankings, they will
continuously be reinforced, as there is no need or trigger for re-evaluation.
in this situation, ‘order’ can be replaced by determinism and analysis; that is, the
system converges towards the plane of organised simplicity.
At the other extreme, the agent perceives the environment as being so tremen-
dously volatile that it can no longer make an effective ranking. All the data that are
sampled become comparable, and so it is impossible to make a useful ranking. This
can be considered a lethargic state. An environment can always drive an agent to-
wards the attractor of lethargy, for instance by creating pure randomness (or dead
silence), or because the complexity of the environment is beyond the modelling
capacities of an agent. It will be clear that in very volatile environments, simple pro-
cesses will fail more easily than more complex ones. In that sense, the ‘volatility’
of the environment is a relationship between the modelling capabilities of an agent
and environment dynamics. In this case, the system converges in the direction of
unorganised complexity.5
vi Experts on narrative research will point out that the choice of these terms is not innocent, as they
have strong political connotations. I am both aware of this, and consciously choose this associa-
tion, to demonstrate the problem of terminology. I will speak of ‘the attractors of absolutism and
lethargy’ to make it clear that these words are used to describe a pattern.
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In what follows, the environment will be considered as having certain agency of
stability and volatility for descriptive clarity, but it should be kept in mind that these
characteristics should be seen in relationship to a certain agent that aims to model
its environment.
Any agent that has to achieve certain goals in a dynamic environment needs to
operate within the extremes of stability and volatility. If the agent is part of a con-
vergence inducing process, it will tend towards the attractor of absolutism, but it
also needs to be equipped with a certain flexibility to move back to a more adaptive
or opportunistic state if the nature of the environment requires this. The resulting
rankings (effectiveness) may not be as good as those of absolute convergence, but
they will allow a larger ‘band-width’ of reasonable results.
The symbiotic networks that were discussed in the previous chapter display this
behaviour in a rudimentary sense. Recall that symbiotic networks follow a conver-
gence inducing process, in the sense that they converge to a state where the stress
signals are minimal, and that these stress signals are partially dependent on the en-
vironment in which the network operates. In a stable environment, the system as a
wholevii will no longer produce any stress, and the output of the network will be sta-
ble. However, any disruption in the environment immediately induces stress signals
which will reactivate the learning of the network which will then aim to converge to
a new stable state.6
Agents that are equipped with capabilities to create elaborate internal mappings
of their environment will evidently be better equipped to deal with dynamic en-
vironments. Such mapping mechanisms may differentiate between stable patterns
and chaotic ones in the dynamics of the environment. They may be able to model
complex conceptual patterns by juxtaposing simpler forms, or they may be able to
differentiate between various gradients of such dynamics. This way they can recall
maps for stable conditions or more volatile ones, and effectuate them when required,
for instance when engaging in coordinated action in that environment.
It will be clear that the capabilities to store and recall these maps affect the agent’s
abilities to operate in its environment. Although the repertoire of such agents be-
comes much larger than simple convergence-inducing processes, it can be argued
that the pull towards the attractor of absolutism still holds.
First, this attractor is still a favoured position as energy-wise it is still the most
efficient one to be in, at least when modelling activities require energy. If the envi-
ronment is perceived to be sufficiently stable so that the agent can do with simple
internal mappings, then there is little incentive to maintain elaborate internal mod-
els of the agent’s environment, and so the most important mappings (concepts) will
be reinforced continuously. At the other extreme, there will always be environments
that appear (or are) random, or which otherwise do not allow effective mappings. So
even though these agents may still operate effectively in very volatile environments
which a simple convergence-inducing process can no longer handle, both can still
find themselves in a random environment.
vii There can be local pockets of stress though, but these balance each other out globally
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With this, it can be argued that both attractors lead to contextual diminution of
the internal models. Both attractors lead to a reduction of ‘information’, in the sense
that less contextual patterns are formed in the model. Conversely, the models are
maximised in environments in between stable and random. In stable environments,
contextual diminution happens because the agent does not require elaborate internal
mappings to guide the convergence-inducing process, while in volatile environments
the agent is unable to learn useful contextual maps that would guide the process. As
a result, we can now see a pattern unfold that depicts a relationship between the
contextual space of such an agent, and the environment it finds itself in.
Pattern: Contextual Diminution
Description: Diminution of Contextual Maps as Relationship with Environ-
ment
A.K.A:
Notes: The state of Absolutism is more or less closed for all but the
strongest of disruptions. The lethargic state is extremely open
In the above pattern, the horizontal axis shows the conditions of the environment.
Along the vertical axis, various processes try to confine the context of the internal
models. These predominantly have a pressure towards the attractor of absolutism.
The attractors of absolutism and lethargy are represented by circles with rela-
tively small diameters, which correspond with the contextual space in which the
agent operates. In absolutist states, the number of contextual patterns is small be-
cause convergence is maximised —-few selections with maximum ranking—, while
a lethargic state does not really provide any useful rankings; data largely remains
data. In between the two extremes of absolutism and lethargy, the diameter is rela-
tively large, as relatively large sets of significant data are maintained that reflect the
dynamics of the environment.
The absolutist circle is (almost) closed, as the ability to break out of this mode is
very difficult. Without additional means, the convergence inducing process will be
attracted to the high rankings due to the fact that new testing and evaluation cycles
will always yield poorer results. Besides this, the relatively large gradient between
significant patterns and ‘details’, prevents conceptual patterns from disrupting the
status quo.
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The circle that represents the lethargic attractor is extremely open, but the con-
text is confined by a lack of assignment of ranking sets to data, thereby preventing
internal maps or contextual patterns from being formed. There is, so to speak, a lot
of data with very little means of ranking. The difference with absolutism is that in
the lethargic mode, there is an extreme openness towards the environment, but it is
the openness of a leaking bucket in the rain; water flows in and out, and meanwhile
nothing changes.
The middle ring reflects a mix of these extremes. There is certain openness to
respond to changes in the environment, but also sufficient closure to effectively rank
data. Both, the environment as well as the internal ranking capabilities of the agent,
determine the effectiveness of the mix. Absolutism will be countered in a volatile
environment, while lethargy may be resolved by stabilising the agent’s surround-
ings. In both situations the agent will be pressed to a state where it is more respon-
sive to contingencies from its environment. This awareness tends to become less
near the attractors, as most data become insignificant in these poles. In the centres
however, the awareness is maximised. Obviously this is the place where there is the
most openness towards one’s surroundings. Openness in this sense therefore, can be
considered to be a certain awareness of contingencies in the environment.
Note that when different types of agents are compared with respect to their inter-
nal modelling abilities, the pattern of contextual diminution tends to shift towards
stable environments with a relatively small circumference for simple agents, while
very elaborate modelling agents will be able to shift more towards randomness, and
have a wider circumference, as they will recognise and learn more complex patterns
than just simple ones. However, all are confined to the optimal curve that the pattern
describes.
A state of absolutism makes agents susceptible to sudden changes in the envi-
ronment. Basically, absolutism can only persist if the environment allows it, and
so when this ‘contract’ is breached, the agents are forced to re-evaluate their se-
lections in order to adapt to a changed environment. As absolutism accompanies a
certain ‘blindness’ for the environment —”they only see what they want to see”,
as Cole Sears observed in ‘the Sixth Sense’viii [247] — these interruptions will be
unexpected, but they are also potentially volatile when the agent has little flexibility
to deal with these unwanted changes. There is simply no, or only a little, knowl-
edge base to cope with this novel input, and so only other aspects that determine
the flexibility of the agent determine how quickly it will readjust to the changed
circumstances. And flexibility is just what an absolutist agent will have very little
of, as the contextual space can be severely contracted.
A dynamic environment invites a wider range of strategies, which are usually less
effective than absolutist selections, but which allow more adaptability. The scarce-
ness of storage capacity poses limitations on this adaptability and so there is a point
where the environment becomes so volatile that the agent can no longer effectively
act in it.
viii For dead people, that is
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Most agents will be in continuous flux between the extremes of the two attrac-
tors. On one hand they face contextual diminution and other more or less conscious
forces that pull them towards absolutism; on the other hand the dynamics of their
environment, its continuous change, and the permanent interactions with the sur-
roundings of other agents pulls them towards lethargy. These forces do not counter-
balance each other, but more or less work side by side, sometimes gaining over the
other, and sometimes losing. In other words, contextual diminution tends to move
towards a certain state of indeterminacy where influences from the environment are
sufficiently strong to stop the process of diminution. ‘Healthy’ agents will be those
who manage to close their surroundings sufficiently to keep oversight, without los-
ing certain openness to influences with the environment that might be potentially
disruptive. By keeping these ‘antennae’ tuned to other influences and novel experi-
ences, they will manage to remain optimally sensitive towards the environment and
will be able to act before a contingency becomes a real problem. This, however, is
an unstable position and requires a lot of energy and action to maintain.
Contextual diminution reflects back on the modelling activities. If target, mod-
eller and model are taken up in a feedback loop —and in PAC this is always the
case—, a flexible modelling environment may adjust itself to the requirements of
the target and modeller. A simple target, or coarse modelling activities will lead
to simple models or, in terms of the pattern of contextual diminution, to models
that converge easily towards the attractor of absolutism. Conversely, very complex
and confusing targets, or extremely detailed modelling requirements may push the
model towards the attractor of lethargy.
Any agent that uses models or representations to operate in its life-world will
therefore, not only be subject to feedback loops between target and model, but also
to the effects of contextual diminution of the modeling environment.
4 The Hourglass Pattern
So far, the patterns that have been followed do not seem to be affected by concepts
such as ‘life’ or ‘consciousness’, but it seems plausible that this does not apply
for all patterns. At least, ‘life’ and ‘consciousness’ are the lower boundary of new
processes or phenomena —those which the concepts describe—, and so something
changes at these markers along the complexity perspective.
It may be tempting to consider these markers ‘boundaries’, but this may give the
impression that they are completely impermeable, and this is clearly not the case;
some patterns are not affected by them. For this reason, they will be considered in-
terface concepts.
Interfaces demarcate two (or more) distinct points of transition. The most straight-
forward examples are boundaries (a specialisation of an interface), which demarcate
a transition from for instance, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ perspectives. But interfaces are
more intricate than this alone. The transition of water from a frozen state to liquid,
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and from liquid to gas show a similar change from one descriptive vocabulary (e.g.
crystal structure) to another. As was mentioned earlier, some proponents of com-
plexity take an interest in ‘the edge of chaos’ where order and disorder interfere.
The edge of chaos can be considered another form of interface.
These interfaces will usually be predominantly observed through their character-
istic of closure (filtering, binding, sealing), but this does not do them justice. In fact,
fully closed systems —that is systems with fully closed interfaces—will not be very
interesting as they do not interact with their environment.
An interface needs at least one form of permeability in order to serve as a ‘gate-
way’ from one side to the other (and/or vice versa). With this, an interface quickly
increases the complexity of system-observer interactions. This section will explore
some of the issues related to these interfaces.
4.1 Micro, Macro and Machines
In his book ”I am a Strange Loop”, Douglas Hofstadter introduces free-roaming
electromagnetic marbles called ‘simms’ and their aggregates called ‘simmballs’ as
playful analogies on a discussion of reductionism, in a similar vein to a previous
discussion on the aggregates of checkers in Conway’s ‘Game of Life’.7
Hofstadter argues that the operation of simmballs cannot be meaningfully de-
scribed in terms of simms, but rather develop their own nomenclature, in the same
way that the checkers in Conway’s Game of Life created ‘gliders’ and ‘predators’
and so on. This pattern also returned in the ‘micro-macro’ problem in networks.
Hofstadter uses his simms and simmballs as an anti-thesis for a too rigid use of re-
ductionism; a simmball is more than the sum of simms and the additional emergent
characteristics cannot be described by looking at the simms themselves. Note that
the opposite may also apply; one cannot know the simms from the simmballs.
It may be clear that the micro-macro problem demarcates an interface. When ob-
serving the aggregate form (the ‘outside’), one cannot see the constituents, while the
‘inside’ perspective from the individual elements block a clear view of the aggregate
form. In computer models it is possible to make models that allow both sides (and
maybe others as well) to be seen, but it is worth pointing out that the transition from
micro to macro (and vice versa), in this particular case, usually introduces an ‘un-
certainty gap’. That is, the observer cannot know how the transformation between
the levels takes place or what happens there.
Similar effects can be witnessed at less abstract levels in everyday life. I started
my professional career as a ‘mechatronic’ engineer, which meant that I also had
some training in mechanics, pneumatics and so on, besides my core training in elec-
trotechnics and software development. This meant that I, and the other ‘mechatron-
icians’ in the companies I worked for, were always the ones who were sent off to
the customer for often extended periods of time in order to set the machines in op-
eration. Being single at the time, I usually liked this part of my job and so I never
minded spending weeks in a row in a hotel room somewhere in foreign countries,
or night after night in a production plant somewhere on the outskirts of a city.
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During those visits, I would witness the gradual maturity of such machines,
which usually were just beyond prototype stage, and saw them take their place in
the wider production facilities of the plant. As I gradually also became one of the
(more alien) members of the plants I worked in, I started witnessing, and to some
extent getting involved, in company policies, politics and the social interactions on
the floor, especially while trying to get to know the female employees that worked
there better.
The question that is necessitated here, is how could I ever explain the socio-
political consequences of a machine in a production plant in terms of its internal
parts? When the machine went into production, it became more than just an assem-
bly of nuts and bolts, gears, transporter belts, mechanical gadgets, a computational
processing unit and a few miles of electric cables. Its position in a plant also made
it an actor in factory policies and organisation. Part of the machine can be described
in nuts and bolts, and it will give an accurate description of what it primarily does.
I can describe this in a proper reductionist fashion. But another part of the machine
can only be described by focusing on the machine from its surroundings. This thread
can only be told in terms of company policies, the employees, or even the country it
is located in. This was already described in the previous chapter with the ‘inward’
causality of John Dupre´, and similar ideas expressed by Robert Ulanowicz.
At this level the machine is not the ‘sum of its parts’, yet part of a larger meta-
level. This meta-level is the ‘input’ of this particular narrative of the machine, which
has little relevance to its electromechanical signature.
A part of the resulting dilemma can be answered by appreciating the fact that
the machine, like the checkers in Conway’s Game of Life, is a tag of processes
that emanate from its internal elements into its surroundings and are re-entered into
the machine from its surroundings. The machine manifests itself to its surroundings
not only through its primary production, but also because of its signature for job
security, work conditions, safety hazards, and a forger of group interaction between
its operators. Some of these signatures are related to its mechanical parts, some
absolutely not, and some at best partially.
But the appreciation of re-entrant processes is not all there is to say. Apparently
machines in production plants, or simmballs are loci of multiple descriptions, nar-
ratives, or stories, all of which contribute to what that entity is! Some stories can be
told ‘from the inside out’, some from the outside in, and many as a combination of
both.
Yet all these threads at one point focus on a single concept: machine, simmball,
glider. There is one place in all of these threads where the focus is one concept. Nuts,
bolts, gears and belts become ‘machine’. Factory, policies and employees become
‘machine’. And ‘machine’ makes the sense of the thread. In this sense, ‘machine’ is
a conceptual ‘neck’ that forges relationships between factory, operators and policies
on one hand, and between nuts, gears and belts on the other. This neck is the friction
between parts and surroundings, a necessary friction, where the relationships are
made significant. These relationships correspond to flows of change, of processes,
and the stories that the observer tells follow these processes that move through it.
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Basically every thread describes one, or a few processes that involve the machine.
Every entity in a complex system is therefore more than just structure. It is also
a unit of ‘vertical’ transformation of flow between internal subsystem and the meta-
system it is part of, and ‘horizontal transformation’ of flow through other entities
it is related to. The observer can only fully grasp this flow if her position is such
that she can fully oversee the process and is able to understand the full extent of the
chain of cause and effect of this flow. A thread such as ‘the car broke down because
of a flake of corroded metal blocked the fuel hose that is connected to the engine’
has a smaller scope than the almost similar thread ‘the car broke down because of a
flake of corroded metal in the fuel hose, and caused a major traffic jam’. The driver
may understand both threads, the dog in the car with her will at best understand the
partial thread ‘the car has stopped’. But in both cases, the car, in the words of John
Dupre´, has become a ‘node in a causal nexus’.8
Hofstadter uses the metaphor of ‘simmballs’ that consist of conglomerates of
magnetic marbles called simms, but which have emergent properties that transcend
this fact. He argues that simmballs are much more than the ‘sum of simms’, and that
the emergent qualities can, amongst others, be found in the mutual interactions at the
level of simmballs. From this point on, he uses almost the rest of the book to attempt
to win the mindsets of more reductionist perspectives on simms and simmballs in
favour of the notion that a simmball is indeed an entity in its own right. This effort
is obviously required because the simmballs are still so vividly connected to the
simms.
The socio-political dynamics of a machine in a production plant are highly un-
related to its electro-mechanical constituents. I would have to incorporate extensive
argumentation to convince a reluctant audience —-probably the same audience that
Hofstadter is addressing— to argue why the ‘machine’ is also more than the sum of
the parts ‘factory’ or ‘operators’, and why the mechanical parts can still have mean-
ing in such a thread.
Another example, may demonstrate this. This particular thread starts with the
fact that any new machine in a production environment is usually regarded with
scepticism and distrust, especially when it is a prototype. Obviously the fact that a
prototype machine is far from perfect when it starts its first test runs, does not help
in its acceptance in the local community at the plant, but there are other issues, such
as a resistance to change that many people have, the inevitable safety hazards of any
high-speed, high power production machine, the prospect of having to submit to
extensive training sessions in order to learn to operate it and, extremely important,
the fact that a new machine usually means fewer jobs in the long run.
I had been made distinctly aware of these issues while working at the engineering
department of a production plant a few years earlier.ix Being one of the colleagues
instead of a relative outsider, had drawn me closer to the inside gossip and critique
on the machines we developed there, and so I knew about the reluctance on the pro-
ix This factory was part of a major French company and made truck tyres. This has resulted in my
strange and persisting streak of always checking trucks and buses to see what tyres they have
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duction floor that often accompanied the installation and start-up of new machines.
Quite by accident I found a means of improving the acceptance of a machine that
had been developed to process newspapers for an international customer. One quite
involving task was to programme the error messages for various production prob-
lems that could arise. Normally such messages would inform the operator some-
thing quite unintelligible such as ‘Photocell B4 Time-out’, ‘Cylinder P2 Jammed’,
or something in a similar parlance that could only make sense to the service techni-
cians.
As I did not like such messages, I wanted to replace them with more intuitive ones
which, due to the limitations of the display we used, were restricted to forty charac-
ters. For instance ‘Newspapers are stuck at the inlet (B4)’ or ‘Newspapers block the
folding unit (P2)’. As a result, I started out writing down all the possible scenarios
of paper jams, defects, bin overflows and all other malfunctions the machine could
run into, which needed to be translated in the local language by someone.
As a matter of coincidence, the machine had started test production and would
run about an hour or so during the regular night shift. Therefore every now and then
an operator would walk into my office and tell me that something had gone wrong.
Naturally this happened as I was filling in my list of error messages, and as I accom-
panied the operator to the machine to fix the problem, it suddenly struck me that I
could just as well ask him to provide the text. When we arrived and looked at a bun-
dle of newspapers folded into a highly undesirable origami on top of the machine, I
asked the operator how he would describe the situation we were witnessing, and to
do so in his own language, in maximally forty characters. After his initial surprise
he set to work and I immediately added his text in the software update at the end of
the night.
Over the following days, more people started giving me pieces of paper with
the problems they had encountered during their shift, and I faithfully entered their
messages in the software updates.x Although I was happy with this enthusiasm, I
also felt a bit uneasy, as I was wondering if I was undermining valuable production
time. Newspaper production cannot be stopped once the presses start rolling, so the
night shift especially, tended to be tremendously hectic for a few hours while the
newspapers were being produced.
This uneasiness subsided instantly when I happened to walk over to the machine
one night just as it stopped due to a paper jam. From a distance I could see the team
stop with what they were doing, walk over to the display and then I saw one of
them triumphantly point at himself as he saw the message he had provided me a few
days earlier. What was even more encouraging was that following this, I saw the
team take the correct sequence of actions to clear the transporter belt and restart the
machine. Later I heard that the operators had started to clear and restart the machine
for very visible errors such as paper jams, while on other machines they had to wait
for the technicians to arrive. What had started out as a coincidental question to one
operator, had not only broken the reluctance of the team, but it had also motivated
x Of course, after double checking with the customer
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them to really try to understand the machine’s operation, and the flow of newspapers
through it.
In this particular thread, the relationship between the machine’s surroundings and
its internal structure is now intricately connected. Whereas the previous thread only
needed the aggregate of parts called ‘machine’ in order to position itself success-
fully in its surroundings, the second thread can only be described as an interplay
between elements of the machine’s internal structure —display, software controller
unit, transporter belt, etc.— and the socio-psychological mechanisms at work in a
team of operators who have to work with it. Bits of the machine’s internal operation
are ‘radiating’ into its surroundings, being picked up by operators, service techni-
cians, engineers, and so on, who transform the data and re-enter it into the machine.
Their actions affect belts, gears and software, and alter the internal states of the ma-
chine. All these loops not only aim to optimise the function of this machine as a
production unit, but also as a locus of social interactions, of learning, and of stories.
If someone is still not convinced of the intricate connection between a machine’s
internal structure and its surroundings, I could narrow down the loops even more
with personal struggles on design issues, tests, technical challenges, modifications
and the ramifications of getting a machine to run at its maximum capacity. This of
course is the engineer’s narrative, a thread intimately connected with the machine’s
internal structure. This is where man and machine parts flow into each other, and
‘machine’ becomes an evolutionary cycle of observations, selections, modifications
and actions. Not forgetting the reductionist thread that describes a machine that in-
deed is the sum of its parts.
In abstract terms, some of these threads correspond to a number of feedback
loops that radiate from an object into its surroundings and back again. Some of these
loops are volatile, and only exist during a certain stage of the object’s life-cycle.
Others are more persistent, such as the machine’s ability to process newspapers.
The object therefore is not only an entity that consists of smaller parts, but also
conversely a part, or tag, for a meta-aggregate. The object is also a marker for multi-
ple flows of data that move in and out of it. These flows connect the internal structure
of the object with its environment, and its surroundings reflect the flows back into
the machine, altering its states, altering its meaning. Observers may only see the
bottleneck where these flows are pressed together prior to their release in or out of
the object, and call this conceptual bottleneck ‘machine’.
The object therefore, is represented by the hourglass-shaped structure that the
data flow has to go through in order for it to be significant in its environment.xi
The feedback can —-on both sides— be very close to the concept ‘machine’, on
one side for instance in its relationship to its primary function, or its operation. On
xi Often people point out that ‘hourglass’ suggests a one-way flow of processes, while the re-entry
of processes suggests two directions. There are good reasons why I prefer to stick to the hourglass
metaphor, as re-entry also implies a sequential distinction of the process; it has to flow ‘out’ before
it can flow ‘in’ again, so this would imply a ‘flipping’ of the hourglass at some point. However, the
pattern is mainly useful as it describes a base function. A more complex metaphor will pop up in
the next chapter.
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the far side, there may be processes that are only remotely coupled to the object;
individual parts, nuts, bolts and gears at one extreme, a certain country, ‘operators’,
‘factory’ at the other.9
Pattern: Hourglass
Description: An interface provides a locus of multiple processes that run
through it
A.K.A: interface, boundary, wall, gate,. . .
Notes: The interface can demarcate ‘inside’ from ‘outside’, but also me-
diate, or be an intermediary, between different domains, or de-
marcate a transition between ‘parts’ and ‘whole’
Beyond the surroundings, and probably also deep within the internal core, there
is a level where re-entry is virtually non-existent. In this wider environment, threads
follow the machine in its impact on global warming, to manufacturers of nuts and
bolts or the readers of the newspapers it produces. These ‘wide’ threads are not
necessarily incorrect, but they have little significance for the ‘machine’, in the sense
that the probability of interference through the machine is very low.
The locus of the hourglass pattern delineates an interface (concept), which re-
quires two (or more) perspectives in order to be fully understood, if this is at all
possible.10
For a visually inclined species as us humans, it may be difficult to consider an
object as being anything other than something tangible and locatable in a certain
space. The idea that an object is a ‘locus of multiple processes that run through it’,
and that what we observe may simply be a tag of this locus, may be a bit hard to
fathom. However, this idea is reflected in Bruno Latour’s ‘actor-network theory’,
when he grants objects a certain agency, and allows them to become ‘participants in
the course of action’.11
This pattern also returns in the aspect of polypotency of many objects; a stone
can be a marker of geological processes, a source of minerals, or cause of a bruised
toe when bumped into.12
One important aspect of the hourglass pattern is related to the fact that many
processes pass each other in the often limited space that is spanned by the interface.
This means that they may interact and change the each other’s flows. A rock has
geological or archaeological significance as long as it remains embedded in layers
of soil that allows it to be dated or localised, but when a hiker stumbles over it,
235
the interaction both, changes the flow of the hiker, as well as pries the rock loose
from its embedding. As a result, the rock becomes one like many others, and its
significance for geologists and archaeologists is compromised.
An interface therefore, localises an area where friction becomes an important
phenomenon. This concept, which started this journey into complexity, returns here,
and now can acquire a pattern of its own, which is loosely borrowed from similar
descriptions in quantum mechanics. Note that friction, like all interactions, is a re-
lationship between processes.
Pattern: Friction
Description: Interaction between processes
A.K.A: interferences
Notes:
As an interface can host a myriad of processes, friction tends to a combinatorial
explosion in and around the interface. Every single process may be understood,
maybe even in mathematical and causal descriptions, but the friction between the
processes causes interferences which at some point, can no longer be determined
analytically, unless all the processes are known and can be described as such.
As a result, a single process can be followed in a predictable fashion —-for in-
stance, in a causal or deterministic way— but the interactions through the interface
influence this orderly flow, and make the process a great deal less predictable as
it traverses through the interface. The causal flow therefore, may at best become
probabilistic, which means that the behaviour one may see when isolating a single
process from the others becomes one possible outcome among others, which may
even include the opposite behaviour!
Ulanowicz, following Popper, proposes to speak of propensities. This refers to a
certain likelihood that an expected flow will occur, which in isolation would be sure
to happen.13
The idea, coarsely stated, is that when you offer a tame heron fish (Ulanowicz
is an ecological biologist), the bird will eat it all the time. Thus, the theory that a
heron always eats fish would be proven experimentally. However, suppose now you
go into the everglades and study herons in the wild. It now turns out that herons
eat fish almost all of the time, but sometimes change their diet to include frogs as
well. This may not be very spectacular, but when studying ecosystems with large
populations of herons, it may explain why the frogs are on a decline, even though
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the likelihood of a heron eating a frog is very small. Now take various species of
animals, plants and bugs, and all these small deviations from the various ‘x eats y’
may significantly influence the checks and balances of that ecosystem.
Ulanowicz, then turns towards juxtapositions of propensities, but for the purposes
here I would rather keep focus on Poppers notion of ‘interferences’ and relate them
to the interferences we are speaking of in PAC (pg. 58). As a result, I would propose
a small, but essential, refactoring strategy for this idea in order to adapt it to the con-
cept of friction. My suggestion is that these propensities are often also related to the
friction between flows. That is, the process is fully available, but it cannot manifest
itself in full glory because of the interferences with other flows.
A sailboat sailing in a regatta may best capture this idea. The sailboat has to go
to a certain destination as quickly as possible. In its simplest form, this means just
taking the shortest distance from A to B, as this at first glance would be the ideal
course to take. This ideal can be determined with high precision. If the direction
of the wind is known however, the ideal course may become a bit different, as the
direction of the wind interferes with the shortest route. That is, the shortest route is
no longer the fastest route. A slightly longer route may allow the boat to sail faster
and compensate for the additional distance. If the current is taken into account,
the situation changes yet again. If the race takes a few hours, then a regatta on a
sea will have to account for tidal movement. Then there may be shallows, gulley’s,
the shoreline, all of which will also interfere, not forgetting all those momentary
squalls, undercurrents and other influences that come and go at an instance. For all
these aspects individually, the ideal course may be rather straightforward, but taken
together, these ideals become propensities, that is, they still have some qualities of
the individual aspects, but the combinatorial interferences of other aspects prevent
these ideals from becoming deterministic. This makes sailing an art rather than a
science, even though science can still greatly support the art. It is worth pointing out
that the fastest route of the sailboat cannot be determined by isolating the processes;
all the interferences are necessary to plot the fastest route. These propensities also
are very localised; the individual flows may be described in very generic terms, but
the friction between them always is determined in very specific locations and under
very specific circumstances.
As the view of complexity that is forming in the game of PAC, tends to move
away from oppositions and categorisations, into the zones of ambiguity between
these —complexity is about one and the other—, I would think that quantum me-
chanical approaches, more than statistics, may actually work quite well in many of
these friction spaces.
The shift towards making propensities relational, means that they become sub-
ject to combinatorial effects. Propensities fan out through all the processes in friction
space and interfere with all the other processes. Translated to the hourglass pattern,
this means that the bottleneck or locus of the interface becomes tremendously dy-
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namic, as all these processes come together there. Probably ‘hourglass’ has now
become too static a metaphor to visualise what is happening in the locus.xii
With this, a step can be taken towards addressing issues such as those at the inter-
face between biological and social domains, as researched by Kaplan and Rogers:
Finally, the assumption of unidirectionality harbours one of the most consistent flaws in
genetic explanations of social life. Directionality (allegedly one-way from genes to society)
is mistaken as causality. This is a serious flaw indeed. As others have argued before [. . . ],
logically there is no way in which narrowly distributed properties can be explained in terms
of the more broadly distributed ones.14
From the perspective of PAC, it is inevitable that these frictions will occur at these
interfaces. Whereas some concepts inject too much richness in the conceptual mod-
els (e.g. ‘selfish genes’), other targets may be easily described too narrowly, such as
interface concepts. Following Gould, it requires a delicate ‘balancing act’ between
‘too much and too little’ in order to capture an isomorphy in models of natural
language.15 From a viewpoint of complexity, these discussions can be extended to
processes of feedback that seem inevitable around these loci, even from within a
reductionist framing.
5 Patterns in Psychiatric Genomics
Currently patterns, and PAC with it, have entered social domains. The construction
of a pattern library now also has sufficient body to engage in an exercise where they
are actually used as a modelling tool.
As was mentioned earlier, patterns do not aim to provide theories. A pattern needs
context to become meaningful, and context should be provided by domain experts.
As I am an amateur in social domains, the best I can do is provide hypothesis that
can be taken up by those who are better equipped to study social phenomena.
Patterns rather are a means of making knowledge from one domain accessible to
another. They are meant to be coarse in order to allow stakeholders from different
domains to assemble around a shared theme or concern, and allow the various spe-
ciality domains to create a coherent conceptual network around this theme; that is,
a cross-disciplinary research effort becomes a distributed modelling activity.
Patterns are meant to be drawn on beer-mats or flip-overs so that those who as-
semble around the theme can share a common focus on the theme and therefore a
shared base for discussion. They should be relatively simple and straightforward.16
However, so far the simplicity may have suffered a bit from the construction
activities of the pattern library. In order to correct this, a crude modelling activity
will be carried out, based on an article co-authored by genetic psychiatrist Ingrid
Baart and publicist Marjan Slob from the medical centre of the Vrije Universiteit in
Amsterdam. This article was called ”From determining genes to complex networks:
xii An alternative could be ‘valve’, which in technological domains is usually also visually repre-
sented as an hourglass shape. As a valve typically controls gases and liquids (not sand), it is known
that there is a lot of turbulence around the slit where the flow is regulated. However, a valve is also
typically unidirectional
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On the geneticisation of mental illness”, and was presented in March 2008 at the
concluding event of the SCGR, the NWO programme that financed this research.17
This article is interesting because it directly relates to ‘debates in genomics’, and
also because it draws attention to the notion of ‘interface concept’. In fact, it may be
interesting to model the general tenure of the article as a conceptual network, that
includes both patterns that were discussed in this chapter.18
The article from Baart and Slob draws attention to changes in the concept of
‘mental health’ in the research in psychiatric genomics. This research area tradi-
tionally followed a perspective of causality from genes to ‘mental health problems’,
at least for those problems which are known to have a hereditary component. It
will probably be clear that this aligns with the ‘gene’s-eye view’ of health and well-
being, and most of the problems related to this perspective of ‘outward causality’ are
similar to those described in the previous chapter. Proponents of a strict gene’s-eye
view tend to think along the lines of: fix this-and-that gene and you become healthy
.19
It is currently becoming more and more accepted in the field of psychiatric ge-
nomics that ‘mental health’, or health in general [234], is very hard to grasp and
takes place in a rather complex network, which includes biological and environ-
mental aspects, as well as social values. Some people who are genetically more at
risk of developing certain mental health problems, such as psychoses, depression
or schizophrenia, may never experience these problems, because certain social in-
fluences may determine whether the ‘tipping point’ where the risk is effectuated is
reached. Stress, personality, lifestyle and other factors may contribute to the devel-
opment of a mental health problem.20
In terms of PAC, ‘mental health’ can be considered an interface concept that ad-
heres to the hourglass pattern. It is not surprising that psychiatric genomics deals
with such an interface, as it will be quite clear that the biological processes in-
teract with other processes that are predominantly described in vocabularies from,
amongst others, sociology, ecology and psychology. For one, it may be obvious that
what is considered a ‘mental health problem’ in one culture, may be a sign of di-
vinity in another [30]. This cultural aspect is not a trivial one, for it determines how
an individual with certain symptoms is accepted and treated in a society or a group;
they may be stigmatised as ‘patients’ having an ‘undesirable’ trait in the Western
world, while they might become highly respected spiritual leaders in another.
Baart & Slob make a strong argumentation for a more inclusive view on ‘mental
health’, as even the more subtle differences between various forms or categories of
‘mental health problems’ become more differentiated and blurred as science pro-
gresses, and ‘nature versus nurture’ becomes ‘nature and nurture’ (pg. 25).
For the purposes here, it is interesting to see that such an inclusive approach is ap-
parently not easily achieved (pp. 12-13). The different scientists who are currently
—-either enthusiastically, or with severe reluctance— collaborating in interdisci-
plinary approaches related to mental health problems, such as biologists, psychia-
trists, psychologists and sociologists, have to adjust the vocabularies of their training
and backgrounds, and have to (learn to) understand the issues and knowledge that
other disciplines bring to the table. This seems to be tremendously difficult, and
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some will prefer to omit the contributions of the others and sometimes even deem
them irrelevant. This, of course, is exactly what an interface does; it provides certain
closure.
The hourglass pattern may intuitively point out one of the problems associated
with interface concepts such as mental health, as ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ perspec-
tives tend to ‘deflect’ against the locus of the hourglass and cause a sort of causal
reflection of the observations. This is understandable, as closure (filtering, informa-
tion hiding) is a structural characteristic of an interface. One of the most straight-
forward manifestations of such a deflection is the ‘laboratory condition’ which aims
to filter environmental conditions in order to better study subject matter. With an
interface concept however, such filtering may lead to a overly narrow view on the
theme under investigation. One cannot study ‘health’ without an understanding on
how this concept is socially, culturally and otherwise, contextualised.21
Fig. 1 Causal
Reflection at and
Interface
In figure 1, a few possible threads at the interface called ‘mental health’ are given.
The ‘causal reflection’ of inside-outside perspectives is only one possible manifesta-
tion at the interface. It also shows a possible perspective of a patient,xiii who is ulti-
mately aware of these continuous dynamics, as s/he is the only one who experiences
various sides of the interface (pp. 13-14), from a plethora of, amongst others, phys-
ical, psychological and social manifestations. The term ‘mental health’ has evolved
as describing the combinatorics of the processes at the interface, that is, with an
embedded meaning on how symptoms translate into a plethora of interactions.22
As a result, the theories or models that aim to address the interface concept are
perfectly valid, in the sense that they precisely record the deflected processes, and
the data may correspond perfectly with them (maybe after filtering the ‘noise’ or
‘irregularities’), but all the perspectives may fail at understanding the data if the
other perspectives are not taken into account.23
A gene’s eye view on ‘mental health’ may therefore provide accurate data, but
will only address certain aspects of the concept of ‘mental health’. Conversely, a
(social) constructivist approach will do exactly the same when it ignores the biolog-
xiii I am aware that ‘patient’ is just as much biased as a concept. ‘Client’ may fit the bill better
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ical, or psychological component. If these perspectives do not give an account of
why the others do not affect the interface, they already may lead to fragile analy-
ses or theories. To make matters worse, the assessment whether such influences are
‘details’ can usually not be substantiated from a mono-disciplinary background, as
they lack the expertise to assess the contributions from the others. As a result, all
mono-disciplinary theories of an interface concept will, at best, be severely limited
and potentially fragile.24
Only a more inclusive approach that incorporates the contributions from the other
perspectives on ‘mental health’ can provide such a helicopter view, which can span
the ‘complex network’ around the theme of mental health. In this light, it is inter-
esting to see that endophenotypes are being positioned more and more in between
genotype and mental disorder (pg. 20). These endophenotypes appear to limit the
‘interpretative gap’, or the uncertainty between genes, symptoms, and the concept
of mental health.
However, another pattern complicates the research. As was mentioned earlier,
an interface concept such as ‘mental health’ includes social and cultural values,
and these feed back to the theories and the models that are being made, and the
implicit assumptions that drives the research efforts. (Western) Researchers may
for instance see a ‘problem’ as something that needs to be ‘cured’, and this biases
the theories that are formed, the experiments that are selected, and the assumptions
that are developed and maintained. This has been widely recognised in areas of
psychology ever since the Rosenhahn experiments in 1972.25
At a more subtle level —-and this is probably where most problems surface—,
it is known that some evident forms of brain damage may cause people to become
(socially) successful, as for instance Antonio Damasio has reported.26 As it is ex-
tremely rare that these people are hospitalised, a bias is formed in research, that
tends to focus on a priori ‘problematic’ cases.27
As a result, the interdisciplinary research on an interface concept will consist
of multiple instances of a convergence inducing process, which are susceptible to
amplifications of bias, which reduces the openness to alternatives.
It therefore requires considerable effort on the part of all parties involved, to un-
derstand each other’s contributions, and thereby place the individual contributions,
including one’s own, ‘in perspective’ with respect to the other contributions. Only
then, the conditions for effective disruptions between the specialist domains are met.
Presumably, specialists may be poorly prepared for this, as interest, training, aca-
demic successes and professional closure to peers within the speciality, continuously
reinforces this bias. This allows a supreme ‘focus’ on the processes that are deflected
at the interface, but at the price of possibly being unable to understand the other con-
tributions.28
Note that the ‘laboratory’ often contributes strongly to the closure of an inter-
face. Experiments are conducted in ‘laboratory circumstances’ in order to create an
undistorted setting. However, if a theme is innately embedded in an environment
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that the laboratory excludes, one may wonder if the ‘noise’ or ‘interferences’ that
the laboratory aims to block may actually be a part of that theme.
The laboratory (or institute, etc.) can also amplify the biases and prejudices, as
groups of people with predominantly comparable talents, interests and stakes are
assembled, which increases the risk of convergence towards the attractor of abso-
lutism.
Therefore, the issues of fragmentation of science and ‘speciality barriers’ re-
ported by Laszlo, could find an explanation in contextual diminution.29
It is here also, that reductionism can become problematic (pg. 80-83), for instance
when ‘mental health’ is seen purely as a bio-medical phenomenon, or conversely as
a purely ‘social construction’. At an interface, such interpretative claims are based
on too narrow views.30
Not only does this impair the quality of the theories that are proposed, but it also
imposes risks when these theories are ‘acted out’ in their environment. Preventive
embryonic screening of certain ‘mental health problems’ amplifies bias and preju-
dices, and decreases the diversity of the population. There may be good reasons to
prevent the birth of children with certain dangerous genetic diseases but, as Kaplan
and Rogers point out, it also opens a window towards screening of homosexuality,
aggression, IQ and other traits that are socially and culturally influenced.31
Kaplan and Rogers also bring to attention the role of the media and the (pop-
ular) scientific press, which can be regarded as contributing strongly to contextual
diminution, as they tend to amplify certain values in combination with limited con-
text (i.e. simplistic generalisations of complex phenomena).
Fig. 2 Main Threads of Research of Mental Health Problems
It would seem that science, due to the historical specialisation across various
disciplines, is poorly equipped to study phenomena especially at these interfaces,
and this could explain why ‘nature-nurture’ discussions have been so problematic
in the past.32
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As a hypothesis, one can follow an academic career, where students possess cer-
tain biases (e.g. talents or interests) towards academic studies, which in turn usually
amplify these biases, thereby decreasing the openness for alternative perspectives.
Note that this particularly applies for those matters that form the common frame of
reference. As academic journals usually follow disciplinary, or bounded interdisci-
plinary ranges, the successes of an academic career tend towards closed systems that
follow a convergence inducing process, and more specifically processes of contex-
tual diminution towards the attractor of absolutism. Certain target phenomena get
ranked and described by reinforcement of certain conceptual patterns, which allow
the modeller to understand those aspects that is focused on, but at the expense of
other patterns, that remain contextually underdeveloped. Besides this, the interfer-
ences due to these asymmetries in ranking enforce processes where patterns ‘beyond
focus’ get moulded to ‘fit’ the dominant mental landscapes. In other words, a ten-
dency is enforced to explain everything in the dominant framing. In its extreme,
‘reality’ will be described in a specialist vocabulary, and the theorist’s fallacy will
begin to take shape.33
6 Passing Consciousness
At this point, the waves of the patterns discussed so far are washing into the cross-
waters of the social. The question is, are the mental abilities of human beings con-
strained by this pattern of contextual diminution?
The rationale behind this question is clear. The human mind has means for map-
ping the human environment, and capabilities beyond that of any autonomous agent
discussed so far. But does this mean that contextual diminution is overcome per se,
or is the pattern scale-invariant across consciousness?
These are dangerous waters. So far, I have been trying to work from the premises
that every word in the vocabulary of PAC serves only as a token for a certain theme
or phenomenon. ‘Absolutism’ and ‘lethargy’ are therefore, merely the extremes of
the process of contextual diminution. Of course, these words have been chosen to
have an intuitive ‘ring’ with everyday experiences, but the claim was that these
words should not be ‘confused’ with similar phenomena that may have associations
with human behaviour. Yet, by seeking these intuitive words, PAC is actually con-
tributing to the confusion!
However, the complexity perspective has now entered the social domain and
thus the vocabulary is extending just where the confusion is maximised. In other
words, are ‘absolutism’ and ‘lethargy’ very similar to —-in terms of PAC, does it
‘match’?— the way these words are used in daily life, in psychology or in social
theory?
I think I have to leave this to the domain experts. Currently, I can only say that the
vocabulary of PAC should be restrained within the context of PAC. In other words,
every word serves to describe certain patterns, and does not say anything about
real social phenomena. PAC can say something about processes, and only initiatives
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from sociology and the humanities may forge a connection with social domains, by
providing more detailed contexts in which the patterns can form.
6.1 Contextual Diminution and the Human Mind
There are good reasons to believe that, for human agents, there are at least two addi-
tional phenomena that have not been discussed yet, which may amplify convergence
towards the attractor of absolutism.
The first phenomenon is related to the fact that our main cognitive mapping fa-
cility —-the brain— is an organ that is subject to evolutionary pressure, and one
evolutionary heuristic is: if something costs energy and does not serve a purpose, it
most likely becomes redundant.
The second phenomenon is related to the issue of incomplete learning that was
discussed previously. There is ample evidence that the brain has certain plasticity
with respect to stimuli from its environment. Generally speaking, an enriched and
stimulating environment has an effect on the brain structure, including the size and
weight of brain regions, the number and size of neurons and glia, the complexity of
dendritic trees, and the number of synapses.34
These findings support the notion that there is always an enormous pressure to
use brain capacity effectively. Stored information that is of little use is likely to
be removed eventually, and if an organism can get by with as little information
as possible, there will be no incentive to maintain extensive representations of its
environment. Besides this, a stable environment does not introduce novel inputs,
and therefore at best, only reinforces what is already maintained. In other words, all
these issues stimulate a convergent process towards the attractor of absolutism.
From a phenomenological perspective, confirmation bias seems to support selec-
tive filtering of perceptions. The Dutch word for this literally translates to ‘tunnel
vision’, which better captures the absolutist tendencies. Note that bias has, as could
be expected, become a pattern that manifests itself beyond consciousness along the
complexity perspective.35
At the other pole of the pattern, lethargic responses to changing environments
have been documented from fish, human beings and even organisations.36
Especially in the case of humans, it is of interest to note that lethargy changes
mental states, such as perception of time, certain emotional numbness, and a general
perceived loss of meaning. Lethargy therefore, is more than ‘absence of acting’; it
is rather a mental condition.37
In this respect it will be clear that there is a clear distinction between passiveness
and lethargy. Passiveness is not necessarily a bad strategy for an agent as it conserves
energy. There are some extremely passive creatures, such as the sloth or the sleeper
shark, that appear to have very little ill-effect due to their nature. Again, it is the
environment that determines the success of such a trait.xiv
xiv It will also be clear that ‘passiveness’ too is a relativist concept. A sloth will probably consider
human beings extremely ‘neurotic’ creatures, if it could make such an assessment
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Of course, now the attractors have become associated with similar phenomena
that are reserved for human beings. The vocabularies of PAC are in severe friction
with those of psychology and related scientific fields. And the point is, that this
is inevitable. The ‘selfishness’ of genes may be contested, simply by stating that
‘selfishness’ is not a concept that has relevance in the contexts where the models
of genes are described, but PAC aims to move into social contexts, which makes
the problem of words much more pressing. With this, we are slowly moving to the
problems that a ‘lingua franca’ would run into, and what the lingua democratica
aims to address.
7 Wrapping Up
With the patterns of contextual diminution and hourglass, the complexity perspec-
tive has progressed beyond consciousness and into social domains. A first exercise
was conducted in using these patterns in a social setting, and some threads were
followed through the interface concept of ‘mental health’, which weave through so-
cial, psychological and neuro-physiological domains to a model which may for all
intent and purposes be related to the philosophy of science, but there is undoubtedly
a research area called ‘psychology of science’. The (radical) process-orientation is
following threads, wherever they may drift to.
These exercises have no other pretences than to demonstrate the ability of pat-
terns to forge such interdisciplinary connections, and to show why complex themes
can only be tackled from various angles. Does this mean ‘plurality’? I would say no,
because these collaborative modelling activities still aim to capture as many ‘little
truths of matching’ as possible, and there is still the issue of coherence and robust-
ness to consider. All these ‘pluralist’ approaches and perspectives still aim to paint
a coherent picture, at least when maximising isomorphy is the intended goal. Ambi-
guity, contradiction and confusion should be seen as events that show that something
interesting is happening around those concepts that confuse, and not that this cel-
ebrates multifarious interpretations. I would think that science, and probably some
within philosophy as well, do not want to leave it that way. It is science’s prerogative
to aim for minimising ambiguity, as this is the game science chooses to play.
A process-orientation, rather than biasing the intellectual skills that a specialist
domain offers, places a complex theme itself in the centre of attention and various
specialists are invited to collaborate and share their insights, if the processes require
this. A certain theme is considered a central concept in a network of intertwining
threads —-a conceptual network—, which different stakeholders address with mu-
tually different vocabularies. PAC, or any other methodology with similar aims, can
assist in creating certain coherence in the different contributions.38
Part III
Into Social Systems

Chapter 8
Tying Some Threads Together
To recapitulate the activities so far, a mysterious concept called the lingua democrat-
ica was introduced in part one, and almost immediately an extensive detour along
complexity and patterns was taken with a vague promise that it would eventually
bring us back to it.
The detour consisted of the assembly of a pattern library, primarily based on the
concept of feedback, which concurrently provided a means to chart and explore the
landscape of complexity. This ‘landscape’ by now has taken the shape of an unde-
termined space where threads of order are created, some existing only in fractions
of seconds, while others may be more lasting. These threads, are observed or de-
tected by other processes, and take up form, or become information, when they are
contextualised. With this, as was argued, information can also be seen as a fleeting
moment on the waves of pattern.
It is probably good to call to mind that all this forms a model. So far, nothing has
been said about the characteristics of the target. Patterns, interaction and friction
spaces, aggregates, tags and all the other items in the vocabulary that has been as-
sembled, contribute to the model. This also applies to ‘genes’, ‘evolution’, ‘model’
and ‘modeller’. It may have appeared that this would project the activities of PAC
onto ontological domains, but it has to be stressed that this was never the case.
Even ‘environment’ is an isomorphism of the background against which a target is
framed. It may be somewhat confusing that the ‘models include the models’ in a
self-referential fashion. This is usually the moment when the untrained mind draws
blanks and feedback-junkies start to get excited. Yet it is all modelling work; cur-
rently the target is virtually unknown.
As a final exercise in building the vocabulary of PAC, it is therefore good to
address this asymmetry and start tying some threads together. The reason for waiting
until this point, is that a number of issues can now be addressed with the vocabulary
and the pattern library.
First, some details about the target need to be filled in. This unleashes a philo-
sophically volatile can of worms that contains concepts such as ‘reality’, ‘interpreta-
tion’ and so on, but these problems can now be circumvented by simply positioning
them in the context of PAC. All the schools of thought on these subjects may or may
not have relevance for the development of this vocabulary, but for the purposes here
they are simply needed to address certain issues related to pattern and target.
Another asymmetry involves the difference between ‘essence’and ‘details’ that
was introduced at the outset of this journey. Details have been given ample credit for
their role in complexity, as they span the expansive, indeterminate space in which or-
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der can form. However ‘essences’ have hardly been shaped beyond the observations
of Stephen Jay Gould, and maybe now something more can be said about them.
But before all this, it is worth pointing out that the modelling activities them-
selves follow a pattern that has become quite familiar by now, namely feedback.
In other words, the pattern library now provides descriptions of the approach that
creates the patterns. It may have gone largely unnoticed, but every new concept or
pattern is immediately used to advance the game of PAC itself. PAC is describing it-
self, and has to, simply because PAC is a complex production system that describes
complex production systems! Everything that PAC produces, such as ideas, insights
and so on, immediately affect the production system that produces these ideas and
insights!
The immediate advantage of this approach is that the methodology creates its
own coherence. As we started out by throwing philosophy, science and practicality
in one giant heap because complexity does not care too much about human cate-
gorisations, this freedom had to be constrained in some way in order to prevent this
exercise from becoming meaningless. It has already been mentioned earlier that co-
herence would be a counter-pressure of freedom and choice —of ‘anything goes’—,
and in PAC an attempt has been made to use self-referentiality as a means of creating
this counter-pressure.
But PAC has also argued strongly for disruptions as a means of countering the
inevitable tendency of closure of self-referential systems, and so while traversing
various scientific disciplines, attempts have also continuously been made to ‘re-
connect’ to the insights and knowledge that were obtained there. The game itself
is continuously trying to find out how the game should proceed! This is hardcore
scienza nuova; we have come full circle!
1 Recursive Methodology
Pattern: Modelling
Description: A process of interaction between a model, modeller and a target
A.K.A: crafting, experimental method
Notes: Modelling presupposes a certain correspondence between target
and model
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The ‘agile’ modelling activities of PAC can be described as a pattern of feedback
between target, model and modeller.
Modelling presupposes a certain correspondence between target and model that can
be evaluated through conceptual patterns, which are provided by the various per-
spectives on the model. These patterns are ‘put in context’, or ‘contextualised’ by
internal maps of model and modeller, which themselves are networks of contextual
patterns. Thus conceptual patterns are ‘formed’ as focal concepts in a meaningful
network of relationships with other concepts which are already in the repertoire of
the modeller. With this, the repertoire has become a sort of epistemological network
that provides the means and constraints to build such a model. This model will be
called ‘conceptual network’, as it is built up of concepts that interact with each other.
Logically speaking, the minimal requirement for contextualisation requires two
patterns, which become each other’s context. Put a bit simpler, the patterns rank
each other, and cause interferences, like waves ploughing into each other. (Self-
referential) observation/detection of the interference ‘informs’ the patterns.1
With the necessary reservations, one might state that the ‘meaning’ of a con-
cept resides in its context, in the structure of the network that is formed there and
the ranking that is overlaid on the supportive concepts and their relationships. This
way, a ‘mental landscape’ is formed, which both influences projection (guidance)
and reflection of observation/detection. These landscapes are guided by the goals,
intentions, desires and all those other aspects of the mind that inject certain values
into the modelling activities. They are not fixed or static, but change under influ-
ence of reinforcement of patterns or, conversely, are levelled out or altered by such
disruptions.
The act of guidance aims to influence the target in such a way that it provides
new patterns that can further detail the model, or improve it if set against certain
goals. The goal of the modelling activities is aimed to reduce the uncertainty be-
tween target and model, at least when ‘understanding’ the target is the key focus.
In the crafts, modelling can change the target. The crafts combine ‘understand-
ing’ or ‘knowing’, with acting on this knowledge. The resulting feedback describes
what typically happens in construction activities, in art, and other activities that aim
to create something tangible. Note that this feedback can be both divergent (e.g. ex-
plorative) as well as convergent (e.g. optimising). More specifically, sometimes the
target becomes the model. An architect making the plans of a city’s infrastructure
may later observe the roads and buildings that were once only on paper or a com-
puter screen. And with improved modelling techniques, the target often corresponds
strongly with the model. What is happening here in terms of PAC?
1.1 Constructions
According to Henri Atlan, physical objects (i.e. ‘targets’) correspond with ‘physical
structures’, which are descriptions in the idiom of physical theory (i.e. ‘models’),
and resemble a:
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[. . . ] picture of the current state of our knowledge of matter, which we have obtained by the
particular method that is physical science.2
Up to now, attention has been diverted away from ‘target’. It has been mainly used
as a tag for something in the space outside the modeller and model.
This rather crafty move was meant to circumvent some inevitable philosophi-
cal issues, such as ‘reality’, ‘objectivity’ and other heavily contaminated possible
replacements for the ‘target’.
The examples of stars ‘being a speck of light’ (target) and their corresponding
conceptual networks, have focused on the model and modelling activities, without
explicitly addressing the ‘contents’ of the target. The target merely provides con-
ceptual patterns that assist in the modelling activities. It provides ‘perspectives’.
However, perspectives usually do not address one vital issue of modelling activ-
ities, and that is the situation when a target is formed from the model, that is, when
the target is constructed.
Construction activities project the internal models outside the modeller. These
constructed targets have been formed and shaped according to these internal models,
and become cities, bridges, books, paintings and so on. Often these targets can also
be observed as being coherent with the models, at least when one aims to faithfully
reproduce these models. So then, what is the ‘content’ of these targets?
The most straightforward explanation is also the most intuitive one, that is, some
of the aspects of the models are apparently ‘realised’ in, or by that target. In con-
structions, there is a certain isomorphy between some aspects of the target, which
can be perceived as matching with patterns of the model. A map (model) of a city
(target) is a more or less faithful model of that city, in the sense that the juxtaposi-
tion of observations coherently match with the map, at a certain level of granularity
obviously, and at least if the map is a good and recent one, of course. There is certain
isomorphy between the map and city. This was already discussed in chapter three.
Turning this discussion around, it means that this isomorphism may also apply
for a target that is ‘out there’. In other words, the models of stars and nebulas might
actually reveal the inner structures and processes of those targets. In that case, a
system may actually be ‘out there’.3
This brings with it a problem for PAC, for what does this ‘reality’ mean, as con-
cept?
Remember that PAC is a game! A new concept called ‘reality’ is introduced to
the vocabulary, which needs to be described with the tools, means and mechanisms
that have been developed so far.
At first glance, reality is a space that at least includes the combination of model,
modeller and target, of which the latter is the excluded third from model and mod-
eller. If this space can contain one target, it can also contain more, so reality can
be seen as containing many targets, and assemblies of targets. This space can also
include other modelling agents that can detect or observe things. If a certain target
is consistently modelled by different agents, that is, the various conceptual patterns
that that target provides, are projected as isomorphisms over many modelling agents,
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including those that are part of that target, this may be seen as proof that the target
and the models are more or less equivalent, that is, the models are ‘realised’ in the
target. The discussion on whether a system is a model or target becomes less of
an issue, as the main difference between these two is that the model captures the
isomorphisms by using a certain idiom.
To recapitulate all this: if a target consists of many modelling agents, and an
external observer can match the models of these modelling agents with its own
internal models, then that observer has modelled the target successfully.
However, this does not provide any clues on how the model is ‘realised’.
With the risk that they become a kind of all-healing elixir that travelling con
artists once sold poor, beguiled bystanders, pattern yet again comes to the rescue.
In order to substantiate this claim, one must first realise that models consist of
patterns and patterns alone! Some may be novel (conceptual ones), others may be
stored and recalled (contextual ones), but in the end there is nothing but patterns in
a model. So if something of the model is realised in a target it must be patterns!
But then the question arises, how patterns manifest themselves in these construc-
tions? For, as was argued earlier, patterns alone do very little. Apparently, some
patterns can be contextualised in matter!
In other words, material substance allows some patterns to express themselves
‘in reality’ as in; outside the model and modeller. ‘Reality’ is a space in which pat-
terns can ‘materialise’. This should not be seen as a mystical idea. Earlier, balls on a
pool table were already given the agency of being data, and tagging (ranking) them
made them significant. In terms of PAC, the tags (a set of numbers and correspond-
ing colours) provide the pattern which ‘realises’ the balls as belonging to the pool
game. In turn, the table ‘contextualises’ the pool balls as instances of a game.
Contextualisation of patterns creates identities and differences, which inform. So
a difference in patterns that are observed as a target can be isomorphic with the
mental landscapes of any modelling agent that is able to capture them.
But does this not contradict what was said earlier, that a difference is a powerful
means of organising observations? In fact, no, because observation is nothing more
than a process that opens a gateway through which patterns can interfere, namely
conceptual and contextual ones. This way, observation captures differences (or iden-
tities, aspects, etc.) in a target and recreates these as isomorphisms in models.
If patterns can be detected, they can be contextualised, so matter needs to inter-
fere with patterns in order to realise (or materialise) them. From here, it is small
step to conclude that matter is a pattern; at least a pattern of existence. Matter is a
projection of location, and existence is nothing more than a potential for observation
or detection. Ulanowicz expresses this idea as follows:4
Circularity becomes a given self-evident element of existence.
This may be a bit hard to chew on for some, for the children of the earth are accus-
tomed to seeing material objects as being distinct, often solid and tangible. However,
contemporary physics paints a picture where matter consists of particles which are
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predominantly pure space, and all that what is not space turn out to be ‘probability
waves’.5
In order to grasp this idea, it may help to turn to another sensory organ which is
specialised in processing patterns: our ears.
Power on your hi-fi set, position yourself in between the stereo boxes, put on a
CD with your favourite music, close your eyes and listen. It will seem that some
instruments are closer to your right, and others will be closer to your left. In a way,
it seems that the band or orchestra is positioned in between the loudspeaker boxes!
The full stereophonic effect is achieved through the juxtaposition of (wave) patterns.
The instruments, at least through your ears, ‘exist’ because of these interferences.
This is contextualisation (and information) in its simplest form.
However, sound waves ‘wash into each other’ and move away again. This form
of contextualisation needs to be continuously enforced, or energised by the boxes.i
Some patterns however, contextualise into feedback processes that, as was men-
tioned earlier, allow both localisation and stability. Such processes may contextu-
alise into ‘matter’.6
Wax, latex, a photograph, film or a holographic device may allow expression of
some (human) patterns into visual form, but not biological organisational patterns.
Likewise matter, in the shape of a seawall, a production machine, or a sand castle
on the beach, may express (functional) patterns and some organisational (structural)
patterns in the able hands of its builders.
If matter can contextualise patterns, then there are probably more means by
which patterns can manifest themselves in reality. For instance, various social agents
can group themselves into a ‘society’, which provides a context in which organisa-
tional and other societal patterns can express themselves. In other words, through
these interacting agents, patterns can become ‘realised’, maybe even ‘real’. A target
thus becomes a manifestation of patterns through a medium that can contextualise
them.
Note here, that this contextualisation —for instance through materials— is often
very simple. The conceptual pattern may just be projected onto matter, just like the
light beams of a film projector casts a movie on a screen. Building activities extend
these capabilities to two- and three dimensional planes, while dynamical construc-
tions extend the model with temporal patterns.
As matter has now essentially become a form of locatable process, it inherently
adheres to the hourglass pattern. Matter becomes the locus of a number of processes,
of which at least one is a feedback loop that allows other processes to locate it. These
processes may interfere with each other, and thus there may be different forms of
friction in and around the locus that is formed.
i ‘Emergise’ might be a more appropriate term, as the interferences of pattern allow the orchestra
or band to emerge at a certain location.
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1.2 Target and Model
With this, the patterns that PAC has been following can be further detailed. What
has basically been done so far, was to create sequences of patterns becoming infor-
mation (in a context), becoming patterns yet again, and information, and so on, and
so on. Up to now, this has essentially has been a modelling trick; there is no ‘real’
operator that carries out this process. However, despite this being a trick, it must
correspond with something ‘in reality’ for it to work.
In fact, there is. For if there is a certain set of mutually discernable things —
data—, such as particles, themes, objects, agents, pool balls, simms or whatever,
and there is a process that makes a selection in this data, then the base premises
of ‘patterning’ have been met. So, any process, or agent, that finds a point of ob-
servation/detection that allows selection of other processes or agents, also allows
patterning. If the processes of selection include the process/agent itself, then pat-
terns of feedback can form, which have been assembled in the pattern library that
has been developed. It doesn’t matter on what medium (or substrate) this occurs,
and the pattern library is far from exhaustive, but the above describe the conditions
on which contextualisation, expression or materialisation of the patterns may occur.
These three concepts now basically mean the same thing, but the latter is a spe-
cialisation of contextualisation ‘in the material’, while ‘expression’ tends to the phe-
nomenological/ecological, that is, from an observer position outside the observed
process.
Most, if not all, complex targets consist of ensembles of observer/detection en-
tities that interact with each other, and therefore have some means to model their
being part of that target. In other words, these entities can be described in terms of
observation/detection, pattern/model, action/contingency and so on. If an external
observer is able to model these entities as being part of the target, and has sufficient
modelling complexity to match the internal models of these entities, then the target
can be fully described by the modelling tools at the disposal of that observer.
If the target has no sources of uncertainty, for instance ambiguous, undetermined,
or disorderly operators, then for that observer, the target will be complicated rather
than complex. A target with random operators will also be complicated rather than
complex, because randomness can be modelled fairly easily as operator in the plane
of unorganised complexity.
If a target does have sources of uncertainty, or the target has more complex as-
pects than the observer’s modelling abilities, then that target will be complex and
will always be incompletely modelled, for instance through approximation. This
transition point from the (complicated) plane of organised simplicity to organised
complexity has to be made very clear, for there may be relatively simple systems of
organised complexity, like global search. The point is that when randomness (e.g.
exploration) is used as a model of aspects of ambiguity, uncertainty or disorder in a
target, then this is always an approximation. In this case, causality and determinism
no longer apply. As Weinberg stated, this is also the end of analytical approaches.
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A model of noise, randomness, ambiguity, disorder or indeterminacy can never pro-
duce a faithful isomorphism! Conversely, any model that excludes, or otherwise
does not account for the influence of sources of uncertainty can never faithfully rep-
resent a real, complex target. These models are inherently fragile.
Note that the observer has to have deep emphatic skills, in the sense that she must
‘enter’ the target, flash out the observer/detection entities that make that target, and
understand what they do. The external observer that watches subject matter ‘from a
distance’ has been replaced by the craftsperson who is intimately connected to her
target, as was already mentioned earlier. This is not a matter of controlling a target,
but rather querying it, as is reflected in Ilya Prigogine’s ‘dialogue with nature’ for
complex systems.7
Therefore, as targets become more complex, they can only be understood by ob-
servers that can equal or better the innate complexity of such targets, and with this
the increasing problems of understanding complex targets becomes more clear, as
complexity moves away from physical entities, living cells, to human beings and
human societies. Humans observing other human beings, or societies of human be-
ings, will always be riddled with uncertainty!
Model and target have now become intimately connected. The flow between re-
alised target and conceptualised model are no longer positioned ‘out there’ or ‘in
there’; they rather fill the indeterminate space in between these attractors. Here, pat-
terns interfere and create, what John Smith and Chris Jenks might call the ‘fuzzy
sets’ between the attractors of target and model.8
Model, modeller and target have all become subject to the same building blocks;
from the moment the early universe created pattern that could both detect other pat-
terns and act on interferences, the first threads were formed, and the universe started
to ‘organise’ (at least) itself around patterns of causal attraction and withdrawal. I
think this, in abstract terms, is what quantum physics is telling us.9
The more straightforward types of emergence can be seen as the result of juxta-
positions of patterns that create new forms; a chemical compound binds with other
compounds and the aggregate form begets new behaviour. More complex forms of
emergence are more involved. Note that the ‘washing of pattern’ is also a form of
emergence; information has become equivalent to emergence!
This may also explain what our brain ultimately does; it reproduces worlds based
on common (ontological) patterns, and often even manages to take this reproduction
to unsuspected novel vistas.
1.3 Modelling as Production System
Modelling has now become a production system; patterns contextualise, thereby cre-
ating new forms which can provide more complex contexts for these patterns. Some
of these contexts are more stable than others; in fact stability is the first selective
criterion of evolution, as it increases the probability that patterns can contextualise.
Stability allows the formation of more complex targets with respect to more volatile
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ones. Note that stability (and thus order) in the true fashion of Metis, should be read
here as ‘delayed entropy’.10
To make matters more complex, model, modeller and target can now be seen as
a meta-system that can be observed and described as a model. This self-describing
modelling can at least take two distinct forms. The first form is when the meta-
system can be fully described by the modelling tools. In other words, target, model
and modeller can be completely matched by the model’s context. In this case, the
modelling agent can fully determine or describe the system it is part of. As a result,
the overarching system containing target and modelling agent is of equal complex-
ity as the models that the modelling agent can make.
The other configuration is formed when the overarching system is more complex
than model and modeller, for instance because emergent patterns are formed that
cannot be described with the existing modelling tools. In other words, the modeller
is not able to fully model that what it is part of. The overarching system may still
be composed of simpler patterns, but there is at least one pattern that is beyond
comprehension of the modelling agent. The agent has at least two strategies to deal
with this uncertainty. One strategy will approximate the additional unknown patterns
with existing ones, which introduces risk when the agent also acts on these patterns.
The other strategy will consider the unknown patterns to be details, noise, dis-
order, randomness or uncertainty. Either way, this novel aspect will be reduced to a
form that agent can understand.ii An external observer can only describe the over-
arching system if it at least has equal modelling capabilities as the modelling agent,
and the emergent patterns.
But here is another problem! If an observer agent models a target that it is part
of, and uses descriptive distinctions and categories to assist in these observations,
then these descriptions can become ‘realised’ in that target. A human being that is
observed as having certain traits will be described, classified, categorised or other-
wise ‘made to fit’ a certain idiom. If those descriptions reflect back to that human
being and are internalised, a convergence inducing process is formed that amplifies
the distinctions or categorisations, with the result that those traits become crisp real-
ities for that human being. This is one way how scientific, philosophical, economic,
psychological, social and other ideas become ‘realised’. Thus human beings will
justify their actions as ‘being coded in the genes’, or as a ‘result of class struggles’,
or ‘based on an Oedipus complex’. Once a certain idiom interferes in society and
takes foot there, society will absorb and therefore ‘realise’ certain aspects of that vo-
cabulary. This, of course, is what social theorists have long known.11 However, with
the analysis so far, it may also become clear that these self-referential processes do
not always happen; they require a certain ‘tipping point’ when the vocabulary be-
comes sufficiently strong to percolate widely through a society in a defining way.12
ii Of course, the agent can also simply admit that it doesn’t know...
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Philosophy and science have never been the arts of obtaining knowledge, for
the sake of knowledge alone. Especially since the invention of the printing press,
intellectual activities have always had a component of contextualising ideas in a
certain society, and therefore have a potential of constructing these ideas.
1.4 Complexity and Simplicity
The materialisation of patterns offers an hypothesis of the relationship between com-
plexity and simplicity. One may assume that simple patterns are those that contex-
tualise very easily in various media. For this reason, simple mathematical patterns
such as a curve, circle or line, and the processes that work with these patterns (i.e.
most mathematical operators), are likely to be found in many places in our universe.
The models that an observer may make about such patterns will be equally applica-
ble on Earth as in the Crab Nebula. Such patterns will also be relatively timeless, so
observations about such simple patterns made well over two thousand years ago by
Pythagoras or Archimedes will likely still hold today. Because of their relative sim-
plicity, the art of knowing or modelling those patterns, which include simple forms
of attraction and withdrawal, or distribution patterns in planes and volumes, can be
achieved with a high level of detail. This level of detail is also the big challenge in
those areas that take an interest in these patterns, as they can aim for an extreme form
of coherence. With this, the perspectives of mathematicians, astronomers and physi-
cists can be understood; they see a world of universal —as in applying throughout
our known universe— and more or less timeless (often also reversible) patterns.13
More complex patterns can only contextualise in certain media. Connectionist
models of neurones can be made on substrates of carbon or silicate (e.g. comput-
ers), but only in the former these patterns have, to our current knowledge, formed
without designer intervention. This is not surprising, for the enormous ability of
carbon to take up different forms, shapes and (thus) bindings with other chemicals
is beyond compare. Carbon is one of the most versatile media for materialisation
of patterns. With this, carbon-rich environments allow the formation of patterns to
move beyond certain levels of complexity that other chemicals cannot facilitate. As
complex patterns require complex media to contextualise in, it is likely that very
complex structures also tend to be relatively rare and are highly localised. With this,
a relationship between simplicity and complexity can be set against universality and
timelessness, if ‘universality’ is understood as ‘forms being detectable/observable
everywhere at any time in our known universe’.
Figure 1 gives a sketch of how complexity becomes more localised to ever
smaller pockets as it increases. As a reference, a silicate world is sketched next
to the complexity of a carbon-rich world, such as here on earth. The above graph
does not mean that earth is the only place in the universe that hosts targets of high
complexity, but that earth shares this with relatively few other places in the universe,
while worlds of similar complexity as those of silicates will be more plentiful.
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Fig. 1 Simplicity, Complexity and Availability
Simple patterns are relatively universal, while complex patterns are highly lo-
calised.
Biological organisms are localised in very specific locations in our known uni-
verse (to our current understanding, only on the planet earth), while the complex
structures of for instance silicates may be more widely available. Very simple pat-
terns will be found everywhere.14
The evolutionary perspective depicts a relationship between available patterns
and the media in which they can contextualise. Relatively simple patterns can con-
textualise in simple media or substrates, which allows more complex patterns to
form. These simple patterns can also contextualise in complex media or substrates,
and easily cover large scales along the complexity perspective. However, this will
usually not, or hardly ever, result in novel patterns.iii The growth of complexity is
predominantly shaped by the most complex forms that are available at a certain
point in evolution, and this growth is likely to decrease exponentially. This relation-
ship is at the base of the assumed bell-like shape of complex areas; locations with
very complex patterns are confined to very specific locations.
Accepting this means that there is a prize to be won with the discovery of simple
patterns as these are more universal (or probably more correctly; less localised). It
would also support the strategy of ‘Occam’s razor’, although one has to keep in mind
that a simple model can only match simple targets. A certain theme requires models
that do justice to it. If a theme in organised simplicity or unorganised complexity is
represented by a complex model, then strategies such as Occam’s razor will work
quite well. That is, the model is likely to be overly complex with respect to the
target’s innate qualities.15
On the other hand, simple models of many themes in organised complexity are
not likely to do them justice. Occam’s razor will fail with such themes.16
iii This is a tough call; the emergence of feedback with a complex form can probably have severe
consequences for the production of additional complexity in forms
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1.5 Simplicity, Locality and Universality
The methodology of PAC has now sufficiently progressed to tackle a few issues
that usually open a philosophical variant of Pandora’s Box, with aeons of thinking
and discourse behind them. These ancient traditions can be respected by modestly
stating that the only reason to bring them up here, is to position them in the context
of PAC. In other words, how do these terms ‘make sense’ in the vocabulary that is
being built?
From the previous discussion one can now assume that our known universe is a
space that contains a plethora of patterns. This would be in accordance with the ob-
servations of cosmologists and quantum physicists. Due to the combinatorial nature
of their interferences, this space is indeterminate for any observer in that space. This
might be called the ‘Metis ontology’.
At this point, it may be good to distinguish between ‘coding’ and ‘interpret-
ing’. In PAC, coding will be used for processes that project pattern onto a medium
in an unambiguous fashion. This means that a pattern can be pre-processed onto a
medium or substrate (encoding), carried elsewhere, and be post-processed (decoded)
in exactly the same way as it was encoded. The isomorphy is ensured because of this
unambiguous nature. This manner of transfer is typical for environments that consist
of crisp data items, such as digital computers. If the receiver is able to recreate the
same context as the sender, then these patterns can be ‘informed’ in an unambiguous
way. In these cases one can safely speak of transfer of ‘information’.17
Most patterns will however, be less ‘crisp’; their projection onto a medium less
accurate and their post-processing may take place in different contexts. These pat-
terns themselves may be complex juxtapositions or sequences of simpler patterns.
Under these circumstances it may be more correct to speak of interpretation; that
is, it is highly likely that the post-processing contextualises patterns differently than
their encoded forms. Depending on the goals of the projection/reflection this may,
or may not be problematic. If accuracy is required, then interpretation will always
be problematic; it may also be the best that one can achieve.
Maybe it is more correct to call this ‘restricted interpretation’, as the word seems
to have even richer meanings in the humanities.18
With this, a fluent gradient between decoding and interpreting is established, in
which uncertainty is non-existent at first, but definitely present in the latter. To my
knowledge, encoding does not have a specific ‘interpretative’ counterpart.
Pre-processing of patterns is predominantly encoding, while post-processing can
fill the entire range between decoding and interpretation. Note also that construction
work usually approximates coding. The isomorphy between internal models and re-
alised constructions tends towards coding rather than interpretation.
It is worth pointing out that, in computer science, ‘interpretation’ is also used
in a different way. A piece of code is said to be ‘interpreted’ if it is translated into
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a form that the computer can process, the moment this code is needed. Usually
the translation from programming languages to computer language is carried out
during development of the application, in which case the programming language is
compiled into its eventual application, for instance as a file with the extension ‘exe’,
for ‘executable’.19
In many cases, it is more convenient to delay this translation until it is needed.
The most widely used example of this are the web pages that are displayed in a web
browser. Besides the information that is of interest for the person who is surfing
the Internet (content), a web page contains a lot of extra symbolic patterns that are
used by the browser to create the layout of the web page (this is often called the
‘mark-up’). One can check this by surfing to a web page and then opening the web-
page’s source.iv The source will prove to be an extensive and often incomprehensible
jumble of symbols and codes that are used by the browser. The actual content usually
only is a fraction of the total source code. In software lingo, the browser is said to
‘interpret’ the mark-up, in order to generate the layout of the web page.
Whether this form of interpretation is similar or different from the way it is used
here in PAC is a matter of taste. On one side, the interpreted code is still a symbolic
code and is translated in a rather unambiguous manner. On the other hand, every
browser will generate slightly different layouts, and so one could also say that every
browser provides a (slightly) different context, in which the conceptual patterns that
are captured in the markup are formed. This would mean that the two forms of inter-
pretation are very similar, but that the interpreted code approximates coding. Here
again, it would seem that a distinction, such as between coding and interpretation,
has its zone of ambiguity.
Encoding and decoding are characteristics of the pre- and post-processing stage
of message transfer (or ‘information’ in the way it is normally used), and in infor-
mation science this typically means that pattern is neatly projected onto a medium
in a one-to-one fashion. This is the kind of transfer one may see when downloading
something on a computer; the downloaded (decoded) file is an exact match of the
uploaded (encoded) file.
Complex targets will tend to be predominantly interpreted. They will be approx-
imations of ideal patterns, or conversely be at least partially described in terms of
‘uncertainty’, ‘noise’, ‘disorder’, and so on. In the latter cases, statistical approaches
will become the preferred tools, as these ambiguous aspects of a target will be in-
terpreted as being themes of unorganised complexity. This interpretation will be
incorrect, but the modeller will have no other tools at her disposal to interpret these
aspects otherwise, until, through a stroke of genius, the complex patterns may be-
come known.20
In order to give an idea of how this incorrect interpretation will work, consider the
logistic differential map that was discussed in chapter four. By changing one param-
eter, this equation could display an entire range from orderly to chaotic behaviour.
iv Usually by right-clicking the mouse while hovering over the web page.
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Even though the chaotic behaviour seems to approximate random behaviour beyond
certain parameter values, it would be strictly incorrect to consider the behaviour
as being random. The order may be statistically irrelevant, but it is still there, as
the rather simple equation can testify, and this order still percolates through the
observed randomness. Order ‘flies under the radar’ of statistical approaches, so to
speak. Statistics is therefore compromised by the uncertainty of the actual processes
at work.21
There may be some schools of thought who object, and say that everything is
interpreted.22 If this is true, then isomorphy cannot exist and the whole game of
PAC must end. It also means that modelling in general is illusory, for the model
cannot bring anything into a target. A line becomes an interpretation of a line, a dot
an interpretation of a dot, a car an interpretation of Newtonian mechanics, and a
construction an interpretation of the builder’s ideas.
Like all other concepts, the adjective ‘everything’ tends to stretch a word towards
panchreston. If isomorphy between model and target is no longer possible, then in-
terpretations seem just as futile. An interpretation seems to hold the promise of a
match of whatever is interpreted, or at least some aspects of it. If interpretation suf-
fers from an absence of correspondence, then the word no longer seems to have any
significance; it becomes naive. Therefore, a gradient between a symbolic (coded)
and an interpreted (complex) modelling seems more likely, and it is certainly more
powerful as a descriptive idiom.23
With this, ‘understanding’ something in reality has become equivalent with the
building of an epistemological network —-a conceptual network— which aims to
capture certain isomorphy with the internal structure of a target, or the expression
of this structure in its surroundings. This isomorphy can be asymmetrical at least
in two ways. The most obvious one is the uncertainty between target and model,
which was discussed earlier. This asymmetry involves the necessary reduction of
information between target and model, and leads amongst other things, to bias and
amplifications.
The second form of asymmetry is through the contexts that the various descrip-
tive concepts reproduce. A description of genes using the concept of ‘selfishness’
enriches the isomorphy, as the concept of ‘selfishness’ is conceptually rich.
On the other hand, inappropriate strictness may result in ‘narrow’ perspectives.
It was argued earlier that this is likely to happen with interface concepts, but there
will probably be other concepts as well. For instance, if a scientist discovers a sta-
tistical relationship between two previously unrelated issues, and the findings are
discarded by peers in absence of causality, then for a complex theme, the require-
ment of causality may not do justice to that theme.24
The conceptual model spanned by the ‘selfish gene’ metaphor, therefore is both
too rich in some aspects, as well as too narrow in others. The richness involves ‘self-
ishness’, but also the purported agency that a gene begets, while the metaphor is too
narrow in processes of contextualisation, most notably in the implicit assumption of
linearity between genetic patterns and their expressions in various environments.
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As a ‘rule of thumb’, probably any concept that has an immediate intuitive feel
to it, but is nonetheless hard to capture in a nice, crisp definition, is likely to become
subject to overly narrow descriptive framing.
Thus any modelling activity of themes in organised complexity will always bal-
ance on a tightrope between too much and too little, as Gould had already ob-
served.25
However, ‘understanding’ a complex theme in a complex world comes with its
own limitations. Ambiguity, uncertainty, disorder, and modelling limitations, are all
concepts that defy strict correspondence between target and model. Yet all these
take place, and all these affect an agent that has to do something in a reality like our
own.
If the zone of ambiguity between orderly distinctions is the place where choices
are made, and alternatives can be explored, then maybe Atlan’s ‘cunning reason’ is
not the only intellectual source that Metis draws on. It might be here that intelligence
and rationality are completed with hunches, intuitions, beliefs and all those other as-
pects of human cognition that are so hard to grasp. If this zone allows a multitude of
threads to interfere, and the consequent combinatorial explosion of interactions and
propensities are beyond ‘understanding’, then maybe evolution has already discov-
ered some tricks that would allow a cognitive being to deal with this. The most likely
candidates would be found amongst our emotions and our ‘gut feelings’, which do
not create a detailed mental imagery, but rather accept the complexity of a situation
and create a strong immediate ‘sense’ (and sensation) on how to deal with it. Reason
and rationality tend to be rather slow, as cognitive skills, and often time is limited.
It could even be that reason and rationality feed on this ‘deeper’ intelligence, which
drives the first provisional poles of order in uncertainty and ambiguity, and at least in
the case of humans, allows exploration and sense-making through narratives, stories
and legends.26
1.6 PAC and the Arrow of Time
It is worth pointing out that the unfolding of the universe from the Metis prerequi-
site makes one conundrum in classical physics, generally called ‘the arrow of time’,
almost trivial. The conundrum is, that Newtonian mechanics is invariant in time;
all the equations work ‘towards the future’, as well as when looking back into the
past. Theoretically this would mean that reversing time is a possibility. However, it
is generally accepted that time cannot be reversed, and thus (classical) physics faces
the challenge of explaining this from within a Newtonian idiom.27
In PAC, the Metis prerequisite already includes ambiguity in the unfolding of the
universe.28 Even a simple operator in Newtonian calculus, like the differential oper-
ator, must be seen as a reduction of information, or an approximation of the process
it models. This basically follows Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.29 Apparently
this approximation works very well for most processes in the plane of organised
simplicity, as the robustness of the Newtonian idiom, and all its more recent spin-
offs can testify. Technology, cosmology, astronomy, and many, many other fields
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demonstrate that the Newtonian idiom offers an impressive framework of isomor-
phisms ‘in reality’.
However, even if the approximations of the differential operator are violated with
a minimal probability —that is, the assumption of linear progression between two
states, or two measurements, is at best an approximation of the ambiguity between
them, the arrow of time has already started to move from past to future. Two similar
particles passing the same mass body at exactly the same location, take a slightly
different path, because an electron orbiting around the nucleus is positioned slightly
differently than its equivalent in the other particle, resulting in a slightly different
offset in their trajectories that becomes larger and larger as the particles move on,
and which cannot be undone by reversing time, because of the combinatorial nature
of the propensities with other particles they interact with .
The issue here is not the purported ‘failure’ of the Newtonian idiom, but the
question whether the Newtonian idiom fully captures reality, or approximates reality
by assuming linearity between states, distinctions (measurements) and so on?
The problem of ‘the arrow of time’ is not a problem of reality, but a problem of
modelling. A model that (implicitly) presumes absence of ambiguity will have to
account for ambiguity within the idiom of the orderly, once ambiguity is observed
in reality. For a model that excludes ambiguity, this aspect will always come as a
surprise, as for instance in the asymmetrical distribution of energy and matter in the
universe.30
In PAC, ambiguity is a characteristic of ranking, and (thus) of observation/detection,
and ambiguity is fundamentally irreversible; ambiguity cannot be countered with
absolute certainty by reapplying an ‘ambiguity operator’ in order to reverse the pro-
cess. Thus, with one low-probability event of ambiguity, time might be bounded
reversible to that point when the ambiguity was spawned, but with approximately
1081 simple particles (alone) interfering in a massive parallel fashion, and with all
these interferences hosting a (low) probability of spawning an ambiguous event, it
stands to reason that a universe that is fully reversible in time is highly unlikely.31
The reason why the problem of time’s arrow is brought up here is not to propose
a ‘theory’ on the arrow of time, but rather to show why PAC cannot provide such a
theory. As theoretical physics by choice — and this is the prerogative of the game
they play there— aims to address this issue while excluding an ‘ambiguity operator’,
or more correctly, because such an operator will have to be proven according to the
rules of the game they play, it is PAC that is running into a boundary. This boundary
is the complicated world of organised simplicity, that is, the world of games that
can be played with pure (and formal) analytical approaches of reductionism, strict
causality and determinism. At this level of complexity, those who take an interest in
phenomena that can be studied there, can upgrade the rules of the game to a high
level of detail.
However, when moving up the scales of complexity, pragmatics dictates that the
uncertainty gaps in our current knowledge must acknowledge ambiguity, especially
when playing the reductionist game. The combinatorial nature of relationships poses
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limitations on any modelling agent in a complex universe, and thus must acknowl-
edge uncertainty in the correspondences between target and model. Already, at the
level of complexity of a living cell, pragmatics dictates that our (current) under-
standing is limited with respect to subject matter; that is, there is currently no purely
formal descriptive idiom that completely describes a living cell. Besides, a living
cell does not have a full understanding of its own internal states; that is, it is likely
that the aggregate form does not fully and completely know itself. As a result, there
is an uncertainty gap between micro- and macro level that compromises reductionist
approaches.
Regarding the foundations of complexity, there is an important question that re-
mains open. Newtonian mechanics suggests that ambiguity becomes (almost) non-
existent, or non-measurable, in the orderly world of elementary particles, as be-
comes clear in the power of mathematics as a descriptive idiom in physics and
chemistry. Along the complexity perspective however, the threads of order seem
to stretch and tear under the pressure of ambiguity (entropy?). At a certain point of
complexity, ambiguity seems to become more prominent. This stretching and tear-
ing is not necessarily detrimental, as the interplay of order and uncertainty seems to
create an optimal curve that allows life and other deeply valuable complex phenom-
ena.
This does raise the question, however, whether the threads of order keep tearing
up more and more, as entropy takes over at larger scales and order buckles under
the pressure and has to let go. If order or stability is the delaying of entropy at
local scales, then order provides the principle meshwork that constrains the forces
of entropy. The exponential increase of ambiguity along the complexity perspective
would seem consistent with observations in physics, but remains speculative as long
as this relationship between order and entropy remains open. For this reason, it is
my hunch that there is an upper boundary of complexity, although there remains a
theoretical possibility for an (almost) infinitely localised, (almost) infinite form of
complexity somewhere.
1.7 Essences
Earlier, Stephen Jay Gould was quoted when discussing the difference between
essence and details. Details have been given agency of their own through the con-
cept of ‘uncertainty’. A complex target is a combination of order and uncertainty,
where ‘details’ were considered as being a problematic, normatively charged aspect
of uncertainty. The notion of ‘essence’ has as yet remained underdeveloped.
From the current state of the agile modelling activities, this concept can now be
filled in. Essences are the most defining aspects of a model; they are the idealisa-
tions without blemishes, the purely symmetrical, the absence of uncertainty or the
unusual. They are the highest peaks in a mental landscape. Essences remain when
contextual diminution can diminish no more; they make the minimal model.
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A speck of light in the night sky is a ‘star’, a two-wheel transporting device a ‘bi-
cycle’, an exponential function, a preferred financial growth curve. These essences
are consistent, but not static, for they are shaped and reshaped, and fundamentally in
friction with experience. For experience and other sources of conceptual patterns are
external influences on a model, and introduce a potential for disruption, unexpect-
edness, inconsistency, novelty and change. Diminution towards essences basically
maximizes uncertainty, and therefore an orderly model of a complex theme is also
a fragile one. Theorists may enjoy the aesthetics of orderly models, the craftspeople
may rather find fulfilment in the messiness of that what the orderly leaves out. This
is why complexity ultimately is, and always has been, the domain of the crafts!
With this, in absence of absolute ‘truths’, and in realisation that all knowledge is
limited, probably other criteria for modelling may become more feasible, and that is
coherence and robustness. Coherence is related to internal consistency; which means
that the model does not contradict itself with its own vocabulary. Robustness is the
ability of the model to deal with external disruptions. The experimental method can
provide disruptions from reality in the conceptual networks provided by ‘science’,
but science has proven to ‘absorb’ these disruptions without them affecting the en-
tire epistemological system. In fact, experiments demonstrate that disruptions can
reinforce the conceptual networks, or conversely alter them. Both however, aim to
decrease the uncertainty between theory and reality.
In that sense, PAC is fragile, because it is produced from one source, called ‘pat-
tern’. However, the approach has also aimed to counter this fragility by weaving
threads with currently accepted theories and ideas. PAC has aimed for coherence by
trying to be consistent in its philosophical founding through patterns and informa-
tion, its methodology and its themes. The theories it has interfered with provide the
conceptual patterns that can disrupt the conceptual network, and thus provide the
means of making PAC more robust.
It should be noted however, that these criteria are not restricted to PAC alone.
If social theory excludes the biological aspects of being human, then biology can
become a disruptive aspect of that theory and vice versa. The possible consequences
were already explored in the case of interface concepts, but in general one can say
that a theory that is closed to possible outside interventions will also tend to be
very fragile, because it does not cater to the disruptions from other scientific areas,
philosophical reflection, or practical issues.
Disruptions, in order to alter a conceptual network, need to balance between re-
inforcement, novelty and meaninglessness. A disruption that does not provide new
patterns, at best only reinforces existing contextual patterns, while novel patterns
can reorganise contexts (learning). Indeterminate disruptions, on the other hand,
may lead to indifference or confusion. Only a meaningful disruption can effectively
change a conceptual network. A disruption that is effective, causes inference, that
is, it changes a conceptual network.
Now it can be understood what happens in the complex feedback loop of mod-
elling activities. Along a thin thread (or threads) of isomorphy, a target’s form is
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observed; a certain stream of juxtaposed patterns is carried to an observer of the
target, and is transferred to internal models. These models, in turn, guide further
observations and aim to make the isomorphisms between target and model stronger.
However, as every contextual pattern is itself embedded in a network of concepts
—contexts of contexts—, the modelling follows a delicate balancing act. Concepts
may be too rich, or too narrow (or shallow), and as they interfere with the concep-
tual patterns that the target provides, the little truths of matching are made in this
indeterminate space between epistemology and ontology. Only certain classes of
targets —the truly symbolic forms— can be transferred with high accuracy as code;
isomorphism is maximised in this case. However, most targets are too complex, and
are subject to various forms of interpretation, and so the interferences between target
and model are complex and may even be novel or surprising. As a result, a system
is still a model, simply because the system is a reduction of a target, termed in the
vocabulary of a cognitive workshop. However, the target does have a voice in the
modelling work, and ‘pulls’ the model towards ontological spheres.
2 Into Domains
When agents acquire means of mapping their environment with internal representa-
tions, they inherently also acquire a potential to map interactions with other agents,
because the agents are part of each other’s surroundings. It stands to reason that
certain predictability in the action repertoire of these agents facilitates the mapping
of the interactions to internal models.
At this point, it is good to make a distinction between groups and domains.
Groups will be defined here as aggregates in which nothing can be said about the
interactions amongst the members of the group. Groups are stable in the sense that
they can be observed, but the members of the group do not necessarily have any
mutual interactions. The boundaries of the concept of ‘group’ can be witnessed in
clouds or plasmas of gas or particles; they can be observed as aggregates of vapour,
gas or particles, but only loosely, for their grouping is mainly circumstantial and
their environments largely determine when the aggregate breaks up.
Note that Maturana & Varela’s notion of fragmentation applies here. This pattern
exists until the group is broken to such an extent that only individual entities remain.
At this point a group no longer exists.
At the upper end of the scale, a group probably ends when the observer can no
longer see the boundary of the group. One may consider a plasma cloud or a nebula
in space as a ‘group’, but the gas cloud called ‘air’ is usually not considered as such.
This would imply that the upper end of the scale of ‘group’ can be subjective.
Another ‘configuration’ of grouping is when the elements of the group can be ob-
served as interacting, but for this discussion only the interactions that preserve the
grouping are really interesting. At a very elementary level, attraction can achieve
this, as a solar system can testify, but the forces of closure of elements in a group
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tend to be more sophisticated in the case of agents with means of making inter-
nal representations of their life-world. Here, the agents need to make a distinction
between ‘self’ and ‘group’, and they must be able to engage in coordinated action
in order to maintain the self as part of the group. The resulting dynamics can be
witnessed in an ant colony, schools of fish or a flock of birds.
At this level, the pattern of grouping is no longer limited to external observation,
but is also manifest within the group. The group constitutes itself and maintains it-
self, or in terms of Maturana & Varela, it has become autopoietic.32
Such autopoiesis seems paradoxical though, for it was argued earlier that an ag-
gregate is usually more complex than its constituents. So how can an individual
agent make effective representations of something that is more complex than itself?
Luhmann, for one, considered the following strategy:
Whether a unity of an element should be explained as emergence ”from below” or as con-
stitution ”from above” seems to be a matter of theoretical dispute. We opt decisively for the
latter. Elements are elements only for the system that employs them as units and they are
such only through this system. [. . . ] One of the most important consquences is that systems
of a higher (emergent) order can possess less complexity than systems of a lower order
because they determine the unity and number of elements that compose them; thus in their
own complexity they are independent of their material substratum.33
There is, however, a more straightforward mechanism that allows for a form of
self-organisation, or ‘unity’; a complex system can make itself observable for its
subcomponents through a tag. If the aggregate is able to produce a tag that localises
its existence, other objects can interact with this tag, including those who make up
the aggregate’s constituents. Ant colonies, for instance, are able to self-organise by
communicating through pheromone signals. These pheromone signals allow indi-
vidual ants to explore vast areas around their colony without losing touch with the
colony itself. These pheromone signals therefore, serve, amongst other purposes, as
tags which other members of the colony can ‘connect’ to. In this sense, these trails
serve a function for the colony.34 In a grouping of social agents, certain individuals
may serve as a tag for the group, for instance a ‘leader’.
With this, the emergence of self-organisation can be described in evolutionary
terms. First, there is a group. Then there is a tag; an observable manifestation of the
group’s existence as a group. Consecutively, a mapping is made of the tag in the
constituents of the group: ‘group’ becomes a concept through the observed tag. As
the group by definition, is manifest in the surroundings of its constituents, the thread
that moves through the tag will be reinforced as a concept. If this concept reinforces
the ‘self’ as part of the group, a self-organising system is formed.
Thus when a tag is created that represents the aggregate form, it allows its con-
stituents to observe the group as being important for the maintenance of self. The
maintenance of ‘group’ then becomes part of the system’s action repertoire. Note
here, that the maintenance of ‘group’ becomes a goal for the individual agents. In
other words, the aggregate form needs to be of influence on the goal-sets of its con-
stituents.
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A space that contains at least two entities that can preserve themselves as a group
will be called a domain.
Pattern: Elementary Self-Organisation
Description: A grouping in which the aggregate form creates at least one tag
that can be observed by the individual agents that constitute the
group, and which allows the agents to maintain the group.
A.K.A:
Notes: The shared goals in a domain will be called values
A simple form of self-organisation can now be modelled as a pattern. Basically,
projection of the tag onto the goals that guide the internal modelling activities of the
agents, allows them to share common goals, but as the tag is an emergent property
of the collective, at least in the sense that it represents the group, the corresponding
goals of the aggregate are spawned system-internally. In other words, they also be-
come subject to the internal dynamics of that system. As a result, the big difference
with the simpler forms of convergence-inducing processes is that the system now
is affected by goals that it has formed itself. These goal-directed tags will be called
the values of the system’s domain. Note that these values are distributed over the
internal models of the agents in that domain.
Thus a domain supplies at least one value in which the agents of the group can
maintain themselves as part of the group. Such values ‘tap in’ to the goals that the
agents maintain as part of their models, and which guide their action repertoire.
These values are maintained as models in the individual agents, and can be shared
amongst one another in two ways. The first means is through interaction with the
aggregate form (or the tag that represents the aggregate), which could be considered
a vertical binding. An analogy could, for instance, be a national flag or national
anthem, which serve as the tags that unite the people of a certain country. Here
material and musical tags ‘condense’ the inherent complexity of ‘the nation’, and
reduce it to a ‘story’ of ‘being’ and ‘belonging’. A space with certain significance
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could also become a tag, such as a place of worship, a palace or a presidential
residence.v
The values of the group can also be reinforced horizontally when interaction pat-
terns associated with the domain’s values are shared and reinforced amongst agents.
In the latter situation, communications become important as means of sharing the
common values that bind the elements to their domain. Along the pattern of elemen-
tary self-organisation, we might see an analogy with the heated debates of soccer
fans after their club has played a match. Whatever may be said, they at least carry
the shared values of the soccer club, and as long as these shared essences reinforce
the ‘being’ and ‘belonging’ as part of the aggregate form —the soccer club— the
pattern is maintained. Both forms of reinforcement can happen simultaneously.
With this, it may have become clear that the threads that have been woven in
this chapter, are all a preparation for a disruption into social domains. The classical
problem of social theory, that is, the observer as being part of the observed, has now
been modelled, and a social system as target, and as a source for corresponding
models has been prepared. These social domains are the context for the concept that
started the journey, a lingua democratica for the public debate of genomics.
3 The Lingua Democratica
With domains sufficiently covered, the last thread can be tied to the conceptual net-
work that PAC has been building, which is the lingua democratica itself.
For starters, one can say that knowledge is the result of a production system. Sci-
ence for instance, produces theories, ideas, artefacts, and does this through certain
methodological guidelines. This inherently makes scientific production complex,
not in the colloquial meaning of the word, but in the sense that scientific produc-
tion itself is subject to base notions from complexity, such as dependency on initial
conditions, scale-invariance and emergence.
As new knowledge is produced from existing knowledge, forces of closure tend
to be predominant in the domains where this knowledge is produced. This makes
knowledge domains unique, both in the sense that they can be experts on that portion
of reality that their conceptual models can effectively address, as well as that they
are necessarily closed to other aspects. One might say that these specialisations cut
contextual slices in the knowledge of a target, which includes subject matter, but also
a number of other related concepts that are emphasised with respect to others. Thus,
a social theory that claims that everything is language, will cut a slice of the social,
which excludes the biological, while socio-biology will tend to neglect the binding
force of language as propensity of human societies. Classical scientific approaches
will consider these mutual disruptions as being trivial, while complexity-junkies
will be extremely interested in the interferences between such contextual slices.
v I will leave it up to the domain experts (yet again) to decide if the analogies offered here are
actually patterns that are manifest in human societies.
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Tendencies for contextual diminution in these knowledge domains are partially
countered because these domains act in their immediate environment, and thus dis-
ruptive influences are possible, and must be present in order for those domains to
function optimally. This environment is shared with other specialist domains, which
may interact according to actor/co-actor interactions, but also have innate qualities.
Some domains may be expansive or invasive, which inevitably brings them in
conflict with others. With this, a coarse model of stakeholders has been sketched.
Stakeholders are groups that maintain certain knowledge of a theme, and usually
also act in accordance with this knowledge. Knowledge has thus become subject to
the values that are dominant in a certain domain.
From previous discussions, it may be clear that the knowledge of one stakeholder
domain tends to be considered relatively meaningless in other domains. That is,
knowledge that does not overlap tends to be considered ‘details’ for the stakeholder
that has no models for the excluded patterns, or when that knowledge is relatively
distant from the essences that those domains maintain. If there is no common frame
of reference between stakeholder domains, then the resulting interactions will be
undetermined; the most likely response will be one of indifference.
Now consider the following scenario: one stakeholder has knowledge of a prob-
lem or a concern that another stakeholder has to address, but the problem or concern
is relatively unimportant for the latter.
As a hypothetical example, some stakeholders believe, based on their knowledge
production systems, that the Earth is getting warmer and the reason for this is the
burning of fossil fuels. Other stakeholders have the means to address this, but for
them the melting of polar ice provides ‘market opportunities’ to find new oil, which
will amplify the effects of global warming. The goals, and the consequent rationale
of ‘market opportunity’ creates a convergence inducing process that will eventually
hit a boundary state, either because the oil runs out at some point, or because the
consumer-base is severely reduced as a result of natural disasters related to global
warming (or conflicts over oil).
In this illustrative example, it will be clear that the stakeholders who can change
this likely course of events need to incorporate knowledge of global warming in the
domains they host, in such a way that it both makes sense to them, as well as that
the urgency is successfully transferred. In other words, the disruption must lead to a
process of inference at the recipient; that is, it must alter the contextual maps. Cross-
stakeholder interventions thus need to be disruptive, and the consequent inference
not only needs to effectively decode facts, but also the significance.
Basically, this means that one stakeholder provides conceptual patterns for an-
other, and these conceptual patterns need to be successfully contextualised, which
includes the values. Only then the prerequisites of a ‘lingua democratica’ are satis-
fied.vi Note that the example also calls for an appropriate action, which can only be
vi Another option could of course be a more militant approach, but this is beyond scope here. It is
also questionable if a conflict model, generally speaking, really is beneficial in the long run. For
instance, if there is money to be made on exploiting oil fields on the North Pole, then pressure of
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achieved if such inferences have taken place. Besides this, the timeframe in which
action is possible is bounded by environmental determinants.
This may seem obvious to the point of being trivial, but one conclusion that
can already be drawn is that criticism does not necessarily mean anything. One
stakeholder can formulate with fact and eloquence all s/he wants; if the criticism
does not ‘land’ —that is, there is no inference— nothing has been achieved. Based
on the previous discussion, this scenario is very likely to happen in cross-stakeholder
interactions due to the differences in the mental landscapes that are formed. To make
this argument even stronger, reason and rationality are subject to context! There is
no ‘universal’ rationality or reason, even though some aspects of rational thought
may be, such as logic.
Now, this triviality is suddenly violating quite a number of schools of thought on
discourse theory!35
It is therefore a perfectly rational and reasonable objective for an oil company,
who is interested in profit maximisation, to exploit the North Pole, for they are only
serving the consumers who want to drive their cars, and go on holidays all over the
world. However, this prospect may be appalling for environmentalist groups, who
see the temperatures rise and a world under threat. The problem is; they are both
right within their domains!
As another example, take the following quote from economist, and Nobel Prize
winner Jeffrey Sachs:
It’s true, that the average poor rural African farmer has many talents —he can grow his
own food, build his own house, tend animals, make cloths. But such people are also deeply
inefficient.36
What is wrong with this quote? What is wrong is that it is perfectly correct! There is
a perfect rationale behind it, and Sachs undoubtedly has the best interest at heart for
these people, for his rationale includes the inevitability of efficiency as direction of
human progress. World-wide economic growth is a convergence inducing process,
and it is absolutist as it degrades other values of human existence, at least as long as
the process does not hit boundary states. Such absolutist, self-fulfilling agendas of
economic growth push the inhabitants of planet Earth towards the plane of organised
simplicity, and there is one thing that can be predicted with the patterns described
so far; that is, this process will make ‘the system’ vulnerable to disruptions. As one
can safely infer that our planet lies firmly in the plane of organised complexity, these
disruptions will inevitably happen.
At that moment, African rural farmers may be much better off than those who
are highly dependent on the disrupted techno-economic system. That is why evolu-
tion discovered diversity, as diversity increases robustness. History has also amply
anti-globalist groups needs to be continuously enforced, as long as there is an economic benefit.
Putting this stronger, economic benefit is likely to increase as oil becomes more scarce. If economic
theory is based on scarcity, this basically means that in this case economics only starts to work
when it is already too late, namely when the resources are running low.
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demonstrated that humans are generally poorly equipped to deal with diversity.
There are now two models at work on the target called ‘rural African farmer’.
One ‘reasons’ that they will be forced to assimilate into a global capitalist economy,
while another model wonders if this is a smart thing to do based on insights from
complexity thinking. Both follow a certain rationale, both are correct within their
contexts, both are reasonable, both interfere, and both totally disagree on what the
target should do.
From the viewpoint of a lingua democratica, this also means that any deliberative
discourse based on consensus, shared values, reason, or rationality will not be very
useful. At a deeper level, a few fundamental prerequisites must be met before one
can even start to think from these premises. These prerequisites can be modelled in
pattern, which will be appropriately called the ‘lingua democratica’.
3.1 A Pattern of the Lingua Democratica
To begin with, the lingua democratica has to be rephrased in the vocabulary of PAC
as it has currently only been used rather informally:
A Lingua Democratica is at least successful when patterns from one knowledge domain
allows inference in another
Ideally, a more dynamic, bi-directional flow of communications is desired, in which
all the parties involved feel that the no-man’s land between their domains is covered
and something fascinating is happening there. Something that, for all intent and
purposes, might be considered a true cross-domain discourse;
A Lingua Democratica is a communications that leads to inference within all the social
domains involved in the communications, in such ways that they all agree on the desirability
of their mutual influence
This definition is agreeably a bit more ambitious than the first, but we have now
at least resolutely discarded ‘preaching for the converted’ as an adequate means of
lingua democratica and, besides this, an attempt has been made to exclude invasive
interaction patterns (power-play) as valid form of inference across domains. This,
I think, is required to honour the ‘democratica’ in the power concept that we are
developing here.
With these concepts in place, the lingua democratica as a means of communica-
tions takes a familiar shape.
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Pattern: Lingua Democratica
Description: A continuous form of feedback between two hourglass patterns
A.K.A:
Notes:
As a base notion, a certain concept or theme is embedded in the conceptual net-
works of two domains. Through a communication, the domains aim to start a pro-
cess of inference (the thick arrows) in order to change the conceptual patterns in the
domains.
In cross-stakeholder communications, it is highly uncertain that ‘essences’ are
communicated with a high degree of accuracy, particularly when the contexts of
the communicators are vastly different through (amongst others) culture, language,
training and experience. It requires intensive synchronization efforts to even start
to overcome these differences. However, communications also imply feedback, and
feedback tends to reduce uncertainty.
The environment, and the processes of contextualisation may also interrupt, dis-
turb or otherwise impair synchronization, but the feedback between the hourglasses
‘embraces’ these interruptions and aims to minimise them (unless, of course, they
are desired, for instance when brainstorming on a certain topic).
With this, the pattern of the lingua democratica can be seen as taking up a place
on a scale of disruptive knowledge. This scale is bounded on one side by com-
munications that do not pass any novelty, and therefore at best reinforce what the
recipient already knows. At this end, contextual diminution can converge towards
the attractor of absolutism for those agents caught up in the communicative loop.
The other boundary is that of meaninglessness and confusion, where the vocabu-
laries are so different, abstruse or convoluted that it doesn’t lead to inference. ”Your
lips move, but I don’t hear what you’re saying”, in the words of Pink Floyd. As pro-
cesses are always temporal, this does not have to be a stable state, and over time a
common frame of reference may be found, but this will first require attention before
one can really speak of a disruption.37
Within these boundaries, the resulting gradient of disruptive knowledge still
acknowledges the possibility of aggressive, violating or dominating vocabularies,
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while the lingua democratica fills those positions where such influences are min-
imised, or perhaps more correctly, when they are more or less evenly distributed
amongst the participants.
3.2 Inference between Domains
If I am permitted to give a metaphorical image of what successful inference between
domains —-a lingua democratica— looks like, I would delve into memories of my
youth in the South-American country of Guyana and take myself to the north-east
seawall of the capital city of Georgetown, where the Demerara River enters the At-
lantic Ocean. As my father managed a sea-defence project there, I was often playing
on the bulkhead, at the Koffer-dam, the rock-piles and on the breakwaters on site.
The many faces, forms and shapes water can have has always impressed me;
from the flat-calm withdrawn plane of ebb-tide to the massive, banging force of the
Atlantic against the metal of the Koffer-dam during spring-tide, with foam splashing
overhead.
But the most impressive of these forms was at the end of the rainy season, when
the Demerara threw its spoil into the ocean with such force that it subdued the
Atlantic temporarily. The Demerara is far from being the largest of the Amazonian
rivers, and her mouth is relatively small —-a few miles across—, but somehow I
think that this contributed to the river’s power rather than undermining it.
If one would be watching the water as it hit the ocean, especially at upcom-
ing flood tide, you could suddenly witness an unexpected dance between river and
ocean, sometimes calm, sometimes choppy, but continuously in motion and flux.
At times the waves seemed to freeze, and only the trunks, branches and shrubs
that were speeding by, revealed the tremendous forces of water at work. Sometimes
foam would emerge out of nothing, and a wave would swell up and break, or other
forms and shapes that flowing water can form would appear, from small eddies to
whirlpools that were so large that they were downright frightening.
Inference can take a number of shapes. At one extreme, there is the calm, sub-
dued form of mutual agreement, at the other, the pounding, forceful idiom of those
claiming their right for the sake of it.
There is the sometimes tasteless ‘euro-pudding’ of deliberation, compromise, of
‘polderen’, and there are the distinctly separate flows of ‘agreeing to disagree’ that
run side by side but hardly seem to interact.
Then there is the flow of the Demerara after the rainy season, where sheer energy
collides with another world that is neither subdued, nor hostile to its intervention,
but is willing to take up what it can use, and hold off what it can’t. And the result
is an extremely dynamic dance of words, with no predictable outcome but which
somehow always leaves a signature once the low has calmed down. Bruno Latour
seems to capture this idea best:
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[. . . ] its science its politics, its aesthetics, its morality are all different from the past. It is
still real and objective, but it is livelier, more talkative, active, pluralistic, and more mediated
than the other.38
This lively space of collaborative disruptions forms the stage of ‘creative friction’.
The journey along the complexity perspective started this phrase, and the mod-
elling work will end with it as well. The river of feedback has met the ocean of the
social. This flow, I hope, does not push with the monomaniacal pressure of competi-
tion, or of self-absorbed criticism, but rather takes the shape of the lively turbulence
of identities and differences, re-entering concepts and perspectives from the work-
shop of pattern-oriented complexity.
4 Wrapping Up
With these last loose ends, PAC has become a full recursive vocabulary in which
the philosophical underpinnings shape the methodological tools, which guide the
themes that feed back into the philosophical underpinnings and methodology.
This feedback guides the coherence of the approach; if science discovers that
human cognition creates illusions of certain perceptions, then this has repercussions
for theories and philosophies of science, which in turn affects the theoretical frame-
works that guide the experiments on human cognition. This is a continuous process
that is in perpetual flux, and which I think, describes the evolutionary nature of any
epistemological activity. Some aspects, especially those in the plane of organised
simplicity, may be quite stable and may allow a high level of granularity.
With this, the classical distinctions between philosophy, science, the humanities
and whatever other categorisation one might aim for, have been unscrewed, and in
this particular case, have been replaced with ‘complexity’. Not that these categories
are incorrect or useless, but the threads that PAC has followed just happen to move
beyond the scales in which these categories can effectively model the targets they
take interest in.
This reshuffling of traditional stances is becoming more important as the com-
plexity perspective is entering social domains. Here, human knowing is comple-
mented with human acting, and with this, the mythological sources of science and
philosophy interferes with those of the crafts, in a full recursive fashion. These in-
terferences gain importance when the journey of PAC travels towards the theme of
technology, as will be attempted later on.
Last, the robustness of PAC has been given methodological justification by allow-
ing theory to interfere. Theory is still the guardian of a certain knowledge domain,
and even though PAC may disrupt theory, the latter will always be granted the fi-
nal word. In the end, patterned approaches, theories and other intellectual activities
in academia are attempts to describe threads that capture certain isomorphy with
processes in a complex world.
Chapter 9
Into Social Systems
The lingua democratica has been reintroduced rather bluntly towards the end of the
previous chapter, but will be the focal concept of this last part of the journey.
What has hopefully become clear by now, is that the sole purpose of the en-
terprise in part two has been to prepare the workshop for a task that can now be
described in the vocabulary of PAC.
The aim, from the start, has been to develop a vocabulary that could be used
to create a conceptual network. This network is built around a certain theme, the
‘lingua democratica’, which is positioned in a social context. In other words, social
theory is the vocabulary of choice as means to embed the lingua democratica. In the
normal academic idiom, one might speak of a ‘theoretical framework’ that might
serve as a base for such an exercise. An impression may therefore be given, that
PAC has been nothing more than the construction of such a theoretical framework.
However, a theoretical framework of social theory that is based on concepts and
patterns from all but the social sciences seems a bit odd. In fact, PAC does not aim
to provide theoretical frameworks, rather it provides disruptive knowledge that can
interfere with social theory. The methodology is ‘contextualising’ certain patterns
from other domains to (in-)form in the social. PAC is disruptive, because it uses a
different vocabulary, and has different focal points than other forms of interference
—such as those from biological vocabularies based on genes—, and follows pro-
cesses of feedback and other patterns. Through the self-referential nature, PAC also
has some means to investigate what is happening in these interferences. With this,
the course that was set out with PAC aligns with the goals and aims of the lingua
democratica; the disruptions are the ‘lingua democratica in action’!
1 Jumping Beyond the Brain
Having moved beyond consciousness, PAC and theoretical frameworks in social
theory have therefore come in friction with each other. This source of disruptive
knowledge may be welcomed by some, and lead to defensive reactions by others.
The very same has happened, and is happening, as was argued earlier between bi-
ology and sociology, and it is likely to happen more and more often as academic
endeavours move further into the landscape of organised complexity. In this plane,
genes sometimes will express themselves in a straightforward fashion, although this
does not imply that this is always the case. Likewise, some aspects of a rodent brain
may show a clear isomorphy with the human brain, while other aspects of a chimp
brain may be irreconcilably different from those of humans.
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This is complexity, and the approach that was developed earlier sought to ex-
plore how these interferences work, by consciously aiming to work from a different
vocabulary. This way, an attempt could be made to pinpoint the sources of friction
where valid knowledge from one domain experiences friction with valid knowledge
from another, based on the various criteria by which the ‘validity’ is defined.
Oppositions have become expressions of scales and boundaries, propensities and
plausibilities. With these concepts, a more inclusive approach can be explored, with-
out losing a critical edge. This inclusive character is based on the presumed scale-
invariance of patterns, while the critical edge itself is described in an idiom that
includes concepts such as coherence, fragility and robustness.
It is no longer about truth, rationality and reason —though they may play a role
in certain contexts— but instead about inference; when does knowledge from one
domain effectively disrupt knowledge in another domain? Such disruptions can pre-
vent mono-disciplinary knowledge from closing in itself by providing novelty. It
can also counter bias, although bias can never be fully ‘neutralised’, because there
is always a common frame of reference. Disruptions can only change these biases,
ambiguities and distinctions.
The underlying statement here is, ”hey . . . ,these patterns are known in such and
such scientific domains. Can they be of assistance to advance social theory? Does so-
cial theory allow this knowledge to be incorporated in its theoretical frameworks?”
If the answer is yes, then that theoretical framework is reinforced, if negative, it
either means that the patterns have hit a boundary of scale, they do not play a role in
the theme at hand, or something is wrong with the theoretical framework, especially
if other frameworks which address the same themes have no problem with these
patterns. This is one way to test the robustness of (theoretical) framework.
1.1 PAC and Social Domains
In social contexts, there are a number of departure points along the complexity
perspective for the interface concept: ‘human being as a social agent’. The most
straightforward one is to consider the collection of living matter that makes the bi-
ological organism called human being, the atom of an aggregate system, called a
‘social system’.
Keeping in mind that when there is a large availability of data, there are one
or more observers that make selections of that data, and that those observers are
themselves data in the selections, that then the prerequisites are met for the feedback
patterns that were developed earlier.
In this case, the large number of human individuals form the data, which are
ranked by those same human individuals in a self-referential fashion. Therefore,
there is a structural perspective which allows the patterns that were developed ear-
lier, to form. Check!
However, the influences along the evolutionary and ecological perspectives also
need to be accounted for. This could be achieved by following the complexity per-
spective, as has been done so far. The question then becomes one of the pattern
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library running into a boundary of scale. If not, the patterns can still return in social
domains, but now also through ‘percolation’ along the complexity perspective.
Either way, the patterns that have been developed so far, still seem viable options
in a social context, and therefore it should be possible to make a conceptual network
that includes a concept called ‘stakeholders’ and a pattern called ‘lingua democrat-
ica’.
It will not come as a surprise perhaps, that many of the patterns described so
far have also, almost in literal sense, been observed in social domains, and so the
most straightforward approach could be to ‘match’ the patterns of PAC with similar
descriptions in social domains. Lyotard, for instance, writes:
Society is a unified totality, a ‘unicity’.[. . . ] A process or set of conditions either ‘con-
tributes’ to the maintenance (or development) of the system, or it is ‘dysfunctional’ in that
it detracts from the integration, effectiveness etc. of the system. The ‘technocrats’ also sub-
scribe to this idea. Whence its credibility: it has the means to become a reality, and that is
all the proof it needs. This is what Horkheimer called the ‘paranoia of reason’1
It will be clear that this is reminiscent of a convergence inducing process between
model and target in the manner described in the previous chapter. More interesting
is the proposed means to counter this, by the ‘disruptions’ of critical theory:
‘Traditional’ theory is always in danger of being incorporated into the programming of the
social whole as a simple tool for the optimization of its performance; this is because its
desire for a unitary and totalizing truth lends itself to the unitary and totalizing practice
of the system’s managers. ‘Critical’ theory, based on a principle of dualism and wary of
synthesis and reconciliations, should be in a position to avoid this fate.
Here the pattern of contextual diminution is concisely described, together with the
disruptions needed to counter convergence and propel the process towards the at-
tractor of absolutism. PAC could contribute to this analysis by pointing out that
the attractor of lethargy is not addressed, and also that more is needed than critical
theory alone, in order to be truly disruptive. It may point out that the convergence
inducing process will occur in other areas that are able to construct ‘unitary and
totalizing truths’, such as for instance, those areas that (implicitly) see criticism as
unitary and totalizing disruptions of unitary and totalising truths. Besides this, the
analysis omits the disruptions of the experimental method, which occur at least in
the theories of the natural sciences; the ‘dialogue with nature’, in the words if Ilya
Prigogine.2
One could then hypothesise that critical theory may become a closed system in
itself, consisting of elites who pride themselves in their privileged vantage points,
while the system managers just do their thing and don’t care too much about what
the critical theorists say, if they are at all able to make sense of the ‘critical vocab-
ularies’ that are developed. PAC would also point out that the critics still depend
on the common frame of reference provided by that which is criticised; that is, the
critics ultimately still belong to the system of unitary and totalizing truths . . .
. . . but these playful games of complexity are not very interesting, for the patterns
that have been developed so far are sufficiently powerful now to make such analyses,
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and besides this, PAC would also immediately make clear that such hypotheses are
only a few of a plethora of possible scenarios in the systems dynamics between these
stakeholders.3
So, even though the immediate goals of PAC could be satisfied here, that is to
demonstrate the plausibility of the manifestations of the patterns in a social con-
text, there is still the ‘lingua democratica’ to consider. It may share its ‘disruptive’
qualities with critical theory, but PAC is forced to navigate the indeterminate space
between ‘dualism, synthesis, and reconciliation’, and within these boundaries, the
‘lingua democratica’ tends towards the latter rather than the former.
In order to demonstrate that this approach does not necessarily lead to a bland
reconfirmation of positions already taken, a more thorough analysis of interferences
with respect to social theory may be interesting.
As an exercise of such a disruption, it may be best to take a social theory, of
which the vocabulary best ‘fits’ with that of PAC. The social systems theory of
Niklas Luhmann becomes interesting in this respect, as it shares common roots in
the general systems theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, but is also one of the first
theories in science that boasts to have taken the issue of complexity seriously from
its inception in the Sixties of the previous century, which is an impressive feat in
itself.
However, PAC cannot ‘just’ take over theory; for one, the three perspectives —
ecological, structural and evolutionary— need to be accounted for, and here already
some problems surface.
Luhmann offers an intriguing ecological perspective on social systems. In his
view, social systems are layered, interact with each other, and are mutually con-
tingent. He had much to say about these interactions, and PAC has little to add to
this. The thread that is followed along the complexity perspective therefore, aims to
connect to this idea.
Along the structural and the evolutionary perspectives, however, Luhmann’s
ideas are a bit more problematic, especially with current insights offered in the cog-
nitive sciences, and complexity thinking itself. His theory of social systems is based
on ‘meaning’, and ‘consciousness’, which constitute the psychic layer on which so-
cial systems form, as a kind of substrate. He considers that the meaning systems in
this psychic layer are autopoietic in nature, and that they can connect to each other
through communications.
As progress along the complexity perspective has just passed the interface called
‘consciousness’, there is an uncertainty gap with the concept of autopoiesis, as en-
visioned by Luhmann. Luhmann does not seem to provide an extensive model on
how these autopoietic processes are structured, but instead takes them for granted
and gives an extensive account on what they do, which will be summarized later on.
Here, we can consider a refactoring strategy, that may bridge the uncertainty gap
with Luhmann’s social systems. However, it would seem to be a bit unusual, not to
say pedantic, if social theories are refactored by an engineer who has little training
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in this field. PAC does not have the pretences that Kaplan and Rogers have observed
in (some) scientific disciplines:
Most biologists and psychologists are not trained in sociology but some of them try their
hand at grand social theorizing [...]. These authors present roughly hewn, untrained attempts
at sociology, yet believe that their expertise in biology provides suitable qualifications for
pronouncements of vast political and social consequence4
PAC is of course already methodologically constrained to statements about themes
within its immediate focus. One cannot say anything about a theme that is beyond a
given context. A statement, theory or methodology that presumes to explain every-
thing is not possible, for naive. So knowledge from one domain that does not bother
to interfere with that of others, and overly relies on its own internal knowledge pro-
duction, is bound to be narrow. The immediate implication is that many, if not most,
themes in a complex world can only be tackled in multidisciplinary collaboration,
in order to reduce the fragility of the knowledge of that theme. An engineer can
contribute to this by providing know-how of practical processes of feedback, which
has been assembled in the pattern library.
In order to make the uncertainty gaps between engineering and social theory as
small as possible, the refactoring strategy offered here will be performed by includ-
ing bits of other social theories, which may hopefully make sense to the experts of
social theory who may follow up on this first attempt. Luhmann has always been
aware enough of complexity, and most notably contingency, to realise that theories
of complex themes usually have a provisional nature.5
In order to engage in this refactoring strategy, first the premises need to be made
clear. The theme here is ‘social system’, and according to PAC, three perspectives of
‘social system’ need to be accounted for. As was mentioned earlier, the ecological
perspective of multi-layered, interacting and contingent social systems is covered
by Luhmann, while the other two should be taken up by the threads along the com-
plexity perspective that was followed so far. However, before that, the gap between
the biological domains and social domains must be crossed, most notably the gaps
along the gradient of ‘genes’, ‘organisms’ and ‘human beings’ (as concepts).
It was mentioned earlier that the gene has been a major starting point for ex-
planations of social species, and has even resulted in a sub-discipline called socio-
biology.6 There are many benefits to living in groups, so any viable evolutionary
trick that optimises these benefits and limits the disadvantages is likely to be pat-
terned in genes at some point. This is enforced by the similarities in design of or-
ganisms within a species, as this also stimulates similarity in sensitivity and re-
sponsiveness to certain qualia. Thus, agents of the same species will to some extent
have similar ways of mapping their environment and responding to the challenges
they face, including those caused by their kin. This could result in the formation
of domains at relatively low levels of complexity, such as for instance, symbiotic
networks.7 Also bees, ants and other insects, are generally considered ‘social’, so
there is a possibility of isomorphism with human societies along these markers of
increasing complexity.
280
However, it raises the question of whether the phenomena that are manifest at
this level can still be useful in describing social domains that are being forged by
human beings? Here, consciousness, and the extremely complex mapping abilities
of the human mind may limit the explanatory bounds of a gene’s eye view on the
social aspects of a species.
It will not come as a surprise then that the notion of culture as means of social
binding has been theorised from both a genetic point of view and from a level that
started ‘beyond consciousness’.
2 Selfish Memes
In Dawkins’s seminal book, ‘the Selfish Gene’, a parallel was drawn between the
ways ‘selfish genes’ —units of heredity— work, and how culture might propagate
through human society. Dawkins hypothesised that there would be ‘units of culture’,
which he called memes, which could propagate and reproduce in the minds of human
beings, ruthlessly competing with other memes for high-ranked places in as many
minds as possible. Basically, they acted like viruses that ‘contaminated’ our minds
with cultural information. 8
Evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker compares a ‘meme’ to a:
contagious feature of culture, such as a catchy jingle or the latest fashion craze 9
The British psychologist Susan Blackmore revived this idea around the turn of the
millennium,10 but the meme as a ‘unit of culture’ is still hypothetical, and sociolo-
gists —or basically the humanities in general— have found little need to embrace
this notion for their endeavours.11 This may be seen as a first sign of fragile theory;
if theory isn’t widely adopted then apparently there are good alternatives.
There is also the problem of scientific validity. As the meme is currently still
hypothetical, it is somewhat disturbing that many scientists, like Blackmore, and
philosophers such as Daniel Dennett use this term as if this unit of culture has al-
ready been proven to exist.12
More recently, social theorists John Smith and Chris Jenks, have been quite en-
thusiastic about the notion of memes as operators in social domains. I will return to
this at a later stage.13
The problems of a gene analogy with reproduction in the medium we call the
‘brain’, becomes clear when it is emphasised that reproduction is a process of al-
most perfect copying of the essential patterns that a meme should contain. The brain,
maybe strangely enough, is not a medium that allows a quick and hassle-free means
of reproduction. From the perspective of PAC, this is even highly unlikely. Concepts
and context in our minds are recreated when data from our sensory inputs trigger a
process of inference. The data or patterns can be replicated, like genes can, but the
meanings that are generated in the context of such patterns, as was argued earlier,
are highly personal and so the ‘mutation rates’ of these meanings are tremendously
high. Besides this, memetic information is not neatly assigned to internal maps in
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a one-to-one fashion, but is likely to merge with other maps of previous events or
experiences. Only a limited amount of novel experiences may get their own repre-
sentations.
Even though a unit of contemporary culture such as ‘Lady Gaga’ or ‘Paris Hilton’
may have invaded and infected the reluctant mind of someone highly opposed to the
fads of extreme media exposure, these concepts, in such a reluctant context, will
represent something vastly different from what is perceived by their fans, or people
who embrace celebrity culture.14
Besides this, along the three perspectives of PAC, the concept of ‘meme’ can at
best, only be observed as phenomenon, could be considered a pattern that draws an
isomorphy between genetic and cultural expression along evolutionary lines, but is
especially fragile in terms of structure. What does a ‘meme’ look like? How does it
form?
PAC and scientific validity aside, it would seem that reproduction in the mind is
highly unlikely. The first evolutionary trick of the brain was to coordinate sensory
input with action and thus the brain started out with a very local and very confined
function.15 Memory was required to achieve this function, but this initially only
served a supportive role. The responsiveness to patterns of life in groups (safety in
numbers, etc) that have statistical relevance at genetic level, may have provided suf-
ficient stability for the animal brain to become sensitive to more complex patterns of
social life, such as coding of social hierarchies or political manoeuvring,16 but this
does not provide an evolutionary foundation on how the brain further evolved to
become a vehicle for replication —a ‘meme machine’. Besides, brain function is far
better equipped to evaluate success before integrating concepts, rather than blindly
submitting the organism to the trial-and-error approach of the genei.17
Imitation, such as the use of tools with chimpanzees, will probably best demon-
strate the ‘problem’ of memetic reproduction.18
The use of tools, such as a twig to collect ants or termites, or a rock to crack nuts,
requires practice and so it takes time before the benefit of these tricks become mani-
fest. A process of imitation will be triggered by seeing and understanding the benefit
of this trait, but the benefit is delayed due to the learning. With genetic reproduction,
the benefit or failure of certain traits is immediate as they are ‘programmed’ prior to
birth. The organism will have to cope with whatever traits the gene imposes on it.
Memes have to work with an entirely different medium than genes do. A second-
order ‘reproduction’ (”I heard that she heard that they heard. . . ”) is notoriously
inaccurate, let alone higher order reproductions. It is here that Hamilton’s ”narrow
roads to gene-land” [95] sets a limit to gene-based theories of culture; the brain does
not provide the necessary infrastructure for the ‘narrow roads’ between copying and
production, on which reproduction is forced to travel.
i Although this strategy is certainly possible
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However, in an environment that allows concepts to be synchronised and dis-
tributed with great ease and accuracy, the ‘selfish meme’ analogy could become
a viable option. The previous example of contemporary icons of the media age,
demonstrates that media exposure and propaganda can enhance the reproductive
traits of concepts to such extents that they may acquire traits of memes in the sense
of Dawkins. Pinker’s jingles and fashion crazes are exemplars of memes as being
reproduced by the media. This reproduction is established due to the nature of mass-
media rather than the human brain. In effect, the mass-media provide the tags and
the highly accurate and widely percolating vertical communications to synchronize
these tags with the public. In this way, they provide an environment in which memes
can possibly contextualise. From this viewpoint, it is a bit ironical that the selfish
meme analogy will be more correct along a pathway of downward causality, that is,
from certain ecology to individual mental maps, rather than from memes as coming
to expression in that ecology.19
There is also a practical problem, and that is to connect a ‘memetic theory’ of so-
cial systems to Luhmann’s multi-layered and contingent social systems. This would
presume a hierarchy in the memes, or at least a form of organisation of memes that
allows cultures, traditions and (other) social organisations to form. Currently there
is, to my knowledge, no theory of how these memes would organise themselves into
more complex forms. Memes therefore, do not seem to provide a fabric of social
domains, but at best a fabric of psychological ones.
So, concluding, the gene analogy seems to fail as an adequate description of what
could constitute or bind a human society. Genes may provide the foundations and
the means to establish such societies, but at a certain level of complexity, the brain
seems to take over as it is better equipped to identify and operate on more complex
patterns of unity that bind a society. These patterns are needed, for the members
of a society are to some extent each other’s competitors for scarce resources, and
individual interests are not necessarily compatible with those of the aggregate form.
Therefore, the bonds of a society need to outweigh individual needs in order to be
effective. For this reason, social theories that start from the capabilities of the mind,
are probably more plausible than those that are founded on analogies of the ‘gene’.
In this case, one can only take a pragmatic approach to the uncertainty gap between
‘gene’ and ‘human society’, which returns in the rational choice theory of Coleman.
3 Rational Choice Theory
As was mentioned earlier, the most intuitive approach to a social system would be
to take the human individual as an ‘atomic’ unit. This approach returns for instance,
in rational choice theory, as developed by James Coleman.
Coleman was already mentioned earlier when discussing the micro-macro prob-
lem of networks. According to Coleman, social theory has to be seen as:20
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[. . . ] working out of various rules within which sets of persons act. This view, as well as the
character of macro-to-micro and micro-to-macro transitions, can be understood by a social
simulation game of the sort that is sometimes used in education (pg .11)
Coleman takes the social individual as the unit of social theory, and emphasises the
social agent as being an actor, or player in this game. The game is described by:
1. A set of roles that the players take on, each role defining the interests or goals of the
player
2. Rules about the kind of actions that are allowed for players in each role, as well as about
the order of play
3. Rules specifying the consequences that each player’s actions have for other players in
that game
It will be clear that Coleman concentrates on the interactions between players, while
he sees little need for an extensive theory of how biology, psychology, meaning
and other aspects influence their interactions. This is a pragmatic choice, and the
consequent ‘individual-level theory of action’ is a little more than understanding:
[. . . ] the ‘reasons’ why the person acted in a certain way, implying that we understand the
intended goal and how the actions were seen by the actor to contribute to that goal. (pg. 13)
This ‘common-sense notion of purposive action’ is detailed by the concept of ra-
tionality as is employed in economic theory, which implies that different actions
have
[. . . ] a particular utility for the actor and is accompanied by a principle of action which can
be expressed by saying that the actor chooses the action which will maximize utility (pg.
14)
The problem of the resulting ‘narrowly conceived version of purposive action’ then
requires extensive clarification, because rational acts by human beings are far from
being an apt description for real actions. Coleman pays extensive attention to this
issue, and also addresses the time delays between choice and action, and the various
biases that sometimes lead to choices that are ‘less than rational, according to some
objective standard’.
In other words, a social system that is formed of rational choices is constituted by
agents that are far from rational. The ‘micro-macro’ problem becomes problematic
here along the complexity perspective, as there seems to be little coherence between
individual action and the behaviour of the aggregate form. Society can be analysed
as being ‘rational’, because social agents are first assumed to act rationally. From a
viewpoint of complexity, this seems like a very narrow conception of how a practi-
cal instance of a society would work.
For now, this problem will remain open, but it will be taken up in the refactoring
strategy later on.
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4 In Friction with Luhmann’s Social Systems
The third approach is the one that Luhmann himself considered, which is to start
from consciousness itself. Luhmann embedded his social theory in a foundation
of consciousness which he called the psychic layer. This, at first glance, seems to
provide an intermediate context in which the threads followed so far along the com-
plexity perspective can connect with Luhmann’s system theory (LST).
Considering the background and base premises of his analysis, it would appear a
slam dunk to embed PAC into his theory of social systems, which is based on now
familiar ideas of systems, complexity, self-organisation and so on. However, this
attempt of synthesis has proven to be tremendously difficult.
There are a number of reasons for this, which will be given proper attention later
on, but in essence, these problems are very much related to the cross-disciplinary
approach that is developed here. Luhmann, like PAC, basically followed similar
threads along information theory, the system theories, cybernetics and so forth, in
the direction of the social domain. PAC and Luhmann’s system theory are therefore
mutually disruptive, but also, as will hopefully become clear later, co-creative.
For PAC, one of the (many) fascinating outcomes of Luhmann’s analysis, is his
idea of a society being a conglomeration of many overlapping and interfering social
systems. A human individual takes part in many different social systems at the same
time, sequentially, or in various phases of a lifetime, and all these social systems
together form a highly dynamic, sometimes (mutually) volatile interaction space
that we call ‘society’. Some of these social systems are purely mental constructs,
but serve a certain function in society. These systems require other systems for en-
actment. For instance, a legal system requires a police force, governments, legal
authorities and so on, to ‘realise’ the laws that the system produces. The function
system that produces laws and the moral and ethical underpinnings for these laws,
therefore interacts with other systems that can actually do something.
This is only a very, very tiny, and also in itself a barbarously incomplete summary
of this outcome of Luhmann’s impressive analysis of social systems and society, but
this is a point of connection with PAC. In other words, the patterns developed so far
should ideally return in this ubiquitous social realm.
As both threads are floating on a breeze from conscious agents towards such
dynamically interacting social systems, the points of departure and those of recon-
nection become interesting. For these may imply that the pattern library is losing
its expressive power in the increasingly interpreted, as complex, world of the social.
Conversely, it might mean that LST could be refactored to a form that better fits the
vocabulary of PAC, or a combination of these two could be made.ii
For the purposes here, the interesting exercise will be to refactor LST. This, of
course, is largely owing to researcher bias, but when someone who is all but a soci-
ii Considering that certain ideas of Luhmann have already been taken up in the building of the
pattern library, PAC and LST already combine many ideas
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ologist offers a refactoring strategy of social theory developed by a social theorist,
some clarification is definitely needed.
What this refactoring exercise aims to do is not to criticise Luhmann’s ideas, but
simply to find a path along the complexity perspective, that connects to his theory
at some point, which will then provide a context in social domains for the pattern
library that has been developed. As PAC is termed in a different vocabulary than
Luhmann’s theory, the concepts he developed and used may not align very well with
the pattern-oriented approach that is developed here. So the interference of LST and
PAC, as production systems, may also give some clues of what is happening in these
friction spaces. But this does not necessarily mean that either is incorrect!
Luhmann’s thread, coarsely stated, is:
‘consciousness’-‘autopoiesis’-‘communications’-‘social systems’.
PAC follows patterns along the complexity perspective to the same social systems
as Luhmann’s conception, and tries to reconnect as quickly as possible. If the pat-
tern of the lingua democratica is seen as a specific form of communication, then the
‘communications’ could be taken as the connection point. As currently there is no
conclusive theory on consciousness there is an uncertainty gap between conscious-
ness and communications. Luhmann assumed that there are autopoietic processes
at work in the psychic layer (i.e. consciousness) that communicate with each other.
It is beyond the scope here to question this assumption, but from the perspective
that has been developed here, the question rather is, whether the patterns that are
followed actually follow Luhmann’s thread?
The wide existence of social animals in the biological domain, would suggest that
at their core, social systems organise relatively easily. Luhmann’s theory of social
systems relies heavily on the notion of meaning and consciousness, which serves as
the substrate on which social systems form, but if ants, bees and many other insects
are considered ‘social animals’, then we run into some problems. Do ants and bees
have consciousness, or are they meaning systems in rudimentary form? Conversely,
are societies of social insects interesting templates for the formation of human so-
cieties, or is there something that makes the formation of human social systems
fundamentally different, such as the aforementioned characteristic of consciousness
or other forms of emergence?
I think that this discussion pinpoints the controversies in the ongoing debates be-
tween biological debates of the social and those of the social sciences. It is not one
of ‘reductionism’, ‘plurality’ and ‘holism’ (alone). Biologists make a reasonable as-
sumption that the patterns of social behaviour they see in organisms and mammals
provide useful analogies for the development of human societies. The social sci-
ences tend to draw a pragmatic baseline, from which theories of human societies
are developed, and which the fan out towards very complex, and specifically human
phenomena. This pragmatic interface then can become an impregnable boundary
that makes little sense from the viewpoint of socio-biologists, while social scien-
tists may consider the theories that socio-biology has to offer as being naive and
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simplistic for the topics that they take interest in. As a result, many social scientists
and humanities researchers may not be acquainted with, and partake in, the ongoing
discussions in socio-biology itself on the emergence of groups, culture and so on.
If they do, their contributions will fall short in appreciating the nuances within the
discipline. These cross-disciplinary debates will then only result in ongoing confu-
sion.21
On the other hand, these issues also put all the possibilities of incorrect analogies
and spurious relationships into play, for patterns —in this case, patterns of social
organisation— need contexts to become meaningful, if at all these patterns scale up
beyond consciousness.22
Along the complexity perspective, PAC seems to take a by-pass with respect to
LST, for two reasons. First, consciousness is not needed for the formation of a social
system, as it is sufficient when an aggregate form produces a tag that its constituents
can connect to. Secondly, the concept of autopoiesis is hardly developed beyond the
definition of Maturana and Varela. So the refactoring strategy aims to find out if
PAC can actually reconnect to social systems as envisioned by Luhmann, and if so,
at which point this can be achieved. Is it possible at the level of ‘autopoiesis’, or do
the patterns flow back in at the level of communications?
It may be good here to recapitulate the definition of autopoeisis that Maturana &
Varela proposed:
An autopoietic machine is a machine organised as a network of processes of production of
components that produces the components which:23
1. through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the
network of processes that produced them; and
2. constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the compo-
nents) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.
In itself, the idea that a social system is autopoietic therefore makes sense. Sub-
versive elements in a social system are removed, silenced, or otherwise contained,
attacks are countered, and people are continuously busy constituting and reaffirming
their societies. In that sense, a social system acts like an autopoietic network, in the
sense of Maturana & Varela.
However, the definition follows a phenomenological perspective. It says little on
the means, structure, organisation and bootstrapping mechanisms that make such a
machine. Of course, Maturana & Varela were specifically thinking of living cells,
which repair themselves, maintain themselves, and reproduce. In this definition,
the characteristic that stands out is the self-sustaining nature of the process. The
machine itself tries to keep itself from decaying.
So in order to find out where PAC can reconnect to LST, we need to get a grasp
of autopoiesis as was conceived by Luhmann. This particular thread starts with the
algebra of George Spencer-Brown.24
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4.1 Laws of Form (LoF)
George Spencer-Brown was a polymath who was working in electronic engineering
when he devised a new algebra which, according to R. Robertson, creates ‘some-
thing from no-thing’.25 Spencer-Brown’s departure point was a void, which gets
ruptured by a distinction. This distinction creates space in its most elementary form.
The exemplary distinction is a circle, which creates an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’.
Generally speaking, one could speak of a distinction between unmarked space and
marked space.26
From this first distinction, others could be created using two operators, or ‘laws’:
the laws of condensation and cancellation. For the purposes here, the details of these
laws are not really interesting, but more the interpretations that were developed
around them.
Taken as axioms, the two ‘laws’ could be developed into an arithmetic, after
which an algebra followed, which is formally equivalent to Boolean algebra —-the
most widely used 2-valued algebra, developed a century earlier by George Boole—,
although it can be extended to any 2-valued system (i.e. systems operating on ‘zero’
and ‘one’, ‘on/off’, etc.). Besides this, the operators were much more powerful than
the system that Boole had developed. One of the most striking characteristics of LoF
was its self-referential nature. According to Robertson:
Self-reference emerges within the system in the guise of re-entry into the system. Spencer-
Brown interprets this re-entry as creating time in much the same way in which distinction
created space27
In Spencer-Brown’s somewhat esoteric terminology, the self-referentiality of LoF
created a kind of oscillatory indeterminacy which, he claimed, demonstrated the
formation of time and space. At an abstract level, LoF would be describing what
was happening the moment our universe was formed from the Big Bang!28
It will be clear that the consequences of this system either led people to ec-
stasy for its profound philosophical implications, or conversely drew a more down
to earth response —especially amongst mathematicians, logicians and engineers—
which boiled down to ‘neat!’29 Robertson describes the former point of view in the
following words:
These two laws govern all two-valued worlds. We recognize that the tension between con-
scious and unconscious is as old as life itself. Even the simplest one-celled creature has to
distinguish between food, which it wants to eat, and danger, from which it needs to flee.
It is forced to make a Spencer-Brown distinction, to take one or the other of two paths.
Life began by first developing the skill to make distinctions, to create boundaries, at the
molecular level. Evolution progresses by making ever more complex distinctions until the
emergence of consciousness itself. From the extension of Spencer-Brown’s perspective that
we are presenting here, we could say that consciousness itself is the progressive emergence
of a self-reflective, recursive cycle of ever more subtle distinctions. Mathematician Norbert
Wiener invented the term ”cybernetics” to investigate the self-reflective, informational dy-
namics of such distinctions. And consciousness emerges ineluctably from the process of
making distinctions.30
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It is here that formal algebra blends into consciousness, and self-referentiality is a
strong driving force behind this transition. Spencer-Brown’s algebra acknowledges
a form of ambiguity through the self-referential nature of LoF. As was described in
chapter four, ever since Go¨del, formal systems have had to succumb to the tantrums
of self-referentiality, as the observation of ‘self’ tends to lead to all kinds of inherent
logical conundrums, such as paradoxes and infinite regressions. For many, includ-
ing Luhmann, these challenges demarcate a boundary between ‘simple’ systems and
truly complex ones.
One of the most apparent challenges that self-referentiality introduces, is a prob-
lem of observation. In order for a system to observe itself, the system allegedly has
to ‘step away’ from itself and observe itself from ‘the outside’. But then the observer
is excluded from the observation. In other words, every form of self-observation has
a blind spot, a part of the system that is excluded from the observation of self. That
is, a system that observes itself as being a system must be allegedly blind for its
self-observation.
As a reference, it is worth pointing out that this trick has been applied a number
of times in the game of PAC. By ‘stepping out’ of the system spanned by philosoph-
ical and scientific traditions and taking up (and radicalising) a perspective of the
‘crafts’, I am also stepping out of ‘the (production) system’ of scholarly thought.
However, with the pattern of difference, this new perspective may give interesting
interferences that I can observe and play with, but it still maintains the blind spot
of the common frame of reference that is present between philosophy, science and
craftmanship. The common biases are at best only reinforced. In Luhmann’s terms,
I would have to ‘step out’ along another difference to address this problem.
Within PAC, however, this process can stop when a point is made; the meaning
does not have to be generated indefinitely. PAC follows a energy-efficient strategy
to stop when sufficient meaning has formed in order to address a certain issue. Be-
cause of this finite nature, which aligns with considerations of evolutionary fitness,
autopoiesis seems less plausible as an apt description here.
By taking up the ideas offered by LoF, Luhmann developed a form of a ‘post-
ontological philosophy of differences’, which includes similar —but mutually different—
ideas expressed by Derrida, Rorty and Deleuze.31
These post-ontologies basically, moved away from the idea of identities or, as
Derrida put it, a ‘tendency in the whole tradition of Western philosophy on a meta-
physics of presence’. These new philosophies rather, focused on differences, al-
though each developed their own ideas around them. For the purposes here, PAC
could be considered a ‘post-epistemology/ontology of pattern and information’, out
of which both identities and differences can form. Identities (or presences) create
differences, and differences create identities. If Derrida’s observation on Western
philosophy would translate that both philosophy and science tend to overly rely on
categorisations, crisp distinctions and (subsequent) oppositions, then PAC is follow-
ing a similar course. Although I am not saying that the various post-ontologies of
differences do this, PAC does not replace identities for differences, or the other way
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round. PAC merely states that by taking either premise of identities or differences,
one will inevitably produce different kinds of theories, regardless of whether these
theories are correct or not; this depends on the rules and constraints of the games
that are played, and follows from the nature of these knowledge production systems.
Regarding Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form, my technical side tends towards the
‘neat’ interpretation. Although I respect the fact that nature is maintaining dead-
silence over what consciousness is, my guess is that one candidate for a bootstrap-
ping mechanism for consciousness is the modelling of self in self. So self needs to
have a mental representation of (certain aspects of) itself in order to become con-
scious. Whether this is a matter of identity —I would think it is— or difference, is
then a matter of implementation. Besides this, many non-conscious agents also work
on differences, and so it is rather difficult to grasp the enthusiasm, as described by
Robertson. Consciousness requires much more than differences and self-referential
loops, I would think.
However, for the purposes here, it is worth pointing out that LoF suggests an
ambiguity out of order approach, which is definitely different than the one proposed
by PAC. As Luhmann incorporated the ideas of LoF, it becomes inevitable that LST
takes a different turn than PAC, and that his theories produce a different idiom.
It may therefore be a good idea to follow Luhmann’s thread a bit further, before
returning to the fork in the path that has been identified here.
4.2 Luhmann’s Social Systems
Luhmann took the aspect of self-referentiality to characterise complexity. For him,
complexity is a threshold that marks the difference between two types of systems,
those in which each entity can be related to every other entity in that system, and
those where this is no longer the case. Complexity designates a
[. . . ] lack of information that prevents a system from completely observing itself or its
environment. 32
and:
[. . . ] the proportion of inclusion and exclusion is regulated by the social system itself, and
that besides this, the use of meaning in a social system always incorporates references of the
unknown, the excluded, the undetermined, information defects and the lack of knowledge
of itself.33
It will be clear that Luhmann, by starting from Spencer-Brown’s Law of Forms, im-
mediately entered these self-referential issues and, like Spencer-Brown, exalted in
them because they made systems come alive. A conscious system was continuously
creating distinctions, but Luhmann took this analysis a step further by concentrating
mainly on the processes in a meaning system that were maintaining and reproducing
these distinctions. These processes he brought together under the flag of autopoiesis:
Autopoiesis is thus not to be conceived as the production of a peculiar ‘Gestalt’. Crucial is
rather the formation of a difference between system and environment.34
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From here, Luhmann begins an extensive exercise of rephrasing theoretical con-
cepts of systems in terms of differences. Beginning from the difference between
system and environment, he moves on to differences such as system-entity, entity-
relationship, hierarchies as differences, boundaries as demarcation of differences,
open and closed systems, differences of differences, and so on:
The most fundamental intervention, in understanding the essential transposition of the fol-
lowing, is that one no longer can speak of objects, but rather of differences, and above
that; that differences should not be understood as a certain (differentiated) state of affairs,
but rather that they aim to accomplish this, as one could otherwise be unable to make the
differences meaningful, to observe them, or to pursue them.35
A difference, for instance that which sets a form apart from a background, is not
a ‘by-product’ of the form, but is the essential determinant into making the assess-
ment of what constitutes the form and what not. Autopoiesis is actively reinstating
these differences. In other words, differences are continuously maintained and re-
produced. This is why the concept of autopoiesis is so essential in understanding
Luhmann. Autopoiesis is the ingredient that brings both stability as well as change
to the differences. With this, meaning is a process which consists of, and creates an
ensemble of differences.36
The reason why this particular ‘sytems of differences’ opened up the analytical
space for understanding social systems, was because Luhmann saw that a systems
theory that created systems from constituents, would only model what is known by
the theorist who engages in this modelling work. By developing a systems theory
based on differences, that which is excluded in the modelling work also becomes
influential in the models. This also applies to the system’s modelling of ‘self’, and
so complexity can be connected to a ‘lack of information’. In PAC, the same idea
has been captured with the concept of uncertainty.37
For the purposes here however, the main issue is that PAC has to let go. LST
quickly moves in directions that are hard to reconcile with the pattern-oriented ap-
proach developed here. Not that these threads necessarily disagree, but the idioms
are simply too different. Besides the incompatibilities that Luhmann’s approach in-
troduces, his theory of self-referential systems differs from PAC, amongst other rea-
sons, in the following ways:
1. A system is an ontological presence in LST. Luhmann describes something that
is ‘out there’. In PAC, a system is a model that represents something.
2. A self-referential system is an actor of its own autopoiesis. A system does things
to maintain itself. In PAC, the constituents are the principal actors, the system is
an emergent order of their organisation.
3. PAC follows a process-orientation and not an idiom based on structure, whether
it is described in presences or differences.
On all these accounts, a strategy could be carried out to ‘translate’ the differences
between PAC and LST in focus and idiom to be mutually compatible. These do not
necessarily contradict each other. However, the focus on differences in LST is very
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difficult to incorporate in an idiom that is based on processes. In PAC, a process
flows through these differences (and presences), and changes because of this. These
flows, obviously, depend on differences, usually in the form of energy in the abstract
sense that was discussed in chapter four, but the processes do not necessarily do
anything with them, even if they were to observe them. Such processes could take
up many different forms, of which some would level the differences out, or do other
things. As a result, PAC, simply has no meaningful tools to proceed along this path!
Luhmann says: ”I think that I know how social systems form. I am confident
enough to call this a theory! For those who share this interest, come...but be warned,
as the first mountains are also the most steep and treacherous ones!”
The interference between PAC and LST, therefore starts with the problem that
both come from different directions, and there is immediately a heavy turbulence
between them as they enter their mutual friction space.
One example may make this problem of idioms clear, and that is the observer, as
being the blind spot in a self-referential system.
Spencer-Brown’s LoF introduce ambiguity as a result of self-referential opera-
tions, but this is typically an ‘ambiguity-out-of-order’ approach. The pattern of dif-
ference that was introduced in chapter five offers an alternative source of ambiguity,
where the pattern of difference considers the ranking of conceptual patterns to host
the source of ambiguity; that is, ambiguity already resides between the values of an
n-valued system, which is formed out of an inherent undetermined space as spanned
from the Metis prerequisite. The n-valued system is ambiguity ‘made crisp’ by an
observer. But ambiguity is always present in a real ranking, as the example of the
light switch demonstrated.
Ambiguity and indeterminacy are not the result of self-referentiality, but are in-
herent and necessary aspects of ranking, and the former allows choices to be made.
This ambiguity also requires very deliberate intervention in order to minimise its
effects. Instead of nice, crisp distinctions as a natural state of affairs, a process (or
operator) working on the pattern of difference faces aspects of ambiguity, and even
aspects of similarity through the common frame of reference.
As a result, the logical conundrums related to self-referentiality may be interest-
ing topics of research for logicians and mathematicians, however they usually do
not tend to be that problematic when applied to practical systems, as practicality
often circumvents these problems quite easily. A practical self-referential process
will detect the problem and start to work with it, in whatever way it can.
Most notably, a formal system often implicitly concerns itself with a form of self-
referentiality where the system is forced to observe itself completely, by the rules of
the game that is played there. Under this assumption, one runs into problems be-
cause, as was mentioned earlier, the observer is usually considered to be a ‘blind
spot’ in the system’s ability to observe itself.
A process-orientation, on the other hand, allows a system’s constituents to only
observe one, or a few aspects of the system and, such as is already hinted at in
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the pattern of elementary self-referentiality, this is usually that aspect —the tag for
instance— that is associated with the unity of the various constituents. Note that
this stance follows a ‘philosophy of identity’; a difference is nothing more than a
selection that allows detection of a tag with respect to a certain background, but the
tag as marker of an identity is all that is needed; the difference is derivative of this.
The pheromone signals of an ant colony achieve this ‘partial self’ of the colony,
as ants produce pheromone trails from the nest into the surroundings, that can be
observed by the other ants, and it allows an (initially undetermined) environment
‘to form’ along the rankings of food sources. One could speak of a contextual slice;
that is, a context (model) of an environment as defined along a dominant property
or goal, such as food.
Likewise, the symbiotic networks described earlier achieve a ‘distributed self’
through the stress signals. In other words, their unity is not decided by the physical
self of the entities, but rather by tags that span the domain of the ‘self’ of the net-
work. ‘Self’ is reduced to a location and a space in which the constituents can do
their thing. This location —for instance the ant nest— also serves as a tag of the
aggregate’s identity.
The example of the ant colony also by-passes the alleged ‘blind spot’ of the
observer-in-the-system. This ‘problem’ assumes that a system only has one point of
observation. However, most practical systems distribute observation throughout the
system, and so it follows that every subsystem in a system can keep an eye on the
other subsystems. A self-referential system can thus be formed by (cyclic) chains of
observers, or other configurations of networks of observer agents that monitor each
other. This stance follows research on autocatalyst sets, which usually still heavily
embedded in ‘ontologies of identities’ instead of ontologies of differences.38
In other words, self-referentiality can be established by various subsystems in
the network that keep an eye out for each other and take measures to monitor
and prevent the self-referential loop(s) from decaying. From this perspective, self-
referentiality in complex systems is necessarily symbiotic, that is, a ‘self’ is pro-
duced by multiple threads, each of which attach themselves to tags that represent
certain aspects of the aggregate form.39
Now one only needs to imagine massive parallel re-entry at work, as described by
Edelman and Tononi, and a complex ‘self’ could be constituted out of many partial
selves, all reflecting to various internal mental images or (other) tags.
So the problem of the observer being the excluded third from the observation
is only one issue that is disarmed before it can become dangerous in a process-
orientation. And then we haven’t even begun to cover the other differences between
the two production systems of PAC and LST. And we cannot say that either itinerary
is wrong or right; this is undetermined!
Take for instance Luhmann’s premise to grant ‘the system’ certain agency. Up to
now, PAC has concentrated on the agency of constituents, which allow the organi-
sation of a system. This is the idea of ants forming a colony. Beyond consciousness,
however, ‘the system’ may take over and become an entity with certain agency to
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influence certain aspects of itself. This may be another emergent characteristic of
consciousness; that the scales are tipped, the aggregate is no longer ensnared by
its constituents and begets certain autonomy that can no longer be described by its
parts. This is one step further than the simmballs of Douglas Hofstadter, or the glid-
ers and predators of John Horton Conway; the conscious forms would know that
they are simmballs, gliders, predators, even if only in a rudimentary sense: they
constitute, but I am!
How easily the mind strays in view of the possibilities of these informed specu-
lations, but we have to follow the stricter thread of the interference with LST. What
this means is that Luhmann may be perfectly correct in his assessment that, beyond
consciousness, a path of downward causality is a completely valid strategy. The sys-
tem does things, it creates its own complexity internally, it reproduces, it regulates
its autopoiesis...
...but PAC cannot follow!
At this level, the interferences between PAC and LST only result in confusion,
and a strategy of translation is likely to only make things worse. As Luhmann’s
coherent approach quickly moves away from the thread followed by PAC, the by-
pass that we are attempting here cannot incorporate concepts such as ‘autopoiesis of
differences’. This may be very valuable and important in social theory, but PAC can
only continue along the path of process-orientation. Threads are always constrained,
and LST, from the viewpoint of PAC, has disappeared into a dense fog.
As a result, it may be better to jump over the uncertainty gap, and concisely
describe where PAC can reconnect to LST. This is, as was mentioned earlier, the
description of social systems as being formed on top of a ‘psychic layer’ consisting
of ‘meaning systems’, that are able to spawn communications.
4.3 Meaning Systems and Communications
Luhmann’s approach eventually describes a social system as being constituted of
autopoietic processes amongst meaning systems. Autopoiesis is seen here as a:
[. . . ] systems-internal indeterminacy that can only be reduced by systems internal forms.
Social systems use the ‘medium of meaning’ to accomplish this.40
Again, it is worth pointing out the agency of the social system here. The closure of
systems with respect to their environment is an inherent characteristic of autopoi-
etic operations that recreate this distinction. At first glance this seems paradoxical
in Luhmann’s conception of the social, as the notion of environment is also inher-
ently present in the autopoietic operations. With respect to the closure of systems
however, it should be understood that:
[. . . ] only operationally closed systems can become sufficiently complex internally, to spec-
ify a primacy in which the system can respond to conditions of its environment, while it can
remain indifferent to the environment in all other conditions due to its autopoiesis.41
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Within the system, operational closure is related to the recursive nature of the au-
topoietic operations. Basically, autopoiesis adds a quality to the system that deter-
mines the manner of responsiveness to its environment.
As a result, meaning systems are now constituted, created, recreated and repro-
duced. These meaning systems constitute the ‘psychic layer’. However, in the case
of a social system there is another essential characteristic that needs to connect
the meaning systems together: communications. These communications connect the
various ‘islands’ of consciousness, and are the ‘units’ that constitute a social system.
A communication, for Luhmann, is:
[. . . ] an actual, historically definitely ending, contextually determined occurrence [. . . ]42
In order to establish communications, it is essential that the participants are involved
in knowing and not-knowing, so again a difference lies at the base of communica-
tions. Not knowing is a ‘state of consciousness’ which can be altered by communi-
cations, as it identifies the difference between knowing and not knowing, and then
maintains it until the communication concludes. A communication thus is also a
self-referential process, which is reproduced by the social system and which repro-
duces its difference, although it is invariant to the form and the dynamics of this
difference.
Luhmann assigns this to a synthesis of three ‘selections’:43
1. Information, a selection from a repertoire of referential possibilities
2. Utterance, a selection from a repertoire of intentional acts
3. Understanding, which involves the observation of the distinction between the previous
selections
This notion of ‘information as selection’ is very similar to the concept-context dis-
tinction that has been the point of departure for PAC, and therefore the fog is slowly
starting to lift here:
With this temporal notion of communications, we can immediately correct a popular stance
of information. Information is a surprising selection out of various possibilities. It cannot
exist as surprise, nor can it be transported as such; it must be constituted systems-internally,
as it presumes a comparison with expectations.44
This is another clear match with the ideas developed in PAC. The point of connection
is reinforced here! Luhmann then argues that the:
[. . . ] external world of material objects presents itself to consciousness in the form of a
spatio-temporal field of unactualised perceptions that surround it like a ‘halo of background
intuitions’.45
The actualisation of a specific aspect of a certain object causes others to recede
to the periphery of the ‘perceptual field’, where they reside as a latent, yet con-
stitutive part of its differential structure. The actualised aspect of the object exists
as a ‘meaningful experience’ only in the form of the ‘distinction between actuality
and potentiality’. Luhmann translates this notion to information theoretical terms by
considering meaning as the ‘effect of the production of information via the creation
of differences that ‘make a difference’. Meaning thus:
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[. . . ] resides in the self-referential structure of a consciousness that consists solely in and
through its autopoietic operations and that, in selecting from a self-generating horizon of
surplus references, reproduces that horizon without ever exhausting its possibilities of trans-
gressing its boundaries.46
Communications can interact with the conscious layer (interpenetration), but both
do not depend on each other and each can do its own thing. They can also ‘observe’
consciousness, but only from the outside, and from within the boundaries described
by its specific selectivity. Communication is primarily concerned with its own self-
reproduction, and therefore is much more than ‘a transmission of a message from a
sender to a receiver’. A communication rather, creates a difference as it provokes a
response and thus permits the continuation of the system’s autopoiesis. Communi-
cations therefore, allow autopoietic continuation across meaning systems and with
this (re-) produce social systems.47
Luhmann, instead of coming to terms with the inherent opacity of consciousness,
recognises different layers of the human experience, where consciousness (con-
scious systems) resides in another level than the social (social systems) and then
shows that autopoietic closure can generate openness. In other words, this implies
a:
[. . . ] conceptualisation of the social in terms of a meaning-processing system of communi-
cation’ 48
And this is the ‘substrate’ on which social systems are formed.
The reason why this interface between the psychic layer and social systems is
given more detailed attention, is two-fold. First, it will have become clear by now
how consistent autopoiesis and differences are used to advance the production of
ideas in LST. Secondly, the notion of communications seems to lift the fog that
hangs between LST and PAC. PAC uses concepts such as ‘interference’ and ‘infer-
ence’, which seem compatible with the notions of communications as described by
Luhmann.
There is another point of connection here, that contributes to the sudden clearing
of the skies. In PAC, meaning at least requires the formation of a conceptual network
around conceptual patterns. If I am in the jungle, and see a tiger approach, then the
conceptual patterns of this particular target create a conceptual network that (prob-
ably) consists of ‘tiger’, ‘approaching’ and ‘start running’. This example has been
consciously chosen, because it demonstrates that the ‘communications’ between the
tiger and myself, from an evolutionary perspective, have to create a minimal, mean-
ingful model, as the understanding of the event must happen as quickly as possible!
However, as long as the communications between the meaning system of the
tiger (‘food’) and myself (‘tiger approaching⇒ run!’) is continuing, the autopoiesis
is maintained between the meaning systems.
Likewise, if I am talking to someone, the communications between us are contin-
uously creating meaning, and meaning is guiding the communications. This closes
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the self-referential loop. There are two meaning systems engaging in communica-
tions, and this, according to Luhmann, describe the bootstrapping mechanism for a
social system. Whether the subsequent system is autopoietic in nature, or rather just
a form of feedback, is probably a matter of taste (and idiom). Strictly speaking, it
conforms to the definition of Maturana & Varela, and so autopoiesis might be an apt
description.
For the purposes here, the bootstrapping mechanism thus becomes the following:
A social system is formed when meaning systems engage in a communication that provokes
a response that permits its continuation.
Note that this does not have to be reciprocal, or immediate. In fact, most commu-
nications can percolate amongst many different meaning systems, be delayed, or
whatever, but as long as the communications continue, a social system is formed.
Communications are thus ‘process’, which in PAC translates to a process of infer-
ence.
One could also say that if a disruption (information as a surprising selection)
causes inference in a domain (meaning system), then the conditions have been met
for a social system, as proposed by Luhmann. PAC and LST have reconnected at
this point. Immediately the patterns can flow into social domains, for now we can
further constrain the ‘surprising selection’ with the pattern of difference, and the ad-
ditional characteristics for disruptions: the surprising selection must either reinforce
the meaning in the meaning system (which translates to a surprise of recognition),
or it must provide novelty (”ah, I didn’t know that!”)
But the surprising selection that leads to confusion is highly undetermined, and
for cross-domain stakeholders is likely to result in indifference.
This is the reason why the by-pass is needed. The current confusion between
LST and PAC blocks the percolation of patterns along the complexity perspective.
In order to allow the patterns of the pattern library to take up form in social contexts,
an alternative thread needs to be developed. At least, if the patterns that were devel-
oped previously are still scale-invariant at the level of a social domain, of course!
As a result, the best point of reconnection between PAC and LST is this point
where meaning systems constitute social systems through communications. The un-
certainty gap along the complexity perspective that opened around the interface con-
cept of ‘consciousness’, connects to LST at this point. The refactoring strategy now
aims to build the by-pass that will allow the pattern-oriented approach to proceed
towards this particular concept in LST, while limiting the uncertainty gap as much
as possible. As was said earlier, this will be done by incorporating bits and pieces
of other (social) theories to make it ‘fit’ with the pattern-orientation of PAC.
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5 Constructing a By-pass
If there is one post-ontology of difference that resonates much more the indetermi-
nate, hard to grasp nature of patterns, then Jacques Derrida’s notion of diffe´rance
probably fits the bill. Of particular interest is especially the interpretation of Der-
rida’s ideas on language, by the South African philosopher of complexity Paul Cil-
liers, as it provides an alternative to Luhmann’s analysis of the ‘psychic layer’. Cil-
liers connects Derrida’s ideas to connectionist models of neural networks, which
matches very well with those of PAC. Therefore, the first step in the by-pass con-
nects to these ideas.
5.1 Poststructuralism and Connectionism
In his book ”Complexity and Postmodernism”, Cilliers starts with Derrida’s notion
of diffe´rance. Derrida had developed this idea in his analysis of natural language,
and Cilliers builds on Derrida quite extensively to argue in favour of his point in the
debates governing ‘theories of mind’.
Coarsely stated, (structural) theories on ‘how the mind works’ fall apart in two
mainstreams. One is based on rule-based symbolic systems that were pioneered by
Noam Chomsky in the fifties of the previous century, and which have now matured
to ‘computational theories of mind’, that consider the mind, in essence, to be a
processor of symbols like a computer, or more correctly, like a universal Turing
machine.49
Derrida, and with him Cilliers, contest these ideas by pointing out that natural
language does not have a strict symbolic structure like formal languages have, but
exalts in ambiguity and vagueness that generally enrich the natural language rather
than undermines it.iii It is worth pointing out that both sides usually see language as
a window to the mind, which means that language is seen to provide clues on how
the mind processes information, and structures meaning. These theories thus span a
field of enquiry that includes concepts such as ‘intelligence’ and ‘consciousness’.
It will probably not come as a surprise that research in artificial intelligence was
feeding these discussions, especially between the fifties and early eighties of the
previous century, and the two mainstreams within this research area provided some
ammunition for either side. The proponents of ‘strong AI’ paradigms followed the
idea that everything can be represented by formal rules and logical constructs (the
neats), while the ‘scruffies’ think that intelligence is too complex to capture in for-
malisms and rules (alone). The latter often turn to connectionist models such as
neural networks to prove their point and (subsequently) consider the brain to be a
pattern processor.50
These debates drew quite a bit of attention outside the AI community and thus
philosophers, social and humanities scientists and the general public joined the dis-
iii Although junkies of formal systems usually abhor this aspect of natural language
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cussions and controversies, which to date have not been resolved.51
According to Cilliers, these discussions are directly connected to the issue of
complexity, as a rule-based system by its very nature will never be complex. It may
be complicated, but in the end every state, action or condition can be predicted
with complete accuracy. In other words, in such systems every concept will be sym-
bolically represented internally in the system, and will be clearly related to other
symbols. A complex system however, is contingent, unpredictable (to some extent),
in continuous flux, distributed, non-linear and all those other things that have been
extensively covered in the past chapters.
Regarding one aspect of human intelligence, language, Cilliers sides decisively
with the scruffies and considers language fundamentally complex, which makes him
conclude that rule-based theories of language, such as those proposed by Noam
Chomsky, will never grasp the complexity of how language actually works. By turn-
ing to connectionist models, such as neural networks, Cilliers then makes a connec-
tion with the post-structuralist theories of mind and language of Jacques Derrida,
whose point of departure was de Saussure.
Cilliers’s understanding of de Saussure’s model of language emphasises the lat-
ter’s concern on how words acquire meaning.52 Language consists of discrete units
—signs— which, instead of having certain characteristics by themselves, have rela-
tionships with other signs, which together provide the meaning to the sign in ques-
tion.
The sign is determined by the way in which it differs from all the other signs (pg. 39).
De Saussure makes a distinction between signifier and signified, the latter being
the sign that is stored mentally or psychologically. The signifier is a linguistic unit,
such as a word, while the signified is its ‘mental component’. According to Cilliers,
meaning tends to remain fairly static in de Saussure’s model of language, and he
therefore follows Derrida towards a more dynamic and contingent alternative (pp.
41-42). As language transcends individual users, the signs are not fixed or static;
rather they change and are transformed all the time. Meaning is thus always in flux:
The relationships between signs are not stable enough for each sign to be determined ex-
actly. In a way, interaction is only possible if there is some ‘space’ between signs. There are
always more possibilities than can be actualised [. . . ]. The meaning of a sign is the result of
the ‘play’ in the space between signs. Signs in a complex system always have an excess of
meaning, with only some of the potential meaning realised in specific situations (pg. 42)
In order to deal with the resulting complexity, Cilliers turns to Derrida. In de Saus-
sure’s theory, Derrida sees this tendency in the presence of the signified:
This would imply that the meaning of the sign is present to the speaker when he uses it, in
defiance of the fact that meaning is constituted by a system of differences (pg. 42)
In Derrida’s analysis, or deconstruction, of de Saussure:
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[. . . ] the meaning of a sign is always unanchored, even when we speak. Thus the signified
(or ‘mental’ component) never has any immediate self-present meaning. It is in itself only a
sign that derives its meaning from other signs. Such a viewpoint entails that the sign is, in a
sense, stripped off its ‘signified’ component. Since the signified is also constituted through a
system of relationships, it functions just like a signifier. The signified is nothing but another
signifier that has to take its position in the endless interaction between signifiers. Meaning
is never simply present and therefore we cannot escape the process of interpretation, even
when the speaker is in front of us (pg. 42)
The reason why Cilliers takes an interest in Derrida’s analysis of de Saussure is
because he sees a strong association with the way connectionist models, such as
neural networks, operate. Following Derrida, Cilliers argues that:
[. . . ] there is no place outside of language from where meaning can be generated. Where
there is meaning, there is already language. We cannot separate language from the world it
describes (pg. 43)53
Cilliers argues that the playfully and unpredictably changing relationships between
signifiers are always in flux:
[. . . ] meaning remains the result of the process of interaction between signifiers. This in-
teraction is explained by Derrida in terms of, amongst others, two concepts ‘trace’ and
‘diffe´rance’. He stresses that they are actually neither concepts nor words [...], that they
cannot be given a full meaning. [. . . ] his intention seems to prevent these two terms from
acquiring fixed meanings. It is by their very instability that they allow us to say something
more general about language (pg. 44)
With this, language is embedded in another very influential ‘post-ontology of dif-
ferences’:
The play of differences involves syntheses and referrals that prevent there from being at
any moment or in any way a simple element that is present in and of itself and refers only
to itself [. . . ] each element [. . . ] is constituted with reference to the trace in it of the other
elements of the sequence or system [. . . ] There are only, everywhere, differences and traces
of traces (pg. 44)
To Cilliers, this analysis is a decisive turning point away from symbolic representa-
tions; these would reside fully formed and mutually connected in an unambiguous
manner in some form in the brain, waiting to be actualised.
Cilliers decisively opts against this idea, and makes his point using the operation
of neural networks which are modelled from the neural connections of the brain.
Here he argues that the traces and differences behave very similar to the weights of
neurones, that distribute meaning in such a way that it no longer has an immediate
relationship with input patterns (observation) of the neural network. Instead, the
patterns are dispersed in the network in such a way that there is no direct association
between the nodes of the network and the patterns themselves. The network provides
a medium to store patterns, but it would be wrong to assume that the patterns can
be pinpointed to specific locations in the network’s structure. To Cilliers, Derrida’s
‘traces’ resemble the weights in a neural network, and ‘diffe´rance’ the dynamics of
the neural network (pg. 46).
At this point, these ideas are still very much at par with the concepts that have
been developed and assembled in the previous chapters. Signs (and signified) relate
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to conceptual and contextual patterns, which in themselves are hard to grasp as long
as they are not contextualised, that is, embedded with other signs which do not
necessarily bear any resemblance with the actual patterns that our senses perceive.
As Cilliers writes:
Moreover, since the information is distributed, no explicit distinction between concept and
context has to be made – they are encoded together; context is always already part of the
representation (pg. 72)
In terms of PAC of course, ‘information’ and ‘coding’ are already a bit suspect,
for they refer to actualised, symbolic domains. Cilliers allows ambiguity to play an
essential role in a self-organising system when he discusses the concept of ‘self-
organised criticality’ between rigid order and chaos (pg. 96). The only friction here
seems to be in the choice of words. However, for the refactoring purposes, it is
probably good to reframe these ideas in the vocabulary of PAC.
In PAC, ambiguity is seen an essential characteristic of ranking, and was dis-
cussed earlier that in connectionist networks these ambiguous zones may be quite
dominant if a system does not have a distinct learning cycle. Any system that ‘learns
by doing’ will have to go through highly unstable phases while the patterns that are
learned mature and become more crisp. The ambiguous zones initially facilitate a
large action repertoire that allow experimentation and exploration, and as long as
the interplay of projection and reflection allow optimisation, experience will slowly
reduce the zone of ambiguity and make distinctions more crisp. Thus, there is am-
biguity ‘that informs’. Note that this idea allows a fluent transition from ambiguous
representations, to the necessarily crisp symbolic representations that computational
theories of mind require. If language is indeed a window to the mind, any theory
should account for both stances!54
With Cilliers, this process of making ambiguity crisp seems to be provided by
competition, which is introduced as a necessary mechanism to enforce selectivity
amongst nodes (pp. 97-98). Although this is certainly possible, it is worth mention-
ing that competition between nodes is usually the result of a specific configuration
of a connectionist network. If a neural network has to differentiate numbers, then
competition between the numbers is inevitable (and a somewhat redundant descrip-
tion for what is basically a process of selection), while other networks may decide
that a ‘blend’ is good enough for certain purposes. The reason why this blending, or
synthesis, is emphasized over and over again, is that for the purposes of the lingua
democratica, it is essential to realise that the weights in a network combine synthe-
sis of input patterns as well as their distinctions. In other words, it is not the actual
input patterns that a network is trained with are stored internally, rather those as-
pects that are shared amongst certain groups or categories of input patterns, as well
as those aspects that set these categories apart. Depending on the training sets, the
structure of the network, and the intended use of the network (more specifically, the
amount of outputs the network has), the distinctions between certain input patterns
may become as crisp as binary logic —- in fact, much of the initial research on neu-
ral networks was aimed to train them to function as operators of binary logic, such
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as AND and OR-gates— or they may be highly ambiguous. It will be clear that for
natural language, this innate ambiguity of a connectionist network is of interest as
it represents a very crucial aspect of language.
In short, connectionist models have to find a delicate balance between too much
synthesis (and too little distinction) which would put all input patterns in the same
category, and too much distinction and too little synthesis (every input gets its own
category). And this, I think, is what Derrida and Cilliers are trying to convey with
their notion of traces and diffe´rance.
Note also that for PAC, this again points at a boundary of patterns. When a pattern
becomes so specific that it is unique, it no longer is a pattern. On the other hand, a
pattern that can explain anything is also totally meaningless, a panchreston!
Concluding, Cilliers analysis seems just as good a base for a meaning system as
Luhmann’s autopoiesis of differences. It also allows the meaning system to stop at
a certain point, when sufficient meaning has been formed in order to understand a
situation or observation. As was exemplified previously, if a tiger is approaching,
this event has to be processed as meaning as quickly as possible in order to induce a
correct response (i.e. run away). And this is not a trivial example, because along the
evolutionary perspective, events like these have most likely been guiding the evolu-
tion of the (mammalian) brain.
The issue of communications also becomes pleasantly open. In itself, the com-
munications of Luhmann match well with concepts from PAC, such as ‘inference’
and ‘disruptions’. However, just to be clear on this issue, communications can be
unidirectional, such as a yell or a silent listener or it can take any form of feedback,
feed-forward, or combinations of such processes. Some of these may continuously
be re-affirming shared positions or conversely be in critical debate, or bashing each
other’s heads. The only criterion for a disruption is when one meaning system causes
inference in the other. More complex and dynamic forms of communications, like
the one proposed by Luhmann, can engage in mutual disruptions, which are (there-
fore) in flux until the communication ends.
With this idea, the concept of disruption becomes more dominant, and can be
pinpointed as a characteristic of any communication. In other words, a communica-
tion is an instantiation of the hourglass pattern! Depending on one’s preferences (or
level of detail), one might also state that a communication is a continuous process
of formation and conclusion of hourglass patterns, which move from one domain to
another and back. From this perspective, a communication can even be a form of
massive parallel re-entry between meaning domains!
Within the vocabulary of PAC, one can see a kind of natural tendency of meaning
systems to close themselves systems-internally and try to minimise their context as
an efficiency measure. However, with the pattern of contextual diminution, this can
only be achieved as long as the environment of that meaning system allows this
progressive closure, and it is bounded by an optimal curve.
Disruptions are external interferences that can strengthen the mental landscapes
that are formed as context (i.e. enforce certain concepts already present in a mean-
ing system), as well as change or alter them. In a social system, a major but not
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exclusive, source of such disruptions is provided by communications, of which the
particular form described by Luhmann can certainly take place. Luhmann’s analysis
of communications tends to emphasize this disruptive character of communications,
but then as means to continue the autopoiesis of the meaning systems.
So far, PAC follows Luhmann’s ideas of the structure of a social system as being
formed by communications amongst meaning systems. The only thing that is done
here is ‘phasing out’ the rather abstruse notion of autopoiesis by a more straightfor-
ward alternative! The point of this exercise is not to dismiss Luhmann’s ideas, but
rather create a ‘version 2009’ of some aspects of his ideas along the thin threads
that are currently being woven, by incorporating knowledge from other domains or
other schools in social theory, in a coherent fashion. Such refactoring activities are
common practice in software engineering.
With this alternative substratum on which social systems can form, provided by
Cilliers/Derrida/de Saussure, the refactoring work can now be continued. As a next
step, the substratum should provide the ambiguous ‘Metis prerequisite’ for social
theory. This view returns, for instance, in the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) of
Bruno Latour.
6 A Metis Prerequisite of the Social
The pleasantly undetermined perspective on communications aligns with a previous
discussion, where a gradual formation of ‘group’ into ‘self-organising groups’ or
domains was proposed. Even within social domains, one could argue that some
forms of groups, say some people waiting at a bus stop, are hardly a ‘system’, but
instead a chance gathering by means of a service that they require. The service
localises the group, and the group will dissolve when the service is not actualised.
Other groups may become more or less ‘self-organising’, such as for instance the
supporters of a soccer club.
This stance seems to be in line with, for instance, Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network
Theory (ANT).55 Latour identifies five ‘sources of uncertainty’ when looking into
the major intuitions of the social sciences (pp. 21-22). The first of these, which he
calls ‘no group, only group formation’ already hints at a distinction between ‘group’
and the emergence of group in social domains.
According to Latour, ‘group’, ‘grouping’ and ‘actor’ are very meaningless words
(pg. 29). This he considers a definite advantage, as these terms do not divert attention
to the aggregate a priori. Instead, Latour would rather have sociologists concentrate
on
[. . . ] the ongoing process made up of uncertain, fragile, controversial and ever-shifting ties
(pg. 28)
These ties, Latour argues, can basically be any association between actors, and ac-
tors are not restricted to human individuals (his third source of uncertainty), even in
society.
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Latour thus starts his theory (ANT) with a pleasantly loose definition of ‘group’
as a ‘first source of uncertainty’ (pg. 27-37). According to Latour, a group is a
continuously changing ‘social aggregate’ that is redefined and renegotiated all the
time. A group is the result of hard labour by its members, its adversaries, its peers,
critics and all others who at some stage take interest in this meaningful ensemble.
Latour agrees that communications play an important role in binding ‘the social’.
Groups are:
[. . . ] the provisional product of a constant uproar made by the millions of contradictory
voices about what is a group and who pertains to what (pg. 31)
But Latour also argues that these voices are not enough; that what is communicated
is also important, and this is a certain perspective on a shared identity, to which
someone commits to, or conversely, opposes. The individual members of the group
and those who form the context of the group, apparently have knowledge about
the social aggregate, and even though the characteristics and relationships of that
aggregate differ from member to member, there is consent that de facto, such an
aggregate exists. Note here that Latour describes a social system as being constituted
by its members; the ‘group’ has no agency of its own.
The central intuition of sociology thus, should be that at any given moment actors
are made to fit in a group (italics Latour). But then the question of how this unfolds
arises. According to Latour:
[. . . ] every group formation will be accompanied by the digging out of a wide range of
features, mobilized to make the group boundary hold against the contradictory pressures of
all the competing anti-groups that threaten to dissolve it (pg. 33)
Here we see the first signs of a process that not only aims to stabilise itself, but also
caters to disruptive forces. Latour later on goes on to say:
[. . . ] groupings have constantly to be made, or remade [. . . ] (pg.35)
and later still that:
[. . . ] groups are ‘constantly’ being performed and that agencies are ‘ceaselessly’ debated
(pg. 63)
This sounds a bit like the pattern of elementary self-referentiality. Latour seems to
home in to this concept at a later stage when he writes:
And sociologists, in a careless move, might make a wrong turn and say that durability,
solidity and inertia are provided by the durability, solidity and inertia of society itself. They
might go even further and take this tautology not for the starkest of contradictions, but what
should be admired most in the miraculous force of a society that is, as they say, sui generis,
by which they mean that it is generated out of itself (pg. 67)
Thus, now we face the issue of an underlying mechanism that would allow a social
system to be ‘generated out of itself’. Are there any clues in ANT of ‘aggregates
creating tags that cause re-entry to their constituents’? Actually the notion of emer-
gent order that was described earlier is very much in tune with Latour’s notion of
traces (which should not be confused with that of Derrida). According to Latour,
304
Group formations leave many more traces in their wake than already established connec-
tions which, by definition, might remain mute and invisible. If a given ensemble simply lies
there, then it is invisible and nothing can be said about it. The ensemble generates no trace
and thus produces no information whatsoever; if it is visible, then it is being performed and
will then generate new and interesting data (pg. 31)
Although the notion of trace, to me, would intuitively be more closely associated
with residual information and not with something that is actively generated, for
which I would prefer ‘thread’ or another term that designates action, Latour’s anal-
ysis here captures the notion of ‘aggregates producing tags’. This notion becomes
even stronger in Latour’s account for the ‘third source of uncertainty’, namely that
‘objects too have agency’ (pg. 63). According to Latour, in the context of his so-
cial theory, objects take their place in the associations, they become mediators and
intermediaries.iv
From this point on, the exact line of reasoning as was developed earlier can be
followed to explain how ‘simple traces’ or ‘simple patterns’ could be re-entered
to the aggregate’s constituents. This would imply that ANT does have openings to
incorporate the patterns of PAC.
Now, the refactored ‘psychic layer’ of Cilliers/Derrida interfes with group for-
mations along the lines of ANT. Social actors enclose themselves in groups, but the
multi-layered ecology of LST has not been described, and the structures of such
group formations are still unresolved. The work of Lyotard was already mentioned
earlier as providing a very pragmatic description of group formation; maybe other
social theories can offer some clues on self-reinforcing values which serve as attrac-
tors for group formation.
The Metis prerequisite of social systems can now make most clear what ‘pattern-
ing’ of a (social) system means. When one is walking in busy city, one can see the
indeterminate social space being spanned by hundreds op people who are walking
around you. Most of these people are necessarily insignificant for any observer in
that friction space, who in turn, is one of these undetermined presences in the crowd
as well. But at the same time, continuously, these observers see friends, family, ac-
quaintances, potential partners, people on a collision course, interesting or irritating
individuals and so on, because processes of selection are trying to create order in
this indeterminate sea of human data. This order is found by matching conceptual
patterns with internal models; people you may know, idealisations of the opposite
sex, faces that seem familiar, etcetera . . . .
Such processes, in this setting, allow recursive patterns to form, as observation
and act interfere. Bruno Latour is not only right in his assessment that ‘objects too,
have agency’ in a social system, but along the patterned approach ‘people too, can
become objects’; objects of desire or lust, objects for profit and exploitation, of func-
tion and instrumentality, and this is not necessarily a bad thing, because it depends
on the context! If my friends call me to help them with something, then at that mo-
ment I serve a purpose — a ‘role’, as it is often called— and the only objection I
iv Note that for Latour, these words are definitions with strong inference. They are used in a con-
strained fashion, which enhances their meaning
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could have, is the one proposed by Murphy’s Law, that it is inconvenient for me, but
not because I feel degraded to becoming an object of instrumentality; this is done
by all on a regular basis!
The only problem that can occur, is that ‘others’ are singularly, or narrowly, de-
fined along such conceptions; when certain people are only seen as objects of ex-
ploitation, abuse or entertainment —which also, I might add, is present in the exal-
tation of certain roles, such as ‘leaders’ or ‘celebrities’—. If we operate with limited
knowledge, then our conception of others is always a reduction of their being.
And even those who are made significant, may wonder if this is always a good
thing!
This is probably the greatest irony of the kind of world we live in, that diversity
is very important, for it allows robust societies to form, while at the same time we
are totally incapable of appreciating this, as we are not able to give ‘others’ their due
credit, for they are necessarily relatively insignificant! And the more distant other
people (or roles) are from our own domains, the less capable are we in appreciating
their contributions to sustaining this robustness in society.
The point is, that ‘patterning’ means that objects, allow interference and forma-
tion of patterns. An object is a pattern of existence, and in that sense a stone and a
human being are equivalent. But a human being differs from a stone in the differ-
ences and richness of the patterns that flow through, and interfere at, the localised
presence he or she forms. Note again, that I am not saying that there is no such thing
as an object, but rather that an object is a manifestation of a pattern of existence ‘in
reality’, a materialisation.
7 Tying the Threads Together
The refactoring strategy has helped identify a ‘Metis prerequisite’ of social domains,
in the guise of Latour’s ‘continuous uproar of voices’. These form domains through
communications, which can take up form as processes of feedback. They communi-
cate certain norms and values that serve as tags to which the social actors connect,
thereby constituting the social system. However, every social actor is an interface,
and can ‘bind’ to multiple domains simultaneously. With this, we are almost back
to the ‘ecology’ of LST, with a notion of meaning systems that are able to spawn
communications.
Autopoiesis as pattern might be established if the system —like modern capitalist
societies— produces the goals, norms and values that the individual actors respond
to; for instance, the system produces products that are desired, so that the rational
choice becomes buying those products, because they define the individual actor’s
status in the system, which in turn, amplifies the social importance of that product.
Whether this may count as ‘autopoiesis’ or just a form of self-enforcing feedback
is probably a matter of taste and utility. For the purposes here, the challenge is to
see if the pattern of elementary self-organisation may find a description in a social
306
theory. In other words, are there sources in social theory that might actually describe
the formation of such ubiquitous social systems around a variety of values?
Actually there are, as this idea seems very similar to the idea of a social system
being an auto-eco-organisation, as proposed by John Smith and Chris Jenks. These
social theorists see certain attractors at work in social systems which, ironically
enough, are seen corresponding with Dawkins’s memes.56
The problems with this correspondence have already been discussed, as memes
do not have the same structural qualities as attractors. The important difference, I
think, is that the attractors of Smith and Jenks should not be seen as ‘being repro-
duced in many brains’, but as the result of distributed patterns that are ‘re-formed’
through communications in the quasi-ontological, distributed epistemological space
that provides the substratum of what is usually called ‘culture’. The qualities of
reproduction are not essential here, it is rather the fact that they are ‘in-formed’
through communications, in the same way that signs are distributed over many neu-
rones, but can be recalled again. It is worth pointing out that Smith and Jenks hardly
pay any attention to providing a structure for their auto-eco-organisation, and seem
to like the concept of ‘meme’ mainly for its linguistic correspondences. On the other
hand, all this worrying about the ‘structural integrity’ of these attractors in a certain
medium may just be an engineer’s obsession.
With this refactored notion of social system as a distributed meaning system,
it can now be hypothesised that individual meaning systems can host a certain
(resource-constrained) number of values that are communicated with other mean-
ing systems. These values then become the ‘attractors’ which define a certain social
domain. Each social agent is concurrently participating in a number of these social
domains, which mutually interfere in the way that Luhmann had analysed.
The advantage of this refactored social theory, is that social actors are not tied
down in certain theoretical straightjackets, but have to be seen as ‘in orbit’ around
certain attractors. This brings us back to Coleman’s (utilitarian) rational choice the-
ory.
If one supposes that a human agent at some point engages in purposive action as
described by Coleman then according to the Metis prerequisite, a thread is started,
which weaves a social system that can be described by rational choice theory. With
one actor, the thread disappears the moment the act is finished or completed.
However, when another actor initiates in another purposive act, a next thread is
started, and if this thread connects to the previous, the existence of a social system
based on rational choice is extended. With many agents that are continuously start-
ing these threads of purposive action, the social system following rational choice
theory can become stable and be continuously reinforced.
Thus the act of choosing a product and bartering with an actor who wants to sell,
establishes a system where rational choice is effectuated. In combination with all the
other interactions that precede, accompany and conclude the barter, and the many
similar threads that are concurrently in operation, a social system based on rational
choice is formed on the indeterminacy of all human interactions. As the moments of
rational choice are performed by many individuals and groups simultaneously and
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sequentially, the social system becomes a stable aggregate in a society.
Social agents can now behave however they want; rationally, irrationally all
shades in-between, or along an entirely different set of values, but a social system
that adheres to theories of utilitarian rationality is spanned as a domain, as long as at
any given time, there is at least one purposive action being performed. A purposive
action is, simply, a form of communication.
Note also that different kinds of purposive action may take place simultaneously.
A gift to charity may not be very utility-maximising when one has a goal to become
a millionaire, but it may be rational along a different set of values which spans
different kinds of social systems. Rationality is subject to context!
The many contingencies and interpenetrations that Luhmann sees happening be-
tween these social systems can now be explained by the interactions, disruptions,
frictions, tensions and propensities that were discussed earlier; these are formed by
the many processes that interfere in the locus called ‘social agent’ and, with Latour,
the objects that obtain certain agency in social systems. These interferences now
cannot be ‘explained away’ but should be seen as natural disruptive elements that
these social systems have to deal with, which occur through the disruptions of other
social systems —Luhmann’s double contingencies— and which justify them being
manifestations of organised complexity. With this, a robust social theory has been
made, because it caters to contingencies and disruptions at various levels of organi-
sation. A social system exists, despite these influences!
With this refactoring strategy, the various social theories can, to some extent, be
seen as specific configurations of this ubiquitous social domain in which agents par-
ticipate, and where actions, ideals, norms and values all can play their roles.57 These
theories describe ‘contextual slices’ around social actors, which highlights certain
aspects of the context, or certain interactions of those actors in their reality. These
contextual slices however, can never be seen as operating in isolation, but always in
interaction with other aspects of that social agent’s reality. It is also at this point, I
think, that the refactoring strategy fluently re-enters LST.
What remains in the modelling work so far, is an indication whether the hourglass
pattern compares to ‘communications’ in the way this concept is usually used in
social theory. Between the detailed analysis of communications by Niklas Luhmann,
the ‘constant uproar’ of Bruno Latour, and the language games of Wittgenstein and
Lyotard, there is probably ample space for the hourglass pattern. Here however, a
detailed analysis is probably not really necessary as the hourglass pattern, rather
than being a model of communications, instead depicts the minimal prerequisites
of effective communications between social agents, that is, an interaction between
different agents along which patterns can be passed successfully, and which causes
inference.
Communications in the restricted sense of the ‘pattern of the lingua democratica’,
or ‘effective disruptions’, flow into more complex forms as analysed by Luhmann,
and then take up the more complex forms of ‘language games’ from Wittgenstein,
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or Lyotard.58 Narratives, emotions, power, agonistics and other concepts enter the
games, start to dominate, and need to be analysed at their own contextual levels.
Here, the pattern library that was developed is starting to lose its expressive power
and can contribute little, save maybe a warning note that analyses at these levels of
complexity should not do away with the less complex levels without thought. If lan-
guage becomes the sole glue of society, then the common frame of reference that is
provided by the common biological make-up of the human species, or the common
frame provided by a certain shared ecology, is ignored as a source of interaction and
disruption. The constraints and premises of these lower-level forms of interaction
still percolate to the more complex interactions that are built up on these substrates.
Obviously it is up to the domain experts of the social sciences to assess whether
the added value of this refactoring strategy offered by PAC is worthwhile for their
own enterprises, but the disruptions of this particular enterprise at least incorpo-
rates many insights offered in various research disciplines in a coherent fashion.
These contributions are described in the patterns and the vocabulary that has been
developed so far. Reflecting back on this pattern-oriented approach, the refactoring
strategy has strengthened the disruptive nature of the approach as a form of com-
munication that aims to cause inference across (scientific) domains, and also takes
practical knowledge seriously in the development of theory.
8 Agents, Domains and Values
When I visited Australia for the first time on the inevitable backpacker’s holiday,
I noticed quite quickly how well the country was equipped for this type of travel.
In every place I stayed, however remote, there were hostels, launderettes and all the
other facilities to make backpacking, well..., easy. Camp sites in the wilderness often
had electronic barbeques (barbees) and sometimes the tents were already pitched up,
cleaned and ready for the unsuspecting visitors.
I tend to start my trips with organised tours, as it is convenient while recovering
from jet-lag and tour operators get you to places where you can’t easily go yourself.
But as it was my aim to experience the Outback, I hopped on a McGafferty’s bus
after a week or two in order to visit all the little places in-between Alice Springs
and the ”Backpacker’s Highway” along the East Coast. Another two weeks brought
me through tiny outback towns, where tourists were sparse, and where locals in the
pubs kept asking me if I was lost or something. They were genuinely surprised when
I told them that I actually wanted to visit their towns, and usually upon hearing this,
they would bend over their beers, grunt and say something along the lines of; ”The
Outback. . . , yeah there’s plenty of that around these parts, mate!”
I finally re-entered the tourist mainstreams in Townsville, Queensland, and as I
wanted to take a diving course there, I had booked a room in a hostel for an entire
week.
It was there in the evening, sitting at the camp site and listening to other ‘trav-
ellers’ tell their stories, that it struck me that many of them were cherishing the
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romantic ‘off the beaten track’ image of their enterprises, while, in fact, most of
them were running the same predictable Lonely Planet recommended routes that
everyone else was taking. In the hostels, by the camp fire, they were debunking the
tourists in tour buses who were visiting the same sites at a somewhat faster pace, and
sleeping in luxurious hotel rooms at night. These people, so the ‘travellers’ claimed,
did not have the ‘real’ experience as they themselves did, and everyone then looked
dreamily in the flames nodding, forgetting that there was a whole system around
them to provide them conveniences of all sorts, and that the only difference between
the backpackers and tour-bus tourists were the places they ate and slept.v
Assuming that the patterns developed so far may contextualise in social systems,
it can now be hypothesised that these systems host, amongst others, convergence
inducing processes based on internally defined and maintained values. These values
are attractors which enable social agents to connect to each other. They operate in
an environment that consists of many other social systems, so they are subject, at
least, to actor/co-actor interactions. Social systems can become self-referential and
they tend to preserve themselves by securing their values, according to the pattern
of elementary self-organisation, which maintains the attractors for its constituents.
These processes are inherently non-linear.
If, as Damasio suggests, the notion of ‘self’ is already an embodied presence in
‘mindful’ organisms, then ‘understanding’ the importance of self could be amongst
the first values that could achieve such closure. This self in PAC, would consist of
many feedback loops that connect to tags that represent certain aspects of ‘self’, the
bootstrap mechanism being the first value that emerges in any conscious being, able
to preserve and maintain a notion of ‘self’.59
Like the interpretation of a social system as being a conglomerate of threads of
feedback, the core self and autobiographical self could be interpreted as similar pro-
cesses that create ‘knots’ of order in and around the substrate of the mind, especially
if the notion of re-entry as is hypothesised by Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi is
taken into account as well [69].
Notice that a bootstrapping mechanism of consciousnessvi is now not a differ-
ence, nor an operator on difference, but rather the formation of a feedback loop
that identifies a ‘self’. With this, consciousness ‘grows’ as massive parallel re-entry
creates every more complex notions of ‘self’, and which, at some point, can also
include notions of self as being distinguishable from a background. Here the pat-
tern of difference returns; even a difference of ‘self’, as opposed to ‘other’, usually
shares a common frame of reference where self and other are specialisations of a
shared generalised form, such as ‘human being’. Only beyond this, can a differ-
ence be taken up into the growing consciousness related to ‘self’. This description,
v Now of course my situation was totally different. I had seen the real places where the tourists
hadn’t been . . .
vi of self: in this interpretation, consciousness is no longer an ‘atomic’ phenomenon, a presence in
the mind, but instead it is a superposition of many different forms of consciousness, which includes
consciousness of space and time, of being a physical entity, and so on
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I think, reflects the ideas of neuro-scientists such as Damasio, Donald, Edelman and
Tononi, already discussed previously.
Presupposing that values can provide the threads that the system re-enters to its
constituent parts, thus closing the self-referential loops, it can also be hypothesised
that these values are subject to the preservation of self. Such systems will be ef-
fective if selections from the life-world and internal values are always biased to
maintain the notion of self.60
Now first for some good news! The preservation of ‘self’ does not imply that
social agents are ‘selfish’, ‘self-interested’, ‘self-maximising’, ‘egocentric’ or any
other interpretation of self that adds additional (normatively charged) qualities to
self-maintenance or self-preservation. Such self-referential systems may just be
present in their life-world, do their thing, minding their own business without exten-
sive interaction with others, or aiming to grow, expand, or in any other way enhance
themselves in friction with others. Such co-existing social agents may form very
weak ties, and yet form social domains. It may also be clear that such configura-
tions are usually not very exciting for an external observer.
The bad news is that more intrusive configurations are certainly possible, and his-
torically speaking, such inflationary social systems have been quite dominant in the
biological domains and also in social domains, if only for the fact that reproduction
tends to have an exponentially accelerating nature.
In social systems, the combination of different values and different interaction
patterns may result in various configurations that are at work all the time and con-
stantly being performed.
In a domain such as economics or business administration, certain values tend to
be overemphasised, and conflicts or competitive interactions are often celebrated.
For the lingua democratica, this intrusive attitude can also be seen in Kaplan and
Rogers’s observations of biologists and (evolutionary) psychologists who formulate
social theory without regard for the considerable work that is done by social scien-
tists. Such disruptions tend to be aggressive rather than co-operative.
The base premise of ‘preservation of self’ also suggests that the values related
to ‘self’ tend to be used selectively. Using a Dawkinsian radicalisation, one could
state that such self-preserving systems are inherently hypocritical. Thus travellers
on the Australian backpacker’s highway will maintain an image of self that others
may regard with mild surprise and wonder.61
In that respect, most systems that aim to preserve the self, tend to apply securing
mechanisms to the values they uphold; they use it as long as these values support
the preservation of the self, but will just as easily spot ‘opportunities’ in the values
of other players in their environments if they can use them.
The ‘self’ can only be constituted from internal models, but they are also formed,
reinforced and disrupted by the life-world in which these self-preserving agents op-
erate. As these models are constituted from contextual patterns and operations on
these patterns, it means that models and domains are inherently represented by the
idealisations of self; the juxtapositions of strongly reinforced patterns that dominate
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the views of self and the life-world. This enforces tendencies of contextual diminu-
tion, which converges to the state of absolutism for the values that constitute the
‘self’. In other words, these strong attractors tend to close the various social sys-
tems with respect to each other.
In social actors, experiences change context, and context shapes experiences,
emotions and ideas. Thus the pattern of contextual diminution has a strong pull
towards the attractor of absolutism in social systems. The limitations of any episte-
mological capacity in social agents will always tend to a limited amount of values,
but as these are distributed over many agents, all of who may have their own vari-
ants, the collective can still be quite diverse.
Note that the differences between epistemology and ontology flow into each other
in this intermediate domain that we might call (a substrate for) ‘culture’. Epistemol-
ogy, ontology and culture become markers of spaces in which patterns reside and
where they can interact, but the similarities between these spaces probably become
bigger than the differences. The location, means and scope of contextualisation, and
the participants of these spaces determine the differences. Epistemology is about
patterns in the minds of individual human agents, culture about (shared) patterns
distributed over many minds, and ontology about patterns observed by even the sim-
plest of agents with capabilities to detect things. These could be considered ‘facts’
(within a context).
If culture becomes something like ‘distributed epistemology’, then it also ac-
quires ontological traits, and with this, the differences between ‘facts’, ‘norms’ and
‘values’ become less of oppositions; they all become patterns that flow together in
a contextually restricted modelling environment we call the ‘mind’, and are shared
with other minds.62
8.1 Social Domains and Social Systems
The notion of domains as has been introduced earlier has some interesting implica-
tions when its agents are also able to artificially mould and change their surround-
ings. First, a ‘domain’ is formed and maintained in the internal models of the agents,
but homo faber can also create tags that represent the values of such domains in our
life-world. Human beings create statues, flags, flea marketsvii, celebrities, soccer
clubs and many other tangible representations (tags) of ‘nation’, ‘social system’, or
‘group’. Just so, a concept such as ‘urban domain’ is projected onto the life-world
of urban dwellers by buildings, towns, cities and other geographically situated arte-
facts. A city’s infrastructure and buildings serve as tags of these domains, rather
than define them. A city needs people to truly ‘be’ a city, and the interactions be-
tween those people, their agreement (or disagreement) on rules and regulations and
mutual conduct, seem to be more defining for ‘urban domain’ than these artefacts
alone. Take the people away and a certain barren setting remains.63
vii In this case I am referring to the very Dutch tradition of flea-markets on the queen’s birthday.
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As Christopher Alexander has already observed, the city, its location, and the
manner and being of its buildings and infrastructure provide a ‘stage’ not only for
the ‘urban domain’, but also its ‘atmosphere’ and all those objective and subjective
qualities that completes the picture of what that city or town is.64
This feeds back to the social dimension, as a city can to some extent become its
‘constructed’ stage. In other words, a network of social entities, together with the
tags they create and maintain, allows expression of patterns of their own life-world.
In effect, an artificial life-world closes the loop between projection and reflection,
forming the feedback loops of contextual diminution. If, for instance, certain values
related to safety and stability guide the creation of the artificial, and the artificial
stabilises the environment, then contextual diminution will inevitably take place. In
other words, the values guide those actions and artefacts that in turn stabilise those
values!
If ‘getting rich’ is an important value, then once the threshold where this value is
stabilised is crossed —in other words, the point where money makes more money—
the process of contextual diminution will ruthlessly drive the stabilisation of this
particular value. Likewise, the value of ‘being famous’ will drive any action that in-
creases one’s fame. That’s why pop-stars become actors, fashion-designers, writers,
UN-ambassadors and, most of all, tabloid regulars. The media provide extreme am-
plification of biases already present in a society, and society recursively strengthens
the values they portray. In many ways, attractors of whatever form, are representa-
tions of what the society they emerge in, considers to be of ultimate importance. In
this respect, bonus-frenzied bankers form the red notches on the thermometer of our
current Western/global society.65
As media typically do not have memory, they tend float from ‘fact’ to ‘fad’, from
‘analysis’ to ‘crisis’, from theme to dream and back again, not being hindered by any
need to account for stances, ideas or opinions that they portrayed earlier. Whereas
intellectuals, thinkers and theorists are bound by their former ideas, the media forget
instantly; they exacerbate the ‘now’. This is probably one of the reasons why Morin
considers them as a to source that produces mass ignorance. The modern media are
probably amongst the strongest contributors of the pull towards the attractor of ab-
solutism in contemporary societies.66
In a social environment, every agent becomes the observer/actor of a target that it
is fundamentally part of. A social system —as Luhmann argued— is ultimately self-
referential, and every actor in such a system will act on models of the society it is
part of. As these models are idealisations, a social system fundamentally generates
its own uncertainty; through the incompleteness of the models on which the social
agents operate, the preservation of self in a complex network of dynamic interac-
tions with others, and through the mismatch between idealisations in the context
and the experiences provided by their life-world. Revolutionaries may be wrong in
their claim that ‘the system is rotten’, but the system is fundamentally more com-
plex than our models, more contingent, more complete than our idealisations. And
this completeness is not a ‘better’ one; it is more complete for the simple fact that
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it includes all those things that the models of the social exclude. The more rigid
the idealisations of the model, the quicker contingency will raise its nasty (but also
creative) little head!67
8.2 A Word of Humility
In the past chapters, we have been enticed to step into the ambiguity and indeter-
minacy of Metis’s waters, and it was argued that order is much easier explained
from disorder, than disorder is explained from order. However, this does not give an
account of why the world we live in should be fundamentally undetermined.
This structural perspective can now be filled in, while standing in social domains
—that is, from the world that predominantly shapes us— and looking down along
the complexity perspective at the various aggregates that were passed along the way.
As we have seen, every level of aggregation allows a flow of pattern, process
and uncertainty into higher realms, but looking down, there is also a limit to what
one can observe, because of the combinatorial nature of relationships. The sun may
hit the water’s surface, cast beams of light downward, but there is always a point
when the colours fade, become darker shades of blue and purple, and dissolve into
the darkness of the deep. Yet, even though our observations fail us, this does not
mean that the deep is trivial or unimportant. It still constitutes what we are and what
we do, and although it will usually remain in the background, silently maintain-
ing the structures that are taken for granted, but every now and then contingencies
will percolate through into our ranges of vision. A free radical damages a strand of
DNA, causing cancerous growth, which destroys a life. A virus mutates and causes
a pandemonium, a bolt shakes loose and causes a plane crash. Conversely, a piece
of paper floating on a summer’s breeze happens to be a winning lottery ticket, or the
person who bumps into you round a corner becomes the love of your life.
Less dramatic, the ultimate glue of the social, language, is saturated with con-
cepts that embrace our connection with deep psychology, biology and physics;
‘hunger’, ‘sex’, ‘pain’, ‘love’ and so on. With all our possible ambitions and pre-
tences, these concepts keep reminding us of this intimate connection with these
deep connections of our being. At every level of observation, this undetermined
deep forms the background of any observer agent. The void will sometimes show
the threatening shadows of beasts, or the shining brilliance of a mythical creature,
but mostly it will just be there as a long and trusted companion that has become
like the wallpaper in a home, and getting too little credit for its hard work in the
shadows.
Metis is fundamental, simply because there is only so far that one can see, man,
beast, or particle alike.
Against complexity thinkers of the social realms, such as Luhmann, Latour, Ly-
otard and Smith and Jenks, the contributions from an amateur in social complexity
with a background in engineering have to be seen with some humility.
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The vocabularies of these theorists are, at least in part, based on the same founda-
tions as PAC, such as cybernetics, information theory, the physical and mathematical
dialects of complexity, biology, and so on, and it is interesting to see how they take
up terms such as ‘emergence’, ‘autopoiesis’, ‘chaos’ and so on, and do their thing
with it for the issues they want to address.
At this point, it may only be proper to respect the scaling boundaries of PAC,
and acknowledge that the threads of PAC are dissolving in a space where ‘post-
structuralism’, ‘politics’, ‘democracy’, ‘ethics’, ‘religion’ and ‘humanism’ become,
amongst many, many others, the predominant focus of enquiry. It does not mean
that the threads from other areas no longer hold validity —at least, the complex-
ity thinkers of the social domains seem to argue strongly against this— rather that
they are slowly become those shadows that were described above. Autopoiesis and
emergence contextualise differently in the social, but maybe some threads from the
technical, systemic or biological deep may crystallize strongly enough to tie a knot
or two and weave a stronger mesh in these domains.
Criticism contextualises poorly around these indeterminate interfaces in-between
domains, mainly because the common frames of reference become more diffuse.
Maybe then, the collaborative approaches of engineers68 —and more recently of the
many so-called ‘open-source’ initiatives on the Internet— may be more productive
here; that of different amateurs enthusiastically offering the fruit of their particular
specialities to others; ‘hey, look what I’ve got here! Is this something you can work
with?’
For in a world of indeterminacy, where ‘truth’ has become as fluid a concept
as any, what point does one aim to bring across by a persuasive, if not aggressive
attitude? At least, when one’s aim, as far as theorists go, is to ‘know’ things?
9 A Network of Stakeholders
It will probably become clear from the previous discussions, that social domains are
seen to have a strong tendency to close themselves with respect to their environ-
ment. In fact, this is what makes a society observable as such. The ability to do so
depends strongly on their ability to seal their domains off from disruptions. Hence
engineers working in the public domain, such as construction sites in cities, will
usually be more contextually open to disruptions than techno-scientists working in
laboratories, who can predominantly publish in journals that recursively reinforce
the importance of their research. This, in essence, demarcates stakeholders that are
usually identified as ‘professionals’ from the stakeholders ‘in academia’.
For these patterns, as may be expected, also return in the social system called
‘science’.69
La´szlo´ has identified a certain tendency towards fragmentation in the sciences,
which he considers the result of a drive for specialisation of current scientific enter-
prises. He states that one of the problems of this drive for specialisation is:
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[. . . ] the tendency of patterns of knowledge to create closed bubbles in their own right.70
These ‘speciality bubbles’, according to Laszlo, have the unfortunate consequence
that
[. . . ] knowledge, instead of being pursued in depth and integrated in breadth, is pursued in
depth and isolation (pg. 2)
With this, I have almost closed the circle with the topic that initiated this enterprise,
namely ‘the stakeholders for the genomics debate’. With the patterns described so
far, these stakeholders can be seen as representing social domains that are keepers
of certain production systems of knowledge that are internally coherent with respect
to the internal norms and values they host.
Some of these domains are more open than others with respect to disruptive
knowledge, which is knowledge that (successfully) interferes with the internal ra-
tionale of the domains and manages to change them. Others manage to close them-
selves off, more or less successfully, and can only be disrupted with relative force,
like a strong message that lands, a wake-up call, or stock indexes in free-fall for
financial institutions. The ability of a domain to absorb these disruptions is a mea-
sure of the epistemological robustness of these domains. Fragile epistemological
systems will not take kindly to these interferences, and often need sheer force to
stabilise their surroundings in order to maintain their rationales. Other domains are
less sensitive, for instance because they are already inherently open to such disrup-
tions.
A social system is a context for the individual agents that it consists of. Through
communications, the individual receives conceptual patterns that constitute the do-
main of that social system, and which themselves are idealisations and essences at
the level of the aggregate.71 Target and model flow into one another through self-
referential loops. All but the most predictable of social systems are fundamentally
in flux. A predictable social system is that system in which all the patterns that con-
stitute that system can be effectively modelled by its individual agents. However,
predictability leads to contextual diminution, and contextual diminution increases
uncertainty and risk, so predictability will usually only have a temporary character.
In real contexts, these self-referential systems will always tend to flow towards in-
determinacy, to that equilibrium where uncertainty starts to affect the flow towards
the attractor of absolutism.
Through communications, such domains can also connect to the experiences of
others and open themselves to novelty and change, allowing absorption of novel
patterns, refinement or redefinition of contextual models, and maybe even critical
reflection of idealisations and essences.
Regarding science, it should be noted that, although science has its fair share of
flawed theories and utter nonsense brought as ‘fact’ in intellectual prose, nonethe-
less its openness to experimental validation and criticism from within and without
has resulted in a robust framework of approximated epistemological isomorphisms
that is unique in the history of humankind.72
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As ever more complex themes come in focus of more and more stakeholders,
each has a responsibility towards conserving the knowledge and the values of the
domains they represent, but also towards the disruptions that they can, and will
allow to protrude these domains. These disruptions will need to balance between
reinforcement and surprise. Some will also be (almost) unavoidable, such as those
provided by reality, practicality, experience and so on.
In cross-stakeholder domain interactions however, communications will (often)
be the source of choice. Here we might speak of interruptions.
As was argued earlier, these communications will follow the hourglass pattern,
and the interruptions need to delicately balance between reinforcement and indiffer-
ence or confusion in order to lead to inference and (subsequently) learning.
With this, a journey that started in the plane of organised simplicity has found a
connection with explorations into organised complexity from the humanities. In an
overview on the virtues of humanistics, social theorist Harry Kunneman extends the
notion of autopoiesis to the normatively inspired domain of humanistics by intro-
ducing dia-poiesis:
The result could be considered ‘dia-poiesis’, as demarcation of a special form of au-
topoiesis, where the ‘self’ of the subject is no longer solely in control, but takes part in
a process of co-creation that emerges between all involved and ‘flows through all’ instead
of being controlled by one, as with power relationships, or by both, as with relationships
of exchange. This dia-poiesis can take different forms: besides dialogic forms of commu-
nications also all kinds of narrative forms of co-creation and non-verbal, tactile forms of
communications. A characteristic of all forms of dia-poiesis is that they do not aim to stop
the autopoietic capabilities of the participants, but rather take them seriously and respect
them in such a way, that this autopoiesis, through the dia-poiesis, blend into emergent forms
of co-creation that feed each other[. . . ]73
Here, a vocabulary of complexity is used to suggest the emergence of newer forms
of networks, based on symbiotic interaction patterns, which allow norms and values
to flow into domains where ‘being human’ can get its fullest expression.
This is also where the threads that were followed dissolve in a space that includes
concepts such as art, literature, power, desire, language and all those other words
that in a social context become significantly more dominant than the vocabulary of
PAC.
10 Wrapping Up
The aim of this chapter has been to see if PAC can interfere with established social
theory, in order to use the patterns developed so far to model ‘stakeholders’ in an
interaction space. These stakeholders as seen as having a strong tendency to the
attractor of absolutism, especially in absence of disruptions.
By ‘refactoring’ theory, an attempt was made to create a more inclusive con-
glomerate of social theories in which the pattern library that has been developed in
the previous chapters could contextualise. One of the main aims of this exercise was
to demonstrate that by looking at the world as being fundamentally complex —the
Metis prerequisite—, theories sometimes may actually be refactored to become a
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lot simpler. Liberated from the restrictions of fundamental order, complexity allows
theory to weave threads of order that interfere with other threads, and in collabo-
ration make a complex, but coherent structure, that allows a lot of different frame-
works and explanations to fold into each other. These threads can still be addressed
with the equipment that science provides, but now with an understanding where
concepts as uncertainty, interferences, disruptions, scales, boundaries, propensities
and other conceptual tools from complexity can be deployed. These concepts extend
the expressive ranges of the models that are made, but at the same time constrain
the activities in a creative fashion. Most of all, it presumes that coherent knowledge
follows very thin paths through reality.
Besides the notion of minimal requirements, and the game of composition and
decomposition, probably the foremost important contribution of engineering prac-
tices to theoretical research on complexity, is refactoring. Refactoring moves beyond
criticism by forcing the critic to consider alternatives, and to analyse which aspects
of a theory are worth keeping and which aspects can be replaced with others. This
way pluralistic theory finds a counter-pressure towards coherence, and different the-
ories are invited to see how they ‘fit’ in the knot around complex themes, and how
they relate to each other. Refactoring is normal practice especially in software en-
gineering, where products tend to be provisional and fleeting. It requires strength
of character to dedicate one’s time and energy to issues that may only have tempo-
ral significance, but in research of complexity this is likely to be normal practice
for years to come. It is also an inevitable prospect of many patterns, as they are
meant to be replaced if the community of users see others to be more appropriate,
or powerful.
It should be noted that these interferences in the social domain should be con-
sidered speculative, hypothetical or at best plausible. This exercise should be seen
as one possible example of ‘disruptive knowledge’ into social theory. It is up to the
domain experts to assess whether the interruptions may actually contribute to social
theory. Only then, this methodology of balancing plurality with coherence may find
proof of contributing to a ‘lingua democratica’.
For now, the vocabulary that has been developed will not be extended further.
The next two chapters will rather focus on the very practical implications of the
work so far, by applying the patterns and the vocabulary of the workshop of PAC to
friction between technology and society, with a slight bias towards genomics.
Only in the last chapter will this thread be picked up again and stretched, maybe
up to the point of breaking, into the humanities in order to complete the bridge
across the divide of C.P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’.

Part IV
Technology and Society

Chapter 10
Stakeholders of Technology
The Wagamama cookbook on hip, Asian-style cooking teaches us that Japanese
cuisine is all about preparation.1 The majority of the work is spent on cutting the
vegetables and the meat, and preparing the sauces and spices. The actual cooking
sometimes lasts no longer than a few minutes (in a wok pan), and should not last
longer, as this preserves the vitamins, the texture, and results in a delicate synthesis
of tastes, which transcends the concept of ‘meal’.
The last two chapters aim to give a very practical implementation of using the vo-
cabulary of PAC and the pattern library that has been developed. The focal theme is
‘human intelligence’, and especially some attempts to enhance human intelligence
artificially, as envisioned by the so-called trans-humanist movement, will be given
more attention. This will be the focus of the next chapter, but first a conceptual net-
work will be developed around the theme of ‘technology’, which will provide the
context for these trans-humanist visions.
More specifically, the stakeholder domains that will be focused on here are sci-
ence, engineering and society.
1 Premises
According to pattern oriented approach that has been developed, three perspectives
will have to be sketched, which follow some threads from these stakeholders and
converge to the theme of choice, especially in relationship to gen- and nanotechnol-
ogy. The structure of the theme (‘what is technology?’), the ecological characteris-
tics (how is technology embedded in a social context?), and the historical perspec-
tive of technology need to be addressed, in order to even begin to say something
about this theme. These are all needed to understand the continuous change that is
inevitable in any co-evolution of a theme and its context. In the particular case of
technology and the societal embedding of this technology, the trans-humanist ideal
is one particular vision of the, in their eyes inevitable, direction in which humankind
is progressing.
I will try to point out some criticisms on technology and why I think these crit-
icisms have failed to effectively disrupt technological progress. Last I will show a
few practical points of attention to assess an analysis of technology, but which I
think can be transferred to many other debates as well. These points are all derived
from the previous construction activities of PAC.
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This chapter is a preparation. In the last chapter, the same procedure will be
repeated for the actual theme, intelligence. With this, the extensive preparation of
the pattern library, is finally being thrown in the stir-fry pan of practical application.
2 A Short History of Technology
τεχυη , the ancient Greek word for ”art”, ”craft” or ”skill”, can be considered one
of the phenomenological characteristics of humankind that, together probably with
language, distinguishes us most clearly from other animals. It is true that the use
of tools, or enhancing our appearance artificially, is not restricted to human beings
—-other primates and some birds are known to do the same— but the proficiency
in which we are able to use tools and other artefacts to enhance our lives is beyond
compare.
Although the distinctions are vague, and many use the words interchangeably,
there is a difference between technique (or sometimes technics) and technology.
The first usually refers to the skills and practical use of tools, machines and so on,
while the latter incorporates logos, and therefore acknowledges a body of knowl-
edge that is tied up with the activities concerning techniques.2
Archaeological evidence traces the weaving of clothes back to about 35,000
BCE, which makes it one of the first technologies.3 However, there are clues that
bone and stone tools were used by early hominids as far back as two million years
ago.4 As a reference, homo sapiens is believed to have evolved about 500,000 years
ago, and modern man about 130,000 years ago.5
It is generally believed that two features of humans have made us specifically
suited to become Homo Faber, the ‘making’ man. First the fact that we learned to
walk upright freed our hands from a primary task of motion and allowed them to be
used for other things. Secondly, the specific position of our thumbs —-as opposed to
that of other primates— allowed a high level of control over our fingers for grasping
and other forms of manual activity.6
More recently, neurological research has suggested that the human brain is
specifically suited for tool use in the way that it represents physical causality in-
ternally, which also opens the possibility that the human brain co-evolved with an
increasing skill in tool-making. It is hypothesised that the brain considers a tool to
be natural extension of the hand, so it deploys the same areas of the brain it would
use for grasping and manual handling of things. However, as opposed to primates,
the human brain specifically activates parts of the brain that deal with abstract repre-
sentations when handling tools, which suggests that manual handling is connected
to a wider repertoire than the performance of very specific tasks alone.7 In other
words, a chimpanzee may understand how a rock can crush a nut, but humans can
understand that the same principle can be applied for other things as well.
It is worth pointing out here, that brain, hands, tools, target and eyes form a
feedback loop which, if this hypothesis is correct, is self-reinforcing.
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More recently, these cognitive skills are seen more and more as providing the
defining edge over other hominids, such as the Neanderthals. Recent findings,
and especially practical tests, of experimental archaeologists in South Africa have
demonstrated that heat-treating stones, which makes it easier to shape them into
tools, can be dated back at least 70,000 years and possibly well over twice that
timeframe. Experimental evidence shows that this is more than ‘discovery by acci-
dent’, but that this controlled use of fire actually requires planning and foresight.8
Although definitions tend to be very fuzzy, the specific branch of engineering is
historically situated in the crafting of artefacts of larger scale, which typically re-
quires the organisation of human tasks and skills. These skills can be traced back
to the dawn of humankind, and probably well before that, as coordinated hunting
is obviously a collaborative enterprise. Clues of collaborative hunting skills for hu-
mans are dated back half a million years ago, but homo is not unique in this, as it
can also be seen in other primates, packs of wolves, and other social carnivores and
omnivores.
Here again, the active use of tools such as spears, axes and knives distinguishes
homo from other animals, but it is also worth pointing out that communications such
as gestures, facial expressions, grunts, and so on, become important here.9
The etymological roots of engineering can be traced back to the (Roman) mili-
tary, where the genie-troops concentrated on the logistics of military displacement
and the building activities of fortifications, bridges and so on. ‘Genie’ can be traced
back to the Middle-East, where the ‘jinn’ was a supernatural creature that possessed
free will.
Engineering activities can be traced back to the Neolithic period when sites of
worship such as Stonehenge (approximately 2800 BCE) and the pyramids in Egypt
were built.10 ‘Engineering’ in the way it is used here, therefore implies a social con-
text in which these activities are embedded. Stonehenge, the pyramids, and military
campaigns were not performed for the sake of technology itself, but rather served
goals that are assigned outside the context of these technological activities, whether
they are spiritual, societal, economical or military.
As modern equipment is becoming more and more sophisticated, many techno-
logical activities can be carried out within an organisation or a laboratory, in many
ways in a similar fashion as was done by classical craftspeople. When this is done
with a focus on technology itself, or when acquiring knowledge about certain things
is a focal issue, I would, with Bruno Latour, prefer to speak of techno-scientific ac-
tivities and not engineering activities, as the former misses this direct and immediate
link with societal goals. 11
It will be clear that this distinction not only influences the way technology is
pursued, but also the way technology is perceived by those who are performing
technology.
At this point, it can be stated that both the ‘know-how’ of technical skills and the
organisation of team effort to produce artefacts was already developed relatively
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early in human evolution. However, this knowledge was hardly put to writing, and
in fact, the traditions where skills are handed over through tutoring were still com-
mon during enlightenment in the Western world and to date is still quite common
elsewhere.
As always, the first philosophical reflection on technology in the Western World
can be traced back to the writing of Plato and Aristotle. According to Don Ihde,
these ancients —-from a modern perspective— saw a natural union of function and
aesthetics. In techne¯, the forerunner of technology, these were both present and re-
quired.
Plato and Aristotle were appreciative of what they called techne¯. But can techne¯ be trans-
lated as technology? Techne¯ was simultaneously a craft and art object- it could be a mar-
vellous shield, a finely wrought statue, or a vessel for drinking. Art and technology were
not separated, and, indeed, intrinsic to the judgement of any such subject was not simply its
utility, but also its beauty.12
In his meticulous account of historical thinking of technology, Carl Mitcham shows
a gradual separation from the functional and the aesthetical into the contemporary
chasm between technology and (modern) art. In this respect, the divide between the
functional and the aesthetical is a modern one, and returns for instance in the work
of Mumford.13
With contextual diminution, one can see how such idealisations of certain ideas
and people in history are formed. Once a distinction is observed, however vague and
undulated it may be, it can form in the distributed epistemological space of a culture
and can become more ‘crisp’ as time goes by. It is worth pointing out here that these
distinctions tend to be typical of philosophical and scientific approaches, and can be
amplified through education. Social dynamics ‘crispify’ these distinctions once they
have been observed as being distinctions, and eventually become ‘facts’, for truths
within that culture.14
Performing craftsmen nowadays will usually still be confronted with the combi-
nation of aesthetics and utility in the way as was described by the Greeks. Potters,
but also industrial designers, for instance, will clearly have to balance between the
two. But many artists will also recognize the ‘being with’ the media on which they
paint or sculpt. Likewise, professionals and scientists will probably also recognise
and appreciate a strong aesthetic quality when something (finally) works in the way
it was intended, or a conclusive proof has been given for a certain problem.15
In this respect it is often surprising to see how aesthetics, in the view of the en-
thusiasts, is often limited to a few media, such as canvas, music or writing, which to
me, seems rather unimaginative.
The distinction between aesthetics and utility may be a recent one, this does not
apply for the distinction between the material and the intellectual. Western ideology
has a long history of assigning ‘higher’ virtues to the intellectual and assigning the
material to lesser realms. This creates a chasm between ‘thinkers’ and ‘doers’ that
is probably as old as the moment people started living in groups, and some came
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to the conclusion that assigning laborious, manual work to others made life a great
deal easier for themselves.16
As both engineering and techno-science currently are represented in academia,
they encounter the friction of being the children of two historical lineages. One fol-
lows the traditions from the Ancient Greek and Roman elites, through the Christian
monasteries and cloisters to the European aristocracy, while the other connects to
the craftspeople, builders, engineers and artisans.
For the purposes here, this value-laden distinction has introduced an asymmetry
in thinking between the crafts on one side, and predominantly theoretical enterprises
on the other, which has resulted in theory-bias in science and philosophy that was
discussed in chapter two.17 This bias can be seen as percolating into our current
understanding of technology, where certain ideals governing our life-world has be-
come a defining tag of technology. For instance, the Baconean ideal of ‘controlling
nature’ through science and technology, will often be regarded with some surprise
by many practitioners of technology, as it does not match with their experiences.
As a result, these technologists find themselves criticised by philosophers and other
critics, for world-views proposed by other philosophers, who happen to be techno-
enthusiasts.
As a result, many craftspeople, but also experimenters, will find little solace in
Plato, Socrates and Aristotle but rather find inspiration in Archimedes, Alexander
the Great and Julius Caesari, Leonardo da Vinci, Roger Bacon and, of course, Isaac
Newton.
Newton biographer Michael White, following historian Charles Singer, expresses
the source of this bias in a dislike for experiment, which resulted in the exultation of
(logical) theory and reasoning, which only produced a ‘distorted picture of reality’:
But, because of Aristotle’s stature, this limited approach became endowed with an aura of
infallibility which persisted until the beginning of the modern era.18
Luckily, experimenters have never been disheartened by the biases of theorists to
do their thing. The lack of written chronicles may give the impression that there
are long periods of relatively little technological activity, but as more and more is
known about dating artefacts, and more historical accounts take novel (disruptive)
sources into their research, it becomes clear that techne¯/technology has always had
a momentum of its own.
Take for instance the European medieval ‘dark ages’, which is often seen as an
historical sink-hole in which very little happened. According to historian David Lan-
des however, Europe in this period was one of the most innovative societies that
history had ever known up to that point:
Some may be surprised: for a long time one saw these centuries as a dark interlude between
the grandeur of Rome and the brilliance of the Renaissance. That cliche´ no longer holds in
matters technological.19
i Both Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar deserve a place in this chronology especially for
their skills in logistics —the massive displacement of troops, armours and (other) resources— and
organisation of building activities, such as fortifications, on their military campaigns.
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Slowly a somewhat different view is formed on the historical developments that lead
to enlightenment and especially the Industrial Age. Rather than a sudden genesis of
theory (of the natural world), the co-evolution of instrumentation and theory paved
the way for new vistas of knowing and looking at the world.
For some, this demarcates the transition from techne¯ to technology, but this dis-
tinction would obfuscate the historical continuity of the ‘logos’ that must always
have been present in techne¯.
The (re-)invention of the printing press, the microscope and the telescope opened
new ways of observing and sharing knowledge, while the disruptions that the ex-
perimental method introduced to theoretical work anchored these theories in a real
world, instead of floating around amongst certain elites.20
It will not come as a surprise that social values have also always been a partner,
not only in engineering, but also in technoscience. The emerging modern science
played a decisive role in changing the way people thought about nature and human
existence, but it was also social acceptance of this world-view that paved the way
for a positivist scientific era. Morton Winston thus speaks of the ‘social construction
of technology’ (SCOT) model, that also includes the social values that ‘shape the
precise forms that technological artifacts make’.21
Some also see certain economical values that shape technology, which makes
technology truly an interface concept that cannot be understood from a singular
point of reference.22
Even though artefacts are becoming more and more autonomous, with all the
philosophical issues that this brings into play, technology is currently still as firmly
attached to the human life-world as when the first tools were used. Self-reproducing
technology that only serves its own autopoiesis is likely to remain science-fiction
for at least the next decades.23
In the resulting friction space, technology presents itself predominantly through
very specific goals. Technology typically purports to make life easier, better (faster)
or safer through the artefacts that are produced. Humans are usually also very re-
ceptive to these promises. Cars replace horses, elevators replace staircases, email
replaces written letters; most people will see the benefit quite quickly and adopt a
new technology for these reasons. This is partially self-reinforcing, as technological
artefacts have the tendency to evolve from being commodities to necessities.24
The invention of clothes may have allowed our ancestors to move into the colder
climates of the Northern and Southern hemisphere, but it also caused us to rely on
these artefacts for survival. As successful technology also tends to become taken for
granted, common or trivial, technology in this sense not only entices us to live in a
progressively artificial world, it also makes us very dependent on this world. This
aspect of technology is therefore most definitely progressive with respect to certain
human values, which are related to (immediate) benefit. This progression also has
characteristics of a convergence inducing process. For this reason, technology has
been a strong amplifier of utilitarian and instrumental values.
327
This brief historical sketch would make it seem that technology is part of be-
ing human, despite the uneasiness that this may bring. If technology is considered
‘unnatural’, then this is also a deep characteristic of humankind.25
Although technology is only one influence in the amalgam of change that swept
over Western Europe in Newton’s lifetime and the European Golden Ages that fol-
lowed, it is clear that the new science played a vital role in these developments.
Within a century after Newton published the ‘principia mathematica’, the Industrial
Revolution was changing human life in ways never before imagined, and ever since,
the pace of change has gone faster and faster, leaving many with an uneasy feeling
that technology is no longer under human control, and besides this, that humankind
is deeply confused by these rapid changes.26
2.1 Gene Technology and Nanotechnology
Along the previous chapters, one thread that followed the complexity perspective
aimed to sketch the current state of knowledge on genes, and the way this knowledge
is currently influencing technological progress. The thread was woven through the
various examples that were introduced, and will be briefly summarised here.
In short, the more differentiated views in evolutionary biology see the DNA as
repositories of certain patterns that are either used to activate other patterns, or di-
rectly express themselves in chemical, and (other) ecologies, including social ones.
Currently the understanding of these threads between activation of pattern and the
various phenomenological expressions is highly fragmented. In other words, it is
currently highly uncertain how many genes express themselves at the level of indi-
vidual organisms or at the level of species, and most of the resulting interpretations
of these threads can be criticised as being too narrow.27 At various levels of aggre-
gation between DNA and species, various complex networks are formed, some of
which —-like the cell— include other repositories of patterns such as messenger-
RNA.
Besides this, many expressions of these patterns are influenced by actor-environment
interactions, and as the threads from gene to expression at the level of the human
individual pass many interfaces, we can safely say that any claim that genetic in-
tervention can improve human traits has an extremely high level of uncertainty.
Concepts such as ‘uncertainty’, ‘feedback’, ‘interfaces’ and ‘patterns’ increase the
complexity of the propensities along the threads from genes to their various expres-
sions. For a detailed account, see for instance [124]. A more recent summary is
given in [66].
Gen technology is a vast area of research, that fundamentally aims to intervene
artificially in the threads between genes and their expression, currently often by al-
tering the patterns that are stored in the various repositories, most notably DNA.
Using all sorts of techniques, certain genes are altered so that the organism behaves
differently. This way certain crops have been made resistant to bugs, which reduces
the need of insecticides, bacteria have been genetically altered to produce medicines
or cure diseases, and rabbits and monkeys have been changed in order to glow in
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the dark.28
One of the big promises of gen technology focuses on human genes. Preventive
screening against possible illnesses and disorders is becoming more and more nor-
mal, but an ultimate goal is to re-engineer human genes in order to cure illnesses
and other conditions that impair the quality of life.29 Currently the human genome
has been mapped in great detail, and some diseases with a strong genetic component
have been more or less pinpointed. From the previous discussion on psychiatric ge-
nomics, it may have become clear that this one-to-one relationship between genetic
pattern and expression is, although certainly possible, also quite rare. Disciplinary
boundaries in science and research institutions have also often prevented scientists
from following the full threads between genes, their expressions and the feedback
mechanisms in the contexts where these expressions take place, which almost cer-
tainly has resulted in narrow framing and consequently fragile theories. This, as
was exemplified in psychiatric genomics, is being recognised more and more, but
currently collaborative cross-scientific activities are still often problematic due to
cultural differences and communication problems, not forgetting the lack of an im-
mediate relationship with commercial profit.30
For the purposes here, nanotechnology currently is very much in a similar phase
of development as gene technology is. Nanotechnology currently concentrates on
making structures at molecular level, such as microscopic machines or pumps. Car-
bon plays an important role in many of these developments, because of the abun-
dance of forms and shapes that can be made with it. Generally speaking, nanotech-
nology has been very successful in the laboratory, where currently all kinds of fas-
cinating devices are being constructed. Their application in practical environments,
for instance in the human body, is currently a more uncertain factor in these devel-
opments.31
Nanotechnology is a rational next step in the creation of ever finer, tinier and
more precise tools and machines. They allow themselves to be rigorously tested
and monitored in various environments. It is my personal assessment that nanotech
will therefore be able to live up to many of its immediate promises in the near
future, although polypotency is a major source of possible contingencies. One recent
example of this can be seen in the growing concern that nano-tubes may become the
‘new asbestos’.32
Most notably, nanotechnology is one of the more likely candidates in developing
self-replicating machines or structures. Due to the exponential character of replica-
tion, this would be one of the more contingent developments, as it raises concerns
on how this growth should be contained. Nanotechnology is a natural symbiont for
biotechnology, and it is clear that these will become more and more intertwined.
This is the main reason why it is brought up here.
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3 Technopoiesis
If there is one agreement between the critics on technology and its supporters, then
it is that technology has its own momentum, is progressing with an ever-increasing
pace and that there is little that individual people, or societal groups, can do to stop
it. As Hans Jonas states:
With technology having seized power —a revolution this, planned by no-one, totally anony-
mous and irresistible— the dynamism has taken on aspects not contained in any earlier idea
of it and not foreseeable by any other theory.33
This ‘dynamism’ has been also been called ‘engine’, ‘dynamo’ or, probably more
correct, the ‘symbiotic relationship’ between science and technology.34
This symbiotic relationship has established a positive feedback loop in which
instrumentation results in new theory which, in turn, results in new instrumentation.
It will be clear that this feedback loop actually adheres to a convergence inducing
process and, as positive feedback goes, tends to be self-reinforcing, expressing itself
in an exponential fashion. Technology is no different in this respect. Kurzweil has
shown this trend in many different manifestations of technology and technological
produce, and has opted to call it the ‘law of accelerating returns’. The trend he has
described, is exponentially increasing in volumes and availability, and decreasing in
size and price.35 This self-reinforcing form of production has been called autopoi-
etic.36
Kurzweil’s careful analysis of his law gives an interesting supplement to Landes’s
account of the European dark ages. According to Kurzweil:
Exponential growth is deceptive. It starts out almost imperceptibly and then explodes with
unexpected fury—unexpected that is, if one does not care to follow its trajectory.37
This would give the impression that the Industrial Revolution was already being
shaped by the technological innovations in the Middle Ages, and the ‘knee of the
curve’ coincided with early enlightenment.
Within the confines of this process, values related to utility, efficiency and pro-
ductivity are considered important. The constructive aspects of these processes al-
low these values to outrank other aspects of human existence in the social domain,
according to the pattern of contextual diminution. Here Jeffrey Sachs ”inefficient
African farmers” return, either as a ‘fact’ within that rationale, or as a warning of an
inevitable self-fulfilling prophecy.38
This inevitability can have some severe consequences. It does not require an ex-
tensive economic training to see that the contextual slice that is created by over-
laying a utilitarian ranking on our global life-world, will assign increasing eco-
nomic value on scarce resources. As a result, these scarce resources can become
more scarce and thus increasingly valuable. In other words, scarcity can cause self-
reinforcing, positive feedback loops. Tigers on the brink of extinction are coveted
for their furs, making them more scarce, which if left to themselves drives an in-
evitable process towards extinction.
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As these self-reinforcing feedback loops are dominant operators in any system,
it can be argued that any economic model based on equilibria will never be robust
models of real life economics; there usually is no ‘invisible hand’ to counter such
processes, as it is their nature to plough towards boundary states. Such mechanisms
will, like the proponents of a free market economy claim, eventually ‘correct’ them-
selves, but it is questionable whether society will be better off with these severe
corrections, which may also come too late.
We also need theories to deal with abundance! And things that are abundant
usually get little attention.
Likewise, monopolies may be demonstrative of ‘market failure’, but they are
also the inevitable result of the system dynamics around attractors formed by scarce
resources.
As long as there is no scarcity, many goods may be freely available for the hu-
man and non-human population; these goods are sometimes called the ‘commons’.
However, when scarcity kicks in, these commons become subject to the desire of
privatisation and exploitation, as they become economically profitable goods. It has
already been observed that a common such as fresh water is entering this phase. 39
It should be noted that, while a capitalist system basically assigns ownership to
scarce resources to those who can pay for them, alternative distribution policies will
be not be ‘better’ or ‘more just’ per se; it is the nature of scarcity to be problematic.
The perceived benefits of technology secure technological artefacts in society,
and results in irreversible changes of state, which means that every artefact irre-
versibly changes natural and social environments. This irreversibility is not neces-
sarily problematic, nor is it unique for technology. Much depends on ability of those
environments to absorb these changes.
Every problem that has been resolved, or every benefit associated with the arte-
fact that is effectuated, will result in a tendency to tackle new perceived shortcom-
ings that come into focus. As technology continuously solves specific problems by
creation of commodities, it stabilises the human environment with respect to the is-
sues that are addressed, making us susceptible for new problems that may not have
had that denomination at an earlier stage. The socio-technological process thus ad-
heres to a pattern of contextual diminution, and enforces processes towards the at-
tractor of absolutism, were it not for the polypotency of artefacts. In the words of
Richard Sclove:
Technologies function as social structures, but often independently of their nominal in-
tended purposes. This is one of the phenomena that the conventional view of technology
obscures[. . . ] In other words, technologies exhibit superfluous efficacy or ‘polypotency’
[. . . ]40
Polypotency therefore uncovers a bias in the perception of what technology does,
and allows the artefact to interact in natural and social contexts with both expected
as well as unforeseen consequences, making it a major source of disruptions. In a
way, a new artefact changes the contexts in which the artefact is embedded, if only
because a perceived problem addressed by that artefact is resolved, but in essence
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because reality is altered. Polypotency therefore attributes emergent qualities to the
artefact, but with this also a potential for contingency.
A chemical may be developed as a means to kill bugs on crops, but its expression
in a real natural world may have unforeseen consequences, such as poisoning an
ecosystem or, more subtly, disrupting a delicate balance in which another bug may
suddenly thrive.41
It will be clear that this aspect of technological artefacts corresponds with La-
tour’s notion of agency for objects, or the hourglass pattern mentioned earlier. This
is not surprising, as it was already argued that technology is an interface concept.42
3.1 Theory and Autonomy
One characteristic, although not exclusively, of engineering is that artefacts are com-
monly not associated with specific persons. Engineered artefacts all require team
effort and team management in order to be successfully made. It is therefore not sur-
prising that these artefacts —-and this continues in modern engineering activities—
are generally not associated with individuals. Sometimes the rulers of the empires
that built certain constructions are associated with the constructions themselves, and
of late, engineering feats are more often attributed to the ‘architects’; those individ-
uals who envision an eventual construction without necessarily being involved in
the actual building activities.
One of the most straightforward explanations of this ‘person-hiding’ is that team
efforts by skilled people make it difficult to pinpoint the success of that team effort
to one person. Who may lay a claim on a construction? Is it the one who financed the
project, the one who drew the plans, the one that organised the task force, or those
who had the genius to overcome the problems and limitations by devising new tools,
and other means of enforcing progress? Not forgetting those individuals whose per-
sonalities, perseverance or sense of humour helps the team through moments when
things do not go as expected. Even today it is often hard for engineers to assign an
individual human being as singular representative of a massive team effort.
It is worth pointing out that this is also common for professionals in an organisa-
tion, where ‘claims to fame’ usually follow the organisational hierarchy.ii
This contrasts starkly with art, where the artefacts are usually closely associated
with their creators. This is also prevalent in theoretical work, where the person who
first articulates a certain theory will remain closely associated with the theory itself,
although it is worth mentioning that this relationship currently also finds itself under
increasing pressure as science becomes more complex. The lists of authors on many
academic publications is increasing, and sometimes the claims of research leaders
to first authorship is being contested by those who do the actual work.
Current developments aside, theory typically still is linked to specific persons
and often the name reflects the importance of the theory, just as the importance of
ii And failure, perhaps, often follows the opposite direction
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the theory reflects back on the person that phrased it. A theory without a name can
lose its value, just like a painting can become less (economically) valuable if it is
proven to be made by an apprentice of a great painter instead of the painter herself.
Perhaps logic and mathematics —-both very crucial to modern science— are the
only theories that, to a large extent, are able to prove themselves within their own
methodology. Mathematically proven theory thus can be ‘cut loose’ from its discov-
erer and be assessed on its own terms. The discoverer is sometimes remembered out
of respect, but names are also often forgotten. Harold Black’s feedback has already
been mentioned earlier as an example of this.43
Whatever the consequences of this ‘disembodiment’ of theory may be for its dis-
coverer or creator, it allows the theory itself to become stronger due to the fact that
the theory begets certain autonomy. Theory is copiediii and reapplied to create new
artefacts and thus the strongest association of such theory is through the artefacts
that it produces. In other words, theory is continuously reaffirmed through the suc-
cess of these artefacts! Every car on the road reaffirms the theories of Newtonian
and statistical mechanics, of thermodynamics, electronics and so on. Every plane
that safely lands reaffirms the theories behind jet propulsion and aerodynamics. Ev-
ery failure in artefacts that can be traced back to human error or malfunction and
not to theoretical shortcomings, reaffirms theory yet again.
It is for this reason that techno-scientific theory follows a different evolution than
theory that does not have such means of autonomous reaffirmation. These dynamics
change the game of falsification of theories.44 Also a paradigm shift more likely
will constrain established theory rather than replace it.45
3.2 A Pattern of Technopoiesis
With this the pattern of converge-inducing process can be extended with that of
hourglass to one that will be called ‘technopoiesis’. 46
iii Note here that memetic reproduction in the sense of Dawkins does not really apply because
proven theory hardly ‘mutates’. Changes in proven theory usually replace the older theory entirely.
It can be seen as another example that shows that memetic reproduction only occurs under very
specific conditions
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Pattern: Technopoiesis
Description: An actor creates one or more artefacts in an iterative cycle of
testing and evaluation until certain goal criteria have been met, a
problem has been solved, or certain values are addressed. How-
ever, due to the iterative cycles, the artefacts change the values,
which results in new artefacts
A.K.A:
Notes:
∙ Actor-artefact forms a convergence inducing process
∙ The polypotency/agency of the artefact adds an hourglass pat-
tern to the process, denoted by the thick arrows, which resem-
ble the various ways how an artefact can manifest itself in its
environment
∙ The polypotency may affect the values that the domain hosts.
The actor can also adhere to the hourglass pattern
∙ The artefact itself works as a securing mechanism. Once it’s
there it often stays!
∙ The many artefacts that somehow fail to contextualise in a
societal setting are also propensities in this securing mecha-
nism; convergence inducing process has this aspect of explo-
ration!
∙ A domain may host numerous of these loops which, in ef-
fect, are forms of the pattern of elementary self-organisation
described earlier
The techno-scientific instantiation of technopoiesis is fairly consistent with the
analysis of Lyotard on knowledge production in the ‘postmodern’ times we live in,
albeit that he concentrates more on power and legitimation of science as totalizing
source of knowledge in a capitalist society.47
There are a number of effects that feed the continuous creation of new artefacts.
First, the incomplete nature of modelling activities will always allow new ‘prob-
lems’ to emerge. Besides this, the polypotency of artefacts and the irreversible na-
ture of their impact in their environment causes a continuous indeterminacy which
feeds the production. Some philosophers of technology even assign intentionality
and morality to technological artefacts, which places them in a normative interac-
tion space.48 This supports the idea that technological artefacts adhere to an hour-
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glass pattern. Just like the pattern of elementary self-organisation, technopoiesis is
continuously in flux.
As with other processes of feedback, technopoiesis manifests itself differently in
various contexts. Regarding technology, it would seem that technological ‘progress’
can follow very strange paths indeed. As an example, in the Netherlands, ‘progress’
first dictated that rivers and creeks were straightened and flow of water was con-
tained and canalised, resulting in the Mondrianesque landscape one can see while
flying over the country on a cloudless day.
In recent years, the negative consequences of these efficiency measures have be-
come more clear. Most notably, melting snow in the Alps and other mountain re-
gions across Europe in early Spring tend to cause temporary surges of high volumes
of water, which now are no longer slowed down by the many bends in a meandering
river, and have few means to overflow in relatively harmless places along the river.iv
Traditionally areas where rivers tended to overflow were adapted to these regular
disruptions of water and usually hosted an abundance of natural life that relied on
this flooding. Besides this, the claimed land has often been used as building sites
—-with a beautiful panoramic views on the rivers—, while these areas still have a
strong tendency to revert to their original roles. Current insights therefore have re-
sulted in many initiatives to restore the original flows which, as may be expected,
is done in the name of ‘progress’.49 I can imagine that this manner of reasoning is
close to being an ethicist’s nightmare.
Note again, the friction here between ‘efficiency’ (order), according to a utilitar-
ian rationality, and ‘robustness’.
The exponential characteristic of technopoiesis is enforced by the securing mech-
anisms. For one, every successfully created artefact is usually much easier repro-
duced after its inception.50 As knowledge of the production is secured it becomes
easier and cheaper to customise artefacts to be deployed in different settings. Be-
sides this, artefacts can be deployed to facilitate the production of new artefacts, and
so the pace of production and the amount of produced artefacts tend to increase.
This acceleration is one of the major sources of the unease that is felt with respect
to the technological ‘dynamo’.51
4 Contextualisation of Technology
With the evolutionary and structural perspectives of technology sufficiently covered,
only the ecological perspective needs to be detailed further. The previous perspec-
tive already touched the materialisation of technology in the natural world, but this is
only one of the contexts in which technology can express itself. There are a number
of other developments that interact with technology, of which two will be addressed
here, as they mutually interfere with technology. These are demographics and some
iv Contrary to common beliefs, the Netherlands are more prone to flooding from the rivers than
from the sea, although global warming may change this in the future
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cultural perceptions of technology, which provide contextual slices on the embed-
ding of technology.
Human population has increased from a few hundred million around 1600 CE to
the current 6.8 billion, which has resulted in an increasing formation of, and demand
on scarce resources, including food and living space. This enormous increase of
the population coincided with the technological (r)evolution, which includes the
Industrial revolution, the increase of mass production of agriculture, buildings and
other artefacts, and has now moved into the Information Age. It is likely that the
population growth will stabilise in the next fifty years or so, although some also
see a possibility that the world population may still double in size in the coming
century.52 In 2008, a tipping point was reached where the majority of the world
population is living in urban environments rather than rural areas.53
Although it is not sure whether the increase of the population was made possible
through, and depends on technology, it is fair to say that both have influenced each
other and technology has been actively deployed to address the needs of a growing
population. Urban life depends on an efficient network of logistics that can bring
food, resources and services in- and out of cities efficiently. It also depends heavily
on efficient technology to dispose of waste products. Advances in medicine have
also contributed to a growing population world-wide. Technology has also facili-
tated and amplified the trends of globalisation, through fast transport, world-wide
information networks and so on.54
One major criticism of technology is whether it actually lives up to its promises.
The polypotency of technological artefacts have already been discussed. When arte-
facts are taken up in a social context that partially determines the way in which these
artefacts can express themselves, expectations, social and cultural values interfere
with the functional aspects of these artefacts and together shape their evolution in
this social context. Besides this, technology changes the values themselves, not only
in the more restricted sense as was sketched in the pattern of technopoiesis, but also
in a wider context. Most notably those values that technology manages to address
effectively, such as stability, efficiency, utility and instrumentality tend to be recur-
sively reinforced.
As a result, some criticisms on technology may assume that the world is becom-
ing more contingent and risky due to technology, while this relationship is often far
from being proven fact. An example of this can, for instance, be seen in an anal-
ysis of Sheila Jasanoff in her call for ‘technologies of humility’, which is also an
interesting article to assess on implicit biases.55
Jasanoff offers a careful analysis on the interferences between technology and
society, and although her argument opens with a number of recent disasters related
to technology, she fails to provide a historical perspective in order to allow assess-
ment whether such disasters are on the rise, or whether we are currently, historically
speaking, in a much safer and secure position than ever before. The disasters she
addresses give no clues whether these are more serious and more threatening than
336
those in the past, or the threats that faced our forebears in the absence of current
technology.
Besides this, for a large number of the examples she mentions, such as Bhopal
and Chernobyl, it is questionable whether technology in the strict sense can be con-
sidered the ‘cause’ of the disasters; mismanagement and the subsequent lack of
training, poor maintenance, security policies and professionalism are not ‘techno-
logical’ in the strict sense, but rather ‘societal’ or ‘economical’, although they are
certainly technology-induced.
As a result, her analysis breathes a strong bias for the possible dangers of tech-
nology, which is based on an:
[. . . ] abundant literature on technological disasters and failures [. . . ] (pg. 110)
On which she proposes to found her ‘new technologies of humility’.
It is worth pointing out, before continuing, that PAC could be considered one of
such:
[. . . ] methods , or better yet institutionalized habits of thought, that try to come to grips
with the ragged fringes of human understanding—the unknown, the uncertain, and the un-
controllable. (pg. 104)
Many of the issues covered in the previous chapters can be ‘overlaid’ on Jasanoff’s
analysis. The reason why her analysis is brought up here, is therefore not because
it in any way disagrees with the goals and aims of PAC, or the project of the lingua
democratica in general. In fact they align very well.
However, Jasanoff’s own analysis follows the very classical premises of ‘exter-
nal observers’ that (need to) monitor technological progress, such as governments,
institutions and organisations, academia included, while the problem of contextual-
isation is that all these ‘are in the loop’ of these developments. For this reason, even
such metasystems will fail to address the uncertainty and contingencies related to
technology. At best, they may create a bit more oversight, if they manage to com-
municate effectively amongst all the stakeholders concerned.
Returning to the bias of the ‘dark passenger’ of technology, there is probably
very little literature on all the technology that causes few problems; it is not interest-
ing to pay much attention to bridges, planes, cars, ships and all those other proven
technologies that do their daily work in the background of human attention. It is
unlikely that, for instance, the engineering feats related to the design and produc-
tion of children’s toys are in the visors of the critics of technology. 56 Technology
that ‘turns sour’ is likely to get more scientific attention than technology ‘in the
background’, because of the immediate concerns that are raised. Therefore, without
a contextualisation of this ‘abundant literature’, Jasanoff will not likely impress a
techno-positivist audience.
In fact, contributions such as those of Jasanoff, often breathe a subtle kind of
circular reasoning, where certain bias guides an analysis, which then ‘proves’ these
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biases. Although such analysis are still worthwhile in the sense that they make these
biases explicit, they can be easily be ‘by-passed’ by approaching the same theme
from a different context. This includes the examples Jasanoff begins her analysis
with.
Taking a techno-positivist stance, for instance, one could also conclude that
Jasanoff’s analysis shows how tremendously well all the problems related to tech-
nology apparently are being addressed! There is an abundance of research on the
contingencies of technology, and there are a lot of initiatives being taken to address
them. Apparently there are many observers who critically monitor technological
progress, and Jasanoff herself is pointing out a route to possible solutions. All what
remains is the will to make it happen!
The contextual slice provided by demographics clearly disrupts this positivist
stance, but also raises more questions to Jasanoff’s analysis. As was mentioned ear-
lier, scarcity tends to amplify interactions in a combinatorial fashion, and the deeply
interconnected global order that has now been spanned, seems to increase contin-
gencies. It was mentioned earlier that the majority of the current world population
is now living in urban domains, which makes the impact of natural disasters on a
local scale, such as floodings or storms much higher. As Huppert and Sparks write:
Mankind is becoming ever more susceptible to natural disasters, largely as a consequence of
population growth and globalization. It is likely that in the future, we will experience several
disasters per year that kill more than 10,000 people. A calamity with a million casualties
is just a matter of time. This situation is mainly a consequence of increased vulnerability.
Climate change may also be affecting the frequency of extreme weather events as well as
the vulnerability of coastal areas due to sea-level rise. Disastrous outcomes can only in-
crease unless better ways are found to mitigate the effects through improved forecasting
and warning, together with more community preparedness and resilience. There are partic-
ular difficulties with extreme events, which can affect several countries, while the largest
events can have global consequences. The hazards of supervolcanic eruptions and asteroid
impacts could cause global disaster with threats to civilization and deaths of billions of peo-
ple. Although these are very rare events, they will happen and require consideration. More
frequent and smaller events in the wrong place at the wrong time could have very large
human, environmental and economic effects. A sustained effort is needed to identify places
at risk and take steps to apply science before the events occur.57
Note here that they see an important role for science and technology in preventing
these disasters from happening. Technology plays its role in this development to-
wards a world of low probability, high impact calamities, but it would be narrow to
consider technology as the sole cause of increased contingency, as the whole eco-
logical friction space where social, technological, economical and political motives
interfere, is heading in this direction where ‘the chances are a million to one, and
still they come!’ 58
For instance, how do the disasters Jasanoff mentions relate to the 2005 tsunami
that killed well over 250,000 people in Asia, and which is currently tackled with
technology? 59
Therefore, an analysis of technology must be ‘put in context’ with ecological
trends, such as provided by demographics, but also socio-political, economical, and
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many, many others, in order to assess if the ‘abundance of literature on technologi-
cal disasters’ is significantly stronger than effects such as analysed by Huppert and
Sparks. Each of these propensities cut a slice in the context around the theme of
‘technology’, and have to be incorporated in the analysis. If not, such recommenda-
tions end up in not addressing the issue they claim to be addressing.
On a more practical note, the choice of population growth as contextual slice
around technology, is a rather straightforward one; if a certain theme displays com-
binatorial effects, then the concepts that one should look for in order to embed that
theme in a conceptual network, should ideally also display that behaviour. Human
demographics is currently one the major sources of combinatorial effects on a global
scale, and therefore should always be incorporated in the analyses of those themes.
At this point, it may have become clear why all the work of building concep-
tual networks, using different perspectives, and using the mini-systems of patterns
that have been prepared in previous chapters, was needed to address the NWO pro-
gramme of the ‘societal aspects of genomics research’ and the ‘lingua democratica
of the public debate in genomics’.
Currently this is being tackled here at the more abstract level of ‘technology’, but
even at this level it is clear that the complexity of such themes cannot be addressed
from a singular point of reference, such as ‘ethics’, ‘sociology’ or ‘technology’. De-
mographics, social and technological dynamics, norms and values are all interfering
at this level, and provide contextual slices along which the relationships between
concepts can be analysed. It also becomes clear how difficult it is to make a coher-
ent and detailed conceptual network that addresses all the relevant concepts and their
propensities. Complexity reveals the boundaries around mono-disciplinary research
or viewpoints.
The approach that is developed here, has tried to be prudent by not proposing
‘theories’ or ‘frameworks’, but rather offering certain, necessarily coarse constructs
that can actually contribute to spanning the relevant contexts around a theme in a
more or less coherent manner.
On the bright side, however, there is also an abundance of literature on these con-
textual slices, but they need to made coherent in order to better understand a theme.
Contextualisation in this sense means ‘defragmenting’ the many contributions from
fragmented intellectual activities such as science, philosophy and professional con-
tributions.
Regarding technology, one can make a distinction between technological disas-
ters based on existing technology, and potential disasters of future technology based
on current research and innovation. Regarding the first, it will be relatively easier
to implement technologies of humility, but these should ideally be directed to the
second kind of technology. These will be tremendously more challenging because
of polypotency, which can at best only partially be covered by societal intervention.
Unknown causality, and especially unknown recursive causal flows through techno-
logical artefacts and the various contexts they are embedded in, are largely beyond
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a pre-emptive human assessment.
It may be safe to state that technology is making the gradient between ‘desire’
and ‘disaster’ more steep. The impact of atomic bombs on one side, and mass vacci-
nation against illnesses on the other, shows that technology percolates far and wide
in the social, in a way that is historically unprecedented. Humanity seems to travel
on a narrow path, with the seminal ‘slippery slopes’, along this increasingly steep
gradient.60
4.1 Applying some Patterns
With contextual diminution, one could hypothesize that the sensitivity for contin-
gencies in a social system is becoming greater as society becomes more stable
and predictable around those values that technology manages to address effectively.
Along these values, the human ability to cope with contingencies may become less;
consider for instance the impact that a major breakdown of electricity that lasts a
few weeks may have in an urban environment.v Contrary to Jasanoff’s analysis,
technology may actually assist in making a safer world, but also at the same time
contribute in stronger feelings of insecurity. This, of course, is a major problem of
these feedback loops, that cause and effect are continuously swapping causal direc-
tionality.
However, as Huppert and Sparks observe, the contingencies that do manage to
disrupt human societies have a high impact due to demographical developments.
This adds a ‘real’ component to the feeling of insecurity, and feeds the worst fears
that one may have. As has been pointed out many times before; an orderly world is
also a fragile world.61
As Jasanoff rightly observes, technology usually does not reflect on its original
purposes once it is embedded in a social context. That is, there tends to be little
feedback over time that investigates whether technology lived up to the promises
that were once made. This makes any positivist notion of ‘technological progress’
suspect.62
The questions then may address the extent of technological intervention. This
would include issues such as the scale and impact of technologies, for instance
with respect to the depletion of natural resources, of deforestation in order to in-
crease agricultural produce, or the effects on the globe. Others may ask the ques-
tion whether the technology (still) is effective with respect to the goals and aims
they purport to address. Bill McKibben for instance, shows how centralised forms
of mass production are cost-efficient only because some aspects are left out of the
equation. In most countries there is no, or at best a little, economical price to be paid
for polluting the environment, which means that the enormous environmental costs
for environmental pillaging, transportation and distribution are not included in the
economic price of these products.63
v Also, I hesitate to say, limited availability of the Internet on a holiday destination . . .
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Attempts to address these issues by some kind of ranking will usually fail to
reach a reluctant audience. Bill McKibben has implicitly taken this approach in this
book ”Enough”, where he argues for a return to a society that is less governed by
the mantra of ‘growth’ [174]. The message is that our current state of technological
and economical progress is near, or has moved beyond, a level where it is becoming
a threat for human existence. Although the non-linear perspective an interesting
one, the problem with these rankings are of course that the zone of ambiguity is
extensive. McKibben demonstrates the benefits of organic markets in New England,
but it is not likely that this will scale up effectively to the demands of major cities,
such as New York City or Boston.
Besides this, others may apply a different ranking set over the same problem,
which leads to different conclusions. A die-hard techno-positivist would say that
these imminent threats require more technological interventions, because technol-
ogy is best equipped to deal with problems of this scale.
At this point, the problems of cross-stakeholder communications that the lingua
democratica aims to address is becoming ever more clear. Although many schol-
ars, practitioners and others are busy analysing, or giving opinions on the theme
of technology, the underlying problem of getting the message across effectively re-
mains a problem. Besides this, most of these analysis are extremely narrow because
of mono-disciplinary focus, bias, and singular mind-sets. And this is even without
consciously deployed schemes, such as propaganda, lobbying, power-play and so
on. Regarding technology, we can now attempt to home into this problem.
We have now returned to our initial point of departure, which was the ‘lingua
democratica of the public debate in genomics’, although it is addressed at the more
abstract level of technology. All the work of the previous chapters regarding pattern-
orientation, pattern libraries and supportive descriptive passages have been aimed
at developing tools to make contexts. And the concepts of choice that are used to
deploy these tools, are ‘stakeholders’ and ‘technology’.
5 Two Stakeholders in Technological Debates
It will probably not come as surprise that debates concerning technology tend to
become particularly volatile when artefacts are introduced in a societal setting. Less
evident however, is that communications between technologists and society are pri-
marily mediated through these artefacts. This communication through the medium
of artefacts is very essential to understand technology, especially if the critics have
a bias for communications through (natural) language.64
If concerns, theories, discourses and opinions are expressed in articles and books
which never reach target audience, then very little is achieved. Besides this, other
messages that are conveyed through non-verbal means may disrupt these concerns.
As long as ethicists hop on planes to conferences on global warming, many of their
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concerns will already be compromised through their acts.
It is here, already, that the problems of a ‘lingua franca’ emerge, such as was
discussed in the first chapter. A lingua franca presupposes that language is a shared
medium to communicate thoughts and ideas, but technologists by the nature of their
enterprises, their training, and their biases will see the world rather through artefacts,
visual representations and actions. A technical world is one of graphs, drawings,
schematics and tables. Their focus tends to select on immediate and specific con-
cerns, in which many things are implicitly taken for granted. Besides this, because
of the different ‘mental landscapes’ that interests, training and experience create
(and maintain), the localised rationales may be vastly different than those of their
critics.
A ‘lingua democratica’ needs to move beyond these constraints and navigate the
delicate paths of ‘creative friction’, or rather ‘effective disruptions’. It may be clear
that this is one of the reasons why PAC is based on visual interaction patterns, rather
than natural language alone.
Conversely, many humanities thinkers on technology will stay within the con-
fines of language and seek an audience that appreciates language; appreciates their
language! Thus papers circulate amongst the in-crowd and concerns are raised for
the converted. Here we see a dynamics that I tend to call the ‘Amsterdam syndrome’,
where one party claims exclusivity over a certain issue, while the other stakeholders
basically don’t care,vi and often are unable to care, as the essences of their commu-
nications get lost in a plethora of words or argumentations that only make sense in
a certain context or for a certain audience.65 Here again, convergence towards the
attractor of absolutism is a major risk in effective cross-domain interactions.
In the debates at the interface of technology and society, criticism from the social
sciences and the humanities will lead to ‘recommendations’ for technologists that,
roughly speaking, can be divided in at least three categories.
One approach is to analyse deeply from the expertise of the critic and yet end
up with very coarse recommendations that give no clue on how to synthesise them
in current practices, or results in feeble conclusions that ‘more research is needed’.
Recommendations that include concepts as ‘plurality’ and ‘holism’ were already
mentioned earlier, but these are only one of the more dominant forms.
Jasanoff’s ‘technologies of humility’ mentioned earlier follow a similar pattern of
in-depth analyses with coarse recommendations, although she does point out some
tools that can be put to use, such as framing analysis.66
Generally speaking, these analyses are usually good in pointing out a problem,
but fail to embed this problem in a technological context. They also often show a
strong bias towards the perceived problems, without addressing strengths. Due to the
coarseness of their recommendations, technologists who would take their message
seriously run the risk of throwing away the child with the bathwater.
vi The Dutch capital could be replaced by any other self-confident city, and their relationship with
an equally self-confident rural community who are quite happy being where they are.
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Another class of recommendations aims to improve the education of technol-
ogists on societal issues. The so-called science, technology and society (STS) pro-
grammes in most science and technology faculties are a clear result of this approach.
However, these STS programmes, which have an impressive history of well over
three decades by now in some countries such as the Netherlands, also seem to sug-
gest that apparently this is not enough. Otherwise these recommendations by now
would be more detailed and targeted, for instance by specifying which curricula
from the social sciences and the humanities are considered to be vital for students
of technology, and be available for these students on their own terms.67
There are few reasons that seem to support this. First, awareness does not imply
better foresight. It was already discussed that the impact of technology on society is
likely to be highly uncertain beyond the functional aspects. Besides this, the com-
binatorial nature of the social interaction space surrounding realised technological
artefacts is likely to absorb all the attention if it is to be taken seriously. It remains
to be seen if the critics of technology would rejoice when enlightened techies know
all about the philosophical and societal consequences of technology, at the expense
of the high quality of technological safety and efficiency that is currently being re-
alised. It is one thing to know philosophical thought on contingencies and risks, it
is another when this indirectly leads to planes dropping from the skies because core
technological and mathematical training is compromised.68
A third class of recommendations builds on the second and considers the impor-
tance of specialist advisors and boards that mediate between technology and society.
These approaches run the risk of contextual diminution, that is, either the advisors
and boards consider their own position to be more crucial than the production of
technology itself, or conversely, they feel incapable of exerting any real influence.
Not forgetting the possibilities of abuse of power in these nodes where information
becomes subject to filtering and manipulation. 69
As complexity goes, it would seem that all these, and other recommendations
need to be pursued in good measure, and all relate to each other in a delicate bal-
ancing act. The most important critique on these recommendations, would be that
all tend to be analysed and framed from too narrow disciplinary and (therefore) cul-
tural boundaries; they either fail to become specific, or conversely they neglect the
wider consequences of their own recommendations, and especially the impact these
recommendations may have on those things that actually work quite well.
5.1 Some Points of Attention
Regarding the social sciences and the humanities, one criticism one can have on
their interferences on technological issues is that, while they are undoubtedly cor-
rect in their assessment that technology is socially contextualised, they often fail to
understand that their own contributions to technology will have to be contextualised
as well.
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In the specific case of technology, the contributions from the social sciences and
the humanities need to be embedded in a socio-technological friction space in order
to reach the target audience. This means that critical reflection is bounded by the au-
tonomous drive of technological production; it is of little use to reflect on the desir-
ability of a certain technological product once it’s there. Or, rather, the nature of the
game changes beyond this transition point. Also, the criticism has to be effectively
translated to the audience that can actually influence technological developments,
even within the limits of organisational and socio-political boundaries.
At least, when these contributions aim to change things; that is, when ethicists,
theorists, philosophers aim to become engineers of the social.
It is remarkable that, although the word ‘context’ probably originated in the so-
cial sciences and/or the humanities, little attention is usually given to what this con-
cept means. So many times, one hears that ‘things have to be seen in a certain con-
text’, without any analysis of how this ‘context’ works (structure), how it evolved,
or how it interacts with the theme at hand. As a result, such a concept tends to be
used callously.70
Context has been a pivotal concept this pattern-oriented approach to understand
complex themes. It has been pinpointed, some characteristics have been isolated,
and it has become dynamic. Even then, the notion of ‘contextual slices’ — a partial
context that focuses on one derivative concept, such as was demonstrated with ‘pop-
ulation growth’ — demonstrate that uncertainty remains an essential characteristic
of the modelling work.
For the lingua democratica, context is very important because it is here that co-
herent connections can be forged between knowledge domains. One can now work
on a theme of interest by drawing on contributions from many others, which add
slices to the conceptual network that is built. It is in the context that these contribu-
tions come together to give meaning to a theme, but this also allows the theme to
alter its context. As a result, no longer can one safely stay within the narrow paths of
disciplinary specialisation and think that a complex theme can be understood in its
entirety this way. In true recursive fashion, plurality and holism have come knocking
on the doors of the humanities. With the additional requirement of coherence, and
the characteristic of combinatorial explosion, research on complex themes promises
to become a great deal more difficult, and not only for the hard sciences. For this
reason, and this reason alone, complex themes can only be more or less understood
by collaborative, coherent approaches. But the need for coherence drives the need
for effective forms of cross-domain vocabularies at different levels of granularity.
Even the rough outline sketched in this chapter is likely to make the debates at
the interface of technology and society a great deal more complex, and increase the
demands of those who aim to engage in these discourses. Besides this, this outline is
only a first attempt to change the nature of these debates into a ‘lingua democratica’.
Here, the prerequisites of such cross-stakeholder communications are not based on
mutual agreement or tapping into a presumed shared rationality or reason, but rather
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on a deep understanding of the implications of limited knowledge of a complex
theme, and the acceptance of disruptions as a means of extending knowledge beyond
one’s current horizons.71
It will probably also be clear that this attempt to a more inclusive approach is far
from being a bland one; disruptive knowledge requires deep emphatic skills from
the critic, but even more an admirable openness to external intervention from those
who are criticised. For it commendable when one actually absorbs the disruptive
messages and changes the action repertoire in order to address them. This abil-
ity of making one vulnerable to external intervention, without collapsing under the
pressure, may be one of the most defining transitions of cross-stakeholder collab-
orations, especially in a world where a culture of blaming-and-shaming presumes
that social agents are accountable by definition for things that go wrong. This cul-
ture assumes an orderly world in which contingencies can be banned completely,
and exceptions are the result of mal-intent or shortcomings.
The heavily intertwined, high-impact societies that we are moving into, rather in-
dicates a world where small, stupid mistakes can have an enormous consequences,
and, despite all efforts to minimise contingencies, things still may go wrong. This
disruptive world accepts that one can be at the wrong place at the wrong time, have
a bad day, a momentary misjudgement, or just wasn’t paying attention.
If an openness to one’s own vulnerability, both of individuals as with institutions,
in a social or legal rationality is seen as ‘proof’, or a ‘confession’ of failure, then
the necessary collaborative efforts that are needed to address these high impact con-
tingencies will be compromised by the same illusions of controllability that should
ultimately support these collaborative efforts.
5.2 Some Points of Analysis
A pattern-oriented approach to complexity implies following different threads from
a perceived problem, along the conceptual nodes to that place or point in time where
the problem can actually be addressed. This means that any problem related to tech-
nology must cause inference amongst the producers of technology, and this can only
be done in the vocabularies that are common and accepted there. Along this thread
(or threads), any analysis on the theme of technology (but basically any concept)
can be assessed at least with the following:
1. (Implicit) bias: Is the problematic side of technology overemphasized and is it
properly analysed as being problematic? Conversely, are the promises and ben-
efits of technology celebrated at the expense of possible problems and contin-
gencies? Bias especially tends to contribute to fragile analyses, because they can
be refuted by simply not accepting the bias, and starting from different frame of
reference instead.
2. Structure: does the analysis demonstrate sufficient insider knowledge on how
technology is produced and conducted? Are the different technological disci-
plines, the manner, means and abilities to interact beyond the narrow scope of
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the production of technology addressed? Does it respect the boundaries in which
professionals have to work, such as between primary producers and management,
or producers and their clients? Does it show how improvements can be actually
performed in the context of technological production? It is likely that many hu-
manities criticism on technology will fail on this aspect, because they usually do
not have sufficient technological expertise to incorporate such ”insider” perspec-
tives.
3. Context: does the analysis show an understanding of how technology is con-
textualised in a social setting, or does it stay within a narrow conception, such
as a functional, or instrumental point of view? How ‘widely’ are the processes
that flow from artefact into its context followed? Here technologists and techno-
positivists will tend to be the light-weights, and thorough analyses are likely to
be filled with concepts as ‘uncertainty’, ‘risk’ and ‘impact’. Conversely, criticism
on technology from the ‘outside’ will tend to be good in exposing the problem,
while offering few means of dealing with it in a practical way.
4. Optimality: Is the analysis built up of oppositions or rather in terms of scales and
boundaries? Does it address the interactions with other aspects of technology.
Does it offer a careful embedding of the recommendations and does it address
those aspects that should remain as it is (refactoring), for instance the quality
of technological production? Does the analysis account for possible frictions be-
tween the recommendations and these aspects? Conversely, are the alleged ben-
efits and promises to technological products portrayed in a linear fashion (the
more the better/worse) or does it account for an optimum when other aspects in
the context start to deteriorate? In any discourse around a complex theme, the im-
plicit or explicit assumptions of linearity should be treated with severe caution,
as it is highly unlikely that linearity is viable for any complex theme.
5. Granularity: At what level does the analysis operate? Is this sufficient for sub-
ject matter? Does the analysis allow refactoring strategies, that might embed the
proposed insights and ideas into subject matter in a fluent way?
6. Robustness: Is the analysis based on idealisations and essences, or does it account
for possible disruptions in a real setting. How well does the analysis account for
contingencies and worst case scenarios? Do the recommendations hold in an
environment where every interaction opposes it?
These obviously can also be used for self-assessment.
It is along these points that the trans-humanist vision of ‘enhancing intelligence’
will be addressed.
6 Wrapping Up
In this bit of preparation, the theme of technology has been briefly sketched along
the historical perspective, the structural perspective (technopoiesis) and the ecologi-
cal perspective provided by the contextual slices of demographic developments and
social interference.
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The point that was made in this chapter, was that the critics of technology usually
do not manage to convey their concerns in a vocabulary that open-minded technolo-
gists can respond to. Either the recommendations are expressed too broadly, without
any guidance on how they should be integrated in the context in which technology
is produced, or a certain bias is injected in the argumentation from the start, which
is easily circumvented by those who do not share those concerns.
Besides this, the autonomous nature of technology constrains a reflexive attitude,
as the irreversible changes of state of technology puts upper boundaries of the avail-
able time one has before technology has formed.
A major constraint on contributions from the social sciences and humanities who
concern themselves with technology is, that although they correctly show that tech-
nology and technologists operate in a social context, and should be more aware
of these consequences, they often tend to forget that this also applies to their own
enterprises, and thus academic reflection and intervention become subject to the dy-
namics of these socio-technological processes. Amongst the practical consequences
of this observation would be the adjustment of vocabularies to target audience and,
very important, to make recommendations that can actually be embedded in tech-
nological practices. On the other hand, it also means that translative vocabularies
allow large bodies of knowledge that have been developed in the social sciences and
humanities to interfere with technical or formal ones, without them being seen as
oppositions per se.
One practical consequence is also that every interference with a certain theme
is likely to have repercussions for the theories or frameworks that have guided the
analysis, and which should be communicated back to those who have formulated
these theories and frameworks. This is full recursive disruption, and a means to
make those theories and frameworks more robust.
The idiom of PAC has claimed that it does not restrict itself to disciplinary bound-
aries, and should be able to ‘weave threads’ from technological domains into the
social and the other way round. The inevitable pay-off, is that PAC is necessarily
coarse, and filled with concepts, such as ‘uncertainty’, ‘contingency’, and so on.
Along the threads that are woven, a network can be sketched that spans both the
theme at hand and the context in a more or less coherent fashion. The various nodes
(concepts) in this thread allow various discussions and debates can be ‘tied together’
which, hopefully, results in more targeted analyses and a assessments.
In the last chapter, the theme of ‘enhancing human intelligence’ will be embed-
ded in the ‘technological context’ that was sketched in this chapter, and analysed
along the three perspectives of chapter three, and the six points of attention that
concluded this chapter.
Chapter 11
Enhancing (Human) Intelligence
In the previous chapter, a ‘context of technology’ was sketched that served two
purposes. First, it allowed an assessment of a number of cross-stakeholder debates
around this theme, and aimed to demonstrate when interferences between technol-
ogists on one hand, and humanities contributions to technological developments at
least fail.
Second, the theme of technology is the ‘embedding’ of one particular devel-
opment that is of interest for ‘the public debate of genomics’, which is the trans-
humanist ideals to ‘enhance’ human beings artificially with gentech, nanotech,
psycho-pharmaceutics, and whatever other means technology has to offer. I will
be focusing on one aspect of this trans-humanist utopia, which is the artificial en-
hancement of human intelligence, as envisioned by Ray Kurzweil. This theme is of
interest for the ‘societal debate on genomics’, because Kurzweil’s vision of the near
future is strongly based on current developments in gene-technology and nanotech-
nology. Besides this, such utopian ideals are strong drivers of gen-tech research.
Kurzweil was already introduced in the previous chapter with his (exponential)
law of accelerating returns. According to Kurzweil, this law implies that humankind
is heading towards a time when the growth of artificial intelligence takes over bio-
logical intelligence. Current research on artificial intelligence, gene technology and
nanotechnology will help to increase our intelligence in such a way that in a few
decades from now, the possibility of (almost) ‘infinite intelligence’ becomes re-
alised. This point in time when the exponential increase of intelligence blows off
the charts is called ‘the Singularity’. This is the claim that will be addressed with
PAC.
Following the pattern-oriented approach, I will first give a rough sketch on our
understanding of intelligence —at least those aspects which are relevant for the
analysis—, before addressing Kurzweil’s analysis of our future of ‘infinite intelli-
gence’.
1 A Rough Sketch of Intelligence
In order to understand the discussions regarding ‘intelligence’, it first may be good
to ask a first simple question; ”what is intelligence?” It should be noted that, in the
wake of this question, a number of others follow, such as ”what is meaning?”, ”what
is understanding?” and ”what is consciousness?”
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The short answer is, that nobody knows.
As biophysicist Henri Atlan states:
[. . . ] where we are dealing with complex natural organizations such as developing cellular
systems or the brain, of which we do not even have a complete model. Affirming that the
behaviour of the brain in its mental activities is the consequences of the activity state of its
neurons, and that every thought or sensation can be described in the form of one of these
states, is an obvious assertion but quite empty as long as we don’t know that description.1
The fragmentary nature of our current understanding of intelligence, can be made
clear by following the various research angles which are currently being pursued.
Some try to define certain characteristics of intelligence, such as the ability to
demonstrate skills in reasoning, which include logic, goal-directed behaviour and
coordinated exploration, others see intelligence in an agent’s ability to perform cer-
tain tasks in its environment in a more or less efficient (or ‘rational’) manner. With
this, concepts such as ‘purpose’, ‘intentionality’, ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ also enter
the modelling space.
In all these, an agent’s ability to learn is crucial. If an agent is able to do some-
thing that for an external observer appears purposeful, and can get better at it be-
cause it learns from its experiences, then that agent can be considered of having
certain intelligence.
Roughly speaking, there are a number of sources that scientists and philosophers
have drawn on in order to come to a ‘theory of intelligence’.
On a side note, ‘Theory of Mind’ is also a somewhat misleading term for the-
ories on how emphatic skills are represented in cognitive models, in the sense of
‘I know what you are thinking or feeling’. These forms, often related to the topic
of ‘emotional intelligence’, are also strongly associated with the question of what
intelligence is.2
One source of inspiration for the quest of intelligence was already mentioned
earlier, and that is language. Language is often considered a ‘window to the mind’,
and demonstrates what the mind is capable of, such as logical, causal reasoning and
the processing of symbolic representations. As these have for long been considered
amongst the highest demonstrations of intelligence, it will not come as a surprise
that many researchers focused on these logical and symbolic capabilities which,
together with the developments in information and computer technology has led
to ‘computational theories of mind’. Basically the rationale behind this is that the
(human) mind is capable of computational tasks, and thus models that display these
capabilities are likely to provide useful analogies.3
An alternative to the computational theories of mind, usually also begins with
language, but rather stress the fact that (natural) language is highly ambiguous, and
take this to demonstrate that the human mind is far from being a computational de-
vice. Connectionist models and the brain as ‘pattern processor’ have been proposed,
and are usually at least in part based on neuro-scientific research; the structure of
the brain is highly connectionist, so the answer to how brain works may be found in
understanding these networks.4
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Another mainstream tends to take an external perspective on intelligence, and
in that respect is not opposed to the two structural perspectives discussed above.
This approach, roughly speaking, considers an agent intelligent when it is observed
as behaving intelligently by an external observer. This stance follows behaviourist
traditions, and has often been criticised as being a dangerous one, as intelligence
does not necessarily require observable behaviour.5
Besides this, the observer of this ‘intelligence’ basically determines what is ob-
served, with the result that social and cultural biases interfere with the observations.
Such an ecological perspective requires an observer that is at least equally intel-
ligent than the observed, and otherwise must have qualities to assess whether the
observed agent indeed is ‘intelligent’. Besides this, ecological stances will usually
be prone to certain biases regarding what intelligence is. In general, such ecological
perspectives run the risk of a form of circular reasoning of the kind: ”intelligence is
what (I consider what) intelligence does.”
A fourth direction can be seen in the way practical research in computational
intelligence has developed ever since the Great Promises of artificial intelligence
could not be delivered in the Seventies and Eighties of the previous century.i This
research is now progressing alongside biology and the neurosciences, and pursue
modest goals which more or less follow an evolutionary perspective of intelligence.
Instead of taking up intelligence at the level of the human mind, basically the
question is asked what kind of intelligence is needed to overcome a certain prob-
lem. What kind of intelligence does an agent need to engage in co-operation? What
kind of intelligence is needed to engage in coordinated action? What kind of intelli-
gence is needed in order for a system to become self-maintaining or self-repairing?
Here, intelligence is more or less seen as an interface concept that combines means,
knowledge, information, and organisation. An agent, or group of agents, faces a cer-
tain challenge that needs to be overcome, and somehow learns to do this with what
it has at its disposal. Intelligence in this respect is closely associated with emergence
and (therefore) complexity.
Personally I think this is the most interesting angle to pursue in a coherent fash-
ion, also because this angle can connect quite a number of successful developments
in certain scientific areas. However, it also clearly shows how large the gap is be-
tween, say the ‘intelligence’ of a simple optimising agent, a complexly organised
cell, and that of the human brain. Besides this, bias may still ignore the roles of
emotions, social interactions and other forms of intelligence that are more and more
being recognized as complements of the more rationalist angle that research on in-
telligence traditionally had.6
Within artificial intelligence, the development of a truly intelligent machine is
therefore still very much a quest. A truly intelligent machine must be able to per-
form tasks in a certain environment, without any influence from the designers, such
as pre-coded intelligence. The robot, agent, or machine must be put in a certain en-
i Note that many current developments in computational intelligence are not purely symbolic,
but also includes randomness, although it is always important to realise that the substrate that a
computer provides always translates this randomness to symbolic code.
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vironment with only preset knowledge of the tasks it needs to perform and then just
try to find its way by learning and acting.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is currently slowly being absorbed by research on
complex systems. Many themes that systems theory, cybernetics and artificial in-
telligence have attempted to address in the latter half of the previous century are
taken up in a wider scientific context, in which the neurosciences and biology have
picked up momentum, and many of the debates around the ‘essences’ of intelligence
(or related issues, such as consciousness) are currently pursued there, while these
discussions have somewhat subdued in the AI community. It is not that nothing is
happening in this area —-the progress, enthusiasm and diversity in these areas are
fascinating— but the majority of the contributions focus around specific research
questions or problems and, as Jerry Fodor and Jeff Hawkins have argued, the ‘big’
question ‘what is intelligence?’ has receded to the background of AI, or compu-
tational intelligence, as it is currently often called. Currently we still do not know
what intelligence is, whether it is human intelligence or machine intelligence.7
It should be also noted that there is a broad demand for tests for IQ and ‘emo-
tional intelligence’ which is worthwhile for psychology and related areas, while
pharmaceutical and other drugs are being developed to improve our mental perfor-
mance, starting with a cup of coffee in the morning. These developments usually
can be seen as taking up an ecological perspective of downward propensities, where
certain values in social domains promise a reward for social individuals who aim to
optimise their performance by using these tools, such as drugs or tests.
1.1 Some Stakeholders in the Discussions of Intelligence
The previous overview may have left the impression that the topic of intelligence
has been strongly dominated by techno-scientists and engineers, but actually the de-
velopments on this theme has known extensive contributions from philosophy and
the social sciences. This is another reason why the theme is of interest here, for
these historical developments may provide clues when various interactions between
scientific disciplines, or between science and society, indeed becomes problematic
and what could be done to monitor and evaluate these discussions.
The field of artificial intelligence has known a lively debate between science and
especially philosophy from the start. Leading thinkers such as John Searle, Jerry
Fodor, Daniel Dennett and Paul and Patricia Churchland are all philosophers (or
philosopher-scientists) who have made their mark on the developments on issues
related to mind and cognition. Besides this, as was mentioned earlier, there have
been many AI scientists who were not afraid to engage in the ‘grander’ narratives on
the mind, cognition and intelligence. There are also many psychologists and neuro-
scientists that perform their research at the heart of human cognition, and who are
deeply aware of the processes operating at this interface.
Broadly speaking, these debates allow us to draw a number of conclusions. First,
the over-exaggerated promises and hypes regarding AI was not exclusively one of
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the scientific practitioners. One cannot say that the optimists are clearly in the sci-
ence camp while the cautionary waving fingers and hellish prophecies are the ex-
clusive terrain of philosophy. In fact, in AI debates, the more or less prophetic roles
may have been taken up more diligently by science-fiction authors as Philip K. Dick
and Isaac Asimov, and art has also clearly coloured these debates, with artists such
as David Bowie and Stanley Kubrick, while films and TV shows like Star Wars and
Star Trek also deserve to be mentioned, amongst many, many others.
Science fiction has demonstrated the ability of art to explore the potential con-
sequences, the possibilities and the risks, of new technology, but it also shows how
(techno-)scientific developments shape art-forms.
It would seem that techno-positivism and techno-gloom are more a matter of
personality, temper, culture, bias and focus rather than being a ‘truth’ of the current
state of affairs of the world we live in and help to shape.
In the specific case of artificial intelligence, it is worth mentioning that the major-
ity of philosophers who have made their mark in developing the various ‘theories of
intelligence’ were willing to do so in a vocabulary that aligns with that of the scien-
tists. They were willing to acknowledge the importance of scientific data, the results
of experiments, and they generally did have a solid understanding of the scientific
contributions and the interpretations that were developed from these experiments.
In other words, the debates concerning artificial intelligence were or are successful
—-regardless if the stakeholders agreed with each other or not; at least they know
what they’re disagreeing on— because to some extent there is a shared vocabulary
that everyone could work with. In this sense, these discourses have been show-cases
of deliberative ‘fruitful friction’.
This may probably also be one of the main reasons why the continental Euro-
pean ‘post-ontology of differences’, a´ la Luhmann or Derrida have failed to become
serious theories in the debates governing language and cognition in science, sim-
ply because they were in many ways ‘untranslatable’ to a scientific vocabulary and
experiment. The debates between post-structuralist philosophy and science, radi-
calised by the Sokal affair and the science wars, has probably been one of confusion
and not one of disagreement. The vocabularies were just too incompatible. Derrida
needs an interpreter like Paul Cilliers to effectively translate his post-structuralist
ideas to a ‘theory of intelligence’.
And even then, despite this broad interest and the lively debates, it has become
clear that intelligence remains an elusive concept. Lively debates are probably sci-
ence and philosophy’s way of saying that they don’t know, but then, not knowing is
also the frontier where they do their work.
1.2 Engineering Artificial Intelligence
The discussions on intelligence that have been waged in AI, both demonstrate that
an amalgam on knowledge domains can interact in a productive way, but that even
then it remains to be seen if it really leads to something. Of course, this question also
is related to the goals and aims that one has, for the quest for a ‘conclusive theory of
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the mind’ is, of course, only one of the possible spinoffs of such cross-domain enter-
prises. At a more practical level, understanding what is happening in other domains,
maybe if only to find inspiration, direction or conclusion for one’s own enterprises,
can be worthwhile as goal in itself. It was also already mentioned that much research
has been conducted in psycho-pharmaceutics, psychology and psychiatrics, which
is currently booming both as research area as in commercial sense, while the spin-
offs of artificial intelligence are finding their way in many practical applications.
Well over half a century of research and speculation on (artificial) intelligence,
has also demonstrated that the Dark Passenger of technology doesn’t necessarily
lapse into lethal tantrums. Despite the enormous technological, social and philo-
sophical implications of the theories that were proposed and developed, it would
seem that research in AI and the neuro-sciences has —-despite the gloomiest of
prophecies— as yet turned out to be quite innocent.
Most AI engineers and techno-scientists are currently doing stuff like using ge-
netic algorithms to optimise ‘job shop problems’, fuzzy systems to improve the flow
of traffic on a cross-section with traffic lights, or neural networks to recognise se-
rial numbers on bank notes, just to name a few.8 Many technologists world-wide
are making similar small technological steps that all revolve around the essential
attractor of ‘intelligence’. There is a massively parallel process at work, but most
individuals are just contributing with small, rather innocent things.
This massive parallel process around the essence of ‘intelligence’ secures every
advance in conference proceedings, articles in journals and, very important, the pro-
totypes, gadgets, machines and robots that are made. Every worthwhile new idea is
quickly taken up by many others and improved, challenged, reworked and upgraded.
Every contribution is a node in this massively parallel convergence inducing process
around the concept of intelligence that, like any technopoietic production system,
has an exponentially increasing trend.
Regarding these activities, Kurzweil observes:
Many scientists and engineers have what I call ‘scientist’s pessimism’. Often, they are so
immersed in the difficulties and intricate details of a contemporary challenge that they fail
to appreciate the ultimate long-term implications of their own work, and the larger field of
work in which they operate.9
For a long time developments take place in the background, until the accumulation
of a number of key developments begin to accelerate and the consequent production
of artefacts and knowledge quickly bounces off the charts. Technopoiesis, translated
to evolution of man-machine intelligence, is the focus of Kurzweil’s book on the
impending ‘Singularity’.
1.3 The Singularity is Near
In its most essential form, the trans-humanist vision of enhancing intelligence boils
down to a relationship between the concepts of ‘technology’ and ‘intelligence’,
which form a self-reinforcing form of feedback. The technology includes, but is
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not restricted to, biotechnology and nanotechnology. It also includes pharmaceu-
tics, implants and so on.10
Fig. 1 Modelling the
Singularity
The Singularity follows directly from combinatorial growth as described by the
pattern of technopoiesis. If things go faster and faster, then this will be represented
by an increasingly steep upward curve that bounces of the charts at a certain point.
In other words, there is a point in time when the curve becomes so steep that it basi-
cally has become vertical. This is the Singularity; according to the Singularitarians,
our whole being will change irreversibly once we pass this point, as technopoiesis is
then producing new, more intelligent artefacts with near infinite speed, and artificial
intelligence will overtake biological intelligence. This includes all research on arti-
ficial intelligence. As the evolution of artificially intelligent agents will overtake the
evolution of biological intelligence, the Singularity thus means that technological
intelligence has surpassed our own:
While human intelligence is sometimes capable of soaring in its creativity and expressive-
ness, much human thought is derivative, petty and circumscribed. The Singularity will allow
us to transcend these limitations of our biological bodies and brains. We will gain power
over our fates. Our mortality will be in our own hands. We will be able to live as long as
we want [. . . ]. We will fully understand human thinking and will vastly extend and expand
its reach. By the end of this century, the nonbiological portion of our intelligence will be
trillions of trillions of times more powerful than unaided human intelligence.11
Note, by the way, that Kurzweil is not envisioning a new world where robots have
taken over. The robots are inside us, through artificial enhancements, nanotech-
nology and re-engineered genes. We have become homo artifis; revamped, photo-
shopped, technologically enhanced versions of ourselves. And the ‘our’ in ourselves
also remains to be seen, for there is little to marvel about our current being, in the
eyes of the trans-humanist movement.12
Our version 1.0 biological bodies are likewise frail and subject to a myriad of failure modes,
not to mention the cumbersome maintenance rituals they require.13
Earlier, Kurzweil states:
Our progress in reverse engineering the human brain [. . . ] demonstrates that we do indeed
have the ability to understand, to model, and to extend our own intelligence. This is one
aspect of the uniqueness of our species: our intelligence is just sufficiently above the critical
threshold necessary for us to scale our own ability to unrestricted heights of creative power
—-and we have the opposable appendage (our thumbs) necessary to manipulate the universe
to our will.14
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In this analysis, the combinatorial pattern of technological progress is related our
future intelligence. In other words, there is a relationship between technological
progress, intelligence and our future selves. What he describes here is a process that
adheres almost perfectly to the pattern of technopoiesis. Note also that the values
related to his vision of technopoiesis are based on control, very much according to
the classic ideals of early enlightenment.
The trans-humanists visionaries include very influential entrepreneurs and (Nobel-
prize winning) scientists who are monitoring science and technology and are ac-
tively trying to massage society in the direction of this trans-human paradise. Con-
sidering the fact that Kurzweil’s book ”The Singularity is Near” became a New York
Times bestseller in 2005, and the Los Angeles Times quipped that it:
Artfully envisions a breathtakingly better world
One can therefore safely say that at least some people apparently are enthusiastic
about this approaching world of infinite intelligence. This also demonstrates that
the ideas of the Singularitarians have a potential of becoming dominant attractors in
society.
All AI, neuro and bio- engineers and scientists are partially contributing to this
future, not because they necessarily want to, but because their humble research in-
terests are helping to make this happen. Who can they turn to for ethical support? To
philosophers and ethicists? To environmentalists? Anti-globalists? Are these stake-
holders able to tell if the humble enterprises of AI should be abandoned, as they will
inevitably push techno-intelligence towards the knee in the exponential curve?
From the previous, it will probably not be difficult to envision the criticism of
ethicists, philosophers and other thinkers to these claims. Hopefully it has also be-
come clear why this criticism will never land in the trans-humanist community.
How would a ‘technology of humility’, or an ‘enough’ with respect our human
abilities to transcend ourselves be incorporated in this process, even if the onset of
cyborg-existence in the near future may be deeply troubling for many, and at the
same time celebrated by others?15 There is no straightforward ‘evil’, such as radio-
active waste, gene-tech monopolies or any other contingency that can be clearly
identified. We are facing a number of great challenges; peak-oil, global warming, fi-
nancial crises and other volatile environmental dynamics at a scale that surpasses the
capabilities of the human individual. Any additional intelligence would be a great
asset, right? And be honest, do not many of us try to improve ourselves intellectu-
ally, or stimulate our children to their best at school? Do students not know those
drugs that sometimes can help in giving that extra kick during an exam?16 Does
cheating not go a lot easier with miniature blue-tooth technology and other digital
means?
Are we not already cyborgs when we walk through our towns in a zombie-like
fashion with mobile phones and IPods glued to our ears, botoxed lips, tattoos en-
hancing our features, while pacemakers and hearing aids compensate the inevitable
drawbacks of aging, watches monitor our fitness while jogging by GPS, and our
fulltime virtual presence is ensured on facebook, which twitters our every move?
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Who is to say that this is ‘acceptable’ technology, but technology related to infi-
nite intelligence is not? Are these nothing but artificial rankings between ‘good’ and
‘evil’ that is as subjective and biased as any ranking?
One can already see the problems of coarsely defined recommendations here. Do
Jasanoff’s ‘technologies of humility’ give any guidance for practicing researcher in
computational intelligence? I would say, no.
When did science become responsible for the Hiroshima bomb? When Max
Planck was testing black-body radiation? When Mme Curie did her experiments
on radon, or when Erwin Schro¨dinger published the famous equation bearing his
name?17 And was the Bomb not technology expressed in the context of a society
caught up in a World War?
Besides this, many scientists and engineers are currently already a stakeholder in
the Singularity without realising it. A sort of ‘pre-emptive ethics’ seems impossible,
because even if measures were taken to prevent or slowdown the developments to
the Singularity, it still leaves open a plethora of alternative futures which may or
may not be wanted. Or wanted by some and detested by others.
If, as Schmidt & Maratto have argued, ethics has failed on the issue of tech-
nology, then it will probably be related to these very, very practical issues. And
practicality is usually a theorist’s weak spot.18
A pre-emptive ethics is hardly possible because of the uncertainty related to the
polypotency of technological artefacts, while ethics ‘after the fact’ is rather easy,
because one can easily pick those technologies that have gone sour.
Can PAC then do a better job? The answer obviously depends on what one aims
to achieve, but if the goal is to assess one future vision of humanity in a vocabulary
that may actually make sense to those who are making this technology happen, and
give those who are forced to, or choose to, watch these developments from the out-
side some clues on how to refine their own vocabularies, the supposedly impending
Singularity is an interesting test case.
For starters, the main lesson to be drawn from the above is that ”intelligence”
is most likely an interface concept, which is highly uncertain along all three per-
spectives that had been drawn out in chapter three. The ‘structure’ of intelligence
is unknown, or at best fragmentary, the ecological perspectives on intelligence are
narrow, and the progress along the evolutionary perspective is currently comparable
to that of insects.ii This already should be sufficient to put any claim on ‘enhancing
intelligence’ down to the humblest of positions. One cannot enhance something one
knows little about, and which —-especially if intelligence is accepted as being an
interface concept— fails to have a strong position along any perspective that one
could take.
ii There is a large variation along different partial aspects of intelligence; our understanding of stor-
age and recall is way beyond that of insects, as the Internet can testify. But the Internet also shows
that insects are more intelligent in other matters, for instance in autonomous, adaptive behaviour.
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But as this is an exercise in using PAC, the claims of the Singularitarians will
be assessed along the six focal points that were discussed in the previous chapter,
starting with implicit and explicit bias.
2 Bias and Optimality
From the previous discussions, a number of implicit and explicit biases are present
in this domain, which include the following:
∙ Our current bodies and minds are imperfect and need improvement
∙ Intelligence can increase exponentially to (almost) infinity
∙ Technology will assist in this inevitable progress
The first two biases will be covered first, before turning the focus on technology.
2.1 The Path from our Current to our Future Being
Regarding the first, it is immediately clear that this is very much a matter of rank-
ing. The perceived quality of our current being depends on the ranking sets that one
is willing to apply and, from an evolutionary point of view, one may ask the ques-
tion why evolution didn’t come up with anything ‘better’ in the first place. If we
focus on intelligence in a narrow sense, the question for instance would be why we
haven’t moved on to a higher IQ? Broadly speaking, there are at least two lines of
argumentation that can be followed here; either we are currently trapped in a local
optimum, or we did not need to become more intelligent because it does not improve
reproductive success.
This bias alone can already result in lots of discussion, but here it is worth point-
ing that maybe our bodies and minds might actually be very well adapted for the
contingent environments we live in.
Kurzweil clearly disagrees, and McKibben shows that this view is generally
shared amongst the trans-humanist movement. In the case of germline genetic engi-
neering he reports:
No, the reason for performing germline genetic engineering is precisely to ‘improve’ human
beings —-to modify the genes affecting everything from obesity to intelligence, eye color
to gray matter. ‘Going for perfection’ in the words of DNA pioneer James Watson. ‘Who
wants an ugly baby?’19
Of course, we can already see some problems here. First, it is remarkable that the
proponents of the trans-humanist movement tend to have a very linear view of im-
provement. Add a few more points of IQ and everyone becomes smarter. However,
there are enough reasons to question these linear assumptions.
With Weinberg’s pattern of organised complexity, I would argue that maybe, just
maybe, there is a good reason why we on average are not more intelligent than we
currently are. Caught firmly between the extremes of rigidity and utter meaningless-
ness, intelligence may adhere to an optimal curve. Our current state of being may
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allow us the joy and fulfilment of discovery and invention because it takes an ef-
fort, and considerable time, to have that stroke of genius or that insight that secures
another step into the unknown.
More practically, there may also be a biological base for optimal intelligence. Re-
cent insights in autism for instance, has seen a shift of thinking from autism being a
‘mental disorder’ to an ‘extreme male personality type’. This type of personality is
at least in part hypothesized as being the result of being hyper-sensitive to external
stimuli, with the result that one is not able to make any sense of this continuous
bombardment of qualia, save maybe in the most calm and predictable of environ-
ments.20 In a similar vein, schizophrenia has also been associated with hyperactivity
of certain areas of the brain.21
If an adequate sensitivity to a certain given environment is considered a prereq-
uisite of intelligence, then it would seem that ‘too much’ may be detrimental rather
than an improvement. This may also apply for other aspects that contribute to intel-
ligence.
Besides this, concepts like ‘intelligence’, ‘happiness’ or ‘empowerment’ are
likely to be deeply contextualised, which means that they are formed by an intri-
cate web of relationships with other concepts and therefore cannot be singularly
connected to patterns of genetic expression or exponential growth of silicon chips.
The fact that we can so easily ‘spot’ these concepts in humans at a phenomenolog-
ical level and single them out is deeply misleading, for it obfuscates their innate
complexity. These concepts themselves are interfaces, loci where internal mecha-
nisms interact with exterior influences. For this reason, claims of ‘enhancement’
can only be made by incorporating knowledge and perspectives provided by dif-
ferent relevant scientific disciplines and most probably also under guidance from
extra-scientific contemplation. As long as this is not done, such claims remain be-
liefs.
3 The Structure of the Singularity
There are also some questions related to the structural assumptions of the Singular-
ity. It will be clear that most of the issues that were already raised return here.
In itself the structure is fairly straightforward; an exponential curve, or rather an
impressive collection of exponential curves, that Kurzweil sees as demonstrating
the law of accelerating returns. Earlier, Kurzweil’s analysis resulted in an almost
perfect description of the pattern of technopoiesis, and so his analysis seems plau-
sible. However, a growth curve in practical settings will also likely hit a boundary
state at some point, and it is clear that Kurzweil does not account for such practical
phenomena when he considers intelligence soaring to (near) infinity.
3.1 The Singularity
As was mentioned earlier, The fundamental idea behind Kurzweil’s claim is that:
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[. . . ]the power of ideas to transform the world is itself accelerating.22
Fig. 2 Linear vs. Exponential Growth
For technological progress, the graph from Kurzweil’s book, as depicted in figure
2, may be helpful to understand the implication.23 According to Kurzweil, this pat-
tern is merely a part of a larger trend, which he calls the ”countdown to the Singular-
ity”. Examples of these are abundant, and are meticulously recorded in Kurzweil’s
book. Moore’s law on the increase of transistors on a microchip is a famous example
(about twice as many every two years).24
In figure 3, one aspect of exponential growth becomes very clear, which is that,
at a certain point, the plot seems to plummet into a steep vertical descent. According
to Kurzweil, this is the point in time when a singularity occurs; a threshold has been
passed when developments pick up to an unprecedented momentum, and which de-
marcates one phase of evolution from another.
In order to get a clearer view on such developments, exponential graphs often are
rescaled to a logarithmic one, as was done in the second image.25 The advantage
of this kind of graph is that the plot itself becomes linear. Apparently in twenty or
thirty year’s time, the pace of development is going to be in days, hours and minutes
rather than decades or centuries, and thus we are currently close to this point where
our innovative power explodes into an unprecedented creative era:
[. . . ] within several decades information-based technologies will encompass all human
knowledge and proficiency, ultimately including the pattern-recognition powers, problem-
solving skills and emotional and moral intelligence of the human brain itself.26
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Fig. 3 Countdown to Singularity
Kurzweil has a lot of similar graphs from others that clearly show the same trend:
The Singularity will represent the culmination of the merger of our biological thinking and
existence with our technology, resulting in a world that is still human but that transcends
our biological roots. There will be no distinction, post-Singularity, between human and ma-
chine or between physical and virtual reality. If you wonder what will remain unequivocally
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human in such a world, it’s simply this quality; ours is the species that inherently seeks to
extend its physical and mental reach beyond current limitations.27
3.2 Analysis along the Structural Perspective
At first glance, Kurzweil makes a strong case for an unprecedented event in our
near future. From the perspectives pursued here, two kinds of criticism can at least
be envisioned. One of them was already discussed earlier, and revolves around the
question if this future is what we should want. The other takes a look at the analysis
itself, and tries to see how robust the theory is. Both return in Kurzweil’s metic-
ulously maintained website (http:∖∖www.kurzweilai.net) where the criticism and
counter-criticism on his views of the Singularity are recorded.28
Kevin Drum from the Washington Post, has opted for the latter approach. He
takes a closer look at the sudden stop of the logarithmic curve and wonders why it
shouldn’t be extended, as is done in figure 4:29
Fig. 4 Drum in "the Washington Post" (2005)
Apparently the Singularity is already happening! The Singularity is now! Taking
this a step further, he argues that Singularities are already and always happening,
due to the nature of exponential curves. In a response, Kurzweil argues that a log-
log plot is not valid when extending events to the future. However, it does beg the
question why Kurzweil has stopped plotting his graph to some thirty years ago.
There should be ample ‘events’ from the invention of the personal computer to this
day to improve the line. Besides this, Kurzweil’s Singularity is also an event in the
future, so following his line of reasoning, it is not valid to make future claims based
on current data.
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Another conceptual problem relates to the scaling of the ‘canonical events’. Sup-
pose the bouncing of a mass object on the floor is called an ‘event’, and then a graph
is made that scales the number of events against the mass of an object, starting with
heavy rocks and ending with bouncing balls. Of course the latter are going to create
more events . . . bouncing balls are made to bounce!
The same applies for the canonical milestones Kurzweil introduces. If you start
events from a time scale that is mapped against cosmological events, then to bio-
logical events and then human events, it is most likely that the events in the various
timeframes speed up. It is not difficult to design a convenient ranking this way. If
the important ‘events’ of a butterfly or another insect is included in the graph (for
instance the ‘munch’ on a bit of food), then the amount of events would accumulate
even faster! The law of accelerating returns is an important one, but here it seems to
be a construction rather than a trend.
Then there is the problem of ‘intelligence’ discussed earlier. The canonical mile-
stones that Kurzweil uses as marker for (technological) ‘intelligence’ are at best
indirect. The growth of transistors per unit of surface (Moore’s Law), supercom-
puter power, and DNA sequencing costs, are all impressive and most likely cor-
rect —-because they are probably instances of the same underlying pattern of
technopoiesis— but it still says very little on the increase of intelligence, because of
the uncertainty gap between ‘technology’ and ‘intelligence’. There is a great deal of
uncertainty between the number of transistors on a silicon surface and the concept
of ‘intelligence’.
The idea of a critical transition point, does not necessarily mean anything. For
instance, some thinkers are currently stressing the fact that the amount of nodes on
the Internet is going to transcend the amount of neurones in the human brain in a
few years time. This transition is seen as a possible moment when the Internet will
become ‘self-aware’. The increase of the connections is an important aspect, but the
amount of nodes does not contribute to much if other (unknown) propensities that
complete the theme of intelligence, such as the (self-) organisation of the nodes,
remain unknown.
If you topple a bucket of sand, you get a sand pile, and you also get this if you
dump a truckload of sand; this does not make the pile any more ‘intelligent’. Of
course, the nodes of the Internet are more organised than grains of sand, but this dos
not really matter; the line of resoning is still the same.
As a starting point for a counter-argument, the idea of Drum to start from
Kurzweil’s premises seems a good one. However, a slightly different approach can
be taken here. Take for instance the graph depicted in figure 5.30
If we take Kurzweil’s claim seriously, we are heading to a mass extinction some-
where beyond 2050! Intuitively, everyone knows that this can’t be true, for isn’t the
population still on the rise and but likely to stabilise in the next half century or so?
31
Of course there is. A Singularity of Death as is predicted in the above figure, will
never happen because the (expected) population growth is much larger (figure 6).
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Fig. 5 Estimated Human Crude Death Rate (CDR) from Antiquity to
2050
Fig. 6 Population Growth
It is here that the importance of concept-context becomes evident; a pattern with-
out context is utterly meaningless as it provides no information. It is just a pattern!
The Singularity seems to be a manifestation of the reminiscence syndrome that was
mentioned in chapter three.
This is one of the problems with these curves; they usually need to be contextu-
alised with others in order to become meaningful, to inform.iii Just like the previous
chapter, demographics is the most interesting contextual slice one can apply here.
For this reason, it might be interesting to plot population growth on a log-log scale,
iii Note that this is exactly the same line of reasoning that was used to question the ”abundance of
literature of technological disasters” in the previous chapter.
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as Kurzweil has done, and compare this global trend with the countdown to the
Singularity, as is done in figure 7.
Fig. 7 Population Growth (thick line) vs. Kurzweil’s events
Kurzweil’s ”events” follow the thin line along this graph, which is adjusted to
overlap the population growth. As one can see, the ‘events’ roughly follow the
growth of the population!
The importance of this graph is mainly in the fact that the descent between
10000 years ago and now is roughly similar to the ”countdown to Singularity”.
The ”events” in the last 10000 years have roughly increased from 102 to 104, while
the population growth has gone up (in millions) from just over 100 (2 million) to
just under 104 (6.6 billion), which is one scale up to that of Kurzweil’s events.
In other words, Kurzweil’s theory can be refactored to an alternative explanation,
which would imply that the ‘canonical milestones’ will level out this century when
the world population stabilises. Probably this will happen with a lag, as ‘canonical
events’ will probably align with the growth of the scientific community and business
rather than the world population. Besides this, various effects from cultural and gen-
der emancipation may ‘boost’ the canonical events in the coming years. It is clear
here that Kurzweil’s claims, put in a different contextual setting, lead to different
conclusions.
This correspondence with population growth, if true, makes another thing clear.
Kurzweil is providing a plethora of exponential patterns to support his claims, but it
may just be that all of them have propensities with population growth! The popula-
tion growth influences available jobs in high-tech industries, the consumer-base that
provides the money for new research, and the number of people with novel ideas
for innovation. Kurzweil’s graphs therefore might all be derivative of population
growth, or probably more correctly, there will be a co-evolution of technopoiesis
and population growth.
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This means that, in the end, all these conceptual patterns do not provide differ-
ent perspectives on the Singularity, but rather on the derivative theme (concept) of
‘population growth’. As a result, the extensive data that has been collected does not
make Kurzweil’s claims Medawar Zone compliant, but they rather prove indirectly
that the world population is growing exponentially.
For PAC, but also the pattern-oriented modelling approach proposed by Grimm
cum suis, this also has consequences. Apparently, the multiple perspectives that
are necessary for Medawar zone compliancy of a complex theme, needs to meet
an additional requirement, which is that every perspective is independent from the
others.32 If this is not the case, multiple perspectives will actually be providing
information on a derivative concept, and not on the target itself.
Kurzweil’s graph of accelerating growth clearly shows that pattern (in this case
an exponential curve) without a proper context is utterly meaningless. The only
thing that Kurzweil’s graph demonstrates is that there is a certain set of canonical
events that follow an exponential curve. Any explanation about the ‘how and why’
of the curve is mere speculation or, at best, hypothesis. As a result, his hypothesis
seems very fragile. There need to be much more ecological perspectives in order to
make the hypothesis Medawar zone compliant and, as we have seen, adding expo-
nential curve upon exponential curve does not necessarily achieve this trick —-even
though the targets, such as Moore’s Law for transistors per square unit of silicon,
the increase of Internet connections, or subscriptions to mobile telephones, may be
diverse—, they may still be derivatives to one underlying pattern, such as population
growth.
4 Uncertainty and Robustness
From the previous, it is already becoming clear that Kurzweil’s claims with respect
to the impending Singularity are highly fragile. This fragility can be pinpointed
more accurately by looking at concepts that are surrounded with high levels of un-
certainty. The most clear ones have already been addressed. For one, intelligence
can currently not be qualified, and it is highly unlikely that this will ever be com-
pletely possible because intelligence is likely to be an interface concept.
There are also limitations and constraints of our human environments that can-
not be resolved with additional intelligence. As Hawkins observes, carrying one
hundred stone blocks across the desert can be solved more quickly with hundred
workers, as compared to only one, but the task is not achieved ‘more intelligently’,
and hiring a thousand workers is hardly a more ‘intelligent’ solution, at least not as
seen from an utilitarian rationality! Conservation laws, scarcity, no free lunch the-
orems, actor/co-actor interactions and other deeply fundamental restrictions of the
environment we live in, are not necessarily solved with intelligence alone.33
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Then there is the problem of robustness. If it becomes possible to enhance intel-
ligence artificially, then this will inevitably mean that the diversity along the scales
of this narrowly defined view on intelligence, becomes smaller and will concentrate
around an upper boundary. In other words, everybody gets roughly the same IQ (and
EQ).
As was argued earlier, a decrease in diversity usually also means an increasing
sensitivity to contingencies. Disruptions with low probability but high impact may
therefore cause severe collateral damage, as typically these disruptions are not ad-
dressed exclusively with intelligence; you also need a lot of people who have other
qualities in order to address these contingencies.
Our future creations may find themselves in an environment which is quite differ-
ent than our own. The values associated with ‘improvement’ are referenced against
our current situations and beliefs. Maybe beyond peak oil and rising global temper-
atures, we may need less lawyers, consultants and scientists, and instead do with
people who accept a simple, demanding and hard life, and who can find enjoyment
and fulfilment there. Intelligence does not relate to ‘happiness’ or ‘fulfilment’ in a
linear fashion for all the reasons that have already been discussed.
It may also be that intelligence is a relativist concept. This source of uncer-
tainty can be exemplified with Wooldridge’s definition of rationality. According to
Wooldridge, the rationality of an agent is defined as ”the ability of an agent perform
actions that are in its best interests” 34
It becomes immediately clear that this utilitarian rationality is related to the com-
plexity of its environment. If the environment becomes more complex, the rational
agent will have increasingly incomplete internal models to act in its best interests,
and therefore the uncertainty of its actions become larger. In other words, the agent
becomes ‘less rational’ when the complexity of the environment increases. If we
accept that our largely artificial human environment is an interaction space that is
more complex than the individual agents that inhabit it, it means that any increase
of intelligence of highly interacting individual agents, is going to increase the com-
plexity of the interaction space to a much greater extent. In other words, our ability
to operate intelligently in this environment may decrease despite —and even be-
cause of — our increasing intelligence, as referenced to certain criteria!
Besides this, increasing intelligence does not mean that having to choose amongst
evils has left us. Kurzweil argues:
But the Singularity will also amplify the ability to act on our destructive inclinations, so its
full story has not yet been written.35
Apparently unprecedented rational intelligence, and superior moral intelligence will
still not entirely wipe out the human inability to get along with others:
Warfare will move toward nano-bot based weapons, as well as cyberweapons.36
The lesson to be learned here is that ‘improvement’ may just mean that the same in-
teraction patterns that we have been dealing with throughout history are just played
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out on a different scale. We see this in economics, where ‘the marketplace’ once
displaced products, then departments, then communities and now entire companies
that are relocated across the globe. The scale becomes larger, but the patterns remain
the same. Apparently, in the future we will just be wiped out more intelligently.
One of the major problems between the models of our current being and the cre-
ated future beings, is that of contextual diminution. For every disease that is cured,
the remaining diseases will become more ‘problematic’, for every additional point
of IQ, those who lag behind will be considered ‘problematic’ due to the inflationary
character of this progress. Besides this, no-one will want to perform the necessary
jobs that do not require supreme IQs.
It is this problem that McKibben often seems to touch on, but just misses the
point. He sees the upward surge of the mechanism of ‘keeping up with the Jones’s’,
but the actual problem may rather be the mechanism of ‘staying ahead of the
Jones’s’. Usually ‘improvements’ are exclusively claimed by elites, who have no
desire to make them widely available. Thus, the most likely scenario of human en-
hancement is not that everyone gets access to these opportunities in equal measure,
but rather that we will most likely become subject to a rather useless and never-
ending (rat-)race of enhancing a narrowly defined conception of intelligence, based
on the friction between individual benefit and that of society as a whole. This we
can also currently see with the ideal of ‘economic growth’.
As a result, a more likely scenario of the future will be that an elite of enhanced
human beings will become parasitic on a vast majority of ‘Luddites’ or ‘Naturals’.
It is likely that our artificially enhanced children will just take over the ten to twenty
percent or so positions that elites usually take, carefully herding the cattle of Lud-
dites and Naturals, while they spend their days in contemplation, reflection, art,
self-indulgence and all those other things that elites tend to do. Again this is just the
same pattern we already know, played out with different actors.
Of course, the idea that our cyborg offspring apparently will just end up in a
somewhat modified variant of our current being, might just be because the trans-
humanist visionaries (and myself) are still very much ‘Luddites’ or ‘Naturals’ them-
selves, that is; they are what we currently all are. One could even argue that the
obsession for continuous improvement is itself very much an ancient trait that we
may want to get rid of! In the end, the polypotency of homo artifis is a major source
of uncertainty, and only they can truly understand the consequences of their being.
As was mentioned earlier, intelligence seems restricted to optimal curves, and
any implicit form of linear thinking with respect to this concept should be considered
with extreme caution. Basically, Singularitarians are proposing to develop against a
moving target.
Regarding ‘infinite intelligence’, it is worth pointing out again that ‘infinity’ is
a theoretical concept, that usually translates in reality to ‘upper boundaries’. The
trans-human agenda is therefore rather one of finding the upper boundary of human
intelligence, both at the level of the individual and as species.
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Say therefore, that a more feasible and quantifiable goal is proposed that aims
to enhance the human IQ to 160-180 points, that is, of highly gifted people. How
certain can we be that this more modest goal is actually worth pursuing?
Suppose also that the trans-humanist movement is correct, and we are heading
towards a human being with high EQ as well as IQ, is happy, productive, carefree
and is herding the free-roaming cattle of ear-markediv Luddites and Naturals with
an eye for their needs and desires. Suppose also that, for a large part, this is due to
the artificial intelligence that has moved beyond the Singularity.
When everybody can become an Einstein, Yehudi Menuhin, Bono, or Tom
Cruise, then this also means that there is no longer a need for an audience, as the
audience can do exactly the same things. Everybody will become performers for
oneself alone, which may be an ideal for a deeply individualistic people, but also
seems to be a bit boring.
5 Social Embedding of the Singularity
A last question concerns the state of our current technology, as means of making the
trans-humanist utopia happen. This question is of interest, but not primarily with
respect to the Singularity.
In his critique on the trans-humanist movement, McKibben is quick to point out
the claims of the ‘engineers’ of our trans-human future, but when reading the liter-
ature it would seem that the trans-human movement is techno-scientific, rather than
one of engineers.
It is here that the differences between engineers and those of techno-scientists be-
come most crisp, and relates to differences in values, and the normative differences
between knowing and doing. Engineers, and other professionals, have to work with
a professional ethics that at least incorporates an approximation of ‘failure is not
an option’ for the claims that are made. Based on the previous, an engineer should
therefore be very cautious to engage in this trans-humanist project, as the outcome
is highly uncertain.
As McKibben points out (in 2003), a biological experiment, such as creating a
modified creature with germlime engineering techniques, is currently considered
successful if it succeeds 70-80 percent of the time. 37
Now these percentages may have improved in recent years, but even if they man-
age to get, say, 99.999 per cent of good results, then one counterexample from en-
gineering should put these figures in context.
Suppose that a bridge has a 99.999 per cent chance of getting you safely across.
This would mean that every one person or car out of one hundred thousand, on
average, will not be able to safely cross that bridge. From an engineering perspec-
tive, 99.999 per cent is not an option, because failure is not an option. Dykes in
the Netherlands are calculated to break on average once every 1250 years. This is
euphemistically called the design discharge and means that a freak condition may
iv They, of course, will be using painless nano-tech implants!
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occur today, it may occur 20000 years from now, but on average they are meant to be
safe for a number of generations. Note that this is a form of constructed redundancy;
such robustness comes with a price.38
In a laboratory, 99.999 per cent may count as being quite good and worth an ar-
ticle in Nature or Science magazine —it may even provide a winner for the Nobel
prize— but once the products of these experiments result in tangible artefacts that
are embedded in society, then such percentages are utterly inadequate.
There is also the problem of how to deal with the remaining 0.001%. Within
the rationality of statistically trained minds, such failure rates may be statistically
acceptable, but it makes a big difference when failure involves the breakdown of a
house-hold appliance, or when it involves human lives. Here, the impact of a fail-
ure in societal contexts is also a variable in the equation, which further constrains
the game of doing with respect to the game of knowing. There is a normative dif-
ference between the approximation of ‘failure is not an option’ and the acceptance
of ‘collateral damage’, which cannot be covered under the blanket of ‘fact’. Facts
require contexts, and contexts are always the result of selections, which makes them
value-informed.
Note that now all the attention has been diverted to the ‘details’, and that at
this transition, the world of ‘facts’ suddenly is becoming the world of norms and
values. Knowing may imply facts, but knowing also implies selections, and selection
implies values. The acceptance of certain failure rates is therefore bound to contexts,
and contexts determine how values are ‘informed’. In other words, rationality is
always embedded in values.
This is also the reason why ‘knowing’ in the world of professionals is always sub-
ject to other criteria. In chapter two, this was already argued for engineering; only
intellectually-biased people, such as theorists, philosophers and other academics can
make the mistake of thinking that ‘engineering’ only involves the methods, method-
ologies and approaches to tackle certain tasks or problems. However, the game of
‘doing’ is much more involved than that.
When science contextualises in the social through artefacts —-which includes
genetically engineered ones— the nature of the game changes. Different norms and
values come into play and the players need to realise that the safe world of labo-
ratories, including the mental landscapes that shape the norms and values that are
dominant there, interface with those of the general public, policy makers and other
societal stakeholders. It is here that reductionism becomes dangerous, and that val-
ues which are commonly accepted in the game of ‘knowing’ may have to be changed
to values related to ‘realising’. In this multi-stakeholder world, colliding flows from
various mental landscapes need to be taken seriously, as each voice is likely to rep-
resent one source of uncertainty, or of inevitable future contingencies.
If such a contingency plays out, then the short term victory may in the long run
prove to be a major setback for the progress of such a technology. And because of
this, the game of engineering must be played with much higher standards than what
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is often acceptable in scientific laboratories, in the ivory towers of thinkers, or the
dormitories where the mental landscapes of future elites are formed.
The dominant mind-set of intellectuals, who currently often play the game of
‘doing’ with the standards of the game of ‘knowing’, is not unique to the trans-
humanist movement, or gen-tech positivists. It is not even specific to the creation
of tangible artefacts, but also involves the contextualisation of ideas! The previous
century has seen a parade of scientists, philosophers and intellectuals alike, from all
kinds of political backgrounds, who saw it fit to ‘play the engineering game’ with-
out any inclination to approximation of ‘failure is not an option’. Their particular
form of reductionism, based on linear determinism, is usually called ‘idealism’, and
hence we now have an impressive historical account, and an ‘abundance of liter-
ature’ on their failures. These —amongst others— social, biological, or economic
‘engineers’, often forcefully subdued stakeholders in real environments —people,
groups and countries— to ‘fit’ their theories, instead of testing the theories to see
how these would absorb the disruptions of reality.39 For reality inevitably has its
ways of putting those disruptions into play.40 And theory has a tendency to not take
these disruptions into account.
There is a rule of thumb within engineering, based on Vilfredo Pareto, which
states that the last twenty percent of certain activities takes up eighty per cent of the
time. Suppose now that about one in every hundred thousand people worldwide are
born with a genetic mutation that is potentially lethal, or severely impairs the quality
of life. If the techno-positivists live up to their promises, their technology should do
better than nature, and so a reasonable policy could be that a genetic intervention in
a human being may only result in failure rate of one in a million, which means that
one in every million genetically modified people turns out to be somewhere between
a ‘Natural’ and a freak (or a corpse, of course).
This simple policy is likely to severely slow down the development of creating
genetically enhanced human beings. If ethicists, environmentalists and policymak-
ers want to slow down technological progress in these directions, then it suffices
to regulate and maintain the commercial activities of these techno-scientific enter-
prises to safety levels which are common in any engineering practice where failure
is not an option. This is not a matter of ethics (alone), but in the first place a matter
of professional credibility.
6 Conclusions
The previous analysis of the Singularity with the vocabulary of PAC would lead to
the conclusion that this particular agenda is highly uncertain. The analysis was in-
teresting also because a mathematical pattern, an exponential curve, was the focal
concept, in order to demonstrate that the PAC does not restrict itself to the mini-
systems that have been discussed earlier. In fact, concepts such as contextualisation,
conceptual patterns, bias, robustness, interpretation gaps and others that were dis-
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cussed throughout this book apply to this particular class of patterns as well.
In the end, I think the Singularity is a rather harmless idea, because it describes
and interprets some trends, and does not aim to offer something in the here and now
that purports to cure something. Whether or not these trends turn out to be true, or
rather that the alternative interpretation based on population growth that has been of-
fered here turns out to be more correct, probably only time can tell. Considering the
time and effort of the people dedicated to the trans-humanist ideals, it may even be
likely that some interesting technological break-throughs may be expected that can
benefit humanity, as seen from current contextual landscapes built around concepts
such as health and well-being. It may be, however, that these investments might
prove more effective in programs to get children to school worldwide, although this
probably will have a very low ROI for the investors.41
The Singularity would seem a belief, loosely based on science and technology.
The only potential dangers of this belief is, like many other beliefs, that it may
prompt people to invest in technologies or, worse still, to offer themselves up as lab
rabbits for all kinds to interventions that are based on extremely uncertain promises,
and where the academic credentials of the Singularitarian spokespeople are used to
give credibility to a cause that has few solid academic underpinnings.
As policy instrument, enforcement of standards common in engineering may
provide a strong practical instrument to manage the developments in these techno-
scientific experiments.
7 Wrapping up
In this chapter a ‘case study’ was performed to evaluate one contribution from a very
techno-scientifically oriented area, namely the trans-humanist movement. Using the
patterns and other constructs that have been developed earlier, such as uncertainty,
contextualisation and conceptualisation, the agenda of Kurzweil’s Singularity was
analysed and criticised, and for now the conclusion would be that our responsibili-
ties, as a global community, can better be redirected so that our attention, resources
and energy is put to use for more pressing current issues.
Besides this, a global outline has been given on how patterns could be used to
engage in a truly cross-domain communications, using the agile methodology that
has been guiding the pattern modelling all along.
This case study of the Singularity also reflected back to PAC, in the sense that it
has constrained the multiple perspectives on a complex theme. It has become clear
that these perspectives must be mutually independent in order to be Medawar zone
compliant. It would seem that the three perspectives of PAC ensure this, but an
earlier discussion on language as being a ‘window to the mind’, may show that this
is not always the case (or always feasible), as language reveals structure, as well as
that it contextualises in a social ecology.
Chapter 12
Into Normative Professionalisation
From the outset of this book, a number of threads have been floating around the
complexity perspective, of which those following complexity and feedback have
been given the most attention. Other threads related to the lingua democratica, tech-
nology and genomics research became more important as the complexity perspec-
tive interfered in social contexts, and towards the end these threads spawned a new
one which focused around the themes of ‘technology’ and ‘intelligence’. Along the
meshes they weave, the distinction between engineering and technoscience became
greater and became most crisp when the values related to, and the normative differ-
ences between, ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’ were highlighted.
1 The Games of ‘Knowing’ and ‘Doing’
In the previous chapter, this difference was addressed from a very practical point
of view, as exemplified by the approximation of ‘failure is not an option’. This
contribution may have left an impression that ethical intervention on technologi-
cal developments often fails, while a deeply practical normative stance may provide
better means to get a grasp on technopoiesis. Personally, I think that this is correct
in the sense that practicality often provides more immediate and raw reasons to ‘do
good’; failure of constructions in real contexts usually leads to severe punishment.
The deep appreciation of this simple fact is, or should be, at the heart of any profes-
sional education.
However, this does not address other aspects of a professional attitude that is
shaped by norms and values. Why would professionals choose to work in an area
where such punishment exists, and how do they manage to find that deep feeling
of joy and fulfillment in their work? What is it that makes a professional attitude a
‘good’ one, or how ‘ought’ a professional to conduct her or his work?
It is here that most scholars will turn to that field of enquiry —ethics— that
traditionally focuses around these questions, and hope to find some inspiration there
by drawing on the aeons of thought that have developed around these matters.
With respect to an ethics of technological professionals, I opt, as I have been
doing throughout this book, to draw on PAC, not out of disrespect for these long-
standing traditions, but simply because my aims here are a bit different.
From the start, PAC intended to explore a river running from the plane of organ-
ised simplicity into that of organised complexity, and this exploration has brutally
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crossed the domains traditionally owned by physics, technology, biology, (a little bit
of) psychology and cognitive science, to end in the social sciences.
I chose this path because, so I hoped, in one sweep it would bring me to the
core of a lingua democratica, because it forced me — an amateur in many of these
matters— to cross various domains inhabited by various stakeholders. The journey
included some scientific specialisations and, very importantly, domains that tradi-
tionally belonged to craftspeople and professionals.
I have tried to achieve this task in a more or less coherent fashion, by choosing
to follow patterns of feedback along the complexity perspective, and trying to figure
out what the commonalities and differences are between the various forms of pro-
jection and reflection, and how they relate to each other. The consequent ‘game’ that
was developed has tried to be prudent in matters of the extent of its claims; patterns
alone mean very little! However, this prudence does project onto other intellectual
activities as well, because in the end they are all production systems that produce
mental models based on models that are already present. All these production sys-
tems have a certain reach, and are constrained to certain contextual slices. The best
one can do is account for these fluid boundaries; if science claims that ‘something
has not been scientifically proven’, then this means nothing if science never took
an interest in subject matter in the first place. It merely states that subject matter
is undetermined along the contextual slices that are spanned by science. If science
states that ‘science was not able to find evidence that supports certain claims’, then
matters change, for it at least accounts for a certain context in which the claims have
been formed, and therefore have certain meaning. This applies for all intellectual
production systems (metaphysics included); we are all in this mess (or mesh) to-
gether, and the mess is called ‘complexity’!
With Henri Atlan, the fluid, crafty wisdom of Metis exposed one major shortcom-
ing in science and philosophy alike, and that is their obsession for distinctions and
categorisations as means of organising our observations of the world. This may of-
ten work very well, but it is a reduction of reality, and in the case of complex themes,
these themes are always framed in specific ways. In quantum mechanics, and prob-
ably also post-structuralist philosophy, theorists have by now probably come to re-
alise this, and their vocabularies have started to incorporate terms that traditionally
belong to Metis, like uncertainty, ambiguity, traces, indeterminacy and contingen-
cies. If my professional side has taken an outsider position to science and philoso-
phy, it would not be to urge them into Metis’ waters, but merely to point out that
this is already taking place, and maybe that this is inevitable as our understanding of
our world is becoming more and more aware of its innate complexity. If I were now
asked to give a definition of complexity then, looking back, I would now probably
prefer the following:
Complexity is a fundamental characteristic of production systems that operate with limited
knowledge of their production and their produce
When an observer operates (that is: observes) with limited knowledge of that what
is observed, which includes its own role in the meta-system it forms with subject
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matter, then the prerequisites for complexity have been met. Concepts such as uncer-
tainty, ambiguity and indeterminacy therefore contribute to complexity, and learning
is a means to reduce it, or to make complexity manageable.1
Like any other social development, innovations in a social system do not take
place overnight, and many areas will still hold on to a science or philosophy that,
in proper sense, is neatly formalised in symbolic tags, either explicitly or implicitly.
There is nothing wrong with that, as long as the practitioners and thinkers under-
stand how it focuses their thoughts and observations, and how it constrains their
view on the world and limits their understanding of alternative threads that interfere
with these themes, and which cannot be (fully) captured in their own preferred id-
ioms.
Kaplan and Rogers may be correct in their assessment that biologists sometimes
make ‘roughly hewn attempts at social theory’, without bothering too much about
the considerable work of those who specialise in this area, but social theorists,
philosophers and other intellectuals often do exactly the same, with the pretence that
their methods and specialisation allow this, or that it makes this approach inevitable,
such as when stating that ‘they are studying technology as social or philosophical
phenomenon’. They often jump from law to technology to democracy, dumping
their analyses and criticisms, and leaving the arena before the first round has even
started. They implicitly assume that their theories and frameworks are context (or
substrate) neutral, and are genuinely surprised when domain specialists just do their
thing and don’t care too much about what they have to say.
The kind of complexity thinking that I propose here, does not really mind such
interferences, and even takes delight in them, but at the same time tries to be deeply
aware of what is happening when such interfaces are explored, what their frame-
works and theories have to say, and especially what they cannot; that is what demon-
strates true mastery! This research has been an attempt to understand this friction
space between domains, where limited knowledge is acutely present.
This brings me to the mother of all distinctions, that between ‘good’ and ‘bad’
(or evil), and with this to questions of normative professionalism, and an ethics of
technology.
Normative professionalism, coarsely stated, revolves around those aspects that
are not directly related to ‘getting the job done’; rather it includes those, often im-
plicit, aspects that make work worthwhile and meaningful. This includes ideals,
norms and values related to ‘being’ a professional; in other words, all that which
gives a profession that deep satisfaction of ‘doing good, while doing the job’. This
includes a ‘pride of achievement’2, but also often a sense of contributing to some-
thing that surpasses individual motives and boundaries.
Typically, this interference between practicality and ethics started in professions
that were most strongly subject to the friction between these themes, such as be-
tween professionals in health care and existential counselling. If technology indeed
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has a severe impact on contemporary societies, it is worth asking the question of
what it means to ‘do good’ while performing technology?
One of the normative components of performing technology has already been
given attention earlier, the desire (and need) to approximate the requirement of
‘failure is not an option’. Any professional will know that this norm interferes with
other aspects, such as efficiency, costs, (company) politics, and so on. Many of these
norms are context-bound, and can only be developed and maintained in specific ar-
eas. However, the question here is how to transcend these more immediate concerns
towards something that might, for all intent and purposes, be an ethics for technolog-
ical professionals. It is probably better to consider a normative professionalisation,
which would imply an ongoing process that travels alongside professionals during
their careers.
A normative professionalisation would invite professionals to develop richer and
more meaningful contexts around their work, especially when the core requirements
related to that work become less pressing due to experience.
But then, how can one further develop a normative professional stance in a com-
plex world where many distinctions are ambiguous, such as between ‘good’ and
‘bad’, ‘just’ and ‘unjust’? 3 What can this particular form of ‘disruptive knowledge’
add to these debates?
As this particular enterprise was conducted at the University for Humanistics,
where normative professionalisation is a key area of research, it had been my ideal
to end the exploration of PAC not in social domains, but with themes that are of
central importance for this university.
Normative professionalisation regarding (new) technology would be the most
appropriate cross-waters to sail, as it would bring the topics of the NWO programme
in interference with a theme that is important for the UH. In order to make this
possible, I have in the previous chapters already woven a seam along the complexity
perspective that might connect the rational, analytical world of organised simplicity
with a world rich in norms, values, and meaning.
This thread started with selections and ranking, wove through observation as a
ranking mechanism, touched on meaning, and ended in a distributed epistemological
space in which values are constructed and maintained, a space where ‘auto-eco-
organisation’ takes place.4 Of course, in a world of patterns, the distinctions between
facts, norms and values are not clear-cut ones, because values (ranks) are needed
to observe facts, and facts can express themselves differently in different contexts
because of the values that are associated with them.
It had been argued that these values can be considered attractors that forge con-
nections between social agents in a complex environment. 5 They include very
ancient (and powerful) values, such as ‘food’, ‘mate’ and ‘offspring’, move to-
wards more complex attractors of ‘helping others’, ‘community’, ‘supporting good
causes’, and end in extremely complex, contemporary concepts, such as ‘post-
structuralist theory’ or ‘a tribute to Michael Jackson’. As the human brain is
resource-constrained, every single mind can only connect to a limited number of
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these attractors. In human societies there is therefore an enormous pressure to con-
trol the processes floating around these attractors, for those who control important
attractor concepts, control the domains associated with them. At least, as long as
there are no disruptions, or an attractor turning stale due to systems-internal pro-
cesses. As control says nothing about justice, or good or bad, this means that such
an eco-auto-organisation at best describes a substrate on which an ethics can form.
This substrate constrains ethics, and theories on ethics with it, but it does not de-
scribe ethics (in a certain context).
Somewhere and somehow, the attractors of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, or ‘evil’, have taken
their place in this auto-eco-organisation, and they cut a contextual slice towards a
professional identity. These attractors are themselves sources of other attractors,
such as ‘justice and injustice’, ‘is and ought’, ‘power and control’, and the disrup-
tions from, and on, professional identity pressurise, but also nourish and stimulate
them.
This seam may thus connect to the concept of ‘ethics’.
For the purposes here, this provides an opening to see how PAC can disrupt the
ethical discussions on technology. In order to do so, we must therefore follow the
evolutionary, structural and ecological threads on the theme of ‘ethics’, and the latter
perspective mainly from the viewpoint of professionals who are performing technol-
ogy; that is, those who are critically open to ethical guidance and intervention.
1.1 An Evolutionary Thread on Ethics (of Technology)
In his book ”The imperative of Responsibility, In Search for an Ethics for the Tech-
nological age”, Hans Jonas begins by stating that ‘ethics is concerned with action’,
and that, since ‘the nature of human action has changed’, it follows that ethics should
change as well.6 The specific change in human nature that Jonas perceives is based
on the powers unleashed by modern technology. From old, humankind was in awe
by the potential of craft, reason, resourcefulness and cleverness, but with a deep
understanding that it was still nothing compared to the forces of nature and the el-
ements. Whatever man could do, it would not disturb the balance of nature.7 From
this, Jonas distils the ‘characteristics of previous ethics’:
∙ All dealings with the nonhuman world (techne, with the exception of medicine)
was ethically neutral, because interventions impinged but little on the self-
sustaining nature of things. Techne itself was in support of the true vocations
of man, and not a goal in itself.
∙ Ethical dealings were fundamentally anthropocentric, and revolved around the
direct dealings of man with man.
∙ For action in this domain, the concept of man was considered constant and was
not considered an object of reshaping techne.
∙ Normative values were closely related to immediate act. The future impact or the
wider scope of man’s actions, were not a concern.
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This classic notion of ethics has now changed dramatically. The formation of
cities, for instance, allowed man to take a place in highly artificial environments,
which loosened the bonds with the natural world. Ethics now deals with, amongst
others, the vulnerability of nature, the new role of knowledge in morality and the
‘rights’ of nature. Besides this, technology has become an integral part of what
defines us as human beings:
In other words, technology, apart from its objective works, assumes ethical significance by
the central place it now occupies in the human purpose.8
Jonas also underlines the fundamental utopian characteristic of technology, and de-
scribes the mechanism that drives this process:
Its cumulative creation, the expanding artificial environment, continuously reinforces the
particular powers in man that created it, by compelling their unceasing inventive em-
ployment in its management and further advance, and by rewarding them with additional
success—which only adds to the relentless chain. This positive feedback loop of functional
necessity and reward —-in whose dynamics pride of achievement must not be forgotten—
assures the growing ascendancy of one side of man’s nature over all the others, and in-
evitably at their expense. If nothing succeeds like success, nothing also entraps like suc-
cess.9
This, of course, is technopoiesis.
This is also that what ethics needs to challenge, but in a time when all classical
values which once offered some form of guidance, have lost their meaning:
[. . . ] we shiver in the nakedness of a nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with
near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.10
This reflects the worst fears of ‘the end of ethics in a technological era’.11 With this,
Jonas embarked on a journey to find a new ethics that can address the challenges of
modern time, imposed on us by the runaway train that technology is threatening to,
or has, become. This culminates in his ‘heuristics of fear’.
The fear in question then cannot be [. . . ] of the ”pathological” sort [. . . ], which compul-
sively overcomes us in the face of its object, but rather a spiritual sort of fear which is, in a
sense, the work of own deliberative attitude. Such an attitude must be cultivated; we must
educate our soul to a willingness to let itself be affected by the mere thought of possible
fortunes and calamities for future generations, so that the projections of futurology will not
remain mere food for idle curiosity or equally idle pessimism. Therefore, bringing ourselves
to this emotional readiness, developing an attitude open to the stirrings of fear in the face
of merely conjectural and distant forecasts concerning man’s destiny [. . . ] is the second,
preliminary duty of the ethic we are seeking, subsequent to the first duty to bring about that
mere thought itself.12
From this analysis, it would seem that the ethical game itself has changed. If once
‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘just’ and ‘unjust’, ‘is’ and ‘ought’ were assigned beyond human
intervention, by the gods, or later as fully, semi-, or transcendental ‘hypergoods’,
these values changed with the evolution of human ideas of their place in the world,
and have become interpreted, relativistic, constructed and all those other things that
makes those values subject to human whims. This is not the place to delve deeply
into these developments, but it would seem that technology especially seems to call
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ethics to challenge, and it would seem that at least some ethicists believe that ethics
is losing, or has lost the battle. In fact, this uneasiness, or alarm, is not confined to
ethicists alone, as these voices of concern have been heard ever since technology
started its upward acceleration. Besides this, as we have seen earlier, it is not only
the acceleration that is deeply worrying to these voices, but also the penetration of
technology in the human:
We often think of machines as if they contain something dehumanizing. At best, they are
seen as useful, even essential tools; at worst, as destroyers of the soul.13
These voices, at least in part, shape the social, and moral contexts in which
technologically-oriented professionals do their work. As fellow human beings, they
may even share these concerns! Yet, like the technologies of humility of Sheila
Jasanoff, and the ‘Enough’ of Bill McKibben, the heuristics of fear seems to fall
short as a guiding principle for these professionals for the same reasons that were
already extensively covered in chapter ten. For PAC, the game of decomposing and
refactoring such contributions and views has already been performed.
However, is there, maybe, a possibility for a lingua democratica? That is, is there
a possibility for an inclusive angle that respects these concerns, the complexity of
subject matter, and still offers professionals some guidance in matters of being a
good professional?
It is prudent, at this point, to tone down possible expectations, and maybe state
that perhaps the issue of ethics in its proper sense, will not be a focal point here. The
focus rather, is on the substratum on which ethics can form, and can maybe be de-
tailed beyond an auto-eco-organisation of certain attractors. This may provide some
information on the dynamics of the processes that take place in such distributed epis-
temological spaces, but it still says little on which attractors should have prevalence
over others, and which contextual slices they cut through the theme of professional-
isation. This issue can only be an exploration in the vocabulary of PAC, and the best
we can do is to see how far we get!
1.2 A Structural Perspective of Ethics
If an ethics for professionals revolves around questions of ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘just’ and
‘unjust’, or on how one ought to conduct oneself, then one prerequisite of any frame-
work that aims to develop an ethics should acknowledge the concept of choice. With
this, ethics is not an aspect of a determined, mechanistic world. If every agent is pre-
programmed to behave unambiguously given a certain set of criteria, then it is of no
use to speak of an ethics. Likewise, the orderly activities of maximisation of utility,
or maximising or optimising certain goals, given preset knowledge of alternatives,
will follow different paths than that of ethics. They may interfere, and it is certainly
not true that the one excludes the other; ethics simply originates elsewhere, namely
in the zone of ambiguity where a choice a made.
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With this, the substratum on which an ethics can form, at least requires a selection
of possible choices, and certain ambiguity between them. An agent must be able to
select without having an unambiguous means of ranking the choices along a gradient
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, or ‘just’ and ‘unjust’. With this, it can already be concluded
that ethics belongs to Metis, and ethics thus requires the same crafty reason that is
needed to navigate her choppy waters.14
As choice fills the indeterminate space between ranks, one first needs to find the
common frame of reference. Good can only be ‘good’ against a reference that dis-
tinguishes it from ‘bad’, or ‘evil’, and vice versa. One can only understand these as
being related to the other, just as one sees the deep (often catholic) religious senti-
ments in Satanist sects, in the sense that they adhere to the same norms and values
they oppose, and exalt in the same symbolism of the holy scriptures they mock.
This means that ethics cannot revolve around preset notions of ‘good’, ‘bad’,
‘justice’ or ‘oughts’, for if ‘good’, ‘just’ or ‘ought’ is known before the choice is
made, then ethics would be a matter of rationality, a sort of moral accounting. This
approach would lead to the least interesting form of ethics possible.
As an example, consider the dilemma of the trolley. Coarsely stated, you are po-
sitioned near the lever of the switch in a track where an approaching trolley can
take one of two directions. The problem is that on each track a number of persons
have been tied up, who are surely going to be run over and killed when the trolley
takes either turn. On one track, one person has been tied up, while on the other, five
people have been tied up. You know this, and you will see the impending disaster
occur. The alleged ‘moral problem’ here is what you will have to decide; will you
let the trolley kill one person, or instead five?
The problem with this problem that I see here, is that ethics has been reduced
to moral accounting, and with this the ethics, and morality, itself has been removed
from the equation. ‘Ethics’ is reduced to two causal scenarios, which has removed
the ambiguity in which ethics can form.
The moral question rather is, which devil brought you in a position to have to
make such a choice, and this devil —usually in the form of an ethicist—, with
a smile on his or her face, tells you that all the alternatives that your overheated
brain is trying to think of are not allowed. But it is exactly this feverish fight with
possible scenarios that allows ethics to form, and it is the lack of context that makes
it impossible to see this example as an ethical dilemma! Is the one person tied on
the rails your partner, your boss, or are they all strangers? Do you think that maybe
you can still run to the single person and cut her loose?
Can you derail the trolley by alternating the switch when the trolley passes over
it? ”No!” says the evil power that is constraining you to sit at the switch and make
a choice that can only be answered by choosing one or the other, leaving you only
with the certainty that whatever you do, it will always spell disaster.
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But the ethics is not only in the act, but also in the frustration of not being able
to maximise the freedom of alternative outcomes, the pumping of your heart as the
trolley draws near, and the tremendous guilt when it takes its designated track. These
feelings are all at the interface of biology, psychology, the social, and the moral as
cultural domain. All these determine the moral dilemma. While the evil ethicists are
enthusiastically analysing the choice that was made, they have turned their backs on
ethics itself, as it dissipates from the horrified look of a subject who was forced to
make a choice, while there was little to choose from.
This example is not a trivial academic game, for if we replace the ‘evil ethicist’
with a commanding officer of a concentration camp in Nazi Germany, who is forc-
ing a prisoner to select which chamber will be gassed, then it becomes immediately
clear that ethics is no longer present at the inmate, but the moral issue has moved to
the person, or persons, responsible for creating the dilemma. Likewise, captives who
are forced to denounce their religion or beliefs through torture in detention camps,
are no longer partaking in anything remotely associated with ethics. The only thing
that these inhumane acts demonstrate, is that ethics and morality are a deep and
fundamental part of being human. If not, then these acts would not be considered
gruelling by those who are forced to undergo them. The fact that this is a form of
torture, is also the proof that morality is deeply ingrained in the human social, bio-
logical, cultural and psychological make-up.
Ethics is therefore bounded by the freedom one has to choose amongst certain
alternatives on one hand, and the time that is available before a choice is effectuated
on the other. Ethics, like most informed concepts in PAC, has become a moment, a
moment of freedom in which one has to make a choice. In this moment a conceptual
network is built up around the potential choices, which ranks them in ambiguous
ways. The combinatorics of propensities fill the ambiguous friction space before the
moment ends. In this respect, it is understandable, though incorrect, that some, like
Jonas, relate ethics to acting, for acting always implies a choice, if only between
acting and not acting, or delayed acting. However, moral action takes place after the
ethical moment has formed; it is the expression of the ethical moment in a realised
context.15
These acts are not unimportant, because the act does contextualise the ethical
moment in a reality, with risks, contingencies and polypotency. However, at least
this is my claim here, an impending act is prepared in the ethical moment. The
moment of action is also the moment when ethics changes, as context itself has
changed with the act.
This makes ethics a deeply practical issue. Not that it is beyond analysis, scrutiny
and contemplation, but without a deep appreciation of the combinatorics of the
propensities that guide these bounded choices in specific circumstances, any such
analysis is bound to fail, or will only produce coarse models.
This brings us to the structure of ‘ethics’ proper, at least along the approach that
has been developed here. If this structure at least acknowledges a ranking of alter-
natives along the gradient drawn by the attractors of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘just and
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unjust’, and ‘is and ought’, then in PAC, this ranking is likely to be related to a con-
text that determines these ranks, and context can change the ecological expression
of the ethical moment.
For instance, if someone sees an accident happen and decides to walk on, this
choice will have a different ethical charge if no-one else is around, or conversely
if an ambulance that happened to be on the same road pulls up and takes charge.
The ethical moment that leads to intervention or non-intervention is shaped by the
observed actions of others, their capabilities or their lack it. The wider ethical tur-
bulence starts with the observation of an impending choice, estimating the contexts
in which the choices will express themselves in a certain environment, the acts, and
ends with facing the consequences of the choice that is eventually made. With this,
the predictive models that shape the contexts of these choices also become part of
the ethical moment. It makes a difference if someone who is witness to an accident
is a first aid medic, a doctor, or conversely someone who faints at the sight of blood,
panics, or would not know what to do. With this, knowledge and experience have
become important propensities of the ethical moment, not forgetting the many nar-
rative threads of one’s own life story that is reflected in the unfortunate event.
Regarding technology, Hans Jonas seems to draw the same conclusions with re-
spect to the roles of knowledge and experience. In a discussion on Kant, he sees a
contemporary technology that has moved beyond a sort of common-sense ‘good’
and ‘bad’, and a consequent ethics which at least requires knowledge that covers the
impact of modern technology:
Knowledge under these circumstances, becomes a prime duty beyond anything claimed
for it heretofore, and the knowledge must be commensurate with the causal scale of our
actions.16
From the previous discussions on technology, it would be easy to point out the
problems related to this idea. I will not delve deeply into them, but Kurzweil’s law
of accelerating returns and the polypotency of technological artefacts have already
been given extensive attention earlier. However, in this case I happen to agree with
Jonas’ argumentation, though for different reasons, which I translate in a more op-
timistic sense.
I do not think that the scale of modern technology has altered the ethical game
regarding technology. A few years ago, a few samples of ice were taken from the
North Pole that clearly showed an increase of lead in the global atmosphere during
the Roman Empire. Likewise, a lot of current wastelands along the Mediterranean
were destroyed by generations of our forefathers who misused the land given to
them, not purposely, but because they did not know better.
If, as Jonas states, the ethics of the ancient Greeks was anthropocentric in nature,
then we can just as well see that the game of ethics is changing because we know
more. Currently, the rights and suffering of animals is being taken more seriously
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in many areas, and nature is considered emphatically, as something that is worth
preserving, and as something that should have agency of its own. Some of us are
considering the concerns of future generations that as yet do not have a voice.
It does not really matter if these attitudes may sometimes host a self-centred com-
ponent —a reasoning along the lines of ‘if we don’t preserve nature, we jeopardise
ourselves’— because many are also willing to give orang-utans, gorillas, dolphins,
elephants and whales a place under the sun, simply because they think that it is not
up to us humans to determine their future for them, or out of respect of a beauty that
is not man-made, which is worth preserving. Our biases may be less emphatic to the
many bugs and insects that should deserve similar attention, as they constitute even
more to the foundation of our natural life-world, but nonetheless.
Such biases aside, an increasing ability for empathy seems to be a clear trend
in the evolution of morality, and this, at least in part, is inspired by our increas-
ing knowledge. This trend suggests that ethics is changing because our knowledge
is increasing, and we are able to see farther and make projections that may have
been impossible only a few centuries ago. My conclusion would therefore not be
that ethics has failed, rather that ethics is evolving. And with this, an evolutionary
perspective of ethics is not a trivial one.
1.3 An Evolutionary Thread of Ethics
At this point, the vocabulary regarding ethics has been extended with two new con-
cepts, knowledge and empathy. Both are related, as empathy includes certain ratio-
nal, emotional and social intelligence regarding others. Or, in other words, an ability
to create mental images of others as if one is that other.17 It is this ability that al-
lows social beings to help others, and also allows ‘evil ethicists’ to devise the kind
of tortures that were discussed earlier. As was pointed out then, these two interface
concepts have a biological component, both in the sense that our biological make-up
allows these cognitive skills to form, as well as that the fact that we have them, gives
rise to the idea that they serve a purpose in making us what we are.
This stance seems to get some support in the research of primates. Frans de Waal
has argued for recognition of a ‘proto-morality’ in chimpanzees and bonobos. He
sees this proto-morality reflected in, for instance, a bonobo who was helping a young
bird to fly, after an unfortunate encounter with an obstacle. De Waal argues strongly
that any such act requires an ability to make mental models of a creature different
than one’s self, and an ability to act emphatically (and in this case, also sympatheti-
cally) on these models. This would suggest that morality requires highly developed
cognitive skills.18
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The problem with explanations and theories based on evolution is always that
they tend to be different when one looks towards the origins, or whether one opts to
look in the direction where evolution seems to be heading.i
Along the gradient drawn between the scales of predominantly self-preserving
agents, and those with emergent forms of morality, we might see that primates mark
a cognitive transition point where self-interest is supplemented with a wider under-
standing of how ‘self’ is embedded in a life-world that includes many other —and
different— ‘selves’. Veneer theory, which was already discussed earlier, may actu-
ally be correct, not in its assumption that morality is a thin layer over, at their core,
self-interested agents, but rather that it describes this interface where self becomes
aware of being part of a wider space of relationships.
Morality, then, in co-evolution with increasing knowledge, seems to find a pull
towards an attractor that facilitates an ever stronger sense of embodiment, away
from self-centred and anthropocentric views. Not that the latter become unimpor-
tant, or that they are replaced by this evolving morality —any first aid medic learns
that self-preservation is a prerequisite for helping others—, rather that this evolving
morality implies a balancing of all these justified values. This thread again pulls the
concepts of ethics and morality into the zone of ambiguity.
Then, maybe, the human species has just moved beyond this interface, and the
diversity within the human population sees a gradient from predominantly self-
interested individuals, to those who are astutely (and innately) aware of being an
embodied presence in a wide network of relationships. The latter cannot be any-
thing else, but be aware of the wider consequences of their being. They see self-
interested agents do things with triumphant looks on their faces, often applauded
and rewarded by many others in certain societal contexts, while their own cognitive
maps tell a different story, and they wonder why everyone else is so enthusiastic.
These people experience themselves as being a node in this network which allows
a continuous stream of ethical moments to manifest themselves in a life-world, and
that these flows can percolate far and wide through the fabric on which humankind
has formed.
Maybe evolution is still making up its mind whether it is worthwhile to proceed
along this path, or if a veneer morality is sufficient to address the challenges of a
highly interconnected global order. It is my guess that this co-evolution between
morality and complexity has only just started, and is needed, as patterns perco-
late through an increasingly dense mesh of interactions. In such a world, even self-
interest must be extended with a deep emphatic understanding of relationships, as
feedback can ricochet good and evil (in a certain context) in equal measure.19
The question then becomes, whether our sense of morality is growing fast enough
to keep up with the pace of technology, globalisation and other issues that are cur-
i This should not be confused with ‘purpose’ by the way. What I am saying here is that there are
a few plausible scenarios of the (near) future, based on societal and environmental co-evolution,
which provide stable patterns that the aggregate system can respond to.
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rently intensifying the interaction space of our life-world, and which make the gra-
dients —-the ‘slippery slopes’— between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ more steep?20
This question is a lot harder to answer, and I will refrain from doing so here. I
would rather opt to remain on the stricter path of our enquiry and return to develop-
ing a contextual slice between ethics, technology and normative professionalisation.
1.4 Back to Structure
I have made clear earlier that I do not believe in an ethics of technology that is
based on a procedural set of guidelines, let alone coarse recommendations, such as
a ‘heuristics of fear’.
Ethics rather, must be seen as a process that travels with the development of tech-
nology, and sparks an event every time a number of choices present themselves, of
which many cause irreversible changes of state; in an act, or acts. Probably more
correctly, this ought to be the case! Ethics thus becomes a disruptive influence in
one’s practices, and is needed to keep these practices embodied in wider contexts,
whether these are societal, cultural, natural or otherwise. It also means that the or-
ganisational, societal and cultural organisations should allow, and stimulate these
interferences if they take normative professionalisation seriously, for the nodes that
allow these ethical moments to flow are not restricted to human individuals, but
scale up to aggregate forms, where they may contextualise differently, and interfere
with other values.
An ethics of technology for professionals thus, is a sequence of ethical moments
that follows a certain technological development from the inception to well beyond
its realisation. For professionals, a normative professionalisation thus, can at least
be improved by understanding how technology is realised, and appreciating the fact
that new technology will have an impact when it takes its place in different contexts,
such as natural or social ones. Knowledge shapes the ethical moment, and so at least
a normative professionalisation should advocate, along with Jonas, a reduction of ig-
norance, of continuous learning, both with respect to the immediate production of
technology, as swell as with respect to the contexts in which technology expresses
itself.
Yet this leaves no clue on what is ‘good’, ‘bad’ or what ‘ought’ to be done, or
what is ‘just’ in the context of our contemporary world and state of knowing. The
professional mindset includes thorough training, a realisation of risk and impact of
technology, and the values that are at least required to realise certain standards at
the least. This, I would say, is already part of most technological curricula, if only
as preparation for a normative attitude towards ‘failure is not an option’.
However, the voices of concern seem to make it clear that this is not enough. In
fact, at this point we may only have charted the bootstrapping mechanisms on which
a professional ethics can form in a proper sense. Where and when does ethics move
beyond this very practical stance? How can these ethical disruptions do justice to
these voices?
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1.5 An Ecological Thread of Ethics
It would seem that many contemporary philosophers are keen to position mod-
ern man in a certain timeframe with specific characteristics that are historically
unique. The preferred prefix is ‘post-’, which usually translates to ‘after’, ‘next’,
or preferably, ‘beyond’. As a result, we are currently partaking in a plethora of
post-something eras that allegedly shape the contexts of our current lives.ii With
Kurzweil, we can already see that the social contexts that are influenced by technol-
ogy currently must change at warp speed, so that the production of ‘posts’ probably
reflects just that. If correct, the increase in the amount of post-eras follows an expo-
nential curve towards a Singularity of a post-human future! iii
However, ‘post-’ also reveals the reference against which these new times are
framed. A new era is usually termed in the vocabulary of what preceded it, mostly
in the form of certain criticism. And, like any other difference, a new era usually has
a lot in common with previous ones. Society does not tend to change overnight. New
ideas express themselves in a societal context, beget certain agency and autonomy,
and take a course of their own. Then, beyond a certain critical threshold, society
finds itself defined by those ideas, and only then the old skin has been shed off and
the ‘post’-era has taken root.21
If the post-modern times we live in have proclaimed the end of grand narratives
and universal truths,22 then what ethics could guide technological progress beyond
the practicalities of contextualising artefacts in reality? This is, of course, the ques-
tion that opens the ethical and moral questions of technology, and with it those
regarding humanity in these deeply technological times.
Many of such questions tend to be somewhat artificial, as first an interface is de-
fined along historical dimensions, after which society is described along the ‘post’-
side of the alleged boundaries. Having come from a rural community myself, I re-
member how the dictate of religion was still very much part of daily life in the
Sixties of the previous century, and even then God, for many, was a very practical
concept, and hardly a source of Grand Narratives that would guide one’s state of
being. Along the coastlines of the North Sea, this treacherous stretch of water was
often the protestant God’s equal: ”A sea that gives, and a sea that takes away”, Sil
de Strandjutter murmured, as the Autumn storms were beating on the island of Ter-
schelling. At least for Cor Bruijn, a dedicated chronicler of the Northern coastline,
but relfected in the memorials one sees on the dykes near villages who once lost
their children to the raging waters.23
Today, the majority of the world population still has few problems believing the
Grand Narratives that religion has to offer. Post-modernity then is either confined to
the epistemological spaces of certain intellectual domains, or has to be seen as the
first exploration of a future state of society. Maybe a Nietzchean nihilism only truly
ii It is worth pointing out that we currently live in a post-yesterday world.
iii which, in the sense used here, means that we can be fully characterised by post-concepts
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took root in society with the punks in the 1980’s, but then often without the vibrant
sense of humour with which young Nietzsche marinated his aphorisms, and without
the ‘lust for life’ that exploded from his analysis of Dyonisian plays.24
Complexity-junkiesiv have to understand and appreciate the lineage of those
thinkers who take great pleasure in the ambiguity and indeterminacy of life, and
who do not seek to organise history around artificial boundaries.
Having said that, the end of Grand Narratives is an idea that has taken root in
society, and forces one to consider what implications this may have for the themes
we take interest in. For professionals, it presents the question of whether all this toil
of our hands is just a means of whiling away our time from the moment we are born
to the moment we die?
The UH would not take to this deeply nihilist idea, and may rather propose that
this time is spent in a meaningful way, which then raises questions on what this
means and how it influences our lives?
For professionals, it means that an ethics of professional activities take place in
an even wider ecology than was discussed so far. These activities first include the
complexities of ‘getting the job done’. Then, as was discussed previously, it involves
the complexities of embedding these professional activities in societal, cultural and
natural domains. Lastly, as was argued here, it involves issues how to perform one’s
job in a meaningful way, and that in a time when the possibilities of reward, such as
in an afterlife, for many are no longer certainties.
Roughly speaking, this ‘expansion’ of the ecology of professional activities fol-
lows the ideas of Mode 1-2-3 science that has been proposed by some thinkers
in science and philosophy. ‘Mode-2’ science has been proposed by Helga Nowotny,
Peter Scott, and Michael Gibbons, and is basically a call for recognition that science
has become a societally contextualised knowledge production system, as science is
taking an increasingly strong foothold in societal developments.25
I have argued earlier, that this means that (techno-)science is becoming engineer-
ing in the proper sense, that is, a science that progresses with a deep understanding
of doing, besides the game of knowing (Mode 1). I have also argued that this also
applies, or ought to apply, for the other domains in academia, the social sciences
included. For is an artefact nothing more than a materialised idea? If this move to-
wards the traditions of the crafts is seen as a degradation of academia, then it either
means that they don’t give these traditions their due respect, or instead that academia
should dedicate itself to the stricter rules of the game of knowing, and be very aware
of this.
The idea of Mode-2 knowledge production has been extended to questions con-
cerning normative professionalism, that is, involving the ethical and moral questions
of professional activities and ‘being’ a professional, by Harry Kunneman.26
iv Maybe complexity’s ‘surf-dudes’ is a more appropriate characterisation.
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However, practicality immediately constrains such ideas, for these calls dictate
that professionals become a locus in a complex interaction space, in which the com-
binatorial explosion of the relationships quickly moves beyond individual capabili-
ties. Living up the expectations of Mode-1 production is often challenging enough,
even without these additional threads from Mode-2 and Mode-3 interfering with
one’s work. Even though one may diligently try to incorporate these wider contexts
in one’s work and life, there is only so much that one can reasonably do, and there
is only so much that one can influence.
In terms of PAC, it shows yet again that professional work must take place in
the zone of ambiguity, and the theories and methodologies of professional training
must be supplemented with ‘crafty reason’, in order to sail along these ethical mo-
ments into an uncertain, partially constructed future. Following Atlan, this basically
means that professionals have to appreciate their own mythological sources and his-
tory, which never took the a course along the intellectual elites of ancient Greece
and Rome, monks in isolated monasteries, and the European aristocracy of the Re-
naissance and thereafter.
The professional historical narratives instead, follow the smiths, bakers, farmers,
millers, genie troops and weavers who always had to be deeply aware of their role
in their communities. Professionals have always worked in Mode-2 environments,
and most probably, at least in part, in Mode-3 as well!27
Currently, professionals at least ought to be aware of this, as the communities
have moved beyond interactions directly between person to person, and social net-
works span a global scale, and involve many ties that at best only have a virtual
presence. Our societies currently include many, predominantly invisible ‘others’,
who are ever so often easily reduced to sources of profit and exploitation, to evildo-
ers, or simply hindrances.
Maybe then, the dominant force of academia in education and professional train-
ing in the past century or so, has severed the once obvious ties with professional
ancestry that was still common in the classical tutoring system. In these deeply inter-
connected, dynamic global interaction spaces, knowledge is likely to fall behind, and
especially knowledge that cannot appreciate the pragmatics needed to handle ambi-
guity and uncertainty. Complexity thinking in this sense, for professionals, means
reclaiming their heritage.
With this, the wider ecology of professional work seems to connect to an evolu-
tionary perspective that is not defined by philosophers (of technology) who criticise
the ideas of other philosophers (on the subject of technology), which include those
who came before them. These discourses are usually carried out ‘over the heads’ of
professionals, which could be one reason why these discourses are not very effec-
tive in changing the course of technology. Professionals rather, must (re-)connect
with an older, probably oral, tradition that has been formed by the craftspeople who
worked in their communities, and whose work could never be seen as being indepen-
dent from those communities. But now, with a realisation that this work is carried
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out in global contexts, where the nature of ‘community’ has changed radically.
Returning to the question of an ecology of ethics, one of the first questions of
a distributed epistemological space that hosts the attractors of ‘good’ and ‘evil’,
revolves around the dynamics that take place in-between. Human bias tends to em-
phasize ‘evil’ over the ‘good’, as the latter usually quickly dissolves into the back-
ground. Regarding technology, ‘good’ technology is absorbed into everyday life,
leaving the more problematic aspects of technology exposed as easy targets for crit-
ics who watch these developments from the sideline. But then, of course, maybe this
also feeds the predominant societal operator of technopoiesis.
The quasi-objective nature of such distributed norms and values in various cul-
tures and eras can be seen in the light of its social and evolutionary history, which
provides the common frame of reference for the perceived differences between the
attractors it hosts.
Here, it would seem that the champions of post-modern thought are sometimes
more pre-modern than they like to believe, especially if they season their argumenta-
tions with the adjectives ‘merely’ or ‘just’. If our values are ‘merely’ relativist, if our
life-world is ‘merely’ constructed, do not these thinkers chose a frame of reference
where the higher good still has a universal, everlasting, God-like stature?
Are these people not saying that subjectivity and provisionality are assigned as
being less important or relevant than the universal and timeless ideals, which are no
longer en vogue, but still linger in the background of our social contexts? Is this not
reflected in Dostoyevsky’s outcry:
If God does not exist, then everything is permitted28
Nihilism, borne of the realisation of subjectivity and relativism — and without a
good sense of humour, I might add—, in the end is nothing more than a dark, lethar-
gic nostalgia for God in the face of a paradise lost.29
Of course, nihilism has many faces. There is the vibrant, deeply passionate ni-
hilism of young Nietzsche, as he was passionately riding the waves of ambiguity in
his analysis of the Dionysian.30 At the other end of the gradient, there is the som-
bre, lethargic reminiscing of beacons that have faded, which can no longer guide us
along the treacherous waters of indeterminacy. And between these, there are many
gray-scales.
As we are digressing on the subject of nihilism, it may be good to include a
warning note on being a practitioner of pattern-orientation that probably should be
highlighted and emphasised in the introduction. I once saw a documentary on Dutch
television on the most famous Dutch couple of ballet, Alexandria Radius and Han
Ebbelaar, who were asked if they ever went to a performance by their colleagues.
In all honesty and modesty, they said that they did not, because when they did, they
always found themselves looking at the dance through the eyes of professionals,
assessing the technical details of the ballet, and were therefore unable to appreciate
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the performance as a layman could. Knowledge is the end of mystery, and mastery
is the end of awe.
As the claim here has been that complexity implies operating with limited knowl-
edge, its mysteries will most likely continue to inspire many of us for years to
come. However, the claim was also that patterns percolate far and wide into complex
themes, and those who take an interest in a pattern-orientation will inevitably face
the problems that will see patterns everywhere. Stand-up comedy will be reduced to
endless sequences of people analysing their youth and relationships at nano-scales,
art will be reduced to ‘yet another nude’, or flowers, or abstract strokes on a canvas,
songs to yet another love song, and best-sellers to dead persons and a hero that needs
to solve the mystery of yet another a ghastly murder. A lot of people get killed in
books . . .
The risk of a pattern-orientation therefore is one of a ‘seen it, done it, been there’
attitude, not of an snobbish cut, but instead of a realisation that truly novel patterns
only emerge seldomly, and that generations may go by without any real novel ones
emerging. Worse still, is the risk of missing these rare moments because age and
experience coagulate the brain, and forces of self-preservation make one think that
the world is getting weirder and weirder, and that the really interesting things hap-
pened thirty or more years ago, when the youthful you were in the middle of it. The
warning thus is, that a pattern-orientation and nihilist tendencies go hand-in-hand,
and the cognitive tool provided by nihilism can only be handled by people with a
robust sense of humour.
But what has all this got to do with normative professionalisation?
Consider the following. Suppose you drive up to an engineer who has contributed
to building a bridge and ask if it safe to cross it. The engineer looks at you, then the
bridge, and says, ”Yeah, it’s okay, but remember it’s just or merely a construction”.
I wouldn’t blame you for taking an alternative route!
The point here is that a defeatist attitude is not the attitude of professionals, who
take a deep fulfilment in constructing and creating in these subjective, relativist and
provisional environments. And this sense of fulfilment is much older than the ratio-
nality of postmodernism, for creation has always been a dominant concept in any
religion! Maybe God is a moment, maybe the Aeon is that bright spark that ignites
in friction space!
For professionals, a provisional, subjective, and constructed world is important;
it is valuable. The bridge has been constructed by people who deeply enjoy being
engaged in a creative activity, and a large portion of that joy is derived from the fact
that they are willing to play this game of creation with strict rules and standards
that allow their constructions to be as safe as they can possibly be during their allot-
ted lifetime. These are the essential norms and values that guide the professionals
engaged in construction.
But the ethical moments are consumed by the matter-of-factish trust that people
put in these constructions the moment they drive their cars over them, step into
elevators, planes, or let their children play with toys. It is expressed when creation is
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utilised with a total absence of awe and wonder that those same people may reserve
for a play, a painting, a poem or a novel.
If professionals are to reclaim their heritage, it is not only in realisation of ever-
changing times, but also in the timeless common frame of reference of taking part
in the creative activities of humankind. And these activities go back a long, long
time!
The world of professionals is one of invisible achievement, and if intellectuals
of any era may define, and can exalt in, ‘higher’ goods and values, it is because so
many people are willing to dedicate their lives to produce foodstuff, products and
artefacts that are usually taken for granted, and are just so often put under pressure
for the sake of efficiency and profit maximisation. But every node that is removed in
the foundation of society weakens the structure, and at a certain point will cause the
entire system to collapse. For every node, every social actor, is a gateway of ethical
moments that constitute the fabric of a society.
Now the distributed epistemological space in which the values of ‘good’ and
‘evil’ have taken domicile becomes clear. As generations come and go, these val-
ues have guided every human endeavour, have outlived human individuals, and are
taken up and reshaped with every generation that is initiated in these spaces. They
are expressed differently, but also reinforced as the social contexts change with the
evolution of our collective knowledge, and with the artefacts that are shaped by
them. Despite, or maybe because of this plasticity, these concepts have outlived hu-
man individuals, societies and empires.
Charles Taylor may be right after all, in that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ reside in an onto-
logical space, not because they are an atomic presence beyond humankind, rather
because humankind nourishes, recreates and shares these concepts time and time
again and, each to their own, is willing to respect them as being there. Humankind,
as a collective, continuously reinforce their ‘presence’, and in their wake allow other
attractors to form, like those which determine what is just and unjust, kind and un-
kind, precious and appalling.
As social actors, both at individual levels as well as the levels of groups, need
these values to organise their mutual relationships, there will always be a few values
that take up this role and stand out with respect to others. It is this necessity that
religious orders tap into, as well as current media companies.31 If we then have to
host a number of such values, maybe ‘good’, ‘evil’ ‘ought’, ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ are
more worthwhile in the long run than ‘motorcycle license’, ‘SUV’, ‘shopaholic’ and
the many other attractors that shape our contemporary social domains.
For this fact alone, these hypergoods are not ‘merely’ constructions, they appar-
ently are the necessary constructions that provide coherence and a sense of unity
throughout the evolution of humankind. This is the reason why the anarchists who
think that equality can be achieved by removing leadership are wrong, for some val-
ues will always organise around certain social actors or roles that can be connected
to them. This is also why the many social experiments of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth century were destined to fail; on this distributed epistemological substrate, one
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can replace one society with another, but they will always reorganise around a cer-
tain set of values! Revolutions may reshuffle the context, but the patterns usually
remain the same. And these values are always prone to abuse if a society is not
careful. In the wake of this necessary convergence, there will always be individuals
who will claim control over these values after which a new elite will form, whether
they are aristocrats, robber-barons, comrades, ‘those politicians’, or religious orders.
Their manifestations change, but the patterns remain. And, just to make things clear,
this may also be societally desired!
It is here that the nihilists have provided a cognitive tool that can be very handy:
we can always choose not to be impressed by certain values. This tool is the night-
mare of those who depend on certain values, because those values may evaporate
when a collective disinterest has passed a critical threshold, and the value conse-
quently evaporates into the indeterminate substrate of society. But the theorists of
nihilism tended, as theorists do, to stretch the appliance of this tool towards ev-
erything, leaving the indeterminate substrate bare and exposed only for lethargic
drifters. At the aggregate level, such an attitude cannot hold, for a truly nihilist so-
ciety is no longer a coherent ensemble. Unless, of course, nihilism itself becomes a
dominant value that sufficient people will connect to as a facade of carefully con-
structed disinterest — the epiphany of ‘cool’ in the Seventies—, which recursively
means that this form of nihilism is no longer nihilistic.
I, with some irony, have to claim humility here, for despite all this flirting with
the crafts and professionals, this entire work has of course been one big exercise in
theorising and thinking about patterns, and therefore by now I see them everywhere!
A deformation of the mind . . . , time to do something ‘completely different’! But this
aside . . .
Society’s ‘imperative of responsibility’ is then, at least to decide which values
are more worthwhile than others. If society is constructed, then be engineers and
claim the full pallet of opportunity and responsibility that goes with the job! It needs
guardians who can prevent these values from being abused, and it needs to put all
kinds of deeply practical things into place to make that society robust with respect to
external interferences. Not out of fear, also not conceit, but with a pride that we can
sail these waters, and that we can live up to these challenges. This is what defines
‘professionalism’; it is a statement to the world that one may trust the qualities that
go with the trade. The implementation of this imperative can only be determined
within the contexts of particular societies, and these contexts are also continuously
in flux. Social systems, as Latour already said, is hard, hard work for all of its con-
stituents!
For the purposes here however, I would like to point out that despite the inevitable
parasitic and competitive interventions, it would seem that the attractors of ‘good’,
‘bad’, ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ have obtained a respectable and admirable stability in the
course of human history. Not a bad score, as constructed, relativist concepts go!
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But then, it probably takes a post-anarchist, post-nihilist, neo-cybernetic, post2-
modern engineer, to deeply appreciate this magnificent constructed stability in a
highly indeterminate social interaction space.
2 A Professional Ethics
The question remains; what is valid in guiding professionals in their contributions
towards shaping the indeterminacy of fragile order into an unknown future?
If there is one concept that may serve as a possible opening to answer this ques-
tion, then probably ‘connectedness’ is a good candidate. 32
Now, of course, connectedness has been guiding the argumentation from the start,
and so this concept will inevitably have become transparent. Connectedness is an
implicit characteristic of any systemic approach!
However, connectedness was reinforced as the argumentation deepened, and it
now stresses that we all are much less autonomous than we often like to think, at
least in Western culture. Connectedness has always been a hall-mark of human pro-
gression —-for better or for worse— and we have achieved our current state of being
because we take a place in a distributed epistemological network that allows us to
incorporate the experiences and knowledge of others. All humans are gateways for
interferences in the various interaction spaces we inhabit with others. From the mo-
ment we are born, we are fed with patterns, concepts, norms and values that, if we
are lucky, are aimed to give us a place in a future environment that our educators try
to envision from the framing they currently have. Their success or failure depends
on a lot of things, but in an unknown future, a certain mental flexibility is at least one
characteristic that is worth passing to new generations. Inflexibility and dogma are
never good advisors in a contingent world, although they may work well in stable
times. But then, evolution has already discovered some mechanisms to ensure this,
for is it not the power of youth, to come closest to being the ‘tabula rasa’ of new
times?
With the progression of knowledge, our sense of connectedness increases —
whether we like it or not— and longer threads of propensities take habitat in our
epistemological spaces.
Just the other day, I was watching a sky diver jump out of a plane and float on the
breeze towards earth. This one act, in 2009, raises questions whether personal joy
and fulfilment is worth the ecological traces the plane leaves behind, whether the
fuel spent ought to be spared for more serious causes. Yet again, the sky diver might
also be in the military, or someone else who has to practice in order to fulfil her or his
work. And maybe joy and fulfilment do skip the balance against these other justified
values, for reasons that we cannot envision. As said earlier, the ethics or morality is
not the act in itself; it is rather in the many threads that intertwine and come together
in one person hovering a few hundred meters over a city. The combinatorial explo-
sion of the interferences of these threads, their propensities and disruptions in finite
time and finite means, while the zone of ambiguity is not yet closed. As we get to
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know more about these threads, the nature of sky-diving changes, but also our views
on driving cars, flying to holiday destinations, or to grand, energy-consuming festi-
vals that could power a town, and even mundane acts, such as throwing a cigarette
butt in the sea on a boat tour.v
Ethics then not only differentiates between knowing and ignorance, but also re-
flects back to each individual in caring to acknowledge these threads, and incorpo-
rating them in one’s life, each to their own, moment by moment, event by event. If
there is a responsibility attached to an ethics, it must then at least be one that takes
ownership over these moments.
Or conversely, of course, not caring at all and not giving a damn. But even then,
the main difference is that of choices that are made consciously, or those that are
made implicitly.
2.1 Practical Wisdom
How then does this ‘connectedness’ translate to a normative attitude? How can pro-
fessionals assess whether they are equipped to the best of their abilities to follow the
ethical moments that emerge during their daily professional activities? Can there be
something that can replace a ‘heuristics of fear’? I would like to believe there is, and
I would choose to call this attitude one of practical wisdom.
It would seem that wisdom has gone out of fashion in the Western World, as
youth culture seems to be translated for a desire of continuous ‘partying’, and many
celeb role models seem to be selected for their ability to squander, or for extreme
behaviour, in exaltation of stupidity and self-indulgence. That these become memes
of contemporary society is hardly surprising, as the massive, media-induced ampli-
fications enable and construct equally massive copycat behaviour.33
Of course, these role models are often careful orchestrations, ‘designed’ by those
who have stakes in the business of producing stars and celebrities.34 However, these
constructions would not be very effective if a certain societal context does not ‘close
the loop’ that allows them to become self-reinforcing. The dominant attractors of
any era show the state of a collective ‘consciousness’ in that time, and currently the
combination of extreme wealth and sound knowledge of many challenges that face
us on one side, and the ‘soapification’ of our global community on the other, sug-
gests that in a few centuries from now, our descendants will look back on this era,
and call us who are living today the generations of missed opportunities.
v In Australia, I was once told by a diving instructor that a cigarette butt thrown in the sea near the
Great Barrier Reef can contaminate one square kilometre of coral reef before a fish eats it and later
dies a slow and terrible death of constipation or cancer. I do not know if this is scientific fact, but
it was sufficient to get the smokers on board to use the trash bins.
393
As always, it takes a relative outsider to provide some interesting disruptions on
Western culture. The Asian philosopher Kishore Mahbubani points out that Western
culture has done more than exporting pornography and protestantism with equal
zeal, and that, in the end, the most important contributions of the West to the rest
of the world can be summarised in ‘seven pillars of wisdom’ which are gradually
being taken over in other cultures.35
I will not discuss these seven pillars for it is beyond the purposes here, but it does
put a concept in the spotlight that seems to have been put in the category of ‘square’
somewhere along the past fifty years or so.36
Why then should this practical variant of wisdom be dusted off and be assigned
a place in the workshop of PAC?
If complexity means that our future is fundamentally contingent, and there is a
large portion of uncertainty in the flow from our actions to their expressions in future
contexts, then this means that the only guideline we have is our current knowledge.
However, bias and contextual diminution, amongst others, tend to pre-form our
vision of this future, and the activist attractor of absolutism tends to be an espe-
cially dangerous state that both individuals and groups, or any social actor for that
matter, can get caught in. Now I need to be careful here, for a near obsessive atti-
tude can lead to genius if it is managed correctly, so I would certainly not condemn
this state of being beforehand. However, the attractor of absolutism, when translated
to obsessive behaviour, usually contextualises poorly in reality, as here ambiguity,
polypotency, constraints and, very importantly, the ideas of many different stake-
holders interfere with grand visions, ultimate theories and holy causes.37 Therefore,
constructive work in real contexts should go hand in hand with a certain cautious-
ness with respect to one’s own ideas and goals, and an openness for the disruptions
from others. For believe it or not, they may have a point!
And this is where practical wisdom can play a role, for wisdom is not intel-
ligence, although they both interfere. Practical wisdom is partially about knowl-
edge though, or rather a desire to understand the wider consequences of a choice.
Practical wisdom, above all, is the ability to incorporate multiple points of view,
trying to balance amongst contrary views, being reflexive without it hindering pro-
activeness. This latter issue makes the distinction with ‘regular’ wisdom; practical
wisdom needs to take place in finite time with that what is available at some point.
Practical wisdom in this sense, is navigating the ethical moment, being able to un-
derstand and appreciate the locus in time when progression enters a zone of ambigu-
ity and a future path is not yet determined. It is an attitude that attempts to balance
the middle ground between absolutism and lethargy. And with this, practical wis-
dom folds back to ethics and morality, for it basically describes the cognitive tools
that are needed to navigate through friction domains that are morally and ethically
charged.
It incorporates the humility of not knowing and never being able to know how a
future path proceeds exactly, without stopping dead in one’s tracks. It is about doing
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the best one can, given certain circumstances and certain knowledge.
Now, normative professionalism has truly been replaced by normative profes-
sionalisation, for normative professionalism suggests a certain state of ‘being’ for a
professional, while professionalisation refers to a process which is never completed,
and has to be re-evaluated and renegotiated time and time again. Complexity, sadly
maybe, is not about ten steps to becoming successful, or ‘secrets’ that purport to
do the same. Complexity is about ‘being grounded’ in reality, and hopefully about
enjoying the creative game of freedom and constraints, that this reality has to offer.
A few days ago, I read an article in the newspaper about a CEO of a major
Dutch insurance company. One of his business friends considered him ‘someone
who always wants to win [. . . ], and therefore makes a great leader’.
I immediately found myself wondering against whom this man was competing.
Was he competing against his customers —bleeding them dry—, and did his alleged
competitors know they were engaging in a competition of some sort? Do I want to
be a customer of a company of such a moral signature? Do we really want leaders
who are so single-minded?
Practical wisdom rather would differentiate amongst different causes, apply dif-
ferent interaction patterns under different circumstances, and in different contexts.
It would certainly appreciate one’s strengths, but not at the expense of becoming a
one-trick pony. It would also support awareness for one’s limitations, as an opening
for change and continuous learning. This would be another defining characteristic
of normative professionalisation; a will to learn!
However, practical wisdom in densely connected interaction spaces also takes
one extra turn. In PAC, the traditional way of looking at a target, and assigning it
certain properties or characteristics, has been replaced by threads that flow between
target and observer, in this case the CEO of a major Dutch company and myself.
As a result, the flows are reflected back to one individual —myself— and an ethical
moment has opened for me to do something, to make a choice. The question is not
(only) whether a CEO is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in having certain qualifications, whether
it is ‘just’ that such a person is a CEO, or whether it ‘ought’ to be this way. Such
assessments are beyond the view of an external observer. The question also is, how
it reflects back on myself, and how it disrupts my current ideas with respect to pos-
sible future scenarios of my ‘being’ in a real world?
Practical wisdom also has another aspect that makes it interesting as a guid-
ing principle for a normative professionalisation. Practical wisdom can be more or
less assessed externally. More correctly probably, a lack of practical wisdom of-
ten exposes itself clearly. Celebrity Worship Syndrome, briefly mentioned earlier,
is a clear display of lack of practical wisdom by both the celebrities as well as
those who obsessively follow their every move.38 Lack of practical wisdom follows
CEOs who aim for bigger bonuses every year, techno-positivists who consistently
downplay valid concerns for the interests of profit, an electorate who blame all the
perceived problems of society on certain groups of people, theorists who cannot be-
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lieve that reality follows its own agenda, and all those others who express obsessive,
narrowed-down behaviour in real, ambiguous contexts, and refuse to believe that
maybe there is more to those issues than meets the eye.
It is here that the distinction between intelligence and wisdom becomes crisp,
for this small selection drawn from actuality involves quite a lot of very intelligent
people!
Such tendencies can take hold in certain contexts, for it is the nature of positive
feedback loops to produce values that ‘stand out’ against a certain background, but
in real contexts they almost inevitably deteriorate other vital aspects of the social
fabric when they start to dominate. Practical wisdom does not question the exis-
tence of these strong attractors, but rather questions whether they should be exalted,
hyped, and glorified, or rather if they should be monitored closely to see if other
vital aspects of society are put under pressure.
Practical wisdom should raise all the alarm bells when these manifestations of the
attractor of absolutism take hold, for the self-assured, dominant attitude that follows
the one-liners and the oversimplifications is often mistaken for ‘leadership’. For this
kind of leadership the famous maxim applies; ‘be careful what you’re hoping for,
because it just may come true!’. The good may dissolve into the background quite
quickly, but it is usually direly missed when it has been swept away by constructions
based on oversimplifications.
Practical wisdom warns us when the attractor of absolutism starts to converge
towards certain values that float around in a society, and begins to dominate. It is
here that society, as a collective, can take a responsibility, for we always have the
choice to not be impressed by those values, and choose others instead.
For professionals, practical wisdom covers the best an ethics can do in a post-
modern world.
Being an amateur in ethics —but aren’t we all?—, I would certainly not urge
the reader to take up this normative attitude based on the premise of this rough
sketch alone. Rather, practical wisdom should be seen as yet another side-arm of
the river through complexity that has been traversed all along. For practical wisdom
as an ethical guideline in a complex world is voiced more often, and probably more
eloquently, by others.
3 Ethical Complexity
If the previous analysis is more or less correct, and human society is becoming a
global community where humankind also has to take up a global moral and ethical
responsibility, then simple combinatorics would suggest that we will be in need of
practical wisdom, and a lot of it!
But the analyses offered by PAC suffer a major drawback, which is that they are
based upon what is possible rather than what ought to be possible.
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The ‘ethics of PAC’ is not really an ethics in the proper sense of the word,
but rather describes the substrate on which certain values form, without specify-
ing which values ought to be cherished and nurtured. PAC can point out practical
constraints and limitations related to justified causes, but cannot say much about
what these causes ought to be. In the end, PAC is still a vocabulary from the crafts,
and not of those which are struggling with questions such as where certain devel-
opments are going, and where they ought to be going. This is where ethics takes
over in the proper sense of the word, and complexity moves into domains that are
best left to those who can and will dedicate their professional lives to studying and
thinking about these matters, often within specific contexts.
Practical wisdom however, does return in the vocabulary of some philosophers
who dedicate themselves to these issues, voiced for instance through the French
philosopher Paul Ricoeur, but described in terms of complexity by Harry Kunne-
man, in ‘dia-poiesis’ with South-African philosopher Paul Cilliers, who was already
given extensive attention in chapter nine. Kunneman’s ‘ethical complexity’ gives
more embodiment to the ‘distributed epistemological spaces’ that has been guiding
the analysis of PAC into social domains. Kunneman sees some limitations in the
analysis of complexity theorists like Cilliers, regarding the complexity of ethics:
They flow not only from the focus on general characteristics shared by all complex sys-
tems, but also from the concomitant, implicit commitment to an epistemology privileging
cognitive forms of modeling and obfuscating the specific form of insight into the complex
reality of human relations provided by narrative forms of modeling, especially the ethical
and moral insights which can emerge from narrative ‘thought experiments and explorations
in the realm of good and evil’39
This, as was said earlier, is also a limitation of the approach taken here. A little later,
he argues:
On the basis of my complexity informed interpretation of Ricoeur’s views we can say that
such an autopoietic form of ‘cognitive’ reality construction belongs to the ‘basic repertory’
of living beings, but does not embody the only nor the necessary way of relating to ‘their’
environment. Just as physical and chemical processes keep going on within their bodies and
between their bodies and other entities after the death of living beings, so autopoietic pro-
cesses go on after the breakdown of dia-poie`tic forms of relating to others. In the same way
as life embodies another, emergent form of organization vis-a-vis physical and chemical
processes, so dia-poie`tic relations embody an emergent form of organization with regard to
the autopoietic processes out of which they emerge. Thus, there exists indeed a break or a
gap between these two forms of organization, these two forms of ‘poiesis’ of living beings,
as the proponents of the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ do not tire to point out. However:
these two forms of organisation are not only separated by a gap, this gap also gives rise to
new forms of mediation. It is here that Ricoeur’s analysis of the narrative mediation between
the Idem and the Ipse pole of personal identities offers a conceptual renewal [. . . ]40
For the purposes here, it suffices to point out that many of the themes that have been
discussed in the previous chapters, are now gauged towards ‘narratives’, ‘personal
identities’ and other forms of complex interactions and phenomena that are uniquely
and truly human. It is in these complex, deeply human, friction spaces that practical
wisdom is exhibited in moral judgement:
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According to Ricoeur, in such situations they have to recur again to the notion of the good
life and the practical wisdom exhibited in moral judgments allowing adequate action in
specific, unique situations, but now a practical wisdom ‘purified’ so to speak by the univer-
salizing perspective of ‘justice for all’. At this point not only the way in which the narrative
figuration of identities mediates between Idem and Ipse becomes clear, but also the full
complexity of ethically complex relations. The practical wisdom required for morally re-
sponsible judgments and concomitant actions in concrete situations, is contingent on the
outcome of the tensed interaction between two elements: on the one hand the ‘habitual
weight’ and the identifications embodied in the idem-identities of the persons involved; on
the other hand the ethical and moral appeal connected with their ipse-identities. Practical
wisdom, justice and ipse-identities reveal themselves to be internally connected, as emer-
gent qualities contingent both on the narrative mediation of Idem and Ipse on the personal
level and on the ethical and moral richness (or poverty!) of the narrative traditions and
cultural frameworks available to the persons involved41
At this stage, the game of PAC has to let go, and can only point out the ongoing con-
tinuity of complexity that is being addressed in these specific contexts, and beyond
the complexity that demarcated the scales of the enquiry that guided PAC.
It was the aim of PAC to develop a vocabulary that would bridge the gap be-
tween C.P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’, and for now the last bolt has been tightened on
the foundations that have been prepared on the banks of the humanities, but now
with a strong message from ‘the other side’, that the many patterns that are known
there still percolate through these specific forms of narrative, ethical and moral com-
plexities.
A ‘raw’, unrefined practical wisdom, for instance, already sees many ethi-
cally charged frictions between a ‘universalizing perspective of justice for all’ and
scarcity. Since King Solomon, we know that wisdom often means making tough de-
cisions, and complexity itself is warning us that there are no simple one-liners, such
as ‘justice for all’, that can be a guiding principle for all contingencies that face us.
But being an engineer, I also know that work without ideals and vision is usually
quite empty, and as long as visionaries do not disrespect the practical side of things,
both can contribute to an idealism that is both effective and robust.
I will leave these particular interferences to those who are willing to pick up
the gauntlet, and who want to intensify the friction spaces between morality and
practicality. Here rather, I would like to turn back to matters of normative profes-
sionalisation in technology.
4 An Ethics of Technology
As I have tried to point out earlier, technology has always followed its own paths
through human history, and even though theoretical, academic work has become in-
creasingly important in the technology’s current itinerary, it would be rather narrow
and biased to consider theory as being a dominant aspect in this progression. The
narrowness of this view is specifically present in the differences in normative atti-
tudes between the cultures of knowing and doing, which was already discussed ear-
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lier. Regarding technological activities, a Mode 1-2-3 context can now be sketched
around our theme of choice.
It had already been pointed out on many occasions that the theoretical and prac-
tical aspects to technoscience have always floated around each other ever since ex-
perimentation was introduced in academia, and debates regarding the desirability of
theoretical correctness on one hand, and experimental exploration on the other, will
probably always be recurring themes in techno-scientific progress. With the conver-
gence inducing process and contextual diminution, I hope it has become clear why I
think, that these two positions should remain in each other’s orbit. Conservative and
progressive approaches are not oppositions, but ideally they complement each other.
Currently there are many philosophers and scientists, such as Daniel Dennett and
Herbert Simon, who believe that complex themes require an ‘engineering perspec-
tive’, and being an experimenter myself, I am strongly biased towards this idea,
although I do suggest that if one makes such a statement, it should be important
to make clear what this ‘engineering perspective’ is. The academics will, as their
bias goes, mainly refer to the engineering methodologies, the ways of dealing with
complexity and so on; in other words, those aspects related to knowing, and finding
out how something works.
However, as was said earlier, the aspect of engineering that it shares with most,
if not all, professional activities, is related to acting in natural and societal settings.
This was my choice of distinction between engineering and technoscience, and this
distinction is most crisp in the normative aspects of ‘being’ an engineer, or profes-
sional, or craftsman, or scientist.
The archetypal scientist wants to know things, and the deepest fulfilment is to
find out how something works, why things behave in the way they do, or to chart
unknown terrain and make it accessible for others. Besides the narrower concep-
tions of such activities, captured in theories, frameworks, methodologies and so on,
a wider context surrounds these, which includes the culture in which these episte-
mological activities take place, the beliefs and rationalities which shape them, and
the do’s and don’ts of that culture, such as whether or not to grant research leaders
first or second authorship of your hard work, the prices for the talented, and the
‘must-publish’ journals.
Surrounding this, there is an even wider context, and this at least in part shapes
the joy, but also the irritation, of the day-to-day activities of performing. This wider
context partially determines what makes these activities ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and even
though it interferes with the other layers, it has some qualities that do not allow
themselves to be described in methodologies, procedures and rules of conduct. This
includes the irritation one feels of contributions from colleagues that, in your convic-
tion, are sub-standard, the ability or inability you sense in your supervisor to really
understand what you’re doing, the lack of research grants that you think should be
allotted to your research discipline, or the acknowledgement it receives from the
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general public. This outer layer includes emotions, sentiments and other deeply an-
cient sources of bias and guidance that influence any human activity.
This also includes the deep satisfaction one feels when discovering something,
or suddenly seeing order in the epistemological swamps.
It is here that the ambiguity between techno-science and engineering moves into
a crisp distinction. The sense of achievement of a professional, I think, is not in
the order per se, rather it is in seeing that things act out as intended. The ideas,
theories, plans, strategies may have been developed by others, but a professional
will feel enthralled by the adjustments to specific circumstances, the changes that
were applied, by intuition, experience and luck, and then seeing that things do what
they were supposed to do. Professionals cannot afford to be satisfied with theory
alone, for if the theories are correct, but the ship still sinks, then they still end up
with nothing. Theories typically ignore what they cannot explain, but this attitude
cannot hold in practical settings. For professionals, their activities and their sense of
achievement therefore, usually converge to the now famous maxim of ‘failure is not
an option’. This is the distinction between target and model —uncertainty—, and
the reason why professionals always work in complex environments.
If ethics and morality hover around processes of choice, they must include the
guilt (or lack of it) of seeing a wrong choice spell disaster, but will also value the
moment when everything works out as expected, when the personal situation and
the conditions of the surroundings result in a favourable or successful intervention.
It includes not wanting to know, of contextual diminution, and of constraints that
limit the choices, such as corporate pressure or power-play.
Normative professionalisation guide the moments when one has to make a
choice, the knowledge one has about consequences and alternatives, about means
and constraints, seeing irreversibility play out once the choice is made, and learning
the lessons that are communicated as the changes are contextualised in reality. It is
the act of claiming responsibility for that choice, through preparation and prediction.
The ‘imperative of responsibility’ for a professional is not one of fear, but instead
one of claiming the co-evolution of knowing and acting, which orbits around the
attractors in which her professional activities take place.
This is the professional’s normative pride, the realisation that she is the medium
in which these moments can contextualise. It is not her bodily presence, or the at-
tachment of her deeds to her identity, but rather her being witness to the fact that
training, experience and circumstances come to fruition. This does not apply to the
professional individual alone, but also the team, department, company and society,
all of which face their share of choice and knowledge of the potential consequences.
It is this very practical ethics and morality that is in fact being performed daily, by
various stakeholders who are all all caretakers of different knowledge domains, and
ought to take their responsibility of the knowledge they hold, and the means they
have to communicate this with others who share the world they live in.
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5 One Extra Bolt
With ‘friction spaces’, ‘distributed epistemology’ and ‘diapoie`sis’, we can at least
catch a glimpse of one possible direction of the co-evolution of humankind and the
global environment we inhabit. The ‘universalizing perspective of justice for all’
seems sympathetic, but will encounter severe friction from issues such as scarcity
and deeply self-interested agents. How does this perspective hold against their dis-
ruptive influence? how robust is this idea?
I would propose an alternative ‘universalizing perspective’ which I would con-
sider already being shaped in the past two decades, and which immediately reflects
back to the trans-humanist agenda of ‘infinite intelligence’ that was discussed pre-
viously.
If there is one possible feasible scenario for enhancing intelligence, or con-
sciousness, artificially, it will most probably not be an intelligence that focuses on
single human minds, but instead on the increasing connections between these hu-
man minds. Currently these interconnections are becoming more dense and more
complex. With high-speed connections world-wide, and relentless technological
progress in Information Technology, the number and organisation of these inter-
connections are intensified, and are currently already (almost) globalised.
Concurrently, the first generations which were born and raised in these intercon-
nected worlds are maturing, with virtual friends and enemies and online and offline
presences. It stands to reason that for these people, singular attractors, such as ‘na-
tion state’, ‘corporate identities’ and ‘great names’ are of less importance because
they get their information, theories and identities from everywhere, in fragmentary
and provisional bits and pieces. They shop for ideas and visions, and they replace
them with the click of a button. Previous generations which were forced to make
the transition into this world may frown at these developments, and maybe for good
reasons, but at the same time it must be clear that we are moving into contexts which
require such skills, and those who grow up in them cannot do anything else but fol-
low these developments.
Currently, it would seem that the competition for dominant attractors is still very
much formed by classic social and economical forces, but information is leaking
out everywhere and posing serious challenges for singular dominating attractors, as
legal intervention and monopolisation becomes more difficult.
In these new virtual worlds, cooperative interactions, such as embodied in the
open-source movement and also in social networks, have proven to be persistent
and growing. Besides this, theories on co-operation are currently calling the dom-
inant ‘machismo’ narratives in science to challenge, although a universal ‘law of
co-operation’ that would describe the progressive force that builds on Kauffman’s
‘genesis of forms’, is still highly uncertain.
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If I were to propose a candidate law, then I would look at the co-evolution of
a system and its environment, and would see a rather simple form of feedback at
work. If actors find themselves challenged by their environment, and the challenge
is such that it cannot be handled individually, then co-operation is the only option
those entities have at their disposal. Co-operation is, in essence, the formation of a
system from a grouping. I am not talking ‘the sum is more than its parts’ here, for
‘the sum is the parts’ is often more than sufficient. The emergence of novelty that
the former suggests, is feasible however, because of feedback between aggregate
and its constituents, and has been amply demonstrated in networks.42
This would be my choice candidate law for the creative force that travels with
Darwinian evolution. This story is not described by natural selection and compe-
tition. And we are only now beginning to understand this particular thread. It also
acknowledges learning as an evolutionary necessity.
As the global infrastructure is being put in place, which enables the formation
of co-operative strategies that transcends an individual’s scope, and this at an un-
precedented scale in human history, we may envision the formation of a subsequent
‘global consciousness’ or ‘global intelligence’ which needs the challenges from an
environment to come to expression. The question thus becomes, whether we, as a
collective, will become sufficiently intelligent to deal with these challenges?
It would seem that this global intelligence is currently not very well adapted to
face the challenges of our times, as it tends to ‘fall back’ to the whims of its con-
stituents, whether these are corporations, nation states, individuals, or to singular
causes and beliefs. Ray Kurzweil complained that much of our state of being is
‘petty and circumscribed’, which I think at individual level is not necessarily prob-
lematic or undesired —it is probably a good thing to take a break from serious causes
every now and then—, but it is probably rather sad that it currently also applies for
much of our collective endeavours. We may face judgement from future generations
that the generations which were living at the turn of the second millennium, were
pretty sub-standard, especially since we could have known better. We have some
serious problems facing us, but only few manage to mobilise our collective talents
in order to tackle them effectively.
However, it is also my assessment that the combination of this densely connected
infrastructure on which a collective consciousness can form, in combination with
the generations which are growing up with its possibilities, also show that we are
living in very interesting times with exciting opportunities. The new generation is
trained in drawing from multiple sources in order to address the challenges they face.
Their identities are formed in distributed networks that overlap with those of others.
They are not formed by singular ideals, gods, theories or thinkers; they themselves
are dispersed, global presences, while simultaneously remaining anchored in real,
localised life-worlds. New ideas and creative processes are spreading complex pat-
terns to the corners of our globe that contextualise in different cultures, and merge
with different minds.
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Currently the bowels of the Internet, formed by blame-and-shame forums and
the many forms of virtual pillories and cucking stools are getting a lot of attention.
In this world, where human individuals are continuously being bombarded with
information about what to do, what to think, what to improve, the optimal curve of
contextual diminution becomes steeper and steeper, increasing the chance to slide
off either way. In defence of the bloated beings that purportedly are inhabiting the
public space, I can understand that ‘self’ becomes the only reliable anchor in this
constant uproar of voices and opinions, and that ignorance, especially of the wider
consequences of one’s acts, becomes an enticing strategy to clear the head.43
However, in the background the more subdued processes of creation and co-
operation are also at work, usually making the more significant changes in the long
run. Names come and go, and in the massiveness of the Internet, the soapified global
order only creates fame-and-shame in time-spans of nanoseconds and these events
are shared with thousands of others simultaneously. We all have a choice to not be
impressed, and choose our own values!
Many are also collaborating in relative obscurity on novel ideas and innovations.
These people have one reassurance, and that is these innovations often are more
lasting than the many names that are being produced today.
Maybe then, just maybe, there is a possibility in the near future of an emergence,
not of global intelligence, but rather of global wisdom.
Chapter 13
Epilogue
”The strange thing about the theory of evolution is that everyone thinks he understands it”
This quote from one of the Huxleys, and recalled by Stuart Kauffman in ‘Investiga-
tions’, seems to be as true today as it was sixty years ago.1 My feeling has always
been that the same applies to feedback, and as this journey of PAC progressed I
got the feeling that both are related; selection without process does very little, and
process without feedback is usually not very interesting. Feedback is the source of
reflexivity, of organisation, self-referentiality and at least one of the sources of com-
plexity.
In the past chapters I have taken up the role of a tour guide along a river through
a complex landscape, and the river was called feedback. As any good tour-guide,
my aim was to get an audience to see more than ‘just’ a flow of water through a
certain landscape, but instead show how this flow interacts with its environment and
how the interferences at the banks of this river make things happen that are so eas-
ily overlooked by those who are just taking the ride to see the recommended sites.
In the case of complexity, these highlights are ‘emergence’, ‘autopoiesis’ and other
buzz-words that outrank the humble concept of ‘feedback’ that everybody thinks
they understand. As we have reached our preliminary destination, I hope that it has
become clear that we are only starting to understand feedback, especially in the form
when we as observers become part of processes of feedback.
I will quickly re-iterate the journey in order to highlight the main threads that
were followed. First, a crude model was drawn that consisted of system, environ-
ment and observer, and a promise was made that I would recursively revisit these
concepts time and time again as we would follow the downstream flows. These flows
would protrude the landscape of complexity, as flows and landscape are ultimately
connected; landscape shapes the flows and vice-versa. This co-creation was radi-
calised by the ‘concept-context’ duality that has been consistently re-applied time
and time again, in almost a meditative fashion. Context is one of those other con-
cepts that everybody ‘thinks they understand’.
As flows go, they usually start somewhere and end elsewhere. In terms of com-
plexity, this introduces scaling to the methodology that is developed. Descriptive
vocabularies that aim to capture certain order in the landscape of complexity only
have a certain explanatory reach, and so the idea that there is one principle operator
that produces our life-world only seems to lead to fragile vocabularies, of which I
consider some ‘theories’ to be one specialisation, at least when they are based on
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a singular principle or idea. The transition of mathematical vocabularies to visual
graphs in computer science and other engineering disciplines was brought in as one
of the most striking boundaries of scale of formal languages which, following Wein-
berg’s pattern of organised complexity, seem to get increasing problems the more it
moves away from the plane of organised simplicity.
Following the research of mathematical complexity thinkers, one could see how
the vocabularies of symbolic logic have been extended with new concepts in order
to address complexity, and now ‘uncertainty’, ‘chaos’ and other words have become
commonplace where it would have been tabooed less than a century ago.
However, following others who have drawn similar conclusions, I have argued
here that these extensions are still restricted, as they aim to capture one of the most
essential concepts of complexity, which was called ‘ambiguity’, ‘uncertainty’ or ‘in-
determinacy’ in a straightjacket of order. Rather I have argued that indeterminacy is
the foundation on which order can emerge. Following Edgar Morin and especially
Henri Atlan, this ‘Metis prerequisite’ then became the source of the journey through
complexity, in which the ‘water metaphor’ became both appropriate as powerful, be-
cause of Atlan’s insistence that these provide the mythical sources of craft, craftiness
and craftspeople. As the flows through the landscape of complexity now became a
matter of navigating through ‘moments of order’ captured by the theories of certain
disciplines in science and philosophy, the ‘vocabulary of PAC’ now could be consid-
ered an attempt of ‘crafty reason’ to by-pass old debates in science and philosophy,
by introducing new words to describe certain phenomena, and thus ‘disrupt’ these
discourses that are necessarily captured by their own preferred idioms.
With the craft(iness) prepared to travel Metis’ waters, the flows could now be
followed, and the idiom of mathematical complexity was expanded with the notion
of patterns, that have been argued as being the fabric that ‘(in)forms’. With patterns
carrying the properties of both order and ambiguity, the source of the latter could
traced as already being present in the process of ranking, and it was argued that
this aspect is trivialised in symbolic representations, and therefore symbolic pro-
duction systems will always be taken by surprise by ambiguity, most notably when
the production system ‘folds back’ into itself, and creates its own context, as was
demonstrated by Kurt Go¨del. The concept of ‘everything’ has been argued as be-
ing a practical impossibility of any descriptive vocabulary of our life-world, for no
vocabulary can describe ‘everything’, certainly not while excluding sources of un-
certainty. This may have been a major ‘blindness’ of both science and philosophy in
the past, and has always been a major challenge when theory is ‘put to practice’. The
more fragile (aesthetically orderly) the theory, the more likely it will fail in practical
settings, when organised complexity beats into the implicit assumptions, biases and
the conveniently left-out. With this, as was argued, theory has become subject to
concepts such as ‘fragility’ and ‘robustness’.
By developing a pattern library based on the concept of feedback, quite a number
of issues that are usually considered either in isolation or as opposition, could be
described with certain coherence. ‘Facts’, ‘norms’ and ‘values’ could be blended
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with ‘observation’, ‘knowing’, ‘doing’, ‘reality’, ‘ontology’ and ‘epistemology’,
that now all served as buoys along which the threads flow, and which Metis’ craft
must navigate. In all these, these conceptual markers or tags serve as certain attrac-
tors which demarcate the boundaries through which the optimal curves are posi-
tioned. Crafty reason therefore implies staying somewhere in-between these mark-
ers rather than identifying one’s cause too starkly with one or the other, at least
when addressing complexity. Oppositions may still exist, but they should no longer
be assumed implicitly.
Perhaps one of the most ‘crafty’ moves attempted in PAC, was to take the themes
of the ‘lingua democratica’ in relationship to ‘the public debate in genomics’ as
pivotal markers of the course that was plotted out. These two themes forced us to
consider the concepts of complexity as being produced by a complex system that
is normally called ‘theorising’. In other words, every concept that is added to the
vocabulary of PAC inevitably feeds back to the production system of PAC. The
importance of this was exemplified by one of the first contemplations:
What does it mean for science, when science itself, through cognitive psychology, proves
that our minds are creating illusions of that reality what science purports to describe?
Rather than using this self-referential problem to triumphantly proclaim the end of
science, or any other intellectual enquiry aimed at understanding things, PAC has
aimed to argue that patterns are an important means of by-passing this problem. Al-
though PAC, with considerable pleasure, sought inspiration in the most mundane of
phenomena and devices and the most trivial of observations, from ‘details’ to light
switches, the eventual complexity of PAC was never intended to be done by blowing
up certain phenomena by intellectual games, but rather by pointing out what hap-
pens if these little things are taken up in feedback loops that embrace ambiguity.
Intellectual activities may be subject to the results of these self-referential pro-
cesses, but patterns offer a window to understand ‘what is happening to us’ when
taken up in these referential loops. This, eventually allowed an understanding of
some fierce discourses at the interface of biology and the social, as well as provided
an opening to better understand the requirements and the necessity of collabora-
tive approaches, when the complexity of a theme passes a certain threshold, such as
was described by a ‘lingua democratica’. PAC, by following a ‘disruptive course’
through various domains in science and philosophy, aimed at contributing to such
attempts in a more or less coherent and informed manner. With PAC, a certain theme
can be seen as a locus of ‘threads’ that move in and out of it, start and stop, or are
taken up in a mesh with other threads. Through these threads moments of causality,
propensities and other flows interact and constitute that what an observer simply
sees as an object, phenomenon, theme or whatever other singular description is as-
signed to it.
With this, patterns have become another pivotal concept. This concept also tends
to be used callously, and even in those areas where they are actively used, to my
knowledge there currently is little methodological and philosophical reflection on
what a ‘pattern’ is. In the landscape of complexity we have explored, I have chosen
406
to see and describe them as the sources of order (when informed), of ‘threads’ that
weave a fabric on this landscape into domains that are more and more complex.
I have also argued that theories are patchworks of similar threads, nothing more,
nothing less.
As patterns interfere with other threads, they ‘take up form’ and these interfer-
ences allow us to observe and to know them. The same patterns therefore take up
different forms as they interfere in different contexts, just like the waves in realm of
Metis are always different and yet remain waves.
Following these, and other threads that interfere, I eventually aimed to travel to
stakeholders and technology, with a slight bias towards gen-technology. The main
stakeholders were the techno-sciences, the humanities —with a slight bias towards
philosophy—, and professionals.
All these stakeholders engage in observation, and observation necessarily skews
because of ranking, and related to this, introduce bias and amplification. In the game
of PAC, every observer has to delicately balance between rigidness and meaning-
lessness, and no-one can claim an exclusive angle on knowing a certain aspect of re-
ality completely. It is the interferences between stakeholders that span a distributed
epistemological network which allows humankind to lay a mesh of order over a fun-
damentally complex reality.
It requires a lot of qualities to make a good tour-guide, and only the audience can
asses if they consider the journey a worthwhile one. I have made giant strides while
doing so and this can be criticised, but there is only so much one person can do in
a certain timeframe, and PAC never aimed to create ‘theories’ or ‘frameworks’ in
the first place. PAC is a vocabulary of ‘disruptive knowledge’ that provides pointers
to the scientific areas where this knowledge is produced, and where the isomor-
phisms between these theories and the targets they address can be verified. PAC
also started to list the means and constraints one has to critically assess this knowl-
edge in terms of implicit bias, coherence, robustness, context, linearity and so on.
Rugged though PAC may seem, I do think that it has been demonstrated that at
some points it can offer more detailed ways of analysis than many current criticisms
from mono-disciplinary, or bounded interdisciplinary domains. It hopefully also has
brought new concepts to theory itself, such as fragility, robustness and refactoring.
This is only a first draft! Just imagine what may happen when this idea is picked
up by various domain experts and pattern libraries start to be developed and shared!
This first survey suggests that, on one hand, the subsequent methodology relaxes a
lot of theories and approaches by omission of preciseness, and on the other hand it
constrains through requirements of coherence and robustness.
I think this collaborative approach is also appropriate for the current era of virtual
global communities, bloggers and otherwise, and especially those who grew up in
this world, and have never known one without these forms of communication. This
world asks for coarse, but effective vocabularies, instead of detailed, foggy analy-
ses, for theory without an audience is still of little use. Detail is still important, but
in a complex world, the level of detail is always the observer’s prerogative and not
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a methodological law. For those who enjoy fine-grained analysis –go for it!- but
please don’t claim methodological superiority; that is just a psychological illusion.
Others will just fail to see it and do their own thing.
With the Internet, and especially the open-source movement, the distributed epis-
temological domains currently span a global mesh. The Internet is also showing the
limitations of criticism as means to advance knowledge, for one only needs to look at
the many, many forums where the underbelly of human opinions can freely express
themselves, and which hardly contribute for a constructive dialogue. This is entirely
different, but I am speaking purely out of personal experience here, in open-source
debates, where many different amateurs with different backgrounds and expertise,
freely disrupt the ideas of others. These virtual friction spaces are one of the most in-
teresting experimental areas where ideas of (lack of) communications and dialogues
can be researched. This particular contribution has focused on patterns and pattern
libraries as means of connection of different cultures, ideas and disciplines.
Regarding the lingua democratica, the analogy with the craftsperson may be
more appropriately replaced with that of a team of expert professionals assemble
around a certain theme. I have predominantly focused on engineers, but I think
many other professionals will recognise the friction of having to work with experts
with other backgrounds to achieve something.
And it is here that a last thread was woven in the tarpan, and this thread weaves
towards normative professionality. This thread started from selections, through sig-
nificance and ranking in observation to values that act as attractors in a distributed
epistemological space that is at least one of the constituents of the fabric we call
‘culture’. This thread circumvented the traditional dichotomy between ‘facts’ and
‘norms’, not because this distinction is unimportant or incorrect, but rather because
in PAC they had become subject to pattern and context.
If this space interferes with professional activities, that is when theories, ideas
and methods contextualises in a certain reality, this requires a certain ethics that is
different to the ethics of ‘knowing’. And here, the distinction I have maintained be-
tween ‘engineering’ and ‘technoscience’ becomes important.
Professionalism revolves around a sense of pride of seeing that things act out
as intended. This commitment of making things work as expected is not necessar-
ily something that techno-scientists are educated and trained in, and as they are
increasingly acting out in a wider environment than university campuses, certain
friction between their cultural framing and the requirements of this wider domain
of interference may become problematic. I already addressed the friction between
an acceptable success rates in a laboratory, which may be totally and completely
insufficient when acted out in a social, and I would say, also in a natural context.
And yet, sociologists become, implicitly or explicitly, ‘social engineers’, economists
become ‘economic engineers’, biologists become ‘genetic engineers’, and all are
invited to political advisory boards, start commercial enterprises, and otherwise act
out beyond the confines of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, based on theories
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that have not been tested and prepared for standards converging to the attractor of
‘failure is not an option’.2 It is my estimate that a lot of sound policy can be made
on new technology by simply demanding that this ideal is approximated, for it is
simply an ideal that has shaped engineering throughout the ages. There is no need
for ethical reflection to achieve this, or, maybe more correctly, policies based on
this approximation will buy time for ethical reflection on those technologies. It is
also my assessment, that this message, placed in a historical context, should be one
of the essential focal points of STS programmes in technology. When professionals
enter the corporate world, then many, many things take place beyond their grasp.
The most obvious reasons in organisational hierarchies, and contextual diminution
between various stakeholders.
Normative professionality implies taking ownership of that moment when one
has to make a choice, the knowledge one has about consequences and alternatives,
about means and constraints, and seeing irreversibility play out once the choice is
made. It is also about learning the lessons that are communicated as the change
is contextualised in reality. It is the act of claiming responsibility for that choice,
through preparation and prediction.
The professional’s normative pride, is in the realisation that she is the medium
in which the ethical moment can contextualise. Her being witness of the fact that
training, experience and circumstances come to fruition. This does not apply to the
professional individual alone, but also the team, department, company and society
who all face their share of choice and knowledge of the potential consequences. It
is this very practical ethics and morality that in fact is being performed daily, by
various stakeholders who all are all caretakers of different knowledge domains and
who all take their responsibility of the knowledge they hold and the means they have
to communicate this with others that share the world they live in.
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Notes for Chapter 1
1: [143], pp. 194-195. Dutch. He actually uses the Dutch phrase
‘leerzame wrijving’, which literally, but also poorly, translates to
‘informative friction’ or ‘educational friction’. This matches well with
the focus he normally has. His preferred English translation is ‘fruitful
friction’ [58], but as I am already projecting towards evolutionary
mechanisms, ‘creative friction’ seems a more enticing translation.
2: [271], pp. 49-82. The issues concerning Genomics would by now
fill a library of impressive size. The aims of the MCG are concisely
recorded in the booklet that was written after a conference they organ-
ised in 2006 called ‘Complex debate-genomics and society’. This book-
let opens with:
Perpetrator profiles based on DNA traces. . . prenatal screening and predictive
medicine. . . cleaner industry. . . nutritious potatoes that are more resistant to
disease. . .
3: [142] .
4: [202] . This conference article describes the theory behind symbiotic
interactions. An application of the theory is described in [203]. It will
be given more attention at a later stage.
5 ‘Pragmatic’ is used in the colloquial sense of the word! Philosophy
seems to have a tendency to hi-jack words and phrases, and pragma-
tism, since Dewey, seems to have become somewhat contaminated. It
is like a mathematicians asking someone ‘do you mean ”logical” in the
colloquial, or the philosophical sense of the word?’
6: [187], pg. 5.
7: [187], pg. 6. Edgar Morin phrases this as follows:
The pathology of ideas takes the form of idealism, where the idea obscures the
reality it is supposed to translate, and takes itself alone as real. The pathology
of theory is in doctrinarism and dogmatism, which turn the theory on itself
and petrify it. The pathology of reason is rationalization, which encloses re-
ality in a system of ideas that are coherent but partial and unilateral, and do
not know that a part of reality is unrationalizable [. . . ]
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8: [148], pp. 2-13. Ervin Laszlo discusses the fragmentation of ‘spe-
ciality barriers’ (pg. 2) in science quite extensively and puts the systems
sciences into play as a remedy against this ailment. I will be following
Morin (see the previous note) much closer, in the sense that I think
that complexity implies that ‘generalist’ approaches such as holism
also have their limitations. However, I aim to prevent problematising
such issues as much as possible. One of the more important maxims
of engineering is to only make something a problem if it is really
necessary. I think complexity advocates such an attitude.
9: [161] . Also [283].
10: [191], pg.146. The concept of ‘pidgin languages’ has been taken
over from Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott and Michael Gibbons and will
become more important as the argumentation progresses. Nowotny cum
suis consider these (scientific) pidgin languages to become more im-
portant in the ‘Mode-2’ knowledge production system that science is
becoming, which means that science is more and more embedded in
society. As a result, intermediate and mediary languages are needed to
effectively communicate between scientific domains, the general public
and their representatives.
It is worth pointing out, that they base their argumentation on research
from Peter Galison, of ‘contact languages’ between physicists and
engineers, working in nuclear physics. It appears that, even in the hard
sciences, the formal vocabularies of maths is insufficient, even for those
who are trained in these vocabularies.
11: [4], pg. 35. The authors define friction as:
how much interaction occurs between two components, that is measured
based on how a change one component affects both components.
This definition can, of course, be expanded to any amount of compo-
nents (entities) operating in a certain ‘friction space’.
12: [271], pp. 59-62. Dutch. Bart Penders’s contribution is a fine
example of observers influencing the observed, which is a theme that
will become quite essential later on
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13: [262], pp. 8-11. Charles Taylor makes a strong claim against
reductionist thought in his exploration of the sources of modern
views on morality. His concern here is that ‘naturalists’ (i.e. many
scientists) often discard ‘moral ontology as a pure fiction’ (pg. 8). The
‘reductionist trap’ here is that when science claims to concentrate on
facts alone, and thus discard norms and values as being relevant for
their enquiries, they then make a derivative claim that norms and values
are fictional because science does not account for them.
The given example of the surgeon, although maybe a bit corny, is rather
interesting. In order for the surgeon to assess that his subjects are ‘dead’,
he needs to have a certain predetermined notion of what ‘dead’ means.
This notion is guided by the experience that his subjects are normally
alive, which is also the reason why a surgeon will in practice not draw
this conclusion. However, this does not follow from the reductionist
experiments, which only allows the conclusion that his subjects are all
dead.
From this, it follows that many experiments and theories implicitly
use much more information that is provided by the experimental
setting in strict sense, and the reductionist approach is often already
‘contaminated’ with experiential bias.
14: [10], pp. 35-76. Biophysicist and ethicist Henri Atlan gives one
of the more differentiated accounts of reductionism in science, and
also seems to pinpoint the actual problem with the dogmatic use or
reverence of scientific principles, such as reductionism. He proposes
a more pragmatic ‘weak reductionism’ that he, in fact, sees to be the
more common scientific practice anyway.
15: [130] .
16: [82], pp. 371-377. Carlo Ghezzi, Mehdi Yazayeri and Dino
Mandrioli give an extensive account of the transition within software
engineering from the (linear) waterfall model to the evolutionary mod-
els that were pioneered in the Eighties of the previous century. Rapid
Application Development is one of the first widely used evolutionary
approaches.
17: [19] . Kent Beck is the creator and one of the driving forces behind
Xtreme Programming and has extended this evolutionary approach to
testing and management of software projects.
18: [104], pp. 26-30.
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19: [21] . At another time, I might have been tempted to speak of
‘General Systems Theory’, but there are currently many dialects, that
range from purely mathematical to forms used in social domains [157].
Many modern authors therefore prefer to speak of ‘systems thinking’
[278], [81], as they see the manner of dealing with subject matter as the
quintessential characteristic of this approach. Jamshid Gharajedaghi
also observes the various dialects in ‘systems thinking’ [[81], pp.
25-27].
20: [187], pp. 100-109. Edgar Morin considers the ‘relational circuit’
to be ‘beyond holism and reductionism’. It will probably not come
as a surprise that this relational circuit is an abstract representation
that is very similar to the agile methodology in the sense that both are
inherently iterative (or cyclic).
21: [72], 15. Actually many scientists will, implicitly or explicitly, fol-
low a similar approach. In a footnote, Paul Feyerabend mentions how
Niels Bohr followed an approach very similar to the ‘agile’ one that is
advocated here.
One of the few thinkers to understand this feature of the development of
knowledge was Niels Bohr: [. . . ] he would never try to outline a finished
picture, but would patiently go through all the phases of the development of
a problem, starting from one apparent paradox, and gradually leading to its
elucidation. In fact, he never regarded achieved results in any other light then
as starting point for further exploration.
22: [278] . Weinberg defines ‘system’ as a ‘a way of looking at the
world’ [[278], 52].
Morin gives a brief historical account of the ‘parts that make a whole’
paradigm as a means to counter reductionist thought, but from a
perspective of complexity thinking. He argues that even this approach
was still too restrictive to address complexity [[187], pp. 100-109].
The German social theorist Niklas Luhmann considers ‘systems the-
ory’ to be a ‘supertheory’, and traces its evolution from the difference
between ‘part and wholes’ to one between ‘system and environment’.
[[157], pp. 4-11]
23: [187], pp. 9-10.
24: [157], pp. 5-11. Luhmann gives an extensive account of systems
theory in his introduction from the perspective of ‘differences’, which
is quite essential in his particular systems dialect.
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25: [228], pg. 76.
26: [228], pp. 73-78.
27: [278], pp. 131-169. Weinberg addresses the inherent limitations of
(human) observers quite extensively.
One of Luhmann’s main criticisms on the social theories of his time
was that they did not take this problem of ‘observers influencing the
observed’ seriously enough. [[157], pp. 10-11], even in stronger terms
in [[158], pp. 11-44] (in German).
A good account on the ‘birth’ of the concept of ‘uncertainty’ in physics
is given in [[153], pp. 154-155]. The ‘wave-particle dualism’ is, at
least in part, inspired by the problem that instrumentation influence
the measurements, which led Werner Heisenberg to formulate his
(in-)famous ‘uncertainty principle’.
28: [38], pg. 6. Cilliers concentrates on the concept of boundaries. A
system-environment boundary would be one possible example.
29: [278], pp. 131-132.
Most people grudgingly accept that they are unable to flap their arms and
fly, but intellectual people raise their hackles at the mere mention of limits to
the intellect. We have been subjected to so much bunkum about the ‘limitless
capacity of the human mind’ that [. . . ] otherwise dispassionate readers turn
purple. Yet the only capacity of my mind that seems limitless is precisely that
capacity for fooling myself – particularly about my limitless mental capacity.
30: [84], pg. 50. A stable system is usually defined somewhere along
the lines of ‘existing long enough to be observed or manifest’. Chaos
theory challenged this by introducing systems that were both stable as
well as unstable.
31: [111], pp. 10-15.
32: [10], pg. 32. Henri Atlan writes:
[. . . ] we must recognise that knowledge activities are games, in which the
serious is not serious and only humor can be warranted as serious. Then the
rule of rules, when we are dealing with the game of games and not with the
search of some phantom ‘ultimate reality’ [. . . ]
and:
But the best companion on these winding paths remains humor, whose smiles
and laughter open up what was thought to be sealed”
[10] (pg. 11)
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33: [211], pp. 211-298. Visual illusions are demonstrations of one of
the best-known ‘tricks’ our mind plays on us. They usually are con-
sidered amusing and rather harmless. Confirmation bias, as Bollen [26]
and Rassin [224] show, are potentially dangerous illusions that penetrate
deep within our internal belief systems. Regarding science, see [65]
Also see a previous quote from Gerald Weinberg.
34: [211], pg. 212. Pinker remarks that illusions were used by skeptical
philosophy to demonstrate that we cannot really know anything. With
current neurophysiological research, such questions become quite
complex, I guess.
35: [89], pp. 328-329. Physicist Brain Greene offers a good account on
why superstring theory and the likes are valid new roads of progress
in modern physics. He also shows that critics within the discipline
trump the ‘philosophy’ card when ‘it is so far removed from direct
empirical testing’ (pg. 352). As will become more clear at a later
stage, I personally would propose a ‘bottleneck approach’ to research
in complexity that allows some degrees of freedom, but in a confined
manner, and with inclusion of certain ‘bottlenecks’ which scientific
practice must go through at a certain stage. This is the reason why
‘reconnecting’ with scientific data is important.
‘Selfish’ genes [49], is a strictly unscientific description, as ‘selfishness’
is untenable as description for a gene’s agency. It should be noted
that Richard Dawkins himself was very aware of the metaphorical
use of this word when he wrote his classic book, but the commotion
surrounding it resonates today and is an interesting test case for the
‘lingua democratica’.
The controversies between Steven Pinker [211] and Jerry Fodor [74]
on ‘how the mind works’ are another demonstration of the dilemmas
of scientific progress and especially the communication of this to the
general public and other scientific areas, who also often have to rely on
popular scientific books in order to understand what happens in fields
in which they are no specialists. It may become clear that this lies at the
heart of this particular enterprise of the ‘lingua democratica’.
415
36: [50], pp. 55-62. American physicist Alan Sokal managed to get
an article published in a journal dedicated to postmodern thought,
that was complete non-sense and was meant to expose the misuse of
scientific concepts by (some) postmodern philosophers. This affair has
been seen as a major event in the ‘science wars’ between especially
the ‘hard’ or ‘natural’ sciences on one side and (some of the) social
sciences and the humanities on the other. I think Dawkins account of
the Sokal affair is exemplary for the view that many scientists will
have on postmodern philosophy. Having been amongst postmodern,
or rather post-structuralist philosophers myself –both my supervisor
as my co-supervisor are more or less open towards poststructuralist
theory— this affair is continuously in the background of this particular
enterprise. I myself remain sceptical, but mainly in the sense that I
do not think that I need to submerge myself in these theories for my
current aims.
On the other hand, the ‘deconstruction’ of the observer, as has been
done in this chapter, does have a ‘postmodern’ ring to it. . .
37: [251], pg. 61. John Smith and Chris Jenkins seem to be on this track
for their attempt at a ‘qualitative complexity’ for sociology.
Complexity theory begins its ontology instead with emergence. Byrne
stresses, in the holism of emergence, where humanism acknowledges the
emergence of estrangement between knowledge and being, complexity in-
sists on the relation.
Although, as will become clear later on, this particular exercise
follows this idea, it should be mentioned that ‘a relationship between
knowledge and being’ already troubles the idea of ontology.
38: [111] .
39: [187], pg. 100. In terms of the French ‘complexity thinker’ Edgar
Morin:
Objects give way to systems. Instead of essences and substances, organiza-
tion; instead of simple and elementary units, complex unities; instead of ag-
gregates forming bodies, systems of systems of systems.
Likewise, the German Social Theorist Niklas Luhmann captured this
notion in his theory of self-referential systems [157], pg. 8, which,
perhaps more correctly, sees a self-referential formation of system-
environment pairs.
I will take this a step further, by adding the observer to this happy pair.
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Notes for Chapter 2
1: [187], pp. 2-6. Also Henri Atlan, [10], pp. 43-45, Niklas Luhmann
[157], pg. 27, Bruno Latour, [149], pp. 111-112, and [66], pp. 11-17.
2: [66], pg. 11. Philosopher of Science John Dupre´ is an advocate of
plurality in research in (evolutionary) biology. In fact, these discussions
seem to be most prominent at the interface of biology and the social
sciences. Samir Okasha gives an extensive account of the various
viewpoints in the ‘levels of selection’ debate [192], pp. 125-142. One
of the interesting conclusions he draws is that ‘reductionism’ itself has
many faces (pg 139 and further).
3: [187], pg. 2.
4: [187], pp. 3-4.
5: [187], pg. 33.
6: [187], pg. 6.
7: [50], pp. 55-62. Also see Butler [33]:55-57 and Flyvbjerg [73]. A
more inclusive recent approach, that will get more attention later on, is
offered by Robert Ulanowicz [266]
8: [187], pg. 101.
In either case, reductionist or holistic explanation seems to simplify the prob-
lem of complex unity. The one reduces explanation of the whole to the prop-
erties of the parts conceived in isolation. The other reduces the properties of
the parts to the properties of the whole, also conceived in isolation. These two
mutually repelling explanations each arose out of the same paradigm.
Also see [152] pp. 235-236.
9: [72], pp. x-xi.
Philosophers, philosophers of biology especially, suspected for some time
that there is not one entity ‘science’ with clearly defined principles but the
science contains a great variety of [. . . ] approaches and that even a particular
science such as physics is but a scattered collection of subjects [. . . ]. For
some authors this is not only a fact; it is also desirable.
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10: [89] . Brian Greene offers a fascinating account on the friction
between the development of different theories based on genius and
experimental data, and the relentless pressure to get unite these in
quantum physics.
David Lindley focuses on the early phases, on the transition of physics
into quantum physics and the severe intellectual ‘struggle for the soul
of science’ in the first half of the previous century [153].
11: [181], pp.291-303. Melanie Mitchell pays extensive attention to the
problems related to unification of science, and the role that complex sys-
tems science can play in these attempts. In her assessment, it is clear that
mathematics plays an important role in these attempts. I am personally
more sceptical, as I think formal systems are of too high ‘granularity’
to address many issues in severely complex areas, such as are being
addressed in the social sciences and the humanities.
The reason for this assessment is based on my (practical) experiences in
computer science. Even though computer science is fundamentally an
area that deals with formal symbolism, programming practical systems
is rather based on the assembly and representation of forms. Beyond
a certain level of complexity, mathematical rigour becomes subject to
assemblage of forms, and this pattern is consistent with many other
engineering disciplines. for this reason, I think mathematical coherence
will not be feasible, but looser forms are definitely possible. The
attempt at ‘Big History’ [36] can be considered coherent in a somewhat
loose fashion. I think such scientific coherence can be a feasible goal.
12: [66], pg. 12.
13: [161], pp. 41-53. Jean-Franois Lyotard offers a more compre-
hensive analysis of science as knowledge production system in ‘the
postmodern condition’. His premises are ‘language games’, which
builds on Wittgenstein [283].
Although the analysis that will be developed here reinforces many
of Lyotard’s ideas, there are also a few important differences.
These will not be pursued in detail as the aims here are different
than Lyotard. For those who are interested, I think the similarities
and differences will be quite straightforward after completing chapter 9.
14: [56], pp. 187-228. Dennett argues strongly for engineering as
partner in understanding evolution theory. As evolutionary principles
are a central theme to complexity, this ‘marriage between biology and
engineering’ (pg. 187) would apply here as well, although complexity
may rather require somewhat polyamorous relationships.
15: [219], pg. 7.
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16: [10], pp. 44, 61-64. Atlan, while concentrating on science, seems to
implicitly advocate certain pragmatism towards theoretical approaches,
as for instance returns in his call for ‘weak reductionism’. This becomes
stronger in his description of Metis, ‘daughter of the ocean’, and espe-
cially her ‘crafty’ or practical reason:
[. . . ] simultaneously crafty and creative (creative because crafty; cunning and
even deceitful in that it must deal with the unforeseen, the disorderly and the
random) (pg 126)
The American philosopher and outspoken neo-Darwinist Daniel Den-
nett is more outspoken on this issue. In a chapter called Biology is En-
gineering he claims that:
[. . . ]the central feature of the Darwinian Revolution: the marriage, after Dar-
win, of biology and engineering ([56], pg. 187).
As we will see later, I consider evolution theory to be a vital aspect of
complexity. I think there are few who would disagree with this.
Earlier, in regard to the laws of nature, Dennett states:
[. . . ] we still have the stupendous fact that the laws do permit this wonderful
unfolding to happen, and that has been quite enough to inspire many people
to surmise the the intelligence of the Creator is the Wisdom of the Lawgiver,
instead of the Ingenuity of the Engineer ([56], pg. 164).
17: [8], pg. 60.
18: [219], pp. 45-46. Dutch. Procee gives what could be considered
the textbook account, where engineering is a derivative of the hard
sciences. This account will be favoured by many, if not most, academic
and non-academic practitioners of technology.
The American philosopher of technology Don Ihde however, is more
critical of this stance, and at least acknowledges the historical primacy
of techne over theoria [119], pg. 49.
19 Some may prefer to see an evolutionary component in technology,
where the ‘logos’ demarcates the change from techniques to technol-
ogy, which coincides with the era when natural philosophy and the
crafts merged. From this viewpoint, theory would be the source of
the ‘logos’ in technology. I do not take to this idea, because it would
seem ‘theory-biased’. The innovations in technology in the European
Middle-ages, but also the building of pyramids in Egypt must have had
a ‘logos’, as it is impossible to achieve these in an ad-hoc manner.
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20: [280], pp. 95-96. To stress the fluidity between ‘knowing’ and ‘do-
ing’, it is worth pointing out how Nobel laureate Maurice Wilkins, the
‘third man of DNA’ recalls his meeting zoologist Mick Callan:
Mick loved science and I was especially interested in his emphasis on science
as craft. That down-to-earth idea of craft expresses the need of the scientist to
understand and respect the material on which he or she works (and that idea
has more meaning in it than loads of philosophy of science)
21: [282], pg. 2. Morton Winston describes technology as:
Technology is [. . . ] a systematic and rational way of doing things; it is, in gen-
eral, the organisation of knowledge, people, and things to accomplish specific
practical goals
Techniques or technics are often related to the means to accomplish
these practical goals. Ihde also warns against relying too much on these
distinctions [119], pg. 47.
22: [119], pg. 49. Don Ihde gives a brief historical account of the
evolution of technology, and stresses that there are no human cultures
that are pre-technological.
23: [282], pg. 28-38. In the words of David Landes (pg. 29):
[. . . ]Europe of the Middle Ages — one of the most inventive societies that
history had known. Some may be surprised: for a long time one saw these
centuries as a dark interlude between the grandeur of Rome and the brilliance
of the Renaissance. That clich no longer holds in matters technological.
24: [279], pp. 31-32. Newton biographer quotes historian Charles
Singer with evident pleasure in demonstrating theory-bias in the think-
ing of the Grand Names of Greek philosophy. The consequent disdain
of experiment caused:
the neglect of experience and the unprogressiveness of (natural) science for
nearly 2000 years after Aristotle
James Hannam, on the other hand, makes a strong argument that a lot
of decisions and practices that in retrospect seem detrimental for the
evolution of science and technology, were actually quite reasonable
when set against the world-views that were common at that time [96].
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25: [72], pg. 9.
History generally, and the history of revolution in particular, is always richer
in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and subtle that even
the best historian and the best methodologist can imagine. [. . . ] Are we ready
to believe that the naive and simple-minded rules which methodologists take
as their guide are capable of accounting for such as ‘maze of interactions’?
26: [28] .
27: [1], pp. 38-58. Smaling points out that Occam’s razor can result in
reductionism and proposes Chatton’s ‘anti-razor’ to counter this.
28: [201] . In my research for my master’s thesis on symbiosis, the
anemone and anemone fish were one of my favourite examples, since
I learned diving at that time. Polishing fish at so-called polish stations
were another favourite. The idea that sharks allow a polish fish to give
it a dental cleaning without eating it, is stunning!
29: [179] . This issue has been very strongly debated in computer
science about twenty years ago, between proponents of strict formalism
(neats) and those who aimed for a more loose approach as is done in
especially artificial intelligence (scruffies). There has always been a
certain friction between theorists and experimenters (hackers), which
sometimes flares up, but especially since the advent of the computer it
has become clear that experimental approaches often pave the way for
theory and that theory guides experimentation. This issue will become
very central in complexity thinking in general, I think.
I am, by the way, very much a scruffie.
30: [36], pg. xvi.
31: [106] . The Eiffel Tower, by the way, was not designed by Gustave
Eiffel, but by Emile Nougier and Maurice Kouchlin, two engineers
employed at Eiffel & Co
32: [88], pp. 2-10.
33: [88], pp. 2.
34: [88], pp. 8.
35: [84], pg. 287, on a note on page 27. According to Gleick, the
original description on the butterfly effect involved a seagull. The first
time a butterfly was used, it was flapping in Brazil and causing tornados
in Texas.
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36: [211], pp. 211-298. Pinker offers an extensive account on visual
illusions in a chapter called ‘The Mind’s eye’
37: [284], pp.7-10. The belief-desire-intention model of rational
agency:
[. . . ] gets its name from the fact that it recognizes the primacy of beliefs,
desires and intentions in rational action
38 According to the online etymology dictionary:
1530, from M.Fr. biasis ‘slant, oblique’ from O.Prov. biais, possibly from
V.L. *(e)bigassius, from Gk. epikarsios ‘slanting, oblique’ from epi- ‘upon’
+ karsios ‘oblique’. Transferred sense of ‘predisposition, prejudice’ is from
1572.
39: [119], pg. 22.
40: [180], pg. 273.
41: [96], pp. 1-10. James Hannam vividly shows how bias has obscured
our thinking of the European Middle Ages.
43: [163], pp. 112-126. It is interesting to see that other perspectives,
like those provided from a different culture, often expose the blind
spots of bias quite quickly. Kishore Mahbubani demonstrates the
effects of bias in Western values (and often the Western inability to
practice what we preach) in human individuals but also at the level of
interactions nation states.
In a similar vein, Edward Said addresses his bicultural background
as offering a ‘peculiar angle’ on Western Humanism [233]. These
examples show that bias is truly a ‘pattern’.
44: [278], pg. 18. Also see [81], pp. 92-93, for organisation theory, and
complexity in social theory [222].
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45: [41], pg. 17-19. Coleman addresses the aspect of utilisation-
maximisation of human actors as one of the principles for development
of a social theory. With this, concepts such as ‘purposeful action’, ‘ratio-
nality’ and the difference between ‘agents’ and ‘actors’ become points
of attention. There are many correspondences with the theme of com-
plexity that will be developed here. From the perspective of complexity,
it is worth pointing out that a social system that is based on utility-
maximising, rational actors cannot say anything about other aspects of
those actors, such as for instance their ethical or moral positions. Such
social theory does not say that such actors are solely or purely equipped
with these traits. According to Coleman:
It is also important to answer the objection that individuals do not always act
rationally.[. . . ] Since social scientists take as their purpose the understanding
of social organisation that is derivative from actions of individuals and since
understanding an individual’s action ordinarily means seeing the reasons
behind the action, then the theoretical aim of social science must be to
conceive of that action in a way that makes it rational from the point of
view of the actor. Or put in another way, much of what is ordinarily de-
scribed as non-rational or irrational is merely so because the observers have
not discovered the point of view of the actor, from which the action is rational.
With this, Coleman’s description assumes a number of implicit charac-
teristics of the individual actor; the actor is part of the social organi-
sation and the acting constitutes to the social organisation as a whole.
From the viewpoint of complexity, this would seem to be only a sub-
set of all the possible interactions between human agents. As a result,
the rationality of the actor should be further constrained to address only
those acts that contribute to the social organisation. This would allow
the individual agent to have a richer set of actions which include those
that cannot be observed from this particular approach to social theory.
In other words, one cannot say anything about the rationality or non-
rationality of those actions.
This friction between micro and macro levels (pg. 6) is very fundamen-
tal in complex systems in general, and will be given more attention later
on. It is worth pointing out here that these issues are related to reduc-
tionism and holism, or in Coleman’s terms, between methodological
individualism and holism (pg. 5). Coleman also proposes a pragmatic
stance to the approach he offers.
46: [144], pg. 126. Translated from Dutch by author.
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47: [171], pg. 134-135. In the words of psychotherapist/philosopher
Rollo May:
I propose that the statement ”human possibilities are unlimited” is de-
energizing. If you take it at face value, there is no real problem anymore.
You can only stand up and sing hallelujah and go home.[. . . ] it is like putting
someone in a canoe and pushing him into the Atlantic towards England
with the cheery comment ”the sky is the limit”. The canoer is only too
aware of the fact that an inescapable real limit is also the bottom of the ocean.
In these notes, I shall explore the hypothesis that limits are not only unavoid-
able in human life, they are also valuable. I shall also discuss the phenomenon
that creativity itself requires limits, for the creative act arises out of the strug-
gle of human beings with and against that limits them.
Translated to unchecked ‘plurality’, such a plurality without lim-
its is exactly the boundary state where everything becomes meaningless.
48: [72], pp. 231-237. Feyerabend implicitly seems to address the
problem of observing organised complexity. The game of ‘freedom and
constraint’ is a returning issue in complexity, a pattern.
49: [18] . The rise of search engines such as Google can be seen as
both a ‘sign of the times’ as well as a cause.
Notes for Chapter 3
1: [79], pp. 46-49. Especially pg. 48: Although many contributions to
‘Complexity; 5 questions’ make clear that complexity is not going to
counter fragmentation, someone like Bruce Edmonds is most adamant
in stressing this, and the risks of assuming complexity as becoming a
‘theory’.
2: [152] . Both Roger Lewin as M. Mitchell Waldrop [274] give an
enticing account of the successful early years of the Santa Fe institute.
This institute currently seems to have run a bit out of steam (also see
[115]), but this could also be interpreted as a sign that the theme of
complexity has become more mature.
3: [80], pp. 5-29. Also see Paul Cilliers in [47], pp. 43-50.
4: [46], pg. 9. Qualia, is a term often used in the neurosciences for
simple sensory qualities. Here, the term ‘sensory data’ will be used
more often.
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5: [213] . Researchers of metaphors usually do not use ‘model’, but
‘source’. I will use model here because the word better reflects the
correspondence with the target. Besides this, ‘source’ seems to imply
that the model provides for the target, while the alternate approach will
be taken here. Also see [78]. For a detailed discussion on the impor-
tance of analogies for the issue of intelligence, see ([181], pp. 186-208).
6: [43] .
7: [90] . The term was first coined by Craig Loehle in [154], and based
on Peter Medawar’s 1967 reference to science as being ‘the art of the
soluble’. Grimms replacement of Loehle’s ‘difficulty’ to ‘complexity’
is very relevant for the approach taken here, because it ‘upgrades’ the
graph to a pattern, which intuitively relates to Weinbergs pattern.
8: [216] . Karl Poppers approach to falsification of scientific statements
has been very influential in the past, and continues to be so in many
areas of science. In the humanities this manner of logical reasoning
seems to have gone out fashion, presumably because many phenomena
studied there are not easily captured in logical statements.
9: [275] .
10: [62], 218. The idea of production of knowledge as a continuous
co-evolution between mind and its environment is very similar to Mer-
lin Donald’s thesis that human consciousness emerges in co-evolution
with culture. Especially the detailed description of Condillac’s statue is
shows how these production systems evolve.
11: [102], 25. According to Hayles, information is:
[. . . ] pattern rather than a presence [. . . ]. If information is pattern, then non-
information should be the absence of pattern, that is randomness [. . . ] certain
developments within information theory implied that information could be
equated with randomness as well as with pattern [. . . ]
As will be shown later on, I have a somewhat different take to this.
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12: [133] . Klimesova also points out the problematic aspect of ‘mean-
ing’ in information. Often the definition of information as being ‘mean-
ingful data’ is accounted to Claude Shannon’s seminal article ‘A Math-
ematical Theory of Communication’, that is often considered the begin-
ning of ‘information theory’ [246]. However, in this article, ‘meaning’
is only used twice, of which the most important reference is in the ab-
stract:
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated
according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.
Shannon was particularly clear that his focus was on the capacity of
message transfer, and not on content. Also see ([181], pp.179-185,
especially from pg 184 onward).
13: [102] . N. Katherine Hayles gives an intriguing account on how
the early development in information theory supported the idea of the
‘disembodied’ human being, whose mind is essentially detached from
the body. The cyborg is an example of this view, as it does not matter if
mind is ‘inserted’ in a machine or in a biological organism. This idea is
very essential for the trans-humanist movement.
14: [21], pp. 41-42. Bertalanffy expresses the ‘atomic’ view on
information, when he speaks of ‘flow of information’.
15: [21], pg. 42. This example was derived from Bertalanffy. Of course
the cell only effectuates the flipping of a switch. The aggregate system
that includes the switch and the door effectuates the opening of the door.
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16: [144], pp. 1-42. Philosophers will probably immediately recognise
that I am touching on Edmund Husserls ideas on observation, but then
without the notion of consciousness ([144], pp.14-17). From an evo-
lutionary perspective ‘consciousness’ is too complex a phenomenon to
introduce at this stage; observation can do without it, I think, as the pre-
vious example demonstrates. For those who claim that the light switch
was designed by conscious act to switch on motion, I will just use the
counterexample of a mass particle, or an electrically charged one. These
particles –at least from a neo-Darwinian point of view— are not de-
signed, nor are they conscious, and yet they can select data from other
mass-bearing particles. We know that because they change in response
to this selection. So consciousness may design a photo-electric cell and
cause it to respond in a specific way, but its eventual use is fairly simi-
lar to non-conscious material objects. Observation can do without con-
sciousness, I think. Consciousness is needed to know that you are ob-
serving something, but this topic is way off limits here.
Some may reject this, and claim that a mass particle or a photo-electric
cell cannot ‘observe’, but rather ‘detect’ something. As will become
clear later on, I do not think that this distinction is very essential for
this discussion.
17: [157], pg. 2. Some theorists, such as Niklas Luhmann take a
different approach, and prefer to call the target as being the system.
Either way, the underlying aim is to make a clear distinction between
model and target, but feedback, as will become more clear later, tends
to get in the way of clear distinctions.
18: [157], pg. 7. This approach was, for instance, advocated by the
German social theorist Niklas Luhmann for his specific version of a
(social) system theory. His systems theory actually produces system-
environment pairs, which is more correct, but for now this distinction
is not very interesting.
19: [79] . Carlos Gershenson has interviewed twenty-four leading
thinkers on complexity. The different answers to the question ‘how
would you define complexity’ is very revealing.
20: [279], pp. 69-78. The first source of the idea that Earth orbits the
Sun can be traced back to the Greek astronomer Aristarchus of Samos
(BCE 310-230). According to James Hannam, Nikolaj Kopernik can be
seen as the one who revived this idea around 1507 CE, and used state
of the art mathematics to support his ideas. However, his replacement
for the Ptolemean system was, although more accurate, not particularly
more simple.
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21 As an example, try putting a number of dots on a piece of paper
and then draw lines to connect the dots. Two dots make one line,
three dots make three lines, four dots make six lines, five dots make
ten lines and so on. Apparently, the number of lines increase much
faster than the number of dots. For n dots, you get 1+2+ . . . +(n-1)
lines. This combinatorial effect is still relatively ‘smooth’ with re-
spect to others, which truly deserve the name combinatorial ‘explosion’.
22: [176] . Some algorithms are better than others at solving a complex
problem and this is strongly related with the number of variables that
are contained in the problem domain. If the amount of time that the
algorithm spends on solving the problem is proportional with the
number of variables in the problem domain, then this is considered very
good. However, many problems deal with the relationships between
the variables of the problem domain, and so the algorithms may end
up spending an amount of time exponential to the number of variables
due to the combinatorial explosion of the relationships. The order of
an algorithm reflects that aspect which has the largest impact on the
solution speed, even though there may be other aspects of influence
as well. In the example presented earlier, drawing lines between dots
can be solved simply by applying the formula, so the solution is easily
found in this particular case and the problem is therefore not very
complex.
23: [141], pp. 12-13. The formulation of the second law in the current
form was made by Rudolph Clausius.
24: [89], pg. 171. Also see [36], pp. 39-56.
25: [21], pp. 143-145. As Ervin Schro¨dinger remarked:
the organism feeds on negative entropy
26: [50], pp. 98-99.
27: [128] . Roger Lewin also pays extensive attention to the assumed
‘creative’ force of complexity [152], pp. 164-187, Dutch edition.
Others, like John Stewart, propose that co-operation is the inevitable
‘progressive’ force of evolution [258].
28: [266], pp. 13-39. Robert Ulanowicz offers a more extensive account
on the (implicit) assumptions behind science, many of which he calls
to question.
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29: [37], pp. 3-7.
I have heard it said (by someone from France, of course) that a jumbo jet is
complicated, but that a mayonnaise is complex.
30: [127] . Also [111], [113] and [274]. Often ‘order’ is contrasted
against, but not opposed to, ‘chaos’.
31: [181], pg. 278.
32: [266], pp. 89-90.
33: [226] . Recent findings have given strong clues that genes also use
redundancy in order to maintain ‘good tricks’. In layman’s terms, see
[198].
34: [187], pg. 20. Edgar Morin takes this approach. The difference
between ‘order’ and ‘chaos’, was already mentioned. Also see [266],pp.
6-7.
35: [251], pp. 123-128. Smith and Jenks almost follow the exact line
of reasoning as given here, in their discussion of Laplace’s Demon as
source of contingencies in social systems.
36 The aspect of uncertainty is one of the main reasons why ‘system’
is taken to correspond with the ‘model’. One reason is because system
always requires a certain descriptive vocabulary that does not necessar-
ily correspond with things in the target, but the uncertainty positions a
complex target to a significant extent, beyond an observers reach.
37: [38] .
38: [59], forthcoming.
39: [94] .
40: [284], pg. 1. Michael Wooldridge defines an agent as being rational
if it:
chooses to perform actions that are in its own best interests, given the beliefs
it has about the world.
41: [111], pp. 1-39.
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42: [84], pg. 67, Dutch edition. It should be noted that the same applies
for ‘chaos’, which in complexity still has an aspect of order. Most
‘chaotic’ systems are non-linear systems where order and disorder,
most notably randomness, are balanced in certain ways.
43: [252] .
44: [269] . There currently is a lively debate around the relationship
between wealth and happiness. also see [68]
45: [60], pp. 93-108. Dutch edition. Jared Diamond, with apparent
pleasure, shows how gender bias colours the ‘theories’ on penis size,
the size of testicles and female breasts.
46: [181], pp. 6-9. Also pp. 172-176. Of course the immune system
of the human body is much more complex than is sketched here. The
example only aims to draw attention to the role of tagging in immune
systems. Also see [126],pp. 135-140.
47: [39] .
48: [279], pg. 85. The story of Newton ‘discovering’ the laws of
gravitation by watching apples fall is most likely a fable, or at least a
simplification.
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49: [67], pg. 38.
‘Knowledge is no longer seen as observation from an external position, but
as an interpretation of the world in the world, and in which the subject is
part and participant, from the inside. This short sketch does not do justice
to all the historical and philosophical backgrounds of the hermeneutic turn,
which is called that way because knowledge can ever since only be seen as
interpretation. At least by philosophers and scientists’ (translated from Dutch
by author)
It will be clear that this point of view will not be shared by most of the
hard sciences, who still will tend to see an objective –mathematical—
reality, with rules that are generally applicable, that is, the mathematics
of physics will apply anywhere and everywhere in the Universe, from
the Big Bang to the moment it will have ‘died’ due to entropy. Even
though the formulation of these theories may require interpretation
and can be provisional, the theories and laws themselves are seen to
go beyond interpretation and an alien culture of similar intelligence as
human beings will be able to formulate these theories and laws in a
similar fashion as we do. All that is required is a form of translation.
This view of universality and objectivity is most concisely reflected in
Carl Sagans ‘Contact’ [231]. When earth receives a message from an
extraterrestrial intelligence, it is a sequence of bursts that represent the
first prime numbers. The idea behind it is that it takes a developed form
of intelligence to recognise these prime numbers. It also assumes that
prime numbers –and in effect mathematics— apply universally; any
advanced civilisation will at some point discover mathematical rules
and numbers.
50: [62], pg. 283.
51: [213] . Also see [78]
52: [240] . Manfred Schroeder shows how important these power laws
are for scale-invariance of forms and shapes. This will be given more
attention at a later stage. Also see [15]
53: [21], pp. 33-34. Isomorphy is a fundamental paradigm in any
modelling activity. A neural network programmed in a computer is
assumed to be equivalent to certain aspects of a biological neural
network because of isomorphisms, even though both are present on
different substrates (biological/carbon versus in silico).
54: [21], pg. 33.
55: [101], pp. 60-61.
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56: [90] . Volker Grimm and his colleagues follow the same approach
in ‘pattern-oriented modelling’ (POM). His article was very important
in understanding the importance of aiming for different perspectives on
a target.
57: [2] . Also see [3], which covers the backgrounds of his ideas. Espe-
cially the relationship between patterns and ‘harmony’ in architecture
is interesting.
58: [77] . Ward Cunningham and Kent Beck introduced Alexander’s
idea in software design in 1987, although they only became popular
when object-oriented programming became widely used, and the
so-called Gang of Four (GoF) wrote an influential book on design
patterns for software development in 1994. Also see [6] or [34].
59: [31] . Also see (amongst many, many others) [139].
60: [206] .
61: [4], pg. 203.
62: [37], pg 72.. The ‘concept-context’ duality is very similar to the
ideas of ‘distributed information’ that Paul Cilliers develops based on de
Saussures and post-structuralist theories of language. However, Cilliers
sees concept and context as indistinguishable:
Moreover, since information is distributed, no explicit distinction between
concept and context has to be made they are encoded together; context is
already part of the representation.
It is worth mentioning that, although I consider concept-context to be
a useful distinction, the same practical effect that Cilliers describes
is achieved because I consider this distinction to be in the ‘pre-form’
phase. That is, ‘concept’ cannot be pinpointed somewhere, because it
has no form (yet).
63: [10], pp. 161-162. Atlan uses the term ‘interpretands’ for concep-
tual patterns.
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64: [157], pp. 35-36. Contextualisation will be considered a character-
istic of observation from this point on. This is a very different stance
than, for instance, Niklas Luhmann:
[. . . ] on the level of general systems theory, observation means nothing more
than handling distinctions.
Luhmann fills in a more elaborate model of observation as he pro-
gresses into social systems, which seems to flow towards some form
of contextualisation in the form of ‘difference schemata’. As the
example of the photo-electric cell demonstrates, PAC will consider
contextualisation very fundamental to observation. Without context,
(conceptual) patterns cannot be observed.
65: [21], pp. 35-36.
66: [115] .
67: [193] .
68: [206] . This paper gives a summary of patterns that will be
developed here
69: [191], pg. 145-147. Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott and Michael Gib-
bons see the emergence of such ‘pidgin languages’ as an inevitability
of ‘Mode-2’ scientific production, which means that science becomes
more contextualised in society.
70: [266], pp. 97-98. Ulanowicz expresses the same perspectives some-
what differently, although certainly not irreconcilably.
Now, we usually think of higher-level, ensemble systems as more complex
than those below them because the perspective we adopt is to look vertically
down through the hierarchy, so that the complexities at the various levels be-
come additive. But, first, we should be cautious because not all complexity
appears in organized form. Second, the ensemble system appear quite differ-
ently when one regards them from a horizontal standpoint, i.e, at their own
focal level
It is worth pointing out that Ulanowicz argues for a top-down approach
for explanations at macro-scales, that is, moving down the complexity
perspective. At a later stage, I aim to argue why composition-
decomposition (that is up and down) is a more complete approach.
71: [157], pp. 24-27. this ‘multi-perspective’ approach to complexity is
very different (and I think more straightforward) than that, for instance,
developed by Niklas Luhmann, who will be given more attention in
chapter 9. In chapter 3, I will demonstrate this ‘complexity depending
on the perspective’ with the Logistic Differential Map.
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Notes for Chapter 4
1: [103] .
2: [128], pp. 15-16, 23-48. Stuart Kauffman has extensively covered
the problems of so-called autocatalysts as a candidate process in the
formation of living cells. Catalysts are chemicals that improve the re-
actions of other chemicals, without being part of that reaction. Certain
enzymes are especially very important to achieve this. Suppose now
that certain chemicals produce others which serve as a catalyst for this
production, then theoretically a positive feedback loop is formed. A liv-
ing organism would probably consist of a chain of different production
chemicals that eventually form such a loop. Although these autocatalyst
chains have been made experimentally, up to now they generally seem
to break beyond a certain length, and do not tend to be stable enough.
One major challenge in these theories are the bootstrapping mech-
anisms. What ecology of chemicals, and other necessary influences
provide the substrate for the formation of such autocatalyst sets?
3: [178] . The story I heard from my electronics teacher, placed the
birth of feedback in a cinema, where Black scribbled the equation on a
beermat.
4: [23] . It is surprising, when reading original literature from the
founders of cybernetics, such as Norbert Wiener, that Black’s name
is not mentioned at all. I am not sure whether this is because Black
was working in industry and did not publish his discovery in an
academic journal at the time, or whether the discovery had become so
commonplace by then that no-one thought of looking for the sources.
Another reason could be that Wiener and the other early cyberneticians
may –for good reasons— have considered the sources of feedback to
be with the mathematicians who pioneered recurrent equations.
5: [109], pp. 54-55. Douglas Hofstadter seems to share the same
fascination with feedback as I do, including –or especially?— the
mundane forms, such as audio feedback.
6: [225] .
7 I made these sound effect gizmos for a friend of mine as one of my
first successful attempts at electronics when I was about nineteen years
old. As always, I tended to stray from the official schemas offered in
books and electronic magazines and added multiple feedback loops
that provided very interesting effects once my friend had mastered the
knobs and switches.
8: [248] .
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9: [119] . See chapter 2.
10: [56], pp. 50-51.
11: [187], pg. 55,63. Morin distinguishes between program and strat-
egy, where program seems to be used in a similar way as is discussed
here. I have a few reservations in using program in opposition of
strategy –which will be discussed in more detail later—, but this is
probably mainly related to differences in background. In computational
intelligence it is quite common to write programmes that implement
certain strategies. Likewise many civil engineers may set up a pro-
gramme to build, say, a harbour infrastructure, but the engineers and
subcontractors may still deploy a whole range of strategies to make this
work.
12: [152], pp. 62-84, Dutch Edition. The ‘edge of chaos’ has been
a central theme in especially research at the Santa Fe institute. Also
see [274], [128]. Per Backs ‘sandpile’ is a seminal example of this
phenomenon.(pg 82 and further)
13: [214], pp. 5-6.
14: [165] .
15: [84], pg. 62, Dutch edition.
16: [84], pp. 59-79, Dutch edition. Gleicks chapter three gives an
extensive account on the increased use of non-linearity in ecology and
issues concerning population dynamics. For more detailed mathemati-
cal descriptions, see [218], pp. 81-88 (and further)
17: [240], pp. 33-38. The quote is on page 1.
18: [240], pp. 7-8.
19: [84], pp. 18-37, Dutch edition. Chapter one extensively covers the
work of Edward Lorenz, which may be considered the start of the first
wave of complexity. For the Lorenz attractor (butterfly) see pp. 34-35.
20: [113], pp. 137-142. Conways Game of Life is an example of
so-called cellular automata, that were pioneered by Stanislav Ulam.
21: [109], pp. 45-50. Douglas Hofstadter addresses the same kind of
emergence in his discussion on ‘simms’ and ‘simballs’.
22: [69] . Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi argue how processes of
massive parallel re-entry may lead to a theory of consciousness.
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23: [46] . Antonio Damasio, although less explicitly, sees the same
kind of processes at work for the constitution of a (embodied) ‘self’,
both at biological level as at higher cognitive levels.
24: [113], pp. 81-114. John Holland makes an attempt to describe these
processes at a more technical level in ”Emergence”
25: [137] .
26: [85] .
27: [86], pp. 22-37. Godfrey-Smith does not address the impact of
Go¨dels theorems on the early logical positivist movement of the Vienna
circle, many of which Kurt Go¨del knew personally.
28: [223], pp. 52-69. William Rasch metaphorically captures this
notion of ‘complexity beyond order’ when he speaks of ‘injecting noise
into the system’.
29: [157], pp. 32-41. Niklas Luhmann seems to tend strongly to a more
or less singular process of self-reference. In social systems he argues:
The concept of self-reference designates the unity that an element, a process,
a system has for itself. ‘For itself’ means independent of the cut of observa-
tion by others. The concept not only defines, but also contains a significant
statement, for it maintains that unity can come about only through a relational
operation, that it must be produced and that it does not exist in advance as an
individual, a substance, or an idea of its own operation (pg 33)
The problem with this interpretation can be exemplified by a simple
thought experiment. Suppose two simple agents observe each other and
respond to their observations by starting to ‘orbit’ around each other.
In this example, the self-referentiality of the aggregate is constituted
by operations that are already available before the aggregate is formed,
yet becomes self-referential because the individual agents kick-start
a feedback loop in their mutual friction space, which maintains their
aggregate form. In terms of PAC, the friction space contextualises a
feedback loop that consists of observer-actors. The subtle difference
with Luhmanns description is that the self-referentiality is not a unity
that a system has for itself, but rather that it is constituted from
relational operations from its constituent parts. The relational operation
(i.e. ‘orbit’) does not exist from the start –it needs the friction space—
but some individual qualities, that is the observation of ‘the other’ and
a certain action based on this observation are already in place. The
use of the word ‘produced’ becomes a bit problematic here, because
of course the feedback loop between the agents must be established
–produced—, but it is an event (it is kick-started) and once it is there it
is stable.
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30: [187], pp. 16-19. Edgar Morin extensively addresses the issues
around self-organisation, and especially the little we actually know
about self-organising systems. Referring to von Neumann, Weinbergs
graph returns in a discussion between artificial machines as forms of
simple organisation –systems consisting of very reliable elements,
but as a whole very vulnerable and (as yet) unable to repair itself
if it breaks down— and ‘living machines’ of organised complexity,
where the constituent parts are less reliable but tremendously robust.
If all the constituent parts have been renewed, then the system is
still itself. This apparently paradoxical situation becomes less strange
when self-organisation is seen as a gradual process of massive
parallel re-entry. It should be noted however, that self-organisation is
still largely unknown along an evolutionary and a structural perspective.
31: [266], pp. 74.
32: [187], pp. 49-51.
33: [187], pp. 49.
34: [187], pp. 50.
35: [187], pp. 50. It is also worth mentioning here that Luhmann
expresses the same deep understanding that linear ways of argument
and presentation (for instance in a book) are not adequate when
addressing complexity, as concepts and ideas are continuously moving
into each other [157], pp. xxxvii-xliv.
Notes for Chapter 5
1: [99], pp. 2-8. The first neural networks aimed at learning logical
patterns, such as AND- and OR-gates.
2: [124], pp. 184-191. In order to understand the implications of the
pattern of difference, consider Kaplan and Rogers discussion on the
issues of ranking people along the scale of ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’.
The troubled (and also often exalted) relationship humans have with
the ambiguity between these ranking concepts is especially revealing.
3: [236], pg. 20. Jean Clam expresses this creative aspect of ambiguity
in Michael Schiltzs discussion on Luhmanns relationship with the Law
of Forms from George Spencer Brown. Ambiguity is seeded from logic
order-, by its relationship with paradox.
4: [150] . Niels Lehmann gives an overview of four post-ontological
philosophies of difference that have been developed in the past decades
and are becoming more influential. I prefer to trust my knowledge on
light switches on this one.
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5: [251], pg. 72.
6: [66], pp. 19-21. Dupre´ discusses the problems of classification of bi-
ological species quite extensively, and also clearly shows that any form
of classification introduces its own conundrums.
Ingrid Baart and Marjan Slob show, in an intriguing overview on recent
changes in thinking about mental health problems, such as depressions
and psychoses, that a lot of these formerly clear categorisations are cur-
rently being debated [13], pg. 17:
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the claim that the current classi-
fication system in psychiatry provides a solid ontological basis is, to say the
least, debatable. But that psychiatry is built around a set of diseases is, for
many, an established fact. Some scientists even question this assertion, how-
ever, pointing to psychiatric epidemiology research showing that psychotic
symptoms, such as the hearing of voices, also frequently occur in ‘normal’
members of the population. According to these scientists, it is therefore plau-
sible that psychoses are not indicative of a disorder but that they are extremes
of normal human behaviour [. . . ]. The widespread prevalence of psychotic
symptoms within the population during adolescence is then ascribed to the
changes that occur in the adolescent brain in order to accommodate abstract
thinking.
It goes to show that ‘without goal or intention’ is often an observer
perspective and that a complex target, in this case a person who displays
certain symptoms, often may, in this case maybe even literally, be put
in the straight-jacket of oversimplified models.
7: [131], pp. 321-323. The ‘theorists fallacy’ can be a potentially
dangerous attitude that is far from being a remnant from the past. As
we will see later on, human agents, by acting and modifying their
life-world, have to some extent, the ability to shape this world accord-
ing to their internal models, and this closes the loop of a convergence
inducing process. Naomi Klein basically describes the same pattern
with some schools of thought in economics and psychology, and argues
that an obsession for (mathematical) order may partially have paved the
way of a very aggressive phase in Western neo-colonialist politics after
the Second World War. Also see [282], pp. 164-169.
8: [99], pg. 424.
9: [18] .
10: [128], pp. 7-8.
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11: [51] .
∙ Why does an animal behave the way it does?
∙ Why has it developed this behaviour?
∙ Why has it evolved this way?
∙ Why should it behave this way?
12: [170], pp. 94-117.
13: [99], pg. 424. According to Hassoun:
The success of global search methods in locating a globally optimal solution
(say, a global minimum) of a given function y(x) over x, hinges on a bal-
ance between an exploration process, a guidance process and a convergence-
inducing process.
The ‘vector’ x denominates all possible solutions that can be tested,
i.e. the problem domain, and y(x) is related to the goal of the problem
solver and corresponds with a possible solution.
14: [99], pg. 424. A slightly different interpretation to Hassoun is
followed here, as he considers a convergence inducing process to
be part of a global search (the third part of a global search). I have
opted here for a somewhat broader perspective, as the convergence
inducing processes here require optimisation to (eventually) outweigh
exploration, which determines their convergent nature.
15: [201] .
16: [112] . See also [230], pg. 773. Holland’s proof is named after the
one-armed bandits in casinos. The idea is that some one-armed bandits
have a slightly better chance of winning the jackpot than others. It is
up to the gambler to find these machines by devising a strategy that
‘homes in to’ them (convergence).
17: [229] .
18: [128], pg. 19. NFL theorems are named after a book written by the
economist Milton Friedman [75].
19: [200] .
20: [74] . Also [10], pg 48.
21: [46], pp. 321-323. He also uses ‘representations’, ‘images’ and so
on. Also see [69]:pp.95-97.
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22: [15] . Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si gives a very readable account on var-
ious manifestations of networks in different guises.
For networks in the social sciences, also see for instance Bruno Latour
[149] or Manuel Castells [35].
23 See Keith Briggs 2004: http://keithbriggs.info/network.html.
24: [15], pg. 58. Baraba´si makes an intruiging statement regarding the
worldwide web, that may have severe consequences for the way our
societies are organised:
The hubs are the strongest argument against the utopian vision of an egali-
tarian cyberspace. Yes, we all have the right to put anything we wish on the
web. But will anyone notice?
It would seem that, when this idea is translated to human society,
the notion of ‘hubs’ may have consequences for the way in which
society is organised; it would for instance seem that a ‘free market’
will always organise around hubs as well, and always will organise
the marginalisation of the majority. On the other hand, egalitarian
constellations may result in very fragile societies. The concept of ‘hub’
therefore deserves serious attention.
25: [266], pp. 91-95. The reliability of machines (or algorithms) is
usually ensured as long as the environment in which the machine
operates is very predictable. Most production machines require human
intervention when something unusual happens.
26: [266], pp. 89-90. Ulanowicz sees the same pattern in ecology, where
robust ecological networks hinge on a balance between ascendancy
and overhead, which loosely translates to optimisation and exploration
respectively, but then in ecological networks. Too much ascendency
makes the network vulnerable, while too much overhead (redundancy
in this case) is inefficient energy-wise.
If the system performance (order, ascendancy) should become too great at the
expense of overhead(freedom, reliability), the configuration becomes brittle
and inevitably will collapse due to some arbitrary novel perturbation. (pg. 95)
Ulanowicz expresses the ‘theorists fallacy’ in terms of (mechanistic)
monism in science. (pp. 92-93). Bourdieu has described this as:
[. . . ] in ones methodology one may slip from the model of reality to the reality
of a model, meaning that the reality one wished to extract has actually been
defined by the researchers bias: the model becomes real. [124], pg. 215
27: [218] .
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28: [181], pp. 160-168. Melanie Mitchells most recent selection of
complexity topics under investigation at the Santa Fe Institute gives a
good introduction on the emergence of computation at network level in
cellular automation. She relates this with ant colonies and the immune
system in chapter 1. Networks get extensive attention in part 4 (pp. 225-
272).
Coleman [41], pp. 6-13, addresses the ‘micro-macro problem’ in social
theory and economics.
29: [266], pp. 98. For Ulanowicz, like myself, this transition is used
to argue why determinism and reductionism fails for networks in the
plane of organised complexity. Only aggregates that are ‘the sum of the
parts’ can be described in this fashion.
30: [266], pp. 99-103. Some clues in this direction are given in
Ulanowicz’s discussion on suprafacience, an effect that more complex
superstructures replace the elements that formed them. Ulanowicz uses
a muscadine grapevine in his garden as an example of this. As the
grapevine matured, it grew adventitious roots that eventually managed
to support the grapevine when the original trunk died and rotted away.
31 Agent systems are slowly finding their way to the market place
[134]. I have had the pleasure of working for a company called Tryllian
in Amsterdam during the dot.com hype, which developed a framework
for agents. One application they developed was an auctioning system
where, for instance, an agent would get an assignment to buy a certain
music CD for its owner. The agent would then go to a virtual ‘meeting
place’ where it might encounter another agent willing to sell the CD.
Depending on question and demand, and certain predefined auctioning
algorithms, the agents would come to an agreement and return to
their bosses in order to confirm the agreement (or not, after which the
process would start all over again).
32: [21], pp. 39-41.
33: [111], pp. 41-92.
34: [111], pp. 1-2. Also see pg 4 and 5.
35: [278], pp. 18.
36: [170], pp. 114. Maturana and Varela prefer to define evolution as
a form of natural drift, where massive parallel change of biological
systems and their environment are, in their totality, not described in
terms of improvement. Improvement, as was discussed earlier is only
possible when progression is matched against a certain goal criterion
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37: [253] . It appears that some cells of the cerebral cortex in the
human brain are not renewed, which may explain why people ‘behave
their birth age, not the physical age of their cells’ [273].
38: [10], pp. 125-126.
39: [10], pg. 125.
40: [153] .
41: [131], pp. 121-143. It was mentioned earlier that machines are
highly reliable, but also fragile for disruptions, which is a characteristic
of organised simplicity. A biological organism on the other hand is less
reliable, but tremendously robust, which is a characteristic of organised
complexity. When translated to a society, the ‘order’ of the Chicago
School of Economics, as analysed by Naomi Klein, can be seen as an
idealogy of organised simplicity:
There was, as Letelier wrote, an ‘inner harmony’ between the drive to cleanse
sectors of society and the ideology at the heart of the project. The Chicago
Boys and their professors, who provided advice and took up posts in the mil-
itary regimes of the Southern Cone [C.P.: in South America], believed in a
form of capitalism that is purist by its very nature. Theirs is a system based
entirely on a belief in ‘balance’ and ‘order’ and the need to be free of inter-
ferences and ‘distortions’ in order to succeed [. . . ]. In order for the ideal to
be achieved, it requires a monopoly on ideology; otherwise, according to the
central theory, the economic signals become distorted and the entire system
is thrown out of balance (pg. 127).
From a viewpoint of complexity, it is worth noticing that these
‘experiments’ required considerable oppressive force to achieve this
‘harmony’ and ‘order’; it is not an order or balance that ‘comes out of
itself’, which the theories of the Chicago School of Economics seem
to underpin. It would seem that order needs to ‘embrace’ ambiguity
and uncertainty if it aims to become coherent in the way of a biological
organism; that is that it thrives despite its being under threat from
disruptions. This harmony in organised complexity is very different
from the harmony of any order that aims to suppress or eradicate
uncertainty. I will leave it up to the reader to decide if an ideal
society should fundamentally be a manifestation of organised sim-
plicity or organised complexity, but I know where I would place my bet.
41: [62], pp. 205-251. The Metis prerequisite as premise for human
knowledge production returns in Merlin Donald’s account of how the
human mind learns. In this respect, it is noteworthy that symbolic
production is considered an advanced cognitive ability.
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Notes for Chapter 6
1: [207] .
2: [66], pg. 35. It may be clear that this view reflects the perspective of
complexity developed with PAC, although PAC emphasises feedback,
rather than ‘two-way flows’. Also see [266], pp. 97-103.
3: [266], pp. 150-168. Ulanowicz’s ‘Third Window’ of process ecology
has much in common with PAC, although with a slight bias towards a
‘downward causality’. Probably the most essential contribution of PAC
to these propositions is ”Beware of Feedback!”, as feedback inevitably
changes the rules of the game.
4: [36] . David Christian gives an extensive and intriguing account of
the scientific ‘creation myth’ of humankind in ”Maps of Time”.
5: [100] . The Big Bang is also still contested by some physicists [218],
pp. 163-182.
6: [89], pp. 164-176. The relationship between entropy and the ex-
panding universe is much more intricate than described here, as Greene
points out in the ”Fabric of the Cosmos”. He pays extensive attention
to the relationship between entropy and order, and sees the latter as
a probability. So even though the entire universe may be subject to
increasing entropy, this is not evenly distributed, allowing ‘clumps’ of
low entropy (probable locations of order) to emerge, just like throwing
a handful of coins on a table will result in locations where more heads
or tails are concentrated.
7: [70] .
8: [266], pp. 44. Ulanowicz’s account of Elsasser’s work, shows the
effects of combinatorial explosion in its extreme, but also that even at
Universal scale there is always a boundary.
9: [261] .
10: [36], pp.39-75.
11: [263] . Also see [71] and [243]
12: [36] .pp. 344-345
13: [63] . The essays bundled in this book give an account in the style
of ”Maps of Time” on human evolution.
14: [48] .
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15: [56], pp. 23-33. Daniel Dennett gives an insightful introduction on
these issues in ”Darwin’s Dangerous Idea”.
16: [60], pg. 16. Dutch edition. Also see [50]
17: [170], pg. 61. Also see [50]
18: [276] . Also see [162], [280] and [235]
19: [170], pg. 69. Also [192], pp. 145-146.
20: [49] . Also see [272], pp. 21-22, for a critique on the ‘selfish gene’
metaphor. In [55] pp. 177-178, de Waal gives an account of the differ-
ences between intentional selfishness and ‘self-serving behaviour’.
21: [124] . Kaplan and Rogers carefully dissect a number of these
claims, which they consider to be manifestations of ”Gene Worship”.
22: [95] .
23: [166] .
24: [124], pp. 83-107. Kaplan & Rogers also give a detailed account of
linear thinking in evolutionary and socio-biology, and the consequences
this has had on ‘theories’ of gender. Their research shows various
accounts on the subtle relationships between genes and environment at
various levels of expression. Male aggression and sex drive is discussed
in pg. 66 (amongst others). It is also worth pointing out here that
gender-bias has clearly affected the formation of theories in biology
and psychology. It would seem that the uncertainty gap between genes
and human behaviour is currently very wide. Lastly, according to
Kaplan and Rogers, the tendencies for fragile ‘theories’ based on often
incorrect, biased assumptions are still commonplace.
25: [62], pp. 301-303. Merlin Donald’s book on the human mind
strongly supports the idea that the mind takes over beyond a certain
level of complexity.
Kaplan and Rogers also make a similar assessment of some gene-brain-
environment interactions [124], pp. 67-69. Their assessment favours
the plasticity of the brain over genetic expression for many behavioural
patterns related to sex differences.
26: [13] . Ingrid Baart and Marjan Slob give an interesting account
on the changes in approaches to mental health problems in psychiatric
genomics in the past decades. They see a shift from a ‘genes-eye view’
to a ‘complex network’.
For an account of strength and weaknesses of the ‘gene’s-eye view’ in
biology, see [192], pp. 143-172.
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27: [181], pp. 273-288.
28: [108] .
29: [272], pg. 63.
30: [36], pp. 95-104. As opposed to Dennetts ‘universal acid’ [56], pp.
61-84.
31: [128], pg. 17.
32: [49], pg. 2.
33: [50], pg. 226.
34: [272] . De Waals diligent comparison between our close cousins,
the chimpanzees and bonobos, on matters of aggression, politics and
cooperation do suggest certain genetically informed biases on these
traits, but also a rich repertoire of habits that cannot be determined at
the level of genes
35: [12] .
36: [50], pg. 267.
37: [55], pp. 177-178.
38: [281], pg. 22.
39: [257], pp. 23-24. This viewpoint is contested if, for instance, [192],
who does not discard selection at population, or species level
40: [281], pg. 21. Chapter 2 offers a very extensive and detailed
description of many of the issues covered in this chapter in the area of
sociobiology. It will be clear that the friction between genetic expres-
sion and environmental traits are the central theme in sociobiology.
41: [60] . Diamond tends to take this ‘gene-environment’ interaction
stance. See also [36] or [63], where human evolution and history are
strongly described from the stance of adaptations to conditions in our
environment.
42: [66], pp. 26-27. Dupre´ gives a concise account of the many factors
that complicate genetic coding
43: [170], pp. 78-79.
44: [66], pg. 29.
45: [192], pp. 166-169. Samir Okasha draws similar conclusions.
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46: [177] .
47: [56], pg. 77.
48: [56], pp. 75-76.
49: [192] . Samir Okasha draws similar conclusions, but then based
on Price’s equation. Although, like Okasha, I see no problems in
multi-level selections, I have no real idea which fitness-feedback is
most powerful and dominant. I therefore will leave this discussion to
the domain experts.
50: [210] .
51: [107] . Hodge and Wallace give a categorisation that is comparable
to actor-actant.
52: [12] . For an account of so-called ‘evolutionary stable strategies’
as source for social theory, see [251], pp. 66-70. For an introduction in
game theory, see [156]. A more recent, in-depth mathematical coverage
can be found in [190]
53: [230], pp. 83. Adversarialism is especially used in legal parlance.
In artificial intelligence, a somewhat broader form of interaction is
often used when two agents interact, and the actions of one agent is the
source of contingency for the other. These contingencies are always
detrimental of the goal the agent has, so the actor is always hindering
the co-actor in achieving its goals.
54: [63], pp. 56-57. (Dutch)
55: [50], pg. 267. Dawkins describes this ‘illusion of harmony’ from
the perspective of selfish replicators. He gives an example that shows
how grasses that are less affected by grazing outcompete others, which
results in a sort of ‘cooperation’ between grazer and the grass.
56: [60], pp. 56-58. Dutch edition. In his very funny discussion on the
myth of ‘Man the Hunter’, Jared Diamond seems to unveil a theory that
maybe there is a gene on the Y-chromosome of human males that codes
for exaggeration and self-importance. Chapter 3 is also a good read for
a more differentiated view on human sexuality.
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57: [56], pp. 392-393. Selective pressure seems to be quite common in
debates amongst (socio-)biologists. Dennett observes:
I regret that the siege mentality among sociobiologists has led them to over-
look —at any rate, neglect to correct— more than a few cases of egregiously
bad reasoning by members of their own team
It would seem that culture co-evolves with the mainstream ideas on
subject matter.
58: [156], pp. 2-3. The foundations of Game Theory were laid in
the Interbellum, but Luce & Raiffa suggest that maybe World war II
was also a strong driver for the interest in Game Theory. One of the
Grand Names in Game Theory, John Nash, was heavily (and involun-
tarily) influenced by McCarthyism in the Fifties of the previous century.
59: [36], pp. 312. Christian pays extensive attention to these Malthu-
sian cycles in Maps of Time, and shows how they have shaped the
evolution of humankind.
60: [268] . There is a lot of research that demonstrates the subtle
interactions between genes, behaviour and environment, and supports
the idea that although genes may encode certain behavioural bias,
there is a lot of plasticity in the behaviour of individual organisms.
This is a confirmation that social behaviour is —as may be expected–
adapted for the plane of organised complexity, and not that of organised
simplicity. Also see for instance [25]. De Waal’s extensive research
on Chimp colonies has also demonstrated that overly-aggressive alpha
males usually do not make lasting leaders [272].
61: [95] .
62: [55], pg. 33.
63: [55], pg. 6. The entire book is dedicated to this subject. Philip
Kitcher describes the nuances of altruism in relationships very dis-
tinctly, in his discussion with de Waal on the evolution of morality on
pp. 127-128.
64: [36], pp. 381-383. Also pg. 365.
65: [36], pg. 313-314.
66: [266], pg. xv. Stuart Kauffman uses the example of flowers and
hummingbirds as ‘autocatalytic mutualisms’. Mutualism in the sense
of ‘parasitism turned good’ could work very well here.
67: [166] .
68: [167] .
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69: [66], pp. 36-39. Dupre´ gives an extensive account on symbionts in
various biological organisms, including microbes in the human body.
70: [201] . Also [203] and [204]
71: [210] .
72: [50], pg. 224. Note that the Gould’s theory on the extinction of
Irish elks is still controversial.
73: [55], pp. 33-37.
74: [181], pp. 255-257.
75: [60], pp. 381-382. Dutch edition. Also see [36], page 473-475.
Christian sees the tale of Rapa Nui to be a possible future scenario for
our world.
76: [282], pp. 174-181. Joseph Stiglitz seems to describe this form of
inflationary growth at a global scale
77: [181], pp. 176-178.
78 Regular visitors of Internet forums may see a correspondence with
the way ‘threads’ are used there. I do not think that this is a coincidence,
as these threads are (usually) orderly records of a theme, or problem,
that is discussed, and the thread shows how the ideas of the theme
take up form, for instance a solution to the problem that is discussed.
A forum thread is evolutionary, exploratory and collaborative. Robert
Ulanowicz uses the concept of ‘thread’ in the similar fashion in his
preface to ”A Third Window” [266], pg. xxv.
79: [217] .
80: [55], pg. 7. This notion of subduing our immediate environment
was already observed by Thomas Huxley (1894) who compared
humanity with ‘a gardener who has a hard time keeping the weeds out
of the garden.’
81: [128], pp. 15-16. Kauffman pays extensive attention to autocatalyst
reactions in his investigations of, amongst other things, life.
Notes for Chapter 7
1: [69] . Also see Antonio Damasio [46], pp. 25-28.
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2: [128], pp. 15-16. There may be a few other boundaries of scale
even before approaching the concept of ‘life’ along the complexity
perspective, as even some of the prerequisites are currently poorly
understood, such as stable autocatylist sets, if this proves to be a
premise for life.
3: [281], pp. 27-31. The term panchreston (pg. 29) was coined by
Garret Hardin in ”The meaninglessness of the word protoplasm” in
Scientific Monthly 1956 [98].
4: [125], pp. 20-28. for pattern recognition, also [99], pp. 1-30.
5: [266], pp. 42-46. Ulanowicz offers a more detailed discussion on
the implicit assumptions behind statistical approaches. He speaks of
‘complex chance’ and ‘rogue chance’ for events, which might include
the complexities beyond an observers comprehension.
6: [201] . Also [203]
7: [109], pp. 45-50.
8: [66], pg. 16. According to Dupre´:
This is the sort of thing that I mean by a node in the causal nexus. I shall
suggest that this model, incorporating the development of a two-way causal
interaction between a complex thing and its constituents, is the right model
for interaction at many different levels of structural organisation
It will probably be clear that the hourglass pattern takes this idea
much further by incorporating feedback through the node, as feedback
almost inevitably changes the expressions of the processes through the
node, as was discussed with the ‘micro-macro’ problem in networks.
Besides this, feedback still allows a managed view on the complex
interactions around these nodes. Many attempts to move beyond
reductionism, however sympathetic, well-meant and necessary, fail to
provide the means and tools to actually progress in the post-reductionist
scientific realm. At all costs, PAC aims to respect this very sensible and
understandable demand of science.
9: [207] .
449
10: [124], pp. 234-235. This view has been almost literally expressed
by Kaplan and Rogers notion of the dialectic (most probably borrowed
from Hegel) between biology, the (human) individual and the culture
that individual finds herself in. In a criticism on (biological) reduction-
ism and culturalism, which in their view is equally limited, they argue:
Here we are probably at the crux of the argument that has created insur-
mountable barriers between the scientific and cultural perspectives. We have
outlined throughout the book that specific experiential factors have a bearing
on the individual organism [. . . ]. This is not a unidirectional process, but one
that is dialectic. Moreover, interactions between developmentally specified
versus developmentally modifiable events occur at every stage of develop-
ment.[. . . ]
We are not just referring to a single loop between genes and environment at
the stimulus-response level, but to a second loop from symbolic culture to the
individual and vice versa. In fact, even these loops are blurred by interactions
11: [149], pp.63-86. It is worth pointing out that Latour considers this
a ‘source of uncertainty’. For a more detailed overview of Latours ideas
for technology, see Judy Wajcman in [282], pp. 90-100, especially pp.
96-97.
12: [282], pp. 81-83.
13: [266], pp. 52-55. Ulanowicz, following Popper, proposes that
propensities demarcate a transition from (physical) laws to more
complex organisations such as life and ecologies. Although he does not
specifically say so, his analysis is very similar to what we have been
calling ‘themes in the plane of organised complexity’.
14: [124], pg. 235.
15: [282], pp. 110-111. This balancing act has also been analysed in
the so-called framing of certain problems. Frame analysis has been
proposed as a policy instrument.
16: [36], pg.4. According to Santa Fe associate and Nobel prize winner
Murray Gell-Mann, it is important to find researchers who:
[. . . ] have the courage to take a crude look at the whole in addition to studying
the behaviour of the parts in the traditional way
It will be clear that (a) PAC can assist in a ‘methodology of crudeness’.
17: [13] .
18: [209] . For the extended example see [208]
19: [52] . Aubrey Degrey envisions the end of the ‘disease called aging’.
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20: [83] .
21: [62], pp. 47-57. Psychologist Merlin Donald draws similar conclu-
sions on the (interface) concept of ‘consciousness’
22: [62], pp. 59-88. For a detailed account on the experiences of
patients, see for instance [116]
23: [124], pg. 20. As for instance Kaplan and Rogers observe in brain
research on gender differences:
But in the case of researching sex differences, we find that the experimenta-
tion and interpretation of the results is often distorted by social attitudes and
used falsely to justify inequality
24: [124], pg. 163. On sex/gender differences in feelings and emotions
in the expression of sexuality, Kaplan and Rogers observe the same lim-
itations in mono-disciplinary research:
A whole host of theories link all our patterns of behaviour to the affective
domain (to emotions) and therein to reproduction and biology. On the other
hand, some schools of thought on these matters have been appalled at the very
notion of biological determinism and view much of our affective domain as
psychological and thus, by implication, as a cultural construct
25: [227] . Also [256]
26: [46], pp.62-67. Damasio describes his experiences with a patient
who came to him with a minor seizure. As the patient was perfectly
healthy otherwise, they were not prepared to find out that a part of her
brain, the two amygdalae, were almost completely calcified. Further
interviews proved that the patient was extremely open and optimistic
in her social contacts, not to say ‘excessively and inappropriately
forthcoming’. This was eventually traced back to her condition, as
amygdalae control, amongst others, the conditioning of fear. In other
words, the patient had few social reservations.
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27: [16], pp.71-76. This bias can also be seen in Baron-Cohens
discussion on autism and Asperger syndrome. These mental conditions
are often theorised as being ‘extreme male personality traits’ (extreme
male-brain theory)[17]. At a population level, females are stronger
empathizers and males are stronger systemizers, and people with autism
and Asperger are often very good systemizers, at least in relationship
to other qualities. It is remarkable that the extreme personality trait on
the female side of this gradient —which could be extreme emphatic,
communicative or social skills— are not put in a medical category, as
a sort of ‘extreme female-brain theory’. This would imply that women
(and some men) who suffer from extreme emphatic, communicative or
social skills, will not be considered problematic, which may be both a
blessing as well as a curse for these people.
28: [124], pg. 13. In their criticism on gender-biased ‘theories’ in biol-
ogy, Kaplan and Rogers write:
Science is not a search for truth operating in the solitude of the laboratory.
Scientists are part of the society in which they conduct their research and
they share its biases and prejudices
A bit later, they observe:
Complexity is not a message that captures the attention of the media, the
public or, indeed, many scientists
29: [148], pp. 2-3.
30: [146] . Kurzweil gives an extensive vision of ‘improving’ human
beings with genetic and nanotechnology. The same narrow view, of
course, may return in radical forms of social constructivism that deny a
biological component to themes, such as pain, suffering and so on [22].
31: [124], pg. 18. Note that there is usually no linear causal relationship
between genes and these characteristics. But even if there is, it is ques-
tionable whether to proceed in such directions, as decreasing diversity
will inevitably make a society less robust. Basically, a certain genera-
tion imposes certain social values on their descendants, who may be
too restrained by eugenic breeding to cope with changing environments.
32: [124], pg. 74. In many other areas in biology, the ‘nature-nurture’
dichotomy is also rapidly becoming less dominant, or at least is being
contested in the face of growing awareness of complex interaction
patterns.
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33: [124], pg. 131. As Kaplan and Rogers describe it:
From the armchair of a university office in an advanced Western society,
semi-romantic myths of males as the ones with stamina and strength may
seem plausible, but we would like to invite these theorists to go to any de-
veloping country right now and see for themselves who carts the wood, who
carries the water, who ploughs the fields and who makes the new roads [. . . ]
As a United Nations statement said, on a basis of well researched empirical
evidence, women of the world do 90 percent of the worlds work and own 10
percent of the resources [. . . ] Who has to have stamina?
In this case, the theorists fallacy revolves around notions that men have
more stamina based on ‘theories’ (myths) of our hunter-gatherer past.
The argument also shows how a phenomenological perspective –and
especially very practical common sense observations— can provide the
necessary disruptive influences for these absolutist tendencies.
Note also that experience provides ‘disruptions’ to the dominant myth.
34: [138] .
Our results show that the structure of the adult primate brain remains highly
sensitive even to modest levels of experiential complexity. For adult primates,
living in standard laboratory housing may induce reversible dendritic spine
and synapse decreases in brain regions important for cognition.
Also see [61], and for elderly people [14]. There is also evidence that
incompatibilities between a job and the workers capabilities negatively
affect cognition [53].
35: [224] . (Dutch). Quoting the American researcher Kassin, Rassin
writes:
A warehouse of psychology research suggests that once people form an im-
pression, they unwittingly seek, interpret and create behavioural data that ver-
ify it (pg. 36).
The combination of contextual diminution, bias and focus, gives
a whole range of cognitive distortions. Some are funny, others are
potentially hazardous. Also see [26](Dutch).
36: [182] . Discussion on organisations that do not innovate. See [44]
for lethargic responses in fish to toxins.
37: [265] .
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38: [74], pg. 4. Jerry Fodor captures the intentions of a ‘complexophy’
in his discussion on the mysteries of the human mind:
Over the past forty years or so, weve been putting questions about cognitive
processes to Nature, and Nature has been replying with interpretable indi-
cations on the scope and limits of the computational theory of the cognitive
mind
It would seem that this humble querying of a certain theme is exactly
what a complexophy would aim for; heavy debates on various theories,
however useful they may be, often merely imply, simply, that no-one
knows (yet) and a complex target remains silent.
Notes for Chapter 8
1: [181], pp. 160-168. Mitchells description of ‘computing with
particles’ gives a nice visualisation of what I mean by contextualisation
of patterns. Here the ‘particles’ are crisp areas where interfaces are
formed, while other areas contextualise on the interference of two
patterns. Note that Mitchell uses ‘transfer of information’ in this case,
which suggests the ‘atomic’ view of information (pg. 165).
2: [10], pg. 254 . For interpretands see pp. 161-162.
3: [157], pg. 2.
4: [266], pp. 60. The quote is depicted on pg. 63.
5: [62], pg. xi.
6: [266], pg. 60. In the words of Ulanowicz:
According to the theory of the big bang, the universe began as a chaotic,
incredibly dense mass of extremely high-energy photons —pure flux. As this
continuum began to expand, some of the photons came together (collided) to
form pairs of closed-loop circulations called hadrons, the initial matter and
anti-matter.
7: [217] . Also [218], pp.153-162.
For a more extensive coverage of the embodiment of craftsmanship,
see [241], for instance pp. 120-125.
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8: [251], pp. 164-180. Smith and Jenks pay extensive attention to this
issue in a discussion that starts with Batesons question posed to his
audience during a lecture: ‘Do you see me?’ (pg. 166). Although Smith
and Jenks use a somewhat different vocabulary, without the concept
of pattern, and rather use information in the way it is normally used,
I don’t think they will object too much to the ‘fuzzification’ (pg. 173)
of ontology and epistemology through processes of feedback that is
proposed here.
9: [89] .
10: [89], pp. 170-175. According to Greene, ‘current order is a
cosmological relic’. (pg. 171).
11: [157], pp. 20-22.
12: [83], pp. 30-34.
13: [266], pp. 15-16. Carl Sagan was a bit more ambitious in his
messages for Pioneer I, the first space probe destined to leave the solar
system, than in coding sequences of prime numbers.
14: [143], pp. 106. Kunneman distinguishes three perspectives on
nature; micro-, meso- and macro nature. It may be clear, that PAC
opts for a very diffuse increase of complexity, which is based on the
production of complex structures from simpler forms. Such production
usually takes up an exponential form, in this case a rapidly contracting
one; it becomes increasingly difficult to ‘grow’ increasingly complex
forms.
15: [266], pp. 133-135.
16: [1], pp. 38-58.
17: [181], pp. 183-185. Mitchell makes an interesting connection
between optimisation and determinism, when discussing global search,
which she sees as a mix between ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’
(optimisation in terms of PAC), or the ‘interplay between unfocused
and focused processes’. Optimisation, in Mitchells analysis, is de-
terministic. That is, optimisation belongs to the (orderly) Carthesian
universe.
18: [144], pp. 14-28. (Dutch). For instance, the followers of Husserl’s
hermeneutics acknowledge more enriched forms of interpretation.
19: [155], pp. 4-5.
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20: [266], pg. 119. Ulanowicz, following Elasser, warns against a naive
use of statistics:
Elasser, however, has warned us against the hubris of thinking all is now
copacetic by questioning those simplistic assumptions about chance and by
making us aware of the ubiquitous complex chance events that elude treat-
ment by statistics.
The way I interpret this is probably best described by Jeff Waynes mu-
sical coverage of H.G. Wells ”War of the Worlds” [277]:
The chances of anything coming from Mars,
are a million to one, he said.
The chances of anything coming from Mars,
are a million to one,
but still,
they come!
21: [266], pp. 122-124.
22: [144], pp. 126-129. Dutch. Also [67], pp. 38-40 (Dutch). It should
be noted here, that interpretation in some philosophical traditions
link this concept to knowing as being related to a certain context.
Interpretation in the way it is used in PAC implies not knowing certain
aspects (unambiguously). Interpretation is a means of ‘filling in the
gaps’, which aligns with a host of research in psychology [211]
23: [66], pp. 17. In a discussion on the ancient philosophical tradition
of classification as being a means to capture the ‘essence’ of things, and
the failure to achieve this in living systems, John Dupre´ observes:
A sufficient explanation of this failure is the agreement that one biological
kind can evolve gradually in another. The identification of a kind of organism
existing at this moment is an abstraction from a continuous process linking
these organisms through time [. . . ]
Note that categorisation typically is a form of coding, or ranking into
distinct classes. The pattern of difference has already made clear that
PAC does not follow the Platonic ‘essentialist tradition’ as ranking –and
thus categorisation— is epistemological. Besides this, ranking along
gradual lines always implies a loss of information, and thus results in
interpretation rather than coding. This issue has long been known when
performing a measurement, which inevitably splits the gradient up in
lesser amounts of discrete units of a certain scale.
24: [186] . See also the comments on this article in [110]
25: [88], pp. 7-10.
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26: [45], pp. 128-154. Dutch edition. Especially pg. 134, on anticipa-
tory emotions and feelings.
27: [89], pp. 143-176.
28: [266], pp. 60-61.
29: [153], pg. 154. The Copenhagen interpretation of the uncertainty
principle has some far-reaching consequences.
30: [161], pp. 54-60. Lyotard follows similar paths to PAC in his
analysis of scientific knowledge production in the ‘postmodern’ times
we live in.
31: [218] . Ilya Prigogine offers a more extensive account of the
problems of the ‘arrow of time’ in a Newtonian framework. The
solution he proposes steers very near to PAC, although there are some
subtle differences. Prigogine uses an idiom that contains ‘probabilities’
and ‘possibilities’ (see pp. 17-29), and which is likely to be sufficient
to advance complexity in physics. In PAC, the concepts of ‘uncer-
tainty’, ‘ambiguity’ and ‘propensities’ aim, more than probabilities
and possibilities, to include the aspect of unknown causality, which
often may compromise statistical approaches, especially when moving
up the complexity perspective, when the combinatorial nature of
propensities start to dominate over the implicit assumptions behind
statistical approaches. Also, ambiguity, more than chance, allows a
better mechanism for the concept of ‘choice’, when ambiguity is seen
as a low-energy transition area where propensities can ‘tip scales’
relatively easily. More than ‘chance’, ambiguity can be a source for
‘hunches’, ‘intuitions’, ‘sub-consciousness’ and ‘gut feelings’, all of
which suggest a hint of causality, that ‘chance’ or ‘disorder’ seem to
exclude.
32: [169], pg. 135. Also see [170] pp. 47-48. Although the definition
of autopoiesis in terms of Maturana & Varela does not really require
it, autopoiesis in biology really only starts to become interesting when
a group not only maintains itself, but can also repair itself without
external intervention. Even though a solar system is to some extent
‘self-maintaining’, using autopoiesis in this context would seem to
push its meaning to a panchreston. For this reason, I opt to use this
term only in situations when self-maintenance includes an ability for
self-repair.
33: [157], pg 22.
34: [181], pp. 3-4.
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35: [93] .pg. 179 Also Jean-Franois Lyotard critique on Habermas,
[161], pp. 60-76.
36: [175], pg. 179.
37: [161], pp. 60-61. Lyotards notion of paralogy, which means a
movement against an established way of reasoning (most notably
scientific), is similar to the ‘disruptions’ of PAC, although paralogy
seems to concentrate on the ‘moving away’, rather than the delicate
balancing act of the disruptions in PAC. Maybe this is the most defining
difference between postmodern thought and complexity thinking; that
complexity thinking is more attuned to the delicate paths between
synthesis and opposition, or exploration and optimisation.
38: [149], pg. 115. Latour refers to his notion of ‘second empiricism’
that replaces ‘matters of fact’ from ‘matters of concern’
Notes for Chapter 9
1: [161], pg. 12. Lyotard’s finale, when discussing the importance of
‘paralogy’ in science, also steers very close to the pattern of contextual
diminution (pp. 60-67). A slight difference may be that Lyotard focuses
on power as means to ‘close the system’, while PAC works with
‘stabilisation’. ‘Power’ in PAC, might be translated as ‘an ability to
influence reality’
2: [218], pp. 153-162.
3: [33], pp. 53-60. Dutch edition.
4: [124], pg. 25.
5: [157], pp. xlvii-lii.
6: [281] .
7: [201] . Also [203]. Here the values are communicated horizontally
through stress signals. The values are incorporated by design
8: [49], pp. 189-201.
9: [211], pg. 133.
10: [24] .
11: [173], pp. 150-153. Smith and Jenks are recent exceptions [251],
pp. 109-123.
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12: [11], pp.7-8. Also see [56] on page 144 and 166. The fragility of
‘memes’ as scientific construct is voiced by Atran:
Blackmore’s account, like nearly all other stories of the evolution of the big
brain and language, provides neither empirical evidence nor substantive pro-
posals for how one might go about gathering and testing evidence. No insight
is provided into any specific brain structure or neural organization: for exam-
ple, concerning the structure of the late-evolving prefrontal cortices and their
relationship to language comprehension and production centers in the tem-
poral and parietal lobes of the dominant hemisphere. Neither is there a hint
about specific semantic or syntactic structures: such as wh-movement, case
assignment, anaphora, and so on.
13: [251], pg. 108-110.
14: [172] .
15: [272] .
16: [170], pg. 61. Merlin Donald extends this argument to discussions
regarding consciousness, which supports arguments against a ‘meme’
view [62], pp. 59-60. Also pp. 160-161.
17: [211], pp. 208-209. Pinker draws a similar conclusion:
I think that you’ll agree that this is not how cultural change works. A complex
meme does not arise from the retention of copying errors. It arises because
some person knuckles down, racks his brain, musters his ingenuity, and com-
poses or writes or paints or invents something
18: [60], pg. 51. Dutch edition.
19: [266], pp. 125-127. Ulanowicz uses a similar ‘ecology perspective’
to argue for the ‘bankrupcy’ of the meme as sole atoms of culture.
Regarding the topics of consciousness, psychologist Merlin Donald
extends this co-evolution between the brain and culture to be essential
in understanding the unique capabilities of the human mind [62], pp.
157-164.
20: [41], pg. 11.
21: [62], pg. 106. Merlin Donald describes the same impregnable inter-
face between biological and social domains on the issue of conscious-
ness.
Samir Okasha gives a detailed account on, amongst others, the issues
of reductionism, pluralism and holism as they are currently waging in
the domain of biology itself [192].
459
22: [157], pg. 14.
23: [251], pg. 52. Also [157], pg. 66 and [158], pp. 45-46.
24: [220] .
25: [255] .
26: [220], pg. 43.
27: [100] .
28: [236], pg. 9. More recently, Spencer-Brown’s Law of Forms have
been taken up under the denominator ‘boundary algebra’ [194]
29: [220], pg. 49.
30: [150] .
31: [157], pg. xvii.
32: [157], pg. 37-38.
33: [158], pg. 66. Translated from German by author:
Autopoiesis ist deshalb nicht als Produktion einer bestimmten Gestalt zu be-
greifen. Entscheidend ist vielmehr die Erzeugung einer Differenz von System
und Umwelt.
Also [236], pg. 21.
34: [158], pg. 60. Translated from German by author:
Die am tiefsten eingreifende, fu¨r das Versta¨ndnis den Folgenden unent-
behrlichen Umstellung liegt darin, daßnicht mehr von Objecten die Rede ist,
sondern von Unterscheidungen und ferner: daßUnterscheidungen nicht als
vorhandene Sachverhalte (Unterschiede) begriffen werden, sondern daßsie
auf eine Aufforderung zuru¨ckgehen sie zu vollziehen, weil man anderenfalls
nichts bezeichnen ko¨nnte, also nicht beobachten beka¨me, also nichts vortset-
zen ko¨nnte.
35: [158], pg. 62. Translated from German by author:
Der Formbegriff unterscheidet sich damit nicht mehr nur von Begriff des In-
halts; aber auch nicht nur vom Begriff des Kontextes. Eine Form kann im
Unterschied von etwas zu allem anderen liegen, ebenso auch im Unterscheid
von etwas zu seinem Kontext (etwa eines Bauwerks zu einer sta¨dtlichen
oder landschaftlichen Umgebung), aber auch im Unterschied eines Wertes
zu seinem Gegenwert unter Ausschlu dritter Mo¨glichkeiten
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36: [157], pp. 9-11.
37: [128], pp. 15-16. Autocatalyst sets are an interesting point of
reference in this respect.
38: [266], pp. 64-90.
39: [158], pg.67.
40: [158], pg. 68. Translated from German by author:
[. . . ] daßnur operativ geschlossene Systeme eine ho¨hen Eigencomplexitt auf-
bauen ko¨nnen, die dann dazu dienen kann, die Hinsichten zu spezifizieren, in
den das System auf Bedingungen seiner Umwelt reagiert, wa¨hrend es sich in
allen u¨brigen Hinsichten dank seiner Autopoiesis Indifferenz leisten kann.
41: [157], pg. 70.
42: [158], pg. 72.
43: [158], pg. 71. Translated from German by author:
Mit diesen zeitpunktbezogen Begriff der Kommunikation korrigieren
wir zugleich einen popula¨ren Begriff der Information. Information ist
eine u¨berraschende Selektion aus mehreren Mo¨glichkeiten. Sie kann als
U¨berraschung weder Bestand haben noch transportiert werden; und sie
mußsystemintern erzeugt werden, da sie einen Vergleich mit Erwartungen
voraussetzt.
44: [157], pg. xxxvi.
45: [157], pg. xxix.
46: [157], pg. xxiv.
47: [37], pp. 3-5.
48: [150], pg. 56.
49: [37], pp. 38-41.
50: [74] . Also [211]
51: [101] .
52: [74] .
53: [37], pp. 37-41.
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54: [62], pp. 35-39. Merlin Donald draws attention to the differences,
but also the similarities of the ‘language-as-consortium’ theorists, with
respect to the ‘sensory hardliners’ on the issue of consciousness, in this
‘furiously reductionist century’ (pg. 35).
Donald seems to an experimenter, and it would seem that a somewhat
relaxed attitude appears to be quite common amongst experimenters
. . .
55: [62], pp. 116-117.
56: [149] .
57: [251], pg. 108-109.
58: [42] .
59: [161], pp. 11-17.
60: [46], pp. 17-18. Like the interpretation of a social system being a
conglomerate of threads of feedback, the core self and autobiographical
self could be interpreted as similar processes that create ‘knots’ of
order in and around the substrate of the mind, especially if the notion
of re-entry as is hypothesised by Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi is
taken into account as well [69]
61: [262], pp. 325-326. Charles Taylor positions the emergence of the
idea of the ‘self’ as defining characteristic of nature in the Eighteenth
century. Following Holbach, the preservation of self is seen as one of
the most essential goals of any force in nature , which Holbach likens
to ‘gravitation’ in a broader sense than physical.
62: [196] . Recent research in sociology suggests that a high self-
esteem is an important trick in social interaction, especially in order
to deal with rejection. The ‘illusion’ that the capabilities of ‘self’ are
evaluated (overly) positively with respect to other people [195] is
important in social interactions.
462
63: [62], pp. 252-300. Merlin Donald follows the ideas of Luhmann
to a certain extent in his thesis that culture is a driving force of
consciousness. The human mind begot its unique cognitive abilities
through its interactions with other minds. He speaks of ‘community of
mind’ (pg. 254)
Sociologists John Smith and Chris Jenks [251] pp. 105-128, also seem
to sketch a social space that hosts ‘attractors’, in a similar fashion
as the ‘values’ of the domains described here. Ironically enough,
their attractors are derived from their understanding of Dawkins’s
memes. The extended example they offer, based on the changing ideas
of the ‘painted nude’ (as meme) in historical developments in art,
strengthen my own analysis that this should not be seen as ‘memetic
mutation’, but rather as a concept that contextualises differently with
time. Manet’s Olympia as ‘painted nude’ can acquire a different set
of meanings over time as the audience changes. Basically, Smith and
Jenks’s auto-eco-organisation, in some ways represent an ontological
description of concept/context that is used in PAC. The differences in
vocabularies aside, the eventual models seem very similar.
64: [111], pg. 1.
65: [2], pg. x.
66: [172], pg. 55-61.
67: [172], pg. 15. Celebrity worship syndrome seems a nice example
of the ‘tagging’ of human individuals. If someone gets a certain media
focus, this bootstrapping mechanism can start a convergence inducing
process where people become ‘famous for being famous’.
68: [251], pp. 123-128.
69: [249], pg. 4.
70: [10], pg. 205. Note the explicit recursion in his description, which
captures the self-reinforcing nature towards the attractor of absolutism:
The successful technical mastery of the material world (constructed at the
same time it is mastered, and mastered even better insofar as it is constructed)
”proves” the truth of the scientific method. The same method (or a method
that resembles it enough to be taken for the same), applied to another object,
guarantees the truth of the theories thereby elaborated and of the beliefs they
induce.
71: [148], pg. 2.
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72: [161], pg. 15. Lyotard expresses the same ideas but then ‘in the
context of’ language games.
73: [266], pp. 13-16. Robert Ulanowicz offers a more detailed account
on the ‘two windows’ of science, provided by Newtonian mechanics
and Darwinian selection. His account on the down-playing of the con-
cept of ‘process’ in especially Darwinian evolution theory is very inter-
esting, as PAC obviously is very process-oriented.
Note also that the irreversibility of time in PAC is located at ambiguity
of ranking. A Newtonian universe relies heavily on differential equa-
tions, which should be seen as a reduction of information between two
states due to the approximation of a gradient between them. In PAC this
is only one of a whole range of possible connections in the ambiguous
zone in-between these states.
74: [67], pp. 67-68. Translation from Dutch by author.
Notes for Chapter 10
1: [7], pg. 9.
2: [180], pp. 114-134. For the etymological roots of techne, see pp.
117-120. Especially chapter five gives an extensive account on the
differences between techne¯ and technology. Technics / techniques are
somewhat more opaque, and may be used differently (pp. 235-236).
3: [282], pg. 2.
4: [260] . Also [183]
5: [60], pg. 52. Dutch edition.
6: [151] . An alternative theory considers bipedal nature to have been an
advantage for covering large terrain, which is at par with the scavenging
nature our forebears. This alternative theory considers the ‘ensnaring of
our feet’ to be more vital than the liberation of our hands, although it is
worth pointing out that they are not mutually exclusive.
Richard Sennett pays extensive attention to the relationship between
hand and cognition in [241], pp. 149-153.
7: [120] .
8: [27] .
9: [183], pg. 40.
10: [9] .
11: [119], pp. 25-26. Also see Judy Wajcman in [282], pp. 91-92.
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12: [119], pg. 26.
13: [180], pp. 42-44. Also pp. 125-134
14: [262], pp. 22. In an impressive genealogy of ideas concerning
‘self’, Taylor shows that many contemporary ideas of art and expression
are modern and ‘evolved’ alongside the ‘ethics of fame, of rational
mastery and control’. Also [241]. Judy Wajcman concisely describes,
and criticises the (co-)construction of ideas on technology in society
that, ‘themselves help to constitute what they purport to describe and
analyse’ [282], pg. 92.
15: [250] . Singh’s description of the solution of Fermat’s last theorem
is just one fine example the aesthetics of a good mathematical proof.
Ron Howard’s gave a nice visualisation of this process, in ”A Beautiful
Mind”. As John Nash, the founder of Game Theory, is looking at a
blackboard, shiny, golden symbols light up in the plethora of equations
and start to flow together.1
16: [96], pp. 241-245. Hannam’s account of the rediscovery of
Archimedes during the Renaissance is very revealing in this sense.
When Jerome Cardan (1501-1575) wrote a book on Archimedes (the
experimenter), and elevated him over Aristotle (the philosopher) and
Euclid, it inspired one of the most vitriolic book reviews in the annals
of literature’, by humanist Julius Caesar Scalinger (1484-1558), which
was actually longer than the book itself:
You have put a builder before Aristotle, who was no less knowledgeable in
these arts [. . . ] After Archimedes, you have put Euclid as if the light after the
lantern (pg. 244)
As a demonstration of how bias can be persistent in intellectual
activities, it is worth pointing out that even today, Aristotle is still
widely known and taught, while Archimedes’ work is confined to the
‘Eureka’ moment in his bathtub. Cardan’s work on Archimedes is
virtually forgotten.
17: [119], pg. 19. Also [180], pg. 77.
18: [279], pp. 31-32.
19: [282], pg. 29.
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20: [96] . The almost invisible innovations of the European Middle
Ages also applies for the evolution of ideas. James Hannam gives
a detailed account of the developments in early science in Europe
between the end of Roman Empire and the Renaissance. His account
is also a strong call for disruptive knowledge in regular historical
accounts. Bias tends to percolate persistently in historical accounts that
keep referring the same source texts.
21: [282], pg. 12. Also [119], pp. 26-27
22: [8] .
23: [102] .
24: [282], pp. 38-54. Schwartz Cohan gives an interesting account of
this development in the United States after the Civil War
25: [262], pp. 305-367. Like art, many contemporary ideas on nature
and the ‘natural self’ co-evolved with the more rationalist stances
that dominated from early enlightenment. The distinction between the
‘natural’ and the ‘artificial’ has therefore been a persuasive one, but
as all rankings, can easily be contested. Along the scales between the
cave dwellings and wooden or clay huts on one side, and the high-rise
and skyscrapers in contemporary metropolitan areas on the other, the
difference between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ is an highly ambiguous one.
26: [239], pp. 5-11.
27: [192] . Also [66]
28: [199] . Pfeiffer’s description of optimising the production of
complex antibiotics through geneticially engineered bacteria is just one
of the many publications on genetic engineering, the pros and the cons:
[259], [245] and [270]
29: [117] . Also [114].
30: [13] .
31: [184] . Also [244]
32: [215] . Asbestos has been a very dangerous product in the past,
especially for those who worked with the material on a daily basis. The
health risks were so severe that the material is now banned in most
countries. Also see [123] and [242]
33: [121], pp. 127-128.
34: [282], pp. 12. Also see [237], pp. xiv-xv.
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35: [8], pp. 2-3. For a structural perspective, see pp. 21-23.
36: [146], p. 40. Also see [282], pp. 8-11, for a phenomenological
description of this positive feedback loop towards increasing efficiency
and productivity.
37: [146], p. 8.
38: [175], pg. 179. Bill McKibben is strongly opposed to this single-
minded drive for ever-increasing efficiency. Also see Also [174]
39: [282], pp. 182-195.
40: [282], pg. 81.
41: [92] .
42: [266], pp. 7-8.
43: [282], pp. 90-102. Judy Wajcman gives an extensive coverage of
the agency of technological artefacts in society. Many of arguments
reflect those that were discussed earlier by Kaplan and Rogers on
evolutionary psychology and socio-biology.
44: [96] . James Hannam pays extensive attention to all the Great
Minds of the European middle ages that paved the way for modern
science, most who are now forgotten.
45: [216] .
46: [140] .
47: [8], pp. 2-3. Brian Arthur gives an extensive account on the
autopoietic nature of technology.
48: [161], pp. 41-47.
49: [282], pp. 142-152.
50: [197] . Also [188]
51: [175], pp. 177-179.
52: [237] . Also [121]
53: [159] . Also [160]
54: [168] . Also [185]
55: [175], pp.8-9. Also [105], pg. 36, and [76]
56: [282], pp. 102-113.
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57 As an example of technology that usually gets very little attention
of the critics of technology, one can consider toys. Children’s toys
are, especially for mechanical engineers, a major source of innovation
because of the extremely high norms and standards these toys have to
comply with. Engineers working in that area are constrained by safety
issues, available space, the variety of forms and shapes that toys impose
on design.
58: [118] .
59: [277] .
60: [20] .
61: [266], pp. 91-95.
62: [282], pp. 110-111. One of the means to address this is frame
analysis’.
63: [175] . Also [174]
64: [144], pp. 99-115. Dutch. S. IJsseling gives an extensive account
of the importance of writing and scriptures for philosophy and science.
The claim that technology would not be possible (pg. 111) however, is
debatable, as artefacts themselves are a record of the ideas that created
them. However, the absence of books, writing and texts, would no
doubt have slowed down technological developments tremendously.
65: [205], pp. 80-81. I have named this asymmetry after the Dutch
capital city, because some dwellers of a major and self-confident city –
and particularly often those who originally come from the countryside
and fled— claim superiority over rural folk, while the latter basically
don’t care what the urban dwellers think of them.
66: [282], pp. 102-113. Sheila Jasanoff follows a same course with
here ”technologies of humility”.
468
67: [180], pg. 64. Carl Mitcham expresses the wariness of engineers for
this ‘outsider intervention’ most succinctly:
Engineering curricula require engineering students to take humanities
courses, but how many engineering courses are humanities students required
to take?
Regarding specifically STS (social studies of science and technology),
the criticism of social scientists and the humanities on science and
technology will be very clear but, especially after three decades or
more of these curricula in technological areas, it would seem that STS
could also be a bit more self-reflective in their assessments on why
apparently so little has changed [282]: pp. 90-100.
68: [5] .
69: [282], pp. 105-106.
70: [275] .
71: [67], pp. 49-75. Dutch.
Notes for Chapter 11
1: [10], pg. 48.
2: [62], pp. 59-70. Also [16], pg. 57 and [55], pp. 31-32 and 69-73.
3: [101], pp.13-22. Hawkins gives an interesting overview of his
personal struggles with the strong AI paradigms in ‘theories of mind’.
Pinkers ”How the Mind Works” is (evidently) a positivist interpretation
of the ”New Synthesis” of the mind as a computational device, com-
bined with evolutionary paradigms [211], but the positivist attitude has
been severely criticised by Jerry Fodor, one of the pioneers in this area
[74], for a counter-critique, also [212]. It should be noted that ‘compu-
tation’ of the mind vary from loose analogies, to more or less strict ones.
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4: [37] . Although Cilliers does not specifically address the theme of
intelligence, human language and intelligence are never far apart. Jerry
Fodor discusses the weaknesses of (current) connectionist models in
[74], pp. 46-53, especially related to the issue of abduction, a form of
logical inference that aims to create an hypothesis based on a number of
facts, which are presumed to have some sort of relationship. Hawkins
discusses the shortcomings of the classical models of neural models, es-
pecially in the absence of massive parallel feedback loops, as discussed
on the topic of reentry [101], pp. 24-29. Hawkins sees more promise
in a special kind of connectionist architectures called auto-associative
memories that are based on models of how the neo-cortex is organised
[101], pp. 106-176.
A detailed comparison, with a bias towards a hybrid approaches, is
given by Merlin Donald, [62], pp. 149-164. One of his most interesting
claims, which aligns with the approach taken here, is that the ability of
the brain as supreme symbolic processor, might have been the result of
cultural feedback. The process of patterns made crisp by re-entry, and
subsequent reinforcement, through (amongst others) language aligns
well with this analysis.
5: [101], pp.32-33. Rational Agents can be seen as taking a strong
phenomenological stance. According to one definition, an agent is
considered ‘rational’ if it ‘chooses to perform actions that are in its own
best interests, given the beliefs it has about the world’ [284]. In such a
definition, it becomes clear that the environment of that agent shapes
these decisions, and the external observer has to assess the rationality
of the observed behaviour.
6: [46] .
7: [74] .
8: [125] .
9: [146], p.12.
10: [52] . Although trans-humanist Audrey De Grey does not address
intelligence as such, his quest to end the ‘disease’ of aging follows
very similar patterns of thought with respect to Ray Kurzweil. His
recommendations are more strongly based on pharmaceutics.
11: [146], p.9.
12: [174], pp. 111-112. McKibben is a strong critic of the transhuman-
ist agendas
13: [146], p.9.
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14: [146], p.4. for a critique, also see [121], pg. 21.
15: [97] . Donna Haraway has been an influential thinker who cele-
brates the ‘cyborg’ as overcoming traditional differences in gender. In
a way, she is enthusiastic about the androgynous ‘zone of ambiguity’
between male and female, which a cyborg existence seems to head to.
16: [232] .
17: [153] .
18: [237] .
19: [174], pg. 10.
20: [16], pp. 56-57.
21: [238] . See [264]
22: [146], p.3.
23: [146], p.10.
24: [146], p.18.
25: [146], p.17.
26: [146], p.8.
27: [146], p.9.
28: [145] . See for some criticisms on the Singularity, [122] and [147]
29: [129] . Also, [64]
30: [129] . Source US Census Bureau (2008).
31: [36], p.477. There are various estimates, depending on the variables
that are taken into account. Also pp. 344-345.
32: [90] . See also chapter 3.
33: [101], pg. 67.
34: [284], p.1. Also [230], pg. 1:
A system is rational if it does ‘the right thing’, given what it knows.
In AI research, intelligence and rationality are often almost synony-
mous.
35: [146], p.21. Also see [174], pg. 112.
471
36: [146], p.300.
37: [174], pg. 41.
38: [87], pg. 269. Currently there is a development that allows a greater
variability between for instance areas that are densly populated and
areas where a flooding does relatively little harm [132].
39: [131] . Naomi Kleins ‘Shock Doctrine’ was already mentioned as
a more recent pamphlet against ideological determinism in economic
theory [131].
40: [251], pp. 131-132. In the words of Smith and Jenks, following
Gray:
The effects of Stalinism, Maoism, Nazism, Imperialism, to say nothing of the
costs of capitalism, ought to underscore that social theory put in action is a
dangerous business — at least as dangerous as arms trade. Some of the key
writers of Modernism and post-modernism have disastrously failed to take
that onto account.
41: [67], pp. 117-123. Dutch.
Notes for Chapter 12
1: [37], pg.3. Note that I am making a slight distinction from Cilliers’
difference between complicatedness and complexity. A complicated
system is a system that can be fully, or sufficiently known within a
certain context. A jumbo jet, as system, therefore is complex for a
layman, and complicated for an avionics specialist. At the same time,
the jumbo jet is complex for that specialist, as node in a global social
or natural network.
2: [121], pp.9.
3: [267], pp.14-17. Also ([239], pg. 12). Both are in the Dutch
Language.
4: [251], pp. 52-54.
5: [251], pg 63. John Smith and Chris Jenks’ (social) attractors seem to
spring from different sources as those portrayed in PAC, most notably
because the former take a strong ontological focus, while PAC is very
much epistemologically oriented.
6: [121], pg.1.
7: [121], pp.4-5.
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8: [121], j. pg. 9
9: [121], pg. 9.
10: [121], pg.23.
11: [237] .
12: [121], pg.28. This call does bring an interesting difference in
human action to attention, that we can be easily conditioned to future
opportunities, much more than future peril.
13: [37], pg. 83.
14: [10], pg.125.
15: [121], pg. 1. See also Johnson & powers in [282], pp. 143-145).
16: [282], pp.124-126. Jonas comes to similar conclusions in one of
his later contributions to an ethics of technology.
17: [67], pg. 35-47. Dutch edition.
18: [55], pg. 2, pp. 6-7.
19: [92], pg. 35-44.
20: [262] .
21: [161], pp. 37-41. Also [33], pp. 43-60, Dutch edition
22: [29] .
23: [189], pp. 33-144.
24: [191] .
25: [221], forthcoming. In print.
26: [241] .
27: [262], pg. 10.
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28: [251], pg. 143. John Smith and Chris Jenks put this a bit more elo-
quently:
Like Nietschze, the death of a fictional God has profoundly strange conse-
quences, none of them necessary; all of them drawing on an ancient and op-
pressive past.
Likewise, a bit later on:
Post-modernism’s lament, if not for God, is for a Laplacian substitute. So, if
we still belong to God so far as our epistemology is derived from His death.
Complexity theory, of which Darwin is one exemplar, offers a completely
different account of the origins of organisation. It is truly strange that we still
have to point this out to ourselves. If Nietzsche and Foucault accept that God
is dead, complexity insists that philosophy is immeasurably different if He
never was alive. (pg. 150)
29: [189], pp. 33-144.
30: [172], pp. 58-61.
31: [55], pg. 5.
32: [172], pp. 22-23.
33: [251], pg. 154-155. In the words of Smith and Jenks:
One of the distinctive phenomena of human embodied cognition is the telling
of stories.[. . . ] The central feature of all of these is the risk of life, usually
human life, in the pursuit of obsessions [. . . ] Such stories conventionally per-
mit the ‘distanced’ experience of gross forms of violent transgression, real or
imagined.
Then they introduce Nazism as a stark reminder of the distinction
between the ‘genre of transgressive representations’ and the ‘class of
physical perpetration’, with which they mean that transgression, when
taken away from the safe confines of books and academic discourse,
and put in a reality, contextualises in a radical different way, and this
difference is not always as clear-cut as one may think.
34: [172] . Also see [164][14]
35: [40], forthcoming.
36: [40], forthcoming.
37: [40], forthcoming.
38: [15] .
39: [143] . Dutch. Also [254], Dutch.
474
Notes for Epliogue
1: [128], pg. 16.
2: [239], pg. 15. In a similar vein, Martien Schreurs extends this to
intellectuals in general:
But in the manner in which intellectuals manage to get attention for contro-
versial issues with a general societal impact, they take risks and play games,
which are more dangerous than [. . . ] suggests. Often it is very difficult to as-
certain whether intellectuals play the role of political correct angels or that of
the political incorrect devil or demon.
(translated from Dutch by author)
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